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CHA::.PTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is basically a study of the nature 
of the state-local constitutional relationship and division of 
powers in the various New England states, past, present and 
prospective. 
The Problem and Thesis 
The problem concerned is the definition of the consti-
tutional and legal status of the New England municipality in 
general, and the New England town in particular. The principal 
vehicle used to explore this relationship will be the New Eng-
land political or social myth of local independence, however 
conceived and in whatever guise. This myth will be traced from 
its historical origins in the independent actions of the colo-
nia.! New England towns, through the facts and theories accompa-
nying the centralization of the nineteenth century, to present 
day home rule and allied movements and theories in the New 
England states. 
Although the myth and the concepts underlying it will 
be explored in detail, the primary purpose will be to examine 
the varying theories, rules of interpretation, and political and 
jurisprude,ntial theories which continued assertion of the myth 
1 
engendered., These resultants will then be shown to have ere-
ated a judicial pattern and political climate the limits of 
which will determine the need for home rule, and the clmnces 
for success of varying types of constitutional or statutory 
home rule provisions, in the New England states. 
My thesis is that the myth of local independence, how-
ever conceived and in whatever guise, remains a fact of present 
day practical significance in New England, constantly shaping 
the nature of municipal powers and of the status of the munici-
pality in relation to the state; further, it is that the use of 
the myth, ·in an attempt to secure local independence of action 
in local affairs, was an important and relevant antecedent to the 
present da'y home rule movement, and that the concepts underlying 
and purposes motivating each are similar;- finally, that the home 
rule movement to succeed in any of these states must mold its 
"grass roots 11 campaign, its home rule enabling statutes, and 
I 
its constitutional amendments so as effectively to:: {1) "capture 
I 
the decenyies" by showing the home rule movement as a natural 
outgrowth of the traditional New England myth that the New Eng-
land municipality is somehow different from local units else-
where, and thus is deserving of somewhat enhanced status vis a 
vis the state, and {2) make use of the knowledge and warnings 
contained in the web of statutes, court decisions, and theories 
engendered by past attempts to assert claims to local indepen-
dence, to make certain that home rule provisions will be so 
drafted that judges will not be able to nullify or restrict their 
2 
effectiveness by applying the same legalistic rules and stand-
ards which the New England courts developed and applied in 
striking down the earlier attempts to secure local independence 
of action in local affairs. 
Importance of the Study 
3 
Home rule is a matter of considerable interest in the 
southern New England states today. Rhode Island and Connecticut 
already have some measure of home rule, and the subject has been 
under constant consideration in Massachusetts. At the same time, 
in all of these states, metropolitan problems have become more 
acute. Administrative developments at the state level have 
meant that the New England municipality has been subjected to 
closer and closer supervision by the state. The representative 
town meeting and the town and city manager plans have been 
changing the nature of the local governmental structure. The 
functions, scope, and number of governmental units, local, state 
and national have continued to increase. Special purpose dis-
tricts and authorities have multiplied. All of these develop-
ments have meant that political scientists, practical politicians 
and "good government" advocates have been taking a sober second 
look at local government. The position which the municipality 
does and should occupy in the metropolis of the second half of 
the twentieth century has been increasingly recognized as of 
great practical importance. 
Home rule and greater general freedom from legislative 
action in reference to local affairs have been urged constantly, 
as this dis 'sertation will show, as a step toward ma.king local 
government a more meaningful and responsible partner in govern-
mental affairs. Yet such concepts as home rule cannot be con-
s idered in a vacuum. As Professor John F. Sly pointed out in 
1930, 
No method of government can be isolated and judged ir-
respective of local history and tradition or without 
regard to the environment in which it is to be applied, 
and it is very probable that the success of a new pro-
posal will depend more upon the Character of the local 
support that it receives than upon the theoretical ex-
cellence of the plan itself.l 
Pointing out that in l~ssachusetts as of that date there was 
only one town with a town manager, despite the rather widespread 
use of the manager plan in other parts of the country, he stated 
that to address a Massachusetts Rotary Club on the merits of a 
town manager "will require arguments quite different from those 
tba t would impress a similar group in a younger country. n2 
Similarly, the home rule movement of today must take 
account of the patterns and traditions established in New Eng-
land in centuries past. If it is to prosper, home rule must 
be planted carefully in such form that the seedling will with-
stand the rigors of the environment. This dissertation attempts 
to trace and delineate this environment so that the government 
reformer and political theorist can shape his actions and the-
ories accordingly. 
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lJohn F. Sly, Town Government in Massachusetts, 1620-1930, 
Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1930, p. 232. 
2Ibid., p. 235. 
Relevant Studies in the Field 
Ttiroughout this dissertation, and particularly in 
Chapter II, the writings of a great number of political scien-
tists, historians, jurists, and government reformers are ana-
lysed as they pertain to various portions of the thesis. Basic-
ally, the field encompassed within this dissertation remains 
virtually unexplored, particularly insofar as it relates to the 
individual New England states. However, the following types 
of earlier research are relevant to certain points in the 
dissertation:; 
(1) Historical studies of the evolution and nature 
of the early New England town. The early works of such writers 
as Alexis de Tocqueville generated interest in the New England 
town, resulting toward the end of the last century in intensive 
study of town origins. Particularly important were the writings 
of the historians and early political scientists comprising the 
"New Historical School" which centered at Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, and the rebutting theories and proofs brought forward at 
various historical meetings, in the periodicals of the day, and 
in doctoral dissertations. These are all rather fully discus sed 
in the dissertation. However, they are only relevant to this 
dissertation in the limited extent to which they revealed some-
thing of the evolution of the nature of the town-state division 
of powers. 
(2) Political science texts on public law and the muni-
5 
cipality. These have proved of definite relevance, particularly 
the works of Frank J. Goodnow. However, the New England situation 
is given no attention in the detail or scope attempted in this 
dissertation. 
(3) Legal treatises on the municipality and on home 
~· Such monumental works as those by Eugene McQuilli n, 
Howard L. McBain, Thomas M. Cooley, and John F. Dillon have 
examined the nature of the state-local relationship and the 
extent of the powers of the municipality. However, the New 
England situation is given no special extended treatment, and, 
as is shown in Chapter II, certain of these works show the 
limitations and prejudices of their compilers. The casebook 
by Dean Jefferson B. Fordham has been relevant in some respects, 
as have his other writings. 
(4) Town Government in Massachusetts by John F. Sly. 
This particular book is an extremely valuable one as far as 
one of the six New England states covered by the dissertation 
is concerned. However, the problems with 1>1hich Professor Sly 
was concerned in 1930 were such that he found no need to trace 
the legal and constitutional development of local rights even 
in that stat·e. Neither was he concerned with home rule as 
such. Nevertheless, the book appears to be the nearest thing 
to a New England-oriented study somewhat similar in approach 
to that used by this author. 
(5) Recent Writings on Home Rule. Three political 
scientists have explored to some extent the effect of the judi-
6 
cial pattern in shaping and limiting home rule. Professor Harvey 
\valker has so written largely in terms of the Ohio situation. 
Professor Arthur B. Winter has related his discussion almost ex-
clusively to Nebraska. Rodney L. Mott has pointed briefly to 
the same influence, although he does not appear to have done 
an intensive analysis of any state. To this author's knowledge, 
none of these authors has applied his analysis to the New Eng-
land states or to any other state in the systematic and exten-
sive manner attempted in this dissertation. 
Reference Sources 
The author bas drawn upon the traditional political 
science sourbe ITR terials, relevant legal decisions in each of 
7 
the six New England states and to a lesser extent in other states, 
law treatises and casebooks, treatises on public and constitu-
tional law and municipal corporations and home rule, standard 
legal reference works, periodical articles in the social sciences, 
writings in legal journals, present day and colonial statutes and 
constitutions, model home rule provisions, colonial records, town 
histories, monographs on local government, literature prepared 
by New England home rule groups, encyclopaedias, and his own 
personal impressions and observations as a New Englander. 
The student usually finds himself faced with the problem 
of a limited amount of raw material, which has already been worked 
and reworked into more or less valid patterns and conclusions 
closely bearing upon the chosen dissertation. Here the problem 
was quite the opposite. The amount of source material available 
concerning current New England government, and past and present 
New England politics, government and constitutions is immense. 
Virtually every town has its own published or manuscript poli-
tical documents, records and histories. The patterns of consti-
tutional law and court decisions in the New England states are 
almost as old as those of any system of law in countries of 
unbroken national existence. The author bas been forced to se-
lect from among these large numbers of potentially-relevant 
materials those which were most directly in point or those which 
were a good summary or sample of materials on a particular rele-
vant subject or trend. 
Also, there are innumerable textbooks, periodical arti-
cals, mono graphs, and the like on state and local government, 
nunicipal corporations, tow.n and city government, intergovern-
mental relations, home rule, and the other subjects involved in 
this dissertation. The author will make no attempt to go into 
the subject matter already covered so ably by the many writers 
in these fie,lds, except insofar as these do or might relate 
specifically to the New England local-state relation. Likewise, 
the intricacies of town-state history in the colonies and states 
will be traced only to the extent necessary for development of 
the thesis. 
8 
Methodology 
I 
Th~ author has consciously modeled his presentation 
upon the classical political science writings of Professors 
Frank J. Goodnow and John A. Fairlie. In particular, he has 
followed the methodology ~ployed in Goodnow's Municipal Home 
Rule, deeming the technique there used to represent the best 
' 
methodology for the materials herein presented. 
Accordingly, the steps employed herein are: (1) formu-
lation of the theoretical framework, definition of the problem, 
and initial analysis in broad terms, (2) intensive analysis of 
relevant documentary and critical materials, and (3) formulation 
of conclusions therefrom, including the discernment of trends, 
past and prospective. 
Method of Presentation 
The dissertation contains seven chapters in addition 
to this one. In Chapter II, the author investigates basic con-
cepts and relevant theories in the study of home rule and its 
antecedents in New England, defining them and giving examples 
of their effects in actual operation. After considering certain 
characteristics of the New England county, town, legislature, and 
judiciary, the dissertation turns to an analysis of the concepts 
involved in home rule, and to various factors which give indica-
tion of the t~pe of climate in which home rule in New England will 
be nurtured or nipped in the bud. Next, the political and juris-
9 
10 
prudential ~heorists are investigated, and the impact of Austin-
ian concepts of sovereignty and of past and prospective court 
decisions upon possible home rule provisions weighed. The effect 
of the social myth of local independence as a factor instrumental 
in inducing strong centralizing tendencies in tl~e New England 
states is considered. Relevant portions of the model home rule 
plans drawn up by the American Municipal Association and the 
National Municipal League are next investigated, along with 
the experience of various non-New England states with home rule 
provisions of varying types. The metropolitan problem is dis-
cussed in terms of its relation to the problems of home rule and 
of enhanced status and power for the municipality. Using the 
writings of commentators on home rule and drafters of the model 
provisions, plus the legal, historical and constitutional patterns 
described in the dissertation, a prediction is rna. de as to the 
extent of success Which the various plans will meet in the New 
England states. The author suggests ways in which home rule 
statutes and constitutional amendments might be drafted to over-
come the tendency on the part of judges to apply limiting rules 
of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
Chapters III and IV tur.n to the colonial and post-colonial 
municipalities. The statutes, practices, and writings in which 
are buried the origins of the social myth that the New England 
town possessed attributes of sovereignty, or some vestige of 
rights a gainst the state, are set forth and analysed. 
11 
Chapters V and VI trace the progress or this myth 
throughout the period or state and national centralization, from 
1812 to the Spanish American war. Primarily through utilizati on 
of court decisions or the time and relevant periodical literature, 
they sho~-r how the New England central state goverrunent consoli-
dated its position or dominance over the municipality by apply-
ing many or the Austinian concepts of sovereignty which had 
been earlier examined in Chapter II. The pattern is traced 
state by state. 
Chapter VII concerns the New England reaction in the 
twentieth century when reformers attempted to use new measures 
and new theories to curtail l egislative interference with the 
~~ni cipality. This rerorm movement is shown to progress from the 
stJ:o:Ictly;.• l·ega~ one of urging before the court tba t towns and 
cities have inherent, vested, prescriptive, corporate, or 
other ri ghts, to the modern attemp ts to secure home rule for the 
~nicipality and to do awa y with special legislation relating 
to matters strictly local. 
Chapter VIII summarizes selected points made in the 
earlier chapters. Returning to the discussion in Chapter II, 
some additional suggestions are made as to how home rule and 
allied ref orms affecting the state-local division of powers can 
best be achieved in New England. 
CHAPTER II 
BASIC CONCEPTS AND RELEVANT THEORIES IN STUDY OF 
HOME RULE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS IN NEW ENGLAND 
The New England town has been variously praised and 
condemned in reams of scholarly literature. Yet, the town 
has retained a romance and fascination for the scholar as 
well as for the person only casually interested in history. 
The town has been variously traced back to the German mark, 
to the true Teutonic practices of Early England, to the 
church meeting, and the parish in England, to Appenzell, a 
Swiss canton, and for all the author knows, to the caves of 
Spain. 1 
lsee, e.g., Teutonic theory, Alexander Johnston, 
Stud of a Commonwealth-Democrac , 2d ed., Boston, N.Y., 
and Cambridge Mass. , Houghton Mifflin and Co. and River-
side Press, 1903, p. 61; English parish theory, John Fiske, 
Civil Government in the United States, cited in Edward 
Channing~ "Remarks on the Genesis of the Massachusetts 
Town", Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 1892, 
2d series, vol. 7, pp. 242-263; Channing himself believes 
the town had its origins in the English town and parish, as 
modified by American experience; indigenous theory, Joel 
Parker, "The Origin, Organization and Influence of the Towns 
of New England", Massachusetts Historical Society Proceed-
ings, 1866, vol. 9, pp. 19-20; indigenous to the colonial-
type agricultural society, Wellen Chamberlain, "Remarks on 
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the Genesis of the Massachusetts Town", Massachusetts Histori-
cal Society Proceedings, 1892, 2d series, pp. 214-242, 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to trace 
the origins of the town, since other scholars far more qua-
lified have already done much research on the point. Again, 
the modern state-local administrative complex, with its 
grants-in-aid, minimum standards, and regulations, is not 
within the scope of this dissertation,2 nor is the English 
legal background except insofar as it bears directly upon 
the sub ject of this study. The local unit here considered 
is the town, and the city insofar as the city in New England 
l(continued) especially 239-241; Germanic, H.B. 
Adams, "The Germanic Origin o:f New England Towns", Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Science, 
4th series, No. 12, Baltimore, The University , 1886; Swiss , 
Irving B. Richman, Appenzell, cited in the same author's 
Rhode Island, Its Making and Its Meaning, 2 vol., New York, 
Knickerbocker Press, London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1902; 
for discussion of other theories, see George E. Howard, 
Local Constitutional History of the United States, vol. I, 
De velopment of the Township, Hundred, and Shire, Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University, 1889, and Peleg E. Aldrich, 
Ori in of New En land Towns Their Powers and Duties, Wor-
cester Mass. , American Antiquarian Society, 1884. For 
an extensive analysis and critique of the numerous theories 
of town origins, see John F. Sly, Town Government in Massa-
chusetts (1620-1930), Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1930, pp. 52-74, 223-25. 
2These have also been the subject of much research 
by scholars. For example, for detailed studies of the ad-
ministrative structure of one New England state, see Robert 
H. Whitten, Public Administration in Massachusetts; the Re-
lation of Central to Local Authority, New York, Columbia 
Univ. Press, 1898, for the earlier pattern; Dale Pontius, 
State Supervision of Local Government, Its Development in 
Massachusetts, Washington D.C., American Council on Public 
Affairs, 1942, for the development to comparatively modern 
times. See also George c.s. Benson, The Administration of 
the Civil Service in Massachusetts, Cambridge (Mass.), 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1935, and Sly, op. cit. 
is of the' same order as the town, and everywhere subject to 
the same rules, as a municipal corporation. Town internal 
organization, town officers, the town meeting, and the de-
tails of town history will be considered only as they bear 
upon the subject matter of this dissertation. 
The New England County 
It is essential for a proper appreciation of the 
New England state-local pattern that it be appreciated that 
the town is the key element of local government in these 
states. Counties are of relatively little importance, 
serving primarily as convenient judicial districts and 
occasionally for such purposes as headquarters for public 
works equipment, providing of a geographical unit large 
enough for a jail for petty offenses, and the like.3 
Thus in Massachusetts, the county has few important 
functions, having besides the usual court, jail, and record-
keeping duties, certain powers and duties in relation to 
14 
highways, reservoirs and dams, taxing and tax appeals and a 
few other minor matters. In Nantucket County the town 
selectmen serve as county commissioners, and in Suffolk Coun-
ty, the mayor and council of Boston, the Chelsea municipal 
3Robert M. Goodrich, "Rhode Island--A City-State?", 
1936, National Municipal Review 25:645, at 646. 
council, the city council of Revere, and the selectmen of 
Winthrop, exercise the powers of county commissioners in 
their respective municipalities. Three county commissioners 
are elected in each of the remaining counties for four year 
terms. Statutory salaries range from $1500 to $6000 annual-
ly.4 
15 
The Connecticut county is governed by the delegation 
from the county to the state legislature . There are also 
three commissioners in each county, chosen by the legisla-
ture, who have largely administrative duties. Powers and 
duties are limited, being, besides those usual functions 
named above, supervision of an agricultural agent, adminis-
tering aid to certain hospitals and charitable institutions, 
regulating of weights and measures, repaying of forest fire 
fighting expenditures caused by emergency, and also minor 
powers relating to highways.5 
In Rhode Island, the county has no governing body 
or functions as such, though it does serve as a judicial 
district and for related purposes.6 
In New Hampshire, each county is administered by 
three commissioners, elected by the inhabitants of the towns 
4Massachusetts Annotated Laws, 1952, Title VI, 
chapters 34 et seq. 
5connecticut General Statutes, 1958, Title 6, 
chapter 77. 
6Rhode Island General Laws, 1956, Title 42, chapter 3. 
qualified to vote for state senators, for two year terms. 
However, the real county governing body is the county con-
vention, made up of one person from each town elected as 
are the representatives to the general assembly. Although 
the statutes are not clear it appears that these persons 
are actually the county delegation to the legislature, as 
in Connecticut. County powers in addition to the usual 
jail, judicial, and record ones, include supervision of an 
16 
agricultural agent, and certain powers relating to recreation, 
paupers, i~nstitutions, bastardy, forest planning, highways, 
and taxati,on. 7 
In Vermont, the assistant judges of the county 
court (judicial) constitute the county governing body, which 
has only certain jail, judicial, and record functions. 8 
The Maine county is much like a midwestern one, 
being governed by three commissioners, elected at large with-
in the county, with salaries varying from county to county, 
from $600 to $2250. Powers are more extensive than in the 
other New England states, including certain ones relating to 
highways, ~dvertising, agricultural extension work, airports, 
7New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, 1955, 
chapters 23, 24, 28, 168, 187. See also Opinion of the 
Justices, 1955, 114 A. 2d 879 (N.H.). 
Bvermont Statutes, Revision of 1947, Title 3, 
chapters 6, 162. 
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alcoholic beverages , bridges, civil defense, auto junk yards, 
trust companies, coastal surveys, humane and animal regula-
tion, mining claims, motor vehicle taxes, deorganization of 
towns, drains and ditches, ferries, mills and mill dams, 
moving picture~, poles, wires, poor debtors, institutions, 
railroads, sale of timber from public lands, paupers, tramps, 
and taxation, besides the usual jail, judicial, and record 
functions. 9 
Hence, only in Maine is the county of real signi-
ficance. New Hampshire and Massachusetts make more use of 
the county than does Connecticut, where it is largely a 
state administrative district. Rhode Island and Vermont 
make almost no use of the county as such. 
Throughout New England the town has remained the 
primary unit of local government, despite the presence in 
Maine and Vermont of traces of what might be described as 
"non-New England influences." Sir Ferdinando Gorges who 
held a pa,tent to the Province or County of Maine se cured a 
royal charter for the province in 1636. The royal charter 
has been described as "modelled after that of Maryland" and 
as investing Gorges with "the feudal tenure of a county 
palatine and vice-regal powers of government. 1110 The result-
9Maine Revised Statutes, 1954, chapter 89. 
lO"IVIaine", Encyclopaedia Britannica, London and New 
York, Encyclopaedia Britannica Co., Ltd., 13th edition, 1926, 
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ing gove~nmental pattern, in which the county w~s the primary 
local unit and town government was fragmentary, will be 
traced in more detail in Chapter III, below. In Vermont the 
county al:so had an early importance, largely due to the 
early clo
1
se connection between Vermont and New York.ll How-
ever, des1pi te the fact that county functions of importance 
were earl~ assigned in Vermont, the county concept apparently 
had a rather loose hold. County lines were often changed, 
and towns assigned first to one county and then to another, 
as convenience dictated.12 Another element contributing to 
the possible differences between the northernmost New Eng-
land states and the southern three, was the French influence. 
Particularly in Maine, many of the settlers or their parents 
came from the province of Quebec.l3 The 11 Canuck11 influence 
1°(continued) vol. 17, p. 439. The charter con-
tained, apcording to one historian, more extensive privileges 
and powers than any ever granted by the crown to any other 
individuall. William D. Williamson, The History of the State 
of Maine, 1602-1820, Hallowell (Me '.), Glazier, Masters and 
Smith, 1839, vol. l, p. 275. 
llLafayette Wilbur, Early History of Vermont, Jeri-
cho (Vt.), Roscoe Printing House, 1899-1903, vol. 1, pp. 43-
53, traces the early local government established in imita-
tion of the New York system. 
12rbid., vol. 1, passim. 
13Thus, in 1900, of a total state population of 
694,446, foreign born classified as French Canadians numbered 
30,908, and an additional 48,502 Maine-born inhabitants had 
a French Qanadian mother or father. French-speaking inhab-
itants numbered considerably more than 50,000. "Maine", 
Encyclopaedia, op. cit., p. 436. 
in polittcs, the pat tern of poor French-Canadian workers 
brought in to break strikes in the mill-towns, and the al-
most legendary figure of the Maine · guide or trapper of 
French descent are so well known that little further comment 
is needed. With such a considerable segment of the popul a-
tion of Maine cohesive in foreign language, religion, and 
behavior pattern, with large areas of the state even today 
remaining unorganized into towns, and with the pattern of 
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the colonial era, one might predict that Maine would exhibit 
tendencies rather unlike those of the other New England 
states. Yet, even in Maine, the town remains t he mechanism 
for performance of most local governmental functions.l4 
The New England Town: Description and Importance 
The New England town is analogous to the midwestern 
township , except that in most of New England, it came into 
be ing because of natural advantages of a particular locality. 
It usually has an irregular and fortuitous shape, and varies 
greatly in size from town to town and area to area. In Maine 
and in parts of Vermont, the township was set up arbitrarily 
and artificially by the setting out of lines on a map,l5 
14Goodrich, op. cit., passim, and Max R. White, 
"Town and City Consolidation in Connecticut", 1942, American 
Political Science Review, 36:492, passim. 
15wilbur, op. cit., val. l, pp. 43-53. 
but this pattern is very unusual, and occurs only in the 
parts of those states which are even today isolated from 
civilization and thinly populated. 
Every part of New Englan~except for certain areas 
in Maine, is contained within a town, or its successor, a 
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city. Cities, except for the very largest, tend in this area 
to be regarded by courts and legislatures as essentially 
t~wns which have been given somewhat extended powers. A 
network of special-purpose districts, villages, village 
districts, boroughs, and the like does exist, but these are 
part of or disturb the pattern very little.l6 In Connecti-
cut , for example, every city of the state remains either 
part of a town, or is itself simultaneously bot h a city and 
town. There is no part of the state which is not included 
within a town.l7 
The impact of this system upon the Americ an Union , 
particularly those parts of the American Union extending 
west to the Rocky Mountains and south t o the ol d line of t he 
Missouri Compromi se and to the Mason- Dixon line nearer t he 
16Frank G. Bate s , "Village Government i n New Eng-
land", 1912, American Political Science Review 6:367 ; Lashley 
G. Harvey, "The Village District in New Hampshire ", 1946, 
American Policital Science Review 40:962, and, same author , 
11 First B'reak in New Hampshire", 1946, National Municipal 
Review 35:521; Goodrich, op. cit.; White, op. cit. 
17White, op. cit., passim. 
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east coast, has been profound. The township system was extended 
to the Northwest Territory by the Northwest Ordinance18 of 
1787, and to large parts of' the Louisiana. Purchase. New 
18 Thomas Jefferson has been commonly regarded as having 
been largely responsible f'or establishing the townShip feature 
of' the Ord:i:nance of 1787. See, e.g., Charles Moore, The North-
west Under Three Flags, 1635·1796, New York and London, Harper 
Bros., 1900. As a delegate in Congress, Jef'ferson came forth 
with a plan for the government of' a portion of the territory in 
1783, and the Ordinance of April 23, 1784, embodied most of that 
plan. Ibid., pp. 322-25. "As supplementary to the ordinance (of 
1784), Congress, also, at the instance of' Jef'ferson, provided 
f'or a system of government surveys, by which the lands were to 
be divided into townships •••• '' Ibid., pp. 325-26, 326n. The North-
west Ordinance of 1787 retained the township feature, and has 
been described a.s a tree grown f'rom a tender plant planted by 
Jefferson. Ibid., p. 329. Jef'ferson's admiration of the New 
England f'orm-or-local government was to cause him to write in 
1816: "How powerfully did we f'eel the energy of this (town) 
organization in the case of embargo! I f'elt the foundation of 
government shaken under my f'eet by the New England townships ••• 
though the whole of the other States were known to be in favor 
of the measure, yet the organization of this little selfish 
minority enabled it to overrule the Union. What could the un-
wieldy counties of the Middle, the South, and the West do? Call 
a county meeting; and the drunken loungers at and about the 
courthouses would have collected •••• As Cato, then, concluded 
every speech with the words, Delenda. est Carthage, so do I every 
opinion with the injunction, 'Divide the counties into wards' .n. 
Earlier, in the same letter he stated: n ••• the way to have good 
and saf'e government, is not to trust it all to one, but to di-
vide it among the many, distributing to every one exactly the 
functions he is competent to. Let the national government be 
entrusted with the defence of' the nation and its foreign and 
f'ederal relations; the State governments with the civil rights, 
laws, police, and administration of vfuat concerns the State gen-
erally; the counties with the local concerns of the counties, 
and each ward direct the interest within itself. It is by di-
viding and subdividing these republics from the great national 
one down through all its subordinations, until it ends in the 
administration of' every man's f'arm by himself; by placing under 
every one what his own eye may superintend, that all will be done 
for the best." Letter from Jefferson to Joseph c. Cabell, Feb-
ruary 2, 1816, collected in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
(Andrew A. Lipscomb, editor), Washington, D.C., Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial Association, 1903, vol. 14 .. pp. 422, 421. This letter is 
also quoted and commented on in Henry L. Nelson, "Town and Village 
Government", 1891, Harper's Magazine, 83:111. 
Englander's, settling the western territories, brought with 
them that system of local government which seemed logical 
to them ahd consonant with the principles of direct demo-
' 
cracy in which they had been reared.l9 
Various theories have been put forth to account for 
the success of the New England town. There is nothing more 
logical to assume than that the persons of the towns, being 
largely of the same religious, social, economic, national 
and racial groups, would naturally tend to take advantage 
of the time after the virtually compulsory Sunday church 
services t 'o talk over their affairs of every kind. It was 
but a step from there to the setting of dates for such meet-
ings, and the institutionalizing of the whole process, with 
an executive committee to take care of things between meet-
ings. In outline, this remains the pattern of New England 
town government even today. That is, there is the meeting, 
usual l y annual, but with special meetings called from time 
19Lois Kimball Matthews, The Expansion of New Eng-
land: The Spread of New England Settlement and Institutions 
to the Missi ssippi River 1620-1865, Boston and New York, 
Houghton Miiff'lin and Co., 1909. Professor Matthews traces 
in detail the influence of New Englanders who settled other 
parts of the country in bringing the town-meeting or township 
form of government to Michigan, p. 10, New York, pp. 47-48, 
164-65, 234-35, Ohip pp. 190-91, New Jersey p. 54, Pennsyl-
vania pp . 121-25, and Wisconsin pp. 238-39. See also Joseph 
Schafer, Four Wisconsin Counties; Prairie and Forest, Madison 
(Wis.), State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1927, pp. 80, 
121, 198. 
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to time. Certain persons are selected by the meeting to act 
as an executive committee, to oversee the town property and 
affairs. These selected men act as agents of the meeting, 
governing the town between meetings within the limits per-
mitted by the meetings or by statute. For the person favor-
ing economic determinism, there is the fact that the town 
served as a means of distributing land to the settlers, and 
of sharing rights to the grass of' the common lands. "The 
most common and positive desire of' the New Englanders was 
not to worship in a particular way, nor to establish a 
p articular f'orm of' government, but to live.n20 
Town Basis of Representation in Legislature 
A precaution must be added here. At places in this 
dissertation, it will appear as though the state legislature 
has acted with utter disregard for the rights of towns and 
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other local units. The basis of representation in the legis-
lature should be kept in mind, however. With the exception 
of Maine and Massachusetts, the basis of' legislative repre-
sentation is such that every municipality has its own delegate 
20william B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of 
New England, 1620-1789, Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin 
and Co., 1891, vol. 1, p. 51. See also Spaulding v. City of' 
Lowell, 1839, 40 Mass. 71, in which the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, at pp. 77-78, says: "Townships were original-
ly local divisions of the territory, made with a view to 
settlement and disposition of the property in the soil." 
in at legst one of the legislative houses. In Rhode Island , 
the town lserves as the basis of representation not in one, 
but in bot h houses of the legislature. 
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Amendment XXI, added to the Massachusetts consti-
tution in 1857, shifted the basis of representation i n the 
lower house to districts rather than towns. Under the cur-
rent Amendment LXXI, it is often the case that several or 
even many towns, form one legislative district. It is beyond 
the scope 10f this dissertation to inquire into the reasons 
for the change represented by the adoption of Amendment XXI, 
but it is of interest that the change occurred well after 
t he initial Massachusetts constitutional pattern relegating 
the town to a position of nearly-absolute subordination to 
the legislature had been determined by legislative and 
judicial activity. One might reflect upon the fact that the 
pattern of legislative representation in Massachusetts may 
be a valuable index to the early and almost complete sub-
jection of the local governments of that state--an effect and 
not a cause.. In Massachusetts (and in Maine, which shares 
her consti t !utional and judicial pattern) the local govern-
mental unit is more closely subjected to central control 
than in the other New England States. Representation in 
the lower house of the Massachusetts General Court rests 
upon population considerations, and apportionment is made 
via the agency of the counties in establishing the legislative 
districts,. The senate according to Amendment LXXI is like-
wise base',d upon districts and population. 
Connecticut's lower house is based upon towns. 
Each town of 2500 or more sends one representative, and 
I 
each of 5000 or more population sends two, but towns may 
not lose representatives, even if they lose population. 
The senate is based upon population and districts. The 
I 
relevant constitutional provisions are in Article III, sec-
tions 3, 4, and 5. 
In Rhode Island, under Amendment XIII, section 1, 
of the state constitution, the lower house is based upon 
population, but each town and city is entitled to at least 
I 
one repres:entati ve . No municipality is entitled to more 
than one-f:ourth of the entire membership of the house. 
Amendment XIX specifies that each town and city shall have 
one senator, but that cities over 25,000 population shall 
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have an ad~itional senator for each additional 25,000 or 
major fraction thereof, but no one city is to have more than 
six senato~s. Town representation in the Rhode Island le-
gislature will be discussed in more detail below, in Chapter 
III. 
New Hampshire's lower house, under Part II, Arti-
cles 9 and 11, of the state constitution, consist s of from 
375 to 400 representatives, and has one representative from 
each town and city ward which contains the legislatively-
determined minimum number of inhabitants, and one additional 
represent,ative if it has double that population, with an 
additional representative for each additional such unit of 
population; towns with less than the minimum population are 
to have a representative according to their population ra-
tio, and are to have representation in at least one session 
every ten years. The state senate, under Part II, Article 
26, consi s ts of one senator from each of twenty-four dis-
tricts, d~vided according to amount of taxes paid in the 
districts e 
In Vermont, under Chapter II, section 13, of the 
constituti'pn, each incorporated town sends one represents.-
tive. Sen~tors are distributed among counties according to 
population ~ but each is entitled to at least one senator, 
according to Chapter II, section 18. 
Maine has constantly shifted its bases of legis-
\ . lative apportionment, finally eliminating the town as the 
basic unit of representation in the lower house in 1953, 
by Amendme~t LXXVII. Earlier provisions had made town 
population an important consideration. According to Article 
IV, Part I, section 3, as amended in 1953, representation 
in the lower house is based upon counties, districts and 
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population, with no city or town entitled to more than seven 
representatives. The senate, under Article IV, Part II, 
section 1, is based strictly upon population, on a county 
basis. Thus Maine, which shares with Massachusetts a con-
s t itutional and judicial pattern of closer central control 
of local units by the legislature than has been the case in 
the other New England states, like Massachusetts has aban-
doned the , town as the primary basis for legislative repre-
sentation. 
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The constitutional provisions outlined above operate 
I 
in practice to give the towns an even larger representation 
in the legislature than their population would warrant. I n -
equalitie s in representation have occurred when changes in 
population were not recognized by timely reapportionment. 
The limit ~tion set on the maximum number of senators or 
representatives which any one town or city could send to 
the legisl\ature has i:neant, particularly in Rhode Island, 
that large cities have been underrepresented in proportion 
to their population. The situation in Rhode Island has led 
to considerable dissatisfaction,as is discussed more fully 
in Chapter III. The character of the New England legisla-
tures is such that responsible authors have spoken of the 
varying Ne~ England legislatures at times as virtually con-
ventions, where towns gather to trade with each other for 
desired legislation. Thus, it is sometimes the case that one 
clique in a municipality, through its influence in the legis-
lature, causes the passage of legislation ultimately harmful 
to the mUnicipality.21 
Always to be reckoned with in New England is the 
strong idfluence of the major political parties. Party 
machinery is strong, and the division between urban Demo-
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crats and small-town and rural Republicans is found in every 
-New England legislature . This is tempered somewhat here and 
there by variant local patterns. For instance, in the Con-
necticut cities of New Haven and Bridgeport, the Democratic 
party is dominated by Irish elements and the Republican 
party by italian-Americans. The result is that both poli-
tical par~ies in these cities and in their metropolitan 
areas are urban in orientation. However, f requently the 
New Englan1d "ripper legislation" by which the legislature 
has placed, existing municipal functions under the control 
of a state board or agency has been directed toward the end 
of establishing a Republican board or agency to take control 
of existing municipal functions in a Democratic~controlled 
urban area. 
21
see e.g., Clarence Deming, "Town Rule in Con-
necticut", 1889, Political Science Quarterly 4:408-32; 
Lashley G. Harvey, 11 Local Government as a Basis for Demo-
cracy: Direct Democracy in the New England Towns " , tran~ 
script of ah address delivered before the Hague Congress 
of the International Political Science Association, 
September 8-12, 1952; Sly, op. cit., pp. 222-3; and 
discussion, Chapter III, below. 
Manner of Selection of Judges for 
New England Supreme Courts 
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Perhaps an analysis of the mode of s electi on of jus -
tices for the New England supr eme courts may border on ~ 
majeste , but it is a factor which may have some bearing upon deci-
sions such judges make while on the bench. The author does not 
suggest improper influence , and has dis covered no materials be -
yond purely speculative ones which have investigated this pos-
sibility. ,Since i t is a possible relevant factor , however , it 
bears inclusion here . 
In Massachusetts , under Chapter II , section I , para-
graph 9, of the state consti t ution, all judicial officers are 
nominated and appointed by the governor by and with t he advice 
and cons ent of his council . In Connecticut , under Arti cl e V, 
section 3 of the constitution, the supreme court judges are 
nomina ted by the governor and appointed by the legislature as 
prescribed by l aw . The Rhode Island supreme court judges , ac -
cording to Article X, section 4 of the constitution, are chosen 
by the state l egislature alone . Unlike the ster n and indepen-
dent judiciary of Connecticut and Massachus etts , which i s ap -
pointed t o continue in office during good behavior , i. e . , for 
life ~ the judges of Rhode Island hold off ice only duri ng t he 
pl easure of the legislature . A judge may have his place de-
clared vacant by a simple resolution of the legislature . One 
may speculate upon the fact that the town in Rhode Is l and is 
the basic unit of representation in both houses of the state 
l egislature . 
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Of the northern New England states , the New H~~shire 
constitution, Articles 46 and 73 , specifies that all judicial 
officers are to be nominated and appointed by the governor and 
council, and are to hold office for good behavior . Under Chap-
ter II , section 44, of the Vermont constitution, the supreme 
court justices are elected biennially by the electorate , for 
two year terms . lihen one refl ects that state elections are a 
function of the annual tm-;n meeting , one may see hoH closely 
the supreme court is related to the town. Article V, Part I , 
section 8 and Article VI , section 4, of the Maine constitution 
specify that supreme court judges are t o be nominated and ap-
pointed by the governor by and wi th the advice and consent of 
his council , for seven year terms. 
Therefore , in Massachusetts , New H&~pshire and Maine , 
judges of the supreme courts are selected by a process not 
invol ving the electorate or the legislature directly. It 
would appear that one might anticipate that local rights would 
exercise li ttle influence upon the later decis ions of the j udges . 
This will be shown to be in fact tha pattern of decision in 
Massachusetts and Maine , and to a lesser extent , in Nel-v Hamp-
shire . In CoP~ecticut , where both governor and legislature 
have a part in selection of such judges , and vJ"here the towns 
maintain their s trong representation in the lower house , it 
might be ant icipat ed that the decisions of such judges , if mode 
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of selection played any part , \vould tend to be state-centered, 
but wi th some minor trace of concern .for local rights demon-
strated . The pattern of pas t Connecticut decisions on muni-
cipal rights seems to bear out this speculation. In Rhode 
Island , t he tmv-n has lJreserved intact its strong representa-
tion in both houses of the legislature , alone among the New 
England states , and the l egislature appoints all judges , and 
may remove them by simple resolution, and does in pract ice. 
One might anticipate that town prejudices might have some 
effect on the pattern of decision. In fact , it will appear in 
the later chapters of this dissertation, the pat tern of Rhode 
Island court decisions has reflected the severe town versus 
city split in the polity of that state , and t he issue of the 
state-local reso lution of powers is obscured by this more 
significant d i v ision. Even today , it l>Vill appear that the 
state g overnment seems almost entirely controlled by the towns , 
with the cities the object of certain adverse legislative and 
judicial a ction. In Vermont, the town has been and remains to-
day the basic unit of g overnment. From the pattern of election, 
one would anticip ate that the judges mi ght be qu ite solicitous 
of toHn rights, and of local rights in general . It ~o-Jill be 
sho~m that this has been very muc;h the case in practice. Yet one 
cannot say tha.t the 1t1ay judges are chosen has determined the jud-
icial interpretation of state-local relations . One may say per.:. 
haps that t he factors Hhich have determined the relationship 
have also influenced the way judges are se lected. 
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Home Rule: Climate and Prospects 
There appears to be a tendency in political affairs 
for one extreme to beget its opposite extreme. In all of the 
New England states, except Maine, the strain of local parti-
cularism i s strong. Yet the New England legislatures and 
courts, as will be shown in this dissertation, have tended 
to act as decisively as any in the country to adopt patterns 
of theory and action designed to assure legislative control 
over local units. It is almost as if continued strong as-
sertion of half-formed myth-like ideas that somehow the New 
England t0wn was "different" and had special constitutional 
status as ,compared with local units elsewhere in the country, 
called forth especially strong measures from the New England 
legislatures and courts in their attempts to kill the myth 
and establish legislative supremacy. In other parts of the 
country local units lacked the centuries of tradition pos-
sessed by the New England towns and the widespread myth of 
local independence. None of them could claim to have created 
the state as could the towns of Connecticut and Rhode Island. 
None of them had ever been given the opportunity to declare 
their independence of the state government in an atmosphere 
when such a declaration was meaningful and capable of achieve-
ment. Hence there was no need for the state government to 
adopt stern measures to assure its dominant position. 
At the same time, rural areas in New England have 
remained well-organized in their town units for political 
action. Besides their continued strength in the state 
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legislatures, the towns are otherwise well adapted for 
political action. It is natural for small town representa-
tives to regard any home rule or related movement as intended 
primarily for the benefit of larger towns and cities, and 
hence as a threat to the current balance of political and 
constitutional powers and privileges. For many of the 
smaller and poorer towns, the state is a monied partner, 
whose advi ce, funds, and regulations are welcome assistance. 
Although the large New England city or town might bitterly 
oppose an attempt by the state to control its police func-
tions, many New England towns have eagerly sought the ser-
vices of the state police force as a method of securing 
services and equipment far better than the lone small town 
c ould rea~onably or efficiently afford or use.22 To an in-
creasing extent, of course, this reliance upon the state for 
functions such as police may be superseded by metropolitan 
districts, and special purpose authorities and districts, 
such as has been the pattern in Michigan and elsewhere. 
22Luther Gulick , "Do It For Yourself", 1957, 
National Municipal Review, _46:559; and Clarence M. Webster, 
Town Meeting Country, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
1945, especially chapter 1, recognize and deplore this trend. 
Cf . Sly, qp. cit., pp. 120, 123-4. 
The home rule movement has been relatively in-
effective in New England, despite the fact that the early 
status of the New England town has influenced much of the 
theoretical bases of home rule activities elsewhere. A new 
movement frequently attempts to "capture the decencies" of 
a situation by relating itself to a generally admitted and 
accepted theory of the past, or to a generally respect~d 
institution. Thus some persons active in advancing home 
rule ideas in the United States have claimed that they are 
merely attempting to return the municipality to the status 
of the co~onial, and most particularly the New England, 
town. Th~s imagined primeval condition of the New England 
town may or may not have been what some of the partisans of 
home rule ~proclaim, or would have others believe it to 
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have been. Nevertheless, the existence of the myth that the 
New Engl~d town is somehow different is a matter of signi-
ficance to those interested in such affairs. In New England, 
as this dissertation will show, the advocates of various 
theories which held that some sort of right to local self-
government' existed, have in recent times joined themselves 
with local reformers of other types to form the modern New 
England home rule movement. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth century reaction 
against the tradition of local self-government far from being 
of only historical interest, in actuality has controlled the 
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development of the governmental pattern under the home rule 
constitutional amendment of one of the New England states, 
limited such development under the statutory home rule pat-
tern of another such state, and will probably control, define 
and limit the potential effect of any home rule measure 
adopted in any other of the New England states . It will 
appear that the pattern of past development virtually pre-
dieted that the two states, Connecticut and Rhode Island, 
which have adopted some form of home rule would have been 
first among the New England states to do so. Also, that 
only Massachusetts of the other New England states is likely 
to adopt a home rule pattern in the future. It will come 
as no surprise to one who has studied the pattern of evolu-
tion of the state-local division of powers and rights that 
there is a strong home rule movement in Massachusetts, evi-
denced by the constant reports of such activities in such 
journals as the National Municipal Review, 23 while such 
movements are of little practical significance and are 
little needed in New Hampshire and Vermont. This disserta-
tion will show that the reasons for the existence of this 
state of affairs rest to a large extent in the patterns of 
the past, and on the accommodation which has been reached 
between local government units, the legislature and the courts. 
23see e.g., Victoria S.chuck, "Home Rule Stressed at 
Massachusetts Meeting", 1955, National Municipal Review, 44: 
420. 
Home rule movements are strongest where they are most 
needed, and strongest also where the myth of local self-
government, whether derived of political philosophy or 
history, is the strongest. 
it is not too much to say that the person who is 
interested in securing the advantages of home rule for his 
state must know the previous pattern of legislation and 
court decisions relating to the municipality, because in 
this inst&nce, as much or more than any other, those who 
are ignorant of history are eternally condemned to repeat 
the mistakes of the past. Much of the difficulty with 
"ripper",. boards, for instance, has risen during times of 
economic depression . A home rule provision which might 
work well in the prosperous economic climate of the late 
1950's might likely achieve its purposes poorly in a future 
economic. depression if the provision were not drafted care-
fully and 'skillfully with full knowledge and understanding 
of the lessons learned from the patterns of the past. As 
this dissertation will indicate later in this chapter, even 
the model constitutional provisions for home rule have cer-
tain inherent faults when judged by the past. Thus there 
is no guarantee that adoption of such a model provision will 
accomplish the end sought. Only a person with working knowl-
edge of the pattern and intricacies of constitutional develop-
ment in his own state and other states, can hope to draft or 
participate in the drafting of a home rule constitutional 
amendment which will withstand the severe tests of judicial 
interpretation, legislative collateral. assault,and the ham-
mer blows of a great economic depression. 
Home Rule: Basic Concepts 
Before turning to an investigation of the ante -
cedents of home rule, and to home rule itself within the 
particular New England states, an appreciation of the theo-
ries which underlie such an investigation is essential to a 
full understanding of the issues, partisan arguments, and 
points of conflict. 
Home rule has been variously defined, perhaps most 
popularly, as the right of a municipality to frame its own 
charter.24 The definition presented in a monograph of the 
Bureau of Government Research of the University of Massa-
chusetts is more accurate, and concise: 
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The words "home rule" are used to describe the right 
of a community to govern its internal affairs. There 
is no precise definition of the ter m. In states which 
are recognized as home rule states, home rule consists 
of the authority granted by the state constitution 
which permits the people of a city or town to adopt a 
charter for their own government. The extent of home 
24.reff erson B. · Fordham, "The Challenge of Contempo-
rary Problems " , 1953, 6 Univ. of Florida Law Review 275, at 
277 says, "While the term ' home rule' has no fixed content, 
it is most commonly used to denote power in a local elector-
ate to frame, adopt and amend a charter of government . " 
rule varies from one state to another and is dependent 
as m~ch upon judicial inte~gretation as upon the lan-
guage of the constitution. 
The study ' illustrates an exceptionally clear recognition of 
the forces at work, especially as demonstrated in the last-
quoted sentence. The monograph presents no proof for what 
it says, but the truth of the proposition will be demonstrated 
beyond doubt in the course of this dissertation. Only one 
point of criticism might be advanced, and that is that the 
monograph definition ignores the existence of home rule in 
those states which permit it by statute, though no positive 
statement on the subject appears in the state constitution. 
It is quite possible, however, that the monograph includes 
within "the authority granted by the constitution" that 
authority which is implicit as well as explicit, and which 
is recognized as part 'of the state constitution by judicial 
decision. Such a recognition has overwhelming precedent in 
American constitutional law, both national and state. Again, 
it is possible that the monograph may only regard that home 
rule as "real", where the legislature may not abolish it in 
any case. The Connecticut statutory home rule, without 
25Robert P. Bolan, State-Local Relations in Massa-
chusetts, Part I, Home Rule Possibilities, Amherst (Mass.), 
Univ. of Massachusetts Bureau of Government Research, 1957, 
p. 1. This monograph appears to be an exposition of ideas 
of home rule in simple terms, and a call to arms. Included 
in its apparently simple words and sixteen pages, however, 
is a reali~ation of the problems of home rule scarcely matched 
in scholarly works many times its length. 
explicit recognition in the state constitution, would then 
be regarded as a matter of legislative grace, which in fact 
it is, though founded on three centuries of tradition. 
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The battle for home rule is won or lost well before 
the charter-writing stage in any one municipality. The form 
and content of the home rule statute or constitutional amend-
ment itself, and to an equally-important degree, the past 
political development of the local governmental unit within 
the particular state, will determine the success or failure 
or any charter to be drafted in the future. When one speaks 
of home rule, he is not really speaking of one single idea, 
but rather of an inter-related complex of ideas. For pur-
pose of analysis, it is necessary that the constituent parts 
of the "home rule" idea be set forth at the outset: 
First, one must regard the above-mentioned process 
of drafting a new charter for a particular municipality, or 
alternately, the process whereby the legislature may set 
forth a group of model charters, any one of which, perhaps 
with certain allowable variations, a particular local unit 
may adopt. The modern "reform" movements in local government, 
such as the manager and strong mayor forms, with other re-
lated movements for sounder administration, are properly 
thought of as part of this first part • 
Second, one must consider the relation of the local 
unit to the central state government . This consideration, 
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properly speaking, is in turn made up of four sub-parts: 
(1) The constitutional position of the local unit is of 
great importance, because if the existence, powers, status , 
i nternal administration, or the like, of the local unit are 
set by the constitution, then the local unit is thus far 
protected from the actions of any other agency of or within 
the state. The process of constitutional amendment to se-
cure home rule is directed to this aspect of the complex . 
{2) The relation of the local m1it to the state legislat ure 
is likewi s e of great importance. If the legislature is suf-
ficiently sparing in the use of its potential power, no 
strong home rule movement is likely to arise within a parti-
cular state. If the legislature is aggressive in the us e 
of its powers, the opposite is likely to be true. (3) 
Clos e ly connected with and part of this problem is the 
determination of the basic theory of the distribution and 
reservation of powers under the state constitution. This 
determination may be made by the writers of the constitution, 
or by the courts of the state. The importance of the dis-
tinction between the state constitution as a granting or a 
limiting document is examined in greater detail below in 
this chapter. (4) Next in importance is the status of the 
local unit as determined by the courts of the state. The 
courts interpret the wording of the constitution in the 
determination of the constitutional position of the local 
unit, of course, and also, by judicial review., are very in-
strumental in determining the relation between the legisla-
ture and the local unit. However, properly s peaking, the 
courts may affect the status of local self-government quite 
independently of these considerations. If the supreme court 
of a particular state has determined that the constitution 
of the state is a limiting document only, it then will take 
it upon itself to delimit the powers of a municipality in 
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the course of various civil cas~s. For instance, it may 
close off certain areas of potential municipal action, even 
where the legislature has taken no action, by applying the 
"ultra vires" concept that certain acts are b e yond the powers 
of a municipality if not specifically authorized by the 
municipal charter or by the constitution or s t atutes . Again, 
it may rule that certain areas of potential activity are 
closed to the municipality, even though the legislature has 
never defined these areas, and even though such areas open 
exclusively t o legislative action are implied rather than 
detailed in the state constitution. 
All of these factors determinative of the govern-
mental position of the local unit will be more fully defined 
and investigated below in this chapter, and i n later chapters 
in specific instances within the particular New England 
s tates . 
It might be suggested that the posit i on of the local 
governmental unit in relation to the state administration is 
of great importance. However, in the United States, this 
does not appear to be the case. Except for the modern 
growth of authorities and districts in metropolitan areas, 
administrative activities have a relatively mi nor effect in 
determining the constitutional position of the local unit. 
The opposite is the case in England. While i n theory, the 
local units might enjoy the privilege of acting in areas nci 
closed to them by Parliament, in actuality, vi rtually all 
areas have been closed off, and local units made responsible 
to administrative authorities under the control of Parlia-
ment. Not even the protection of constitutional guarantees 
is available to the local units, since there is no written 
constitution, and Parliament, by acting in almost every 
field, has preempted most possible areas of local activity. 
The relation of a particular local tmit to other 
local units of government is also to be considered as part 
of the relationship to the central government. Some in-
fluential opponents of conventional home rulEl concepts have 
based their opposition upon the fact that a rmnicipali ty 
which adopts home rule under a consti tutiona-_ amendment re-
lating thereto, is in effect frozen in statuH, boundaries, 
and so on, for the foreseeable future. The problem of in-
tegrating the governments of a metropolitan urea, and making 
such government cheaper, more efficient, and more satis-
factory to the citizens of the area, is one which must be 
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considered in modern practice if a satisfactory solution 
both for the particular local unit and for its neighboring 
units is to be achieved. The movements of city-county inte-
gration, commonly accompanied by a home rule charter, are 
part of this latter consideration. It will be seen then, 
that any suggested home rule amendment or statute, or any 
"model" home rule plan consists of and must c.ome to grips 
with these two elements, one concerning internal organization 
and administration, and one concerning the re l ation of the 
local unit to other units of government withln the state. 
Political and Jurisprudential Theorists 
An appreciation of the relevant wri1:; ings of certain 
theorists of political science and jurisprud(3nce is essential 
before an investigation of home rule theory :itself is under-
taken. A good part of the effort of home rule theorists, 
and of the drafters of model home rule plans, charters, and 
constitutional amendments is directed to answering, refuting, 
nullifying and otherwise coping with the antecedent pattern 
created by legislative activity, constitutional theory, and 
judicial precedent. This pattern shows a surprising overall 
conformity from state to state. Such consist ency is derived 
directly from the patterns of judge - made law, and indirectly 
from the theorists who have turned their att ention to the 
determination of the constitutional attribute s of the munici-
pal unit. 
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It is impossible to overstate the influence of the 
text-writers, particularly, the influence of ~Tudges John F. 
Dillon and Thomas M. Cooley in 1870's, and that of Profe ssor 
Howard L. McBain and Judge Eugene McQ.uillin i n the last 
decade of the nineteenth century and the firs t decade of the 
twentieth. A host of ot hers were of somewhat less influence , 
such as Professors Frank J. Goodnow, John A. :fi'airlie, Chris-
topher G. Tiedeman, and text - writers in municipal law such 
as Professors Howard s. Abbott and Charles B. Elliott.26 
The influe nce of Alexis de Tocqueville and the members and 
critics of the New Historical School a t Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity will be discussed in Chaptereiii and IV. The pre-
eminence of the authors mentioned above was s uch that many 
26Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home F~le, a Study 
in Administration, New York and London, Macmillan Co., 
1895; same author, "Municipal Home Rule", 1m15 , Polit ical 
Science Q,uar terly, 10:1; John A. Fairlie, Local Government 
in Countie s, Towns and Villages, New York, Century Co., 
1906; Christopher G. Tiedeman, A Treatise on the Law of 
Municipal Corporations in the Uni ted States, New York, 
Banks and Bros., 1894; same author, A Treatise on State 
and Federal Cont rol of Persons and Property in the United 
States, 2 vols., St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 
1900; Howard S. Abbott, A Treatise of the Law of Municipal 
Coruorat ions, 3 vols. , St. Paul, Keefe-Davidt3on Co., 1905; 
· Charles B. Elliott, The Principles o.f the Law of Public 
Corporati ons, Chicago, Cal laghan and Co., 1898; this list 
is far from exhaustive, either of the works of these 
authors or of authors on this subject. See e .g., Charles 
F. Beach, Jr., Commentaries on the Law of Public Corpora-
tions, Including Munic:lpal Corpor ations, Ind:l anapolis, 
Bowen-Merrill Co., 1893 and Roger W. Cooley, Handbook of 
the Law: of Municipal Cornoration, St. Paul ( j\IIinn.), West 
Publishing Co. , 1914 . 
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controversies were resolved on little more than their authori-
ty. 
A recent author has shown almost beyond question27 
that Professors Dillon, Cooley and Tiedeman wer·e casuists; 
polemicists who were not concerned only with restating the 
law as it was, but were also concerned with shaping the law 
as they would like it to be. A study of the works of Pro-
fessors McBain, Mc~uillin, Goodnow and others leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that they were attempting to change 
or influence the course of the constitutional development 
of the states and of the nation. In the case of Judges 
Cooley and Dillon, their main concern appears to have been 
to guarantee the constitutional protections o:f individuals 
to the business corporation in the nascent days of great 
industry. Their concern with municipal affairs seems to 
have been rather secondary, though important. It has been 
stated that John F. Dillon, as an Iowa Supreme Court Justice, 
professor of law, and the greatest railroad lawyer of his 
age, was a vehement Unionist and centralist.28 While Thomas 
27clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts, The 
Influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman and 
John F. Dillon upon American Constitutional Law , Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1954. 
28Rodney L. Mott, "Strengthening Home Rule", 1950, 
National Municipal Review, 39:172. Dillon is the bete noir 
of this author and held responsible for past and present 
evils of l ocal governments, and for sabotaging constitu-
tional and statutory reform. 
M. Cooley, the great Michi gan Supr eme Court Justice 1 
professor of law, and f:trst chairman of the I nterstate Com-
merce Commission, was a conservative and a fr i end of rising 
industry, he was also a friend of the independence of towns 
and citie s in local affairs--among the most i nfluential 
friends such municipalities have ever had, in fact. As 
the author of the concurring opinion in the Hurlbut case,29 
in itself virtually a textbook of the origins and rights of 
towns, he swung his state to the acceptance of the theor y 
of the i nherent right of local self-government. 
The impact of the theories of Judge John F. Dillon 
on the constitutional status of the American municipality 
cannot be overstated. "Dillon's Rule" was an important 
factor in t he establishment of absolute contl•ol of the 
legislature over all lesser governmental bodies within the 
state. ''Dillon's Rule" is that a municipalii:;y has only 
those powers expressly given by its charter or by the state 
constitution and laws, plus other powers nece ssarily to be 
implied therefrom or necessary to accomplish the ends for 
which the municipality was created. These powers are to be 
construed as strictly as possible, according to the exact 
letter of the relevant documents, and any do ubt is to be 
resolved in favor of the non-grant of such powers. More or 
29People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut , 1871, 24 Mich. 
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less as a corollary of the rule, the courts hold that once 
the state has occupied or acted within acertain legislative 
area, that area is thenceforward closed to mw~icipalities, 
unless the statute plainly allows local action concurrently 
with the state. Under this rule, the lo-cal unit became 
little more than a department of an absolutely centralized 
and unified state government. His restatement of the state-
local constitution_al relationship confirmed and strength-
ened the :tendency in most states toward the s ame position. 
Professor Cooley was less the partisan of town rights in 
his systematic treatises than he was in his de cisi ons and 
occasional writings, though he was friendly t oward the ex-
istence of such rights. 
At the turn of the century, the first wri t ings of 
Professors McBain and lVIcQ.uillin appeared in t he periodical 
literature . Far f r om being dispassionate analysts of town 
and city-state intergovernmental relat ions an d constitu-
tional or igins, these men were strong proponents. Judge 
McQuillin asserted flatly, 30 with a we alth of documentat ion 
that local governments were possessed of i nherent rights 
to local self-government, of certain vested rights beyond 
30Eugene Mc~uillin, "Implied Powers of Municipal 
Corporations", 1899, 49 Central Law Journal 464; same author, 
"Constitutional Right of Local Self-Government of Munici-
palities, and Principles Applicable to Centr a l Control", 
1901, 35 American Law Review 510. 
the power of any legislature to divest, and of a private 
character in which they enjoyed the same protection against 
legislative meddling as the private business corporation. 
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His periodical articles on the subject might almost be called 
muck-raking literature or pamphleteering. 
In the same tradition was Professor McBain of 
Columbia. Without asserting that he was answering or re-
futing Professor Mc~uillin directly, nevertheless, he em-
phasized the same points in his articles,31 wi th equally 
impressive documentation, and reached much the same con-
elusions, but with more detail, as had Judge Dillon a few 
decades earlier. His articles were also polemical in tone, 
and partisan in intent. It is a rather anomalous fact that 
his later work should be regarded as one of the standard 
references on the subject of munic i pal h ome rule. It might 
be said that he had as his set purpose the destruction of 
any trace of local rights in common law or eonstitutional 
tradition, and then proceeded to assert tha1:; since only the 
·31Howard L. McBain, "Delegation of Legislative 
Power to Cities", 1917, Political Science Quarterly 32:276; 
and the following, by the same author: "The Doctrine of an 
Inherent Right of Local Self-Government", 1916, 16 Columbia 
Law Review 190, 299; 11 Due Process of Law and the Power of 
the Legislature to Compel a Municipal Corporation to Levy 
a Tax or Incur Debt for a Strictly Local Pur pose " , 1914, 
14 Columbia Law Review 407; "The Rights of Municipal Corpo-
rations . Under the Contract Clause of the Fe deral Consti-
tution" , 1914, National Municipal Review, ~· : 284, and 1917, 
Political Science Quarterly, 32:276. 
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legislatures or the amending process could grant such rights 
of' local home rule, home rule statutes and constitutional 
amendments and political action to secure suc:n , were the 
only way to secure local self-government. Ne vertheless, 
this path which he followed in his reasoning i s the one 
which most home rule states have followed in a ctual practice. 
Only rare stat e s like Iowa and Michigan have g one direct ly 
from a common-law doctrin e protecting local 8elf-government, 
to constitutional home rule. 
In reading thes e authors, it become:3 appar ent that 
Professor s Cooley and McQ.uillin are more soc:L al science and 
hi story-or:t ented in their approach to the sub ject. In re ad-
ing Professors Dillon and McBain, on the other hand, one be-
comes almost oppressively aware that they worked within a 
limited legal research framework. Non-legal materials are 
rarely quoted by either. Professor McBain, p articular l y, 
proved his points in regard to the non-existence of town 
powers by a heavy cit i ng of court decisions ,, and rarely made 
referenc'e t o the many social science materials which trace 
the act ual historical and non-legal development of local con-
s t itutional law. What the courts say history was and what 
history actually was, are, of course, frequently two differ-
ent things. Since courts are essentially part of an ever-
de veloping power structure, they are to a good extent casuist 
in nature. Judicial decisions often state t hings as the 
judges would have liked them to have been, rather than as 
they actually were. For instance, Professor McBain stated 
in a 1914 article32 that from the first pre sentation of the 
question to the American courts, municipal charters have 
been declared not to be contracts. He stated that the three 
cases which he cites, from California, New Hampshire and New 
York, "are probably the only instances in which a law has 
been declared void specifically upon the ground that it im-
paired the obligation of a contract between t he state and a 
municipal corporation." That this was a c ons iderable over-
statement may be gathered from an examination of the cases 
to be discussed in Chapters V, VI and VII, below. However, 
it is well worth noting that Professor McBaln made heavy use 
of what might be called the "dictum device 11 , 33 which is a 
standard tool of attorneys in preparing a b:r>ief. Under the 
dictum principle, if the court makes any other statement or 
reference which can even remotely be construed as giving a 
basis for the decision, it is possible for t he legal re-
searcher to insist that the court decided the particular 
case on that basis, and not on the alter-nate or apparent 
one. A lawyer might protest this definition, yet it is a 
32McBain, "The Rights of Municipal Corporations ••• ", 
op. cit. 
33see particularly the masterful use of the tech-
nique in "The Doctrine of an Inherent Right ••• ", op. cit., 
and "The Rights of Municipal Corporations ••• ", op. cit. 
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reasonably good statement of the principle. 'rhe articles 
by Professor McBain, cited above, were largely tours through 
the cases, distinguishing away as dicta point s not conducive 
t o the author 's thesis. On this basis, a good many of the 
c ases in the succeeding chapters might be "dtst inguished" 
away, as might most of the cases ever cited for any doctrine 
by scholars, attorneys, and judges. 
Si nce the relevant works of Judges Gooley and Dillon34 
34Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Con-
sti t utional Law in the United States of Amer i ca, Boston, 
Little, Brown and Co., 1880; 2d ed. by Alex i s Angell, 1891; 
3d ed. by Andrew C. Mc Laughlin, 1898; 4th ed. by Andrew A. 
Bruce, 1931; Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on. the Constitu-
tional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of 
the American Union, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1868; 
2d ed. 1871; 3d ed. 1874; 4th ed. 1878; 5th ed. 1883; 6th 
ed. by Alexis c. Angell, 1890; 7th ed. by Vi.ctor H. Lane, 
1903; 8th ed. by Walter Carrington, 2 vol., 1927; Thomas M. 
Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation Including the Law 
of Local Asses sments, Chicago, Callaghan and Co., 1876; 2d 
ed., 1886; 3d ed. by Alfred P. Jacobs, 2 vol., 1903; 4th 
ed. by Clark A. Nichols, 4 vol., 1924; Thomas M. Cooley, 
"The Constitutional Limits to the Power of ~raxat ion", 1868, 
2 Western Law Jurist 69; Sir William Blackstone, Comment-
aries on the Laws of England, 4 vols., Oxfo:rd, Clarendon 
Press , 1765-1769; revised editions of 1876 and 1884 by 
Thomas M. Cooley, 2 vols., Chicago, Callaghan and Co., 1876 , 
1884; Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Cons titution of the 
United States, 3 vols., Boston, Hilliard, Gray and Co., 
1833; 4th ed. by Thomas M. Cooley, 2 vols., Boston, Little 
and Brown Co., 1851; see also Charles A. Kent , "Thomas Mc-
Intyre Cooley", 1899, Univ. of Michigan Dis courses, p. 3, 
and Jerome c. Knowlton, "Thomas Mcintyre Co oley", 1907, 5 
Michi gan Law Review 309; John F. Dillon, The Law and Juris -
prudence of England and America, Boston, Li t tle, Brown and 
Co., 1894; same author, The Law of Municipal Bonds, St. Louis, 
G.I. Jone s Co., 1876; same author, Treatise on the Law of 
Municipal Corporations , 3d ed., 2 vols., Boston, Little, 
Brown and Co., 1881; 4th ed., 2 vol., 1890; 5t h ed ., 5 vols ., 
1911 ; see also Harry Hubbard, "John F. Dillon" , 1928, 14 
American Bar Associ ati on Journal 77. 
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are so widely available and are quoted in a l most every text 
on municipal corporations, it would seem to serve the purposes 
of this paper to make only a few pertinent ob s ervations con-
cerning these writers. In the early editions of Constitu-
tional Limitations, 35 Professor Cooley asserte d that the 
doctrine of inherent or veste d town rights, and of the pri-
vate corporate character of a municipality beyond control by 
the state legislature, were strong and recognized patterns 
in law. At the time of the first edition of his work, this 
was undoubtedly an overstatement. However, by the time of 
the third and fourth editions, this was only a slight over-
statement . Meanwhile, in 1872, Professor Dillon's Municipal 
Corporations36 was published f or the first time. The effect 
of Dillon's treatise, which was more acceptab le to most 
state courts as regards rights to local self~government 
than was Cooley's Constitutional Limitations of 1868, was 
largely to offset wha tever initial effect the Cooley trea-
tise had had in the intervening four-year period.37 Once 
again, the close identity of viewpoint of the two works must 
be emp~asized.38 Only on comparatively minor points, such 
35cooley, A Treatise on the ••• , op. cit. 
36Dillon, Treatise on the Law ••• , op. cit. 
37Rodney L. Mott, " Strengthening Home Rule " , 1950 
National Municipal Review, 39 : 172. 
38Jacobs, op. cit., emphasized such identity on 
almost every pag e of his book . 
as the local self-government issue, were the t wo professor-
jurists far apart. The moderate statement of vested or in-
herent local rights to self-government in the f irst, second, 
and third editions of the Cooley work was soft e ned and vir-
tually eliminated in the succeeding editions. The fact that 
these editions were institutionalized and rewritten by other 
authors, b'eginning with the sixth edition, almost certainly 
accounts for this fact. Professor Dillon himself did the 
later editions of his own text, so little change occurred in 
his ~ositive statement of the non-existence of any local 
rights wh a tever. 
Since both judges were conservatives , they did h a ve 
occasion to agree on one limitation of the legislature, as 
re g ards local self-g overnment. Professor Cooley's "public 
purpose" doctrine, in relation to local taxation was adopted 
by Pr ofessor Dillon, though the preceding authority in sup-
port of the doctrine was relatively slight~39 In effect, 
this doctrine stated that taxation must be for a public pur-
pose, laid according to some objective rule of apportionment 
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39rbid., p. 98 et seq. Jacobs state d that the doc-
trine is usually said to start with Goddin v. Crump , 1837, 35 
Va. 120; for sixteen years no other jurisdicti on adopted the 
rule; in 1853, Pennsylvania adopted the rule i n Sharpless v. 
Mayor of Philadelphia, 1853, 21 Pa. St. 147; a fe w scatter ed 
adop tions ' followed, until 1868, when, with the publication 
of Cooley's Constitut i onal Limitations, the r u le was imme diate-
l y adopted everywhere; it became a rout when Dillon's Muni-
cip al Corporations of 1872 adopte d the s ame doctrine. Jacobs, 
op. cit., p. 120-131. 
and not by caprice, and a t ax levied by any political sub-
division of a state must in addition be both public and 
local in purpose. The fact that such a doctrine serves to 
free infant industry from the possibility of a good many 
troublesome local taxes is too obvious, tor equire illustra-
tion.40 However, the incidental result was to limit the 
power of legislatures to require the towns and cities of 
their states to undertake a good many projects. By exten-
sion, the doctrine was widely held to be a limitat i on of 
the financial power of the legislature in regard to local 
matters, as well as tax matters. The reasoning was, that 
almost anything ordered done which could not be clearly 
justified under the "public purpose" doctrine would result 
in the imposition of an illegal tax by the local government, 
and that hence, the original order must be void. Probably 
the earliest New England court to adopt the doctrine specif-
ically was Maine, in Allen v. Jay, in 1872.41 
Before leaving the great early theorists , a brief 
discussion of the conflicting basic theories of charters, 
constitutions and other fundamental documents will help to 
4°Ibid., ibid. 
41Ibid., p. 131. For a full discussion of the his-
tory and subsequent career of the public purpose doctrine, 
see Breck P. McAllister, "Public Purpose in Taxation" , 1930 , 
18 California Law Review 137, 241. 
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throw light on the following discussion. As was discussed 
earlier, the old common-law municipal corporation in England 
was conceived of as having all powers not denied to it by 
statute or common law, while the American municipal corpora-
tion is generally regarded as being limited to the powers 
specifically stated in its charters, necessarily implied 
powers, plus those granted from time tot ime by the legis-
lature, and those absolutely essential to the carrying-out 
of the basic purpose for which the local governmental unit 
was created (Dillon's Rule). 42 In essence, a charter of an 
English municipality of the eighteenth or early nineteenth 
century would be called a limiting instrument, while the 
charter of its American counterpart would be described as a 
granting instrument.43 To illustrate further: under the 
American theory of government, the national government may 
exercise only those powers specifically given to it by its 
42A few years before the publication of Municiial 
Corporations, Judge Dillon stated his rule thus: "Munic pal 
corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers 
and. rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into 
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. 
As it creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it 
may abridge and control." City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids 
and M.R. RR. Co., 1868, 24 Ia. 455 at 475. The United 
States Supreme Court adopted Dillon's rule in 1903, thus 
making it part of American constitutional law, but not bind-
ing upon the state courts. Atkin v. Kansas, 1903, 191 u.s. 
207. 
4~rank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule ••• , ~ 
cit., introduction and pp. 1-18. 
fundamental docQ~ent, plus those powers necessarily and pro-
perly derived from the specified powers, plus those powers 
essential to the carrying-out of the purposes of national 
existence; on the other hand, the state government is looked 
upon as the residuary of power. Thus, the federal constitu-
tion is called a granting document, while most state consti-
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tutions are looked upon as limiting documents, the idea being 
that the people of the state have put beyond them their es-
sential sovereignty, vesting it in the state, and more spe-
cifically, in the legislature. Relatively few states regard 
the state constitution under which the state government op-
erates as a limiting document.44 In these states, the 
4416 Corpus Juris Secundum, sees. 67-70, pp. 180-
209, states: "··.state constitutions are usually regarded 
not as grants, but as limitations of power, at least insofar 
as the state constitution affects the legislative power." 
Those states which regard their constitutions as grants of 
legislative power, or as not clearly limiting documents, 
are there declared to include Connecticut, Oklahoma, Wis-
consin, Indiana, Ohio, South Dakota, North Dakota, Arkansas, 
Michigan and Montana. As to local charters as grants, see 
Hugh K. Forman, The Theory of Municipal Home Rule, Berkeley, 
University of California unpublished J.D. thesis, 1925. See 
also Charles G. Haines, "Judicial Review of Legislation in 
the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and 
Implied I,imitations on Legislatures" , 1924, 2 Texas Law Re-
view 257; 1924, 3 Texas Law Review 1; and Theodore Sedgwick, 
A Treatise of the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation and 
Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law, New York, 
John Voorhies Co., 1857. Sedgwick states that McBain is the 
chief proponent of the state constitution as a limitation, 
and the local charter as a grant, at p. 31. A very good 
short review of the subject is given in 11 American Juris-
prudence sec. 16, p. 614, with a valuable and fairly complete 
citation of cases on the subject. It summarizes the minority 
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legislature is more or less limited to acts authorized by 
the constitution, necessarily implied, or necessary and 
reasonable to achieve the ends of a state government. Hence, 
Dillon's Rule, so-called, is merely an expression of the 
fact that he espoused the theory that local c harters are 
granting documents, and that the state constitutions are 
limiting instruments. Professor Cooley, in his early edi-
tions, and contrary to what was settled doctrine in most of 
the American courts at the time, maintained that state con-
stitutions were granting documents, while local charters 
were essentially limiting documents. 45 His theory appeared 
to be that the people are the ultimate residuary of power, 
that they never meant to put that power far beyond them, 
except for stated purposes, and that the town and city govern-
menta are more logically closer to the people, and hence 
logically the residuary seats of power. Thus~ it would ap-
pear that the justice's e spousal of inherent right theory 
was not a Machiavellian gesture suited to meet the social 
44 (co:z:ltinued) theory thus: "In other· jurisdictions, 
the right to local self-government is treated as inherent 
in cities and towns, and, if not surrendered on the adoption 
of the state constitution, cannot be taken away by the legis-
lature." 
45cooley, Constitutional Limitations, op. cit., 
6th ed., pp. 49, 154, 197, 206-07; Eugene Mc ,~uillin, "The 
Constitutional Right of Local Self-government of Munici-
palities, and Principles Applicable to Central Control", 
1901, 35 Ameri can Law Review 510. 
necessities of the time, but was rather a doctrine in which 
he believed, not necessarily as historical truth, but as an 
integral part of his theory of the socio-political consti-
tutional framework of the country. Professor Cooley stated 
clearly, that a state constitution measures the power of 
the rulers rather than the rights of the governed. 46 
'Professor Frank J. Goodnow's Municipal Home Rule,47 
one of the earliest noteworthy texts in the new field of 
political science, appeared in 1895, His work, while not 
as ·influential as that of Professor Eugene McQuillin, was 
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in much the same vein. With a deep knowledge of the pol i ti-
cal and local history of both England and America , Goodnow 
analyzed the state-local situation in his day, Al though the 
book was largely intended as an early study of the home rule 
46After intensive study of this period, Forman gives 
it as hi s opinion that: "The weight of the cases favors the 
legislative grant theory . (as to municipal charters). It is 
my opinion that this is due to the fact that our courts have 
gone no deeper into the matter than was absolutely necessary 
•••• If more courts had ••• I believe that there would be more 
adherents to the inherent right theory •••• In summary, then, 
••• I would say that ••• the inherent right theory is more in 
harmony with the history of this country and its political 
theories •••• These rights are inherent or the equi valent, 
i.e. such as cannot be taken away." Forman, op. cit., pP• 
31-32. Among those who have studied the subject, includi ng 
this author, it appears that this feeling f or an inherent 
right to local self-government as an article of social be-
lief is of the same order as the statements of the Declara-
tion af Independence or The Rights of Man. Whether provable 
or unprovable, it "cannot be taken away," 
.. 
47Goodnow, op, cit, 
statutes, and is somewhat surpas sed by McBain' s text on home 
rule48 in that regard, the early chapters presented a biting 
analysis of the pattern of development of town-state and 
city - state constitutional relations. It was his opinion 
that the "rings", corruption and deals of the l ate nine-
teenth century were the almost inevitable resul t of Jackson-
ian democracy, necessary to enable {through informal mechan-
isms) that government to function at all. No novel thesis 
certainly, but the distinguished professor offered next as 
his solution to the problem of local government in that era: 
a return to the old English common-law theory of the munici-
59 
pal corporation, with its conception of town and city charters 
as limiting rather than granting instruments. It is of in-
terest to note that he claims to discern in the local govern-
ment affairs of the day a reaction against the legislature, 
a renewed appreciation of the desirability of local units 
governing themselves in their local affairs, and the beginning 
of an era which he is sure will see the entire withdrawal of 
state legislatures from local affairs. Great political 
scientist and lawyer though he was, he mistook the temporary 
disenchantment of responsible persons and theorists with over-
reaching legislatures as a permanent trend. That such dis-
4~oward L. McBain. The Law and Practice of Munici-
pal Home Rule, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1916. 
enchantment gave rise to the home rule movement, he demon-
strated rather clearly. He failed, however, to foresee 
the extent of legislative and judicial adaptability in the 
ensuing era, and the continued success of state legislatures 
in interfering in local affairs, even in many of those 
states ostensibly governed by home rule constitutional 
amendments. 
The state legislature, which has the power to deter-
mine what shall be the functions of municipal corpora-
tions, has, to a large extent, lost sight of their 
orisinal purpose, and has come to regard them as organs 
of the central government, for the purposes of the 
general state administration, and has thus made them 
more public in character than they originally were.49 
Thus the author summed up his earlier demonstration of the 
fact that the original purpose of incorporating towns and 
cities i ,n England, and later in the United States, was pri-
marily to give them some of the characterist ics of the ·pri-
vate corporation in regard to holding property, carrying on 
litigation, and so on. He distinguished clearly the dif-
ference between the public character of the municipality, 
when acting in matters of state-wide concern, and the private 
or local character when acting in local affairs. 
This double character of municipal corporations must 
of necessity have an important influence on their re-
lation to the legislature, the only guardian in the 
American system of administration of administrative 
harmony and uniformity. For so long as the municipal 
49rbid., p. 17. 
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corporation is merely an organization for local govern-
ment, the legislature is not necessarily called upon 
t o interfere with or control its actions except insofar 
as it is to lay down the general norms of its conduct 
•••• But just so soon as a municipal corporation begins 
to act as the agent of the state, to exer cise powers 
of concern to the people of the state as a whole, it 
be comes necessary ••• to see ••• that these powers are 
exercised uniformly and efficiently throughout the 
state. Unfortunately ••• the American legi slature has 
not ~stinguished so clearly ••• the two kinds of muni-
cipal activity, has in many cases forgotten that muni-
cipalities have a sphere of local action in whig8 they 
should move freely and largely uncontrolled •••• 
As will be seen from Professor Goodnow's analysis, 
the controversy as to whether state constitutions are grant-
ing or limiting documents, is essentially the same controversy 
with which this paper is concerned, guised in its form of the 
dispute over the antecedents to home rule in New England. 
Even the disputing parties are largely the same. 
An article in 1899 marked the first significant 
appearance of Eugene McQuillin upon the scene. Since Pro-
fessor Mc~uillin's treatise, Municipal Corporations,51 has 
been the definitive authority since its appe arance in the 
early part of the twentieth century, it will be of interest 
50Ibid., ibid. 
51Eugene McQuillin, A Treatise on t h e Law of Muni-
cipal Corporations, Chicago, Callaghan and Co., 1904; this 
same vol~e supplied the basis for the first edition of the 
multi-vol ume work, A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corpo-
rations, 8 vola., Chicago, Callaghan and Co., 1911-20; 2d 
ed., 4 vola., Chicago and New York, 1928 (supplemented 1934, 
1937, 1939, 1941, 1943); 3d ed. by Clark A. Nichols et al., 
Ray Smith, editor-in-chief, 20 vola., 1949-1951, supplemented 
to date. 
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to consider the antecedents of this work. Such consideration 
may properly begin with his 1899 article, "Implied Powers of 
Municipal Corporations",52 which was essentially an exposi-
tion of that part of Dillon's Rule which states that muni-
cipalities have only those powers granted by their charters, 
those necessarily to be implied therefrom, etc. The author's 
purpose was virtually to provide a handbook of ways in which 
municipalities might claim that the right to do a wide as-
sortment of desirable actions was to be implied from their 
charters, or from the basic ends for which such a corpora-
tion is created. His conclusion, clearly foreshadowing his 
next article and his systematic treatise, was: 
If a city may exercise such powers because it is a 
municipal ~orporation, or because of the general grant 
to it of police powers it is not easy to comprehend 
what owers of a munici al nature are not incidental 
inherent. Italics mine. 
Professor McQuillin's later article, of 1901, pre-
sents what appears to be his matured opinion on the question 
of the constitutional status of the municipality in America: 
At the present the private rights of the municipal cor-
poration are recognized, and all their property of a 
distinctly private character is fully protected by the 
constitutional provisions protecting private property 
of the individual or corporation. (Ci tea cases and 
Tiedeman on Municipal Corporations, sec. 9) •••• The 
52McQuillin, "Implied Powers of Municipal Corpora-
tions", op. cit. 
53Ibid., pp. 206-07. 
right of the State as to the private property of the 
city is a right of regulation, and though broader than 
exists in the case of individuals, is not a right of 
appropriation. l Dillon, Municipal Corporations s. 
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54. Governmental public property cannot be devoted to 
private use by legislative action alone, either direct-
ly or indirectly, a.fter its dedication to publ ic use. 
l Dillon s. 54. But property may be transferred from 
one group of public officers to another •••• 54 
His article called for exact constitutional provisions to 
protect local rights to self-government, citing in this con-
nection 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, section 12a and 
Bryce's American Commonwealth, Chapter 52. He then adopted 
Professor Cooley's view of the nature of the state constitu-
tion as a limitation of power. He cited Cooley on Consti-
tutional Limitations, 6th edition, pages 154 and 197, which 
on close examination do not bear him out very well. He 
continued, . saying that the theory is universally held that 
a constitution merely limits the powers of an agent, and 
does not interfere with generally-acknowledged pre-existing 
rights (city and town rights in this case), citing Cooley's 
Constitutional Limitations, pages 49, 206, and 207. His 
argument was to the effect that the legislature is not supreme 
in areas not closed to it by the constitution (the grant 
theory again), but that previous practice must be taken into 
account. He massed authority showing that the legislature 
is of limited powers, that such powers are to be strictly 
54McQuillin, "The Constitutional Right of' Local 
Self-Government ••• ", op •. cit • 
construed, and that powers not mentioned specifically are 
reserved to the people. 
It i s thus obvious that the Constitution must be con-
sidered in the light of the local and State govern-
ments existing at the time of its adoption. That the 
principle of local self-government constituted a pro-
minent feature in both the Federal and State govern-
ments is a fact which cannot be denied •••• The right of 
local self-government as an undoubted right of the 
people, is regarded as an inseparable incident to our 
Repuolican form of government, and, therefore, all our 
constitutions assume its continuance. All delegations 
of powers which they make, and the express and implied 
restraints which they impose upon the several depart-
ment s of government are to be always construed in the 
light of all recognized pre-existing rights and privi-
l eges of the people, either in their individual or 
aggregate capacity as a local community. The legi s -
lature cannot take away from the people of a town or 
city rights and privileges which they possessed as 
citizens of the State before the incorporation unless 
such rights have been expressly surrendered by organic 
provisions~ (cites Coole!~ Constitutional Limitations, 
6th. ed., PP• 207, 226). 
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He maintained further that constitutions never change the 
common law unless they do so in specific terms,56 that town 
rights are obviously a part of the common law, and continued: 
That all State interests are subject to absolute con-
trol ••• cannot be questioned, but as to all matters 
55Ibid., pp. 206-07. 
56The point is essentially a moot one, since the 
original American states adopted the common law of England 
for the first time during the nineteenth century, and the 
later states all specified in their constitutions as they 
were admitted to the Union that previous rules of l aw were 
to continue unless specifically displaced by the new consti-
tution. See Jacobs, op. cit., p. 9, and Roscoe Pound, Spirit 
of the Common Law, Boston, Marshall Jones Co., 1921 , p. 115, 
and, same author, "Common Law and Legislation", 1908, 21 
Harvard Law Review 383. 
which are of proper local concern only the people of 
the given community have the right to the exclusive 
cont~ol of them, subject, of course, at all times, to 
the generallaws of the State in the matter of general 
police regulations and other proper public or govern-
mental restrictions which affect all of the people of 
the State alike •••• Therefore, in order to invalidate a 
legislative act which denies such right it is unneces-
sary to point out the expS~ss words of the Constitution 
which have been violated. 
He then proceeded to describe the Cooley concurring decision 
in the Hurlbut58 case as a good statement of the real law 
in reference to the subject of legislative powers. 
This article can be accounted for only as a piece 
of polemic literature, by means of which Professor Mc~uillin 
hoped to influence the courts of his time as Professors 
Dillon and Cooley had those of a generation earlier. In the 
years which followed, the writing of his monumental treatise 
occupied most of Professor Mc~uillin's time, the first volume 
appearing in 1904. Writing and publication continued until 
1920.59 
Although Professor McBain's articles on the contract 
rights of municipalities, 60 discussed above, may properly 
57.McQuillin, "The Constitutional Right of.' Local 
Self-Government ••• ", op. cit., p. 524. 
65 
58People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 1871, 24 Mich. 44. 
59see footnote 51, above. 
60see Footnote 31, above. For another, somewhat less 
doctrinaire view, see Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., The Contract 
Clause of the Constitution, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1938, and E.B. Schulz, "The Effect of the Contract 
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be considered a reply to Mc~uillin's articles and to the 
early part of his treatise, it was not until 191661 that 
McBain undertook to analyse and criticize McQuillin's writ-
ings specifically and in detail. He flatly denied Mc~uil­
lin's assertion in 1 Municipal Corporations sec. 70, page 
156, that towns have an inherent right of local self-govern-
ment, as stated in McQuillin's words: 
But apart from these restrictions on legislative in-
terference, from the historical examination of this 
subject, it becomes manifest that local self-govern-
ment of the municipality does not spring from nor 
exist by virtue of written constitutions; that it is 
not a mere privilege, conferred by the central authori-
ty, but that the people in each municipality exercise 
their franchises under the protection of the funda-
mental principles just indicated, which were not ques-
tioned or doubted when the state constitutions were 
adopted, and which in the opinion of ~udge Cooley and 
other eminent American jurists, no power in the state 
can 'legally disregard. 
and in 1 Municipal Coruorations, sec. 169, page 388: 
The community, with certain local rights and privileges, 
and property, as buildings and public improvements, 
which the legislature incorporates by giving it a legal 
entity and personality, is not created by legislative 
action. The legislature merely creates this legal 
personality and invests it with certain privileges and 
powers, some of which affect the state at large, but 
most of which relate to supplying local necessities 
and conveniences. 
60 (continued) Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 
Upon the Power of the States to Control Municipal Corpora-
tions", 1938, 36 Michigan Law Review, 385. 
61McBain, "The Doctrine of an Inherent ••• ", .2E..!. 
Further, Professor McBain accused62 Professor McQuillin of 
attempt ing to give the impression that inherent right was 
accepted generally by American courts (which of course Mc-
~uillin was). He proceeded~o review the cases on the sub-
ject", giving the impression that he was reviewing all of 
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them, which of course he was not. The Michigan cases, com-
prising the mighty series beginning with Hurlbut, 63 are dis-
tinguished away entirely via the dictum device. Since the 
Indiana Supreme Court had decided several cases givi ng no 
other rule than that of inherent right, McBain was f orced 
to concede that state. So he continued, with the Nebraska, 
Iowa, Kentucky, New York, Texas, and California cases, dis-
counting them by one device of legal research or another, 
several for reasons quite sound. The Ohio cases and the 
exhaustive writings of Amasa Eaton were sloughed off, the 
Eaton arguments being considered by reference to his rather 
weak address to the American Bar Association in 1902, while 
the scholarly and persuasive series of articles in the 
Harvard Law Review and elsewhere were not even mentioned.64 
In short, the argument is by a lawyer, for lawyers, almost 
wholly on the basis of court decisions. His only concession 
62Ibid., p. 388 et seq. 
63cited in footnote 58, above. 
64see the extensive treatment of the Eaton articles 
i n Chapter VII, below. 
to histar~, such as that so admir ably amassed by Eat on, was 
this: 
It seems unnecessary to enter upon an extended his-
torical investigation to support or disprove the as-
sertion that in point of time local governments in the 
Ameri can colonies were established prior to or syn-
chronously with, central governments ••• it is probably 
true that "in most of the New England colonies some 
of the towns were older than the central government; 
and in Connecticut and Rhode Island the latter was 
consi dered more as a federation of towns than as a 
supe~ior sovereign authority" (quoting from Fairlie, 
Local Government in Counties Towns and Villa es, p. 
21. Whatever may be the facts of history in respect 
to this matter, such facts have no bearing upon the 
doctrige of an inherent right of local self-govern-
mant .. 6 
In light of the fact that he had just finished criticizing 
McGluillin for utheorizing", this last is a strange statement. 
It would seem that Professor McBain regarded the facts of 
history as theory, and the decis i ons of a particular l egal 
system in one part of the world as a statement of absol ute 
and eterna l ly-obvious fact. It is reasoning such as this 
that has brought lawyers into disrepute among social scien-
tists. For example, referring to the f act tha t a good part 
of the s olution to the question of inborn and inherent local 
rights must be sought in the constitutional question as to 
whether the state constitution is a granting or limiting 
document, he stated:-
But apart from theory and in line with law, it is 
p. 301 . 
65McBai n, "The Doctrine of an Inherent ••• ", op. cit. 
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perfectly obvious that if a positive surrender of the 
"righ~s" of local self-government must be found in order 
to jqstify the authority of the legislature to inter-
fere ,with the exercise of such rights, the courts must 
of necessity seek this surrender in the fundamental 
law of the state.66 · . 
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He asserted that state constitutions are limiting, not grant-
ing documents, and continued: 
It is needless to say that to the average judicial mind 
much 'stronger arguments than those based upon the whol-
ly fortuitous circumstances of early settlement would 
have to b e presented in order to justif'y the refusal to 
apply to the determination of the constitutional au-
thor~ty of the legislature over municipal corporations 
a ca~on of judicial construction that is subject to 
no other exception in our system of jurisprudence. It 
seems reasonable . to conclude, therefore, that the matter 
of p~iority of establishment as between local and cen-
tral ~ governments in the American Colonies has, and can 
have, no possible bearing upon the existence of a 
I lega] ri~ht of local self-government in the United 
3tates .6 · 
Professor ,McBain here presented a summary of the thinking of 
American courts in the nineteenth century. If the facts of 
history dq not fit the theory of monolithic sovereignty, 
history is to be ignored or rationalized. The courts and 
the "judicial mind" are here presented coldly as a part of 
a power s~ructure in which judges impress upon the system 
their own notions of the nature of sovereignty and of the 
constitutional relation· between the state and the municipali-
ty. Rarely has a legal scholar, hypnotized by the limitations 
66 Ibid., P• 302. 
67Ibid., p. :303. 
of his profession, made so bold an assertion of the nature 
of the judicial process as it relates to governmental af-
fairs. 
Professor McBain was substantially correct in his 
statement of the issue. He overstated the cases, treating 
them as a partisan more than as a scholar, but the law in 
most of the states was largely as he said it was. 
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Yet, despite the courts and the law books, the idea 
that somehow the towns are power-centers, with rights as 
against the state, has remained a political reality. It has 
been killed a thousand thousand times, but its ghost still 
rises as a chimera to haunt the dreams of judges, legislators, 
administrators, and politicians. Like blood and soil, or 
manifest destiny, or the rights of Englishmen, in other 
political orders, it is a factor in the political life of 
New England which is omnipresent and never to be disregarded. 
The mere fact that people believe in the idea, that scholars 
who knew that the historical basis for the idea was nebulous, 
and that judges who knew that the course of law had run the 
other way, could yet announce the principle, shows its fasci-
nation and its appeal to the minds of men.68 Objective 
proof on one side or the other is impossible, and one deals 
68see e.g., Forman, op. cit., quoted in footnote 
44, above. 
here on the basis of theory. The right of the New England 
town to rule itself in local affairs is one of the great 
compelling social myths of American political life, and, 
like disproving the ever-protecting folk heroes, Arthur of 
England, Bolitho of Czechoslovakia, Barbarossa of Germany, 
Juarez and Zapata of Mexico, complete logical proof of non-
existence is impossible, because the bases of proof are not 
71 
there present in the shambling, disordered, frontier society 
of colonial New England. 
It is possible to trace these partisan tendencies 
through the other authors in the field of state and local 
government law and public law. For instance, in Judge 
Charles B. Elliott's treatise, 69 the first edition described 
the constitutional status of municipalities thus: 
The extent of legislative power over municipal corpo-
rations is largely determined by the nature of the 
acts sought to be controlled, or the interest affected• 
Such corporations have a two-fold character. They are 
endowed with certain functions and possess powers and 
capacities which are granted to them for the benefit 
of their own citizens, and which are distinct from 
those which they possess as agencies of the state govern-
ment. As regards such private powers and capacities, 
municipal corporations are substantially on the same 
plane as private corporations. (Cites federal, Penn-
sylvania, Indiana, Illinoi~ and Michigan cases, includ-
ing the Hurlbut decision.) 7 0 
~~Charles B. Elliott, The Principles of the Law 
of Public Corporations, Chicago, Callaghan and Co., 1898; 
2d ed. by John E. Macy, 1910; 3d ed. by Stewart Chaplin, 
1925. 
70Ibid., sec. 22. 
His next section, 25, described the Indiana and Michigan 
cases which adopted the rule of inherent right to local 
self-government as "well considered", but on the basis of 
the Massachusetts Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 71 discussed 
below in Chapter VI, he said that inherent right theory is 
not general law. Section 28 was a full exposition of the 
right of a municipality to retain its private property in 
its private corporate capacity, with constitutional guaran-
tees against legislative meddling. Thus, Elliott stated 
what is essentially a moderate position in favor of local 
rights to control local affairs. He did not accept, but 
did not reject entirely either, the inherent, vested, and 
reserved right cases. He did accept the idea that local 
property and local concerns are the sole responsibility of 
municipalities themselves. 
The second edition of Professor Elliott's work72 
72 
was edited and rewritten by Professor John E. Macy of Boston 
University Law School. All of the above material was strick-
en, and Dillon's Rule given as the only law applicable to 
local rights. There was no mention in the second edition 
of private or inherent right, even as an interesting diver-
gent strain in the law. In effect, sections 25 to 27, which 
7lcommonwealth v. Plaisted, 1889, 148 Mass. 375, 
19 N.E. 224, 2 L.R.A. 42. 
72see footnote 69 above. 
replaced the original as cited above, parroted Dillon's 
Rule and the Massachusetts Supreme Court cases. 
The third edition of Professor Elliott's work73 
was edited and rewritten by Professor Stewart Chaplin of 
New York University Law School. New York, as ment ioned 
above, has somewhat of an inherent right variant tradition 
in certain cases. Professor Chaplin restored the balance, 
deleting Dillon's Rule entirely, deleting the Massachusetts 
73 
cases, and in sections 37 to 40, which replaced the sections 
cited in the two earlier editions, he cautiously stated all 
the divergent trends,and avoided taking a strong stand on any. 
Thus, in a single work, first appearing in 1898, there has 
been first a moderately strong statement of local rights, "" 
then an absolute denial of local rights, and finally a 
moderate statement avoiding any strong position. Despite 
the currents of law in the courts, the inherent right theory 
and the idea of local rights somehow vested, or of the pri-
vate character of the municipality, continued to be stated 
hopefully in the texts. 
Professor Charles F. Beach, Jr., in his work of 
1893, 74 stated the law in section 712 thus: 
And as regards property of exclusively local concern, 
the State has no right to interfere and control by 
73see footnote 69, above. 
74Beach, op. cit. 
compulsory legislation the action of municipal corpo-
rations. 
In section 729, much as had Professor Elliott, he stated 
that a municipality in its private character may be entitled 
to the constitutional protections of individuals. 
Professor Howard s. Abbott in his treatise of 1905 
gave clear approbation to the private rights, of a munici-
pality as to their local property and affairs: 
The legislature cannot exercise over these the same 
degree of control which it ordinarily exercises over 
the public corporation and its public property •••• 
Acting as a private corporation ••• the public corpo-
ration, so far as legislative control is concerned, 
stands on an equal basis with a private corporation 
or an individual. A municipal corporation proper more 
frequently acts as and assumes this character of a 
private corporation •••• In its capacity as an individu-
al, a public corporation deals with the legislature or 
the sovereign upon the same basis of equality as a 
private person or corporation •••• The legislature can 
no more arbitrarily pass laws affecting these interests 
t han it can those of private individuals •••• (T)hey 
(the courts) are also more and more recognizing that, 
from the point of view of the inviolable private rights 
of municipal corporations, these bodies may hold pro-
perly as private in character and therefore as invi-
olable in character by any governmental action as the 
property of individuals. It is indeed apparent that 
this point ~as not been reached without considerable 
reluctance. o 
With only this brief acknowledgement of the mass of cases to 
the contrary, the learned professor stated the law as he 
w:ould like it to be. 
63. 
75Abbott, op. cit., sees. 82, 97, pp. 127-29, 162-
74 
• 
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Some scholars tend to view the work of such legal 
authors as dry, technical, and unmindful of the currents of 
political, social, and constitutional thought and experience. 
As the analysis above points out, the contrary is the case. 
By the tradition of jurisprudence, the task of the text-
writers is not merely to restate the law, but to direct, 
criticize and improve it. Scarcely a work of jurisprudence 
from Bracton and Littleton to Cardozo, Moore and Corbin, is 
without its polemical and social-ameliorating passages and 
authorities. 
The governmental actualities of the twentieth cen-
tury have had little effect on the thinking of American 
judges in relation to this problem of the constitutional 
distribution of power between the state and its political 
subdivisions. Indeed, many of these judges are unaware that 
the monolithic central state authority which is so firmly 
buried in most of their texts, cases, and precedents is the 
product of a fixed historical era, and rests largely upon 
the philosophical works of John Austin. Much of Austin's 
philosophy was directed to an analysis of the unified na-
tional government of his nation and temporal period. His 
basic concepts left an ineradicable mark on the still-plastic 
law of England, and through that law, on American jurispru-
dence. Though Austin's work is more or less highly regarded, 
according to the turn of mind of the individual scholar, it 
is regarded in its own field of political theory, interna-
tional law, and jurisprudence, as an important contribution, 
but modified by certain later theories, and discounted by 
others. 
A definitive refutation of the Austinian concept 
of sovereignty has been made by Frederic w. Maitland, one 
of the "classical" writers of jurisprudence. From his writ-
ings, Professor Maitland is known as a theorist of an organic 
societ y, who is convinced that the state itself, and the 
various associated groups within society have a life of their 
own, independent of the individuals who compose the groups; 
further that such groups are "natural", and that they are not 
really "created" but come to exist. His famous Introduction 
to Otto Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Age76 dis-
cussed in detail the "Austinian" concept of sovereignty, so 
thoroughly accepted by the English and American courts. He 
did not like the clear-cut distinction made between the 
State, which is the sole repository of sovereignty in the 
theory of the English and American law, and the other groups 
which make up a society. He pointed out that medieval thought 
made no clear distinction between corporation and state, and 
that only in comparatively modern times did the corporation 
76otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 
Cambridge (Eng.), University Press, 1900. 
clearly become subordinated to the state. That he did not 
completely approve or the resulting pattern is clear: 
For, when all is said, there seems to be a genus of 
which State and Corporation are species. They seem 
to be permanently organized groups of men; they seem 
to be group-units; we seem to attribute acts and in-
tents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these 
units. Let it be allowed that the State is a highly 
peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked whether we 
ourselves are not the slaves of a jurist's theory and 
a little behind the age of Darwin if between the State 
and all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and 
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ask ourselves no questions about the origin of species 
•••• The State that Englishmen knew was a singularly uni-
cellular State, and at a critical time they were not too 
well equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which 
would meet the case ••• of some communities, commonwealths, 
corporations in America which seemed to have wills--and 
hardly fictitious wills--of their own, and which became 
States and United States.77 
He traced the alternate theory of the origin of 
such groups from the "Fiction Theory" of Pope Innocent IV 
(i.e., that the corporation is a person; but it is a person 
by fiction and only by riction) to the modern "concession 
Theory" of English and American law (i.e., that the corpo-
ration is, and must be, the creature of the State. "Into its 
nostrils the State must breathe the breath of a fictitious 
life, for otherwise it would be no animated body but individ-
ualistic dust." 78), and commented: 
Long ago English lawyers recei~d the Concession Theory 
from the eanonists. Bred in the free fellowship of 
77Ibid., p. ix. 
78rbid., pp. xix, xxx. 
unchartered Inns, they were the very men to swallow it 
whole.79 
Note the neat irony of Professor Maitland in the above state-
ment, in pointing out that the centuries-old unchartered Inns 
of Court were in themselves a refutation of the Concession 
Theory. The state had breathed into the Inns no "fictitious 
life"; yet they remained not "individualistic dust'' but ef-
fective organizations. He continued: 
Blackstone could even boast that the law of England 
went beyond 1 the civil law' in its strict adhesion to 
this theory; . and he was right, for the civilians (con-
tinental European legal scholars) of his day generally 
admitted that, though in principle the State's consent 
to the erection of a corporation was absolutely neces-
sary, still there were Roman texts which might be deemed 
to have given that consent in advance and in general 
terms for the benefit of corporations of certain in-
nocuous kinds •••• Nowhere has the Concession Theory been 
proclaimed more loudly, more frequently, more absolute-
ly, than in America •••• Ignorant men on board the 'May-
flower' may have thought that, in the presence of God 
and of one another, they could covenant and combine 
themselves into 'a civil body politic'. Their descend-
ants know better. A classical definition has taught 
that 'a Corporation is a Franchise', and a franchise is 
a por~bon of the State's power in the hands of a sub-
. ject. 
Maitland's scorn for the too-wise descendants is 
plain to behold, and he includes Chancellor Kent therein. 
The concession theory, so firmly embedded in English and 
American law, is not so highly regarded elsewhere. 
In Germany ••• the Concession Theory has fallen from its 
79Ibid., ibid. 
80Ibid., pp. xxx, xxxi. 
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high estate; the Romanists are deserting it •••• rt has 
become difficult to maintain that the State makes 
corporations in any other sense than that in which 
79 
the State makes marriages when it declares that people 
who want to marry can do so by going, and cannot do so 
without going, to church or registry •••• Whether we 
like it or not, the Concession Theory has notice to 81 quit, and may carry the whole Fiction Theory with it. 
The "wave of the future", he writes, is away from rigid con-
cepts of a sovereign state "creating" its "subordinate" 
political and social units, and toward a true pluralism, a 
recognition of the nature of the groups into which men form 
t hemselves, independently of the power of the state: 
However much the river may be gaining in strength and 
dept h and lucidity as it sweeps onward ••• away from 
c orporateness and towards contractual obligation, away 
(i t may be added) from Germanic lands and towards the 
Ete r nal City. It will also be gathered that the set 
of t houghts about Law and Sovereignty into which Eng-
l ishmen were lectured by John Austin appears to Dr. 
Gierke as a past stage. For him Sovereignty is an at-
t r ibute, not of some part of the State, but of the 
Gesammtperson, the whole organized community •••• Some 
f r i endly critics would say that in the past we could 
aff ord to accept speciously logical but brittle theori e s 
bec'ause we knew that they would never be subjecte d to 
serious strains. Some would warn us that in the future 
the less we say about a supralegal, suprajural plenitude 
of power concentrated in a single point at Westminster 
- -concentrated in one single organ of an increasingly 
complex commonwealth--the better for that commonwealth 
may be the days that are coming.82 
Hence, in the course of a few pages, Professor I~it-
land destroys the basis in law, philosophy and jurisprudence 
81Ibid., pp. xxxvii-xxxviii. 
82Ibid., p. xliii. 
which the New England courts have used to subordinate the 
New England town, no matter what its claims to prior organ-
ization and historical rights. Unfortunately for the New 
England town, however, the Austinian concepts of jurispru-
dence are so firmly and unconsciously buried in the cases 
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and in the minds of judges and lawyers of the United States 
that no influence of Roman theorists or of criticism from 
writers such as Maitland or Harvey Walker seems likely to 
have any effect. The Legislature must be supreme; an 1m= 
perium in imperio is a deadly evil; towns and cities may do 
nothing except those acts specifically authorized by charter, 
constitution, or statute. Dillon's Rule is virtually part 
of the air American judges breathe. No matter how obsolete 
in theory, specious in philosophical basis, or harmful in 
practice, the centralized Austinian sovereignty of the state 
government must be preserved. 
Home Rule: The Continuing Impact of Theories 
and Past Decisions 
This Austinian concept of sovereignty, discussed 
above, whether consciously or unconsciously, underlies the 
theories of Professors Dillon and McBain, and forms the 
heritage of most of the American constitutional law decisions 
on the subject of the state-local constitutional relation-
ship.83 Despite constitutional or statutory changes re-
lating to the municipality, the legislatures and the courts 
and their patterns of thought remain pretty much the same. 
Thus Dillon's Rule applies, in the absence of constitution-
al provision to the contrary, to a home rule charter city 
today in much the same fashion that it applies now and has 
been applied in the past, to a non-home rule ~unicipality. 
Courts have been accustomed for a century or more to inter-
prating every legal proposition against the local unit and 
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in behalf of the state. They will not be prepared to change 
that mode of interpretation merely because of a conventional 
new charter or constitutional amendment granting home rule. 
To be truly effective, home rule provisions must be drafted 
in such terms as will withstand court tests in which judges 
will attempt to apply the traditional rules of law and 
Austinian concepts of sovereignty. 
The twentieth-century municipality usually has con-
tinued to find itself pretty much restricted to the powers 
outlined in its charter and by state law. The constitutional 
order has not changed, and a constitution which was a limit-
ing document before did not become a granting document after 
a home rule amendment. Home rule statutes can be changed by 
85rhe notions of Austinian sovereignty referred to 
are to be found in John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
4th ed, 187·3, vol. 1, p. 270, as cited by Walker, op. cit, 
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another statute, or, as is more likely, nibbled away, little 
by little, by peripheral later statut~s.84 The history of 
home rule in the twentieth century has been a history of 
local disillusionment. In those few states where the con-
stitutional order was based upon a constitution viewed in 
some way as a granting document, leaving some residue of 
sovereignty in the people and in the units of government 
closest to them, the towns and cities, home rule has been 
fairly successful. Rodney Mott illustrated this fact in a 
recent article.85 He spoke despairingly of the problem of 
making home rule theory clear to courts trained in the old 
tradition. He stated that courts in decision after decision 
have whittled down home rule statutes "Until one can count 
on the fingers of one's hand the states which now give cities 
reasonable freedom to decide what services to undertake." 
It is his opinion that only when the old judicial idea of 
84For a clear analysis of this problem, see Harvey 
Walker's "Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule", 1955, 
50 Northwestern Law Review 571. The author is much indebted 
to this distinguished political scientist for the clear ex-
pression of the ideas in his article; the author had formed 
much the same conclusions before encountering Professor 
Walker's article, and was delighted to find these notions 
expressed in complete and orderly form by a mature analyst. 
For the multiple ways in which a state legislature can pass 
local legislation and avoid the appearance of doing so, 
see Henry Hubbard, "Special Legislation for Municipalities", 
1905, 18 Harvard Law Review 588. 
85Rodney L. Mott, "Strengthening Home Rule", 1950, 
National Municipal Review, 39:172. 
monolithic sovereignty is overcome can present-day home rule 
really become effective. Of the complex problem thus pre-
sented, he stated: 
The theory that the city is but the stepchild of the 
state is by no means sacrosanct. Indeed, it did not 
obtain wide acceptance until the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century when Judge Dillon foisted it upon 
us •••• so great was his influence that his doctrine 
that municipal corporations are "simply agencies of 
the state that creates them" and "are subject alone 
to the control of the legislature" supplanted the 
principle of the inherent right to local self-govern-
ment which had been tentatively espoused by Judge 
Cooley in Michigan.s6 
The article is in effect a call for federalism within the 
states and for cities and towns to exercise co-equal status 
with the state. In those states which had concluded through 
judicial decision that towns and cities were entitled to 
some sort of vested or inherent right, home rule was largely 
unnecessary, but successful when adopted. It will be per• 
ceived at this stage that this idea of vested or inherent 
right can be viewed either as a sword or as a shield. As a 
sword, i t will give the American municipality the status of 
a municipality with a limiting type of charter, in a state 
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where the constitution is viewed as a grant. That is, it 
will allow the local unit to undertake any project not closed 
to it by statute, charter, or constitution, or in other words, 
abolish the ultra vires rule as to municipal powers. As far 
I 
86Ibid., 174 p. • 
as the author has been able to ascertain, not one of the 
American states has gone so far as to make a flat statement 
to this effect, whether in judicial opinion or otherwise. 
Yet, many of the cases, as in Michigan and Indiana, have per-
mitted local governments to undertake projects not specifi-
cally permitted elsewhere, or permitted by reasonable im-
plication from the documents involved. Alternately, these 
local rights may be viewed as a shield, and it is in this 
capacity that they have most often served in the American 
experience. The vast majority of all decisions of this 
sort in the United States, will be seen on analysis to have 
held that these rights are in the nature of a shield against 
either legislative expropriation of local property, legisla-
tive meddling with, or replacement of local governmental 
offices and services. 
Even in the years immediately after the turn of the 
nineteenth century, certain of the commentators87 expressed 
the opinion that statutory home rule would not work. A 
legislature so untrustworthy as to make such a statute de-
sirable as a protection against it is certainly not the type 
of legislature which would feel compunction at by-passing 
84 
such a statute when such seemed desirable. If the desideratum 
87see e.g., Duane Mowry, "The Government of Cities", 
1903, 65 Albany Law Journal 85. 
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is to get the legislature out of local affairs, the only ef-
fective way of doing so is by constitutional amendment, or 
even constitutional convention, so that no overlooked clauses 
are left to confuse the issue. The Rhode Island experience, 
discussed below in Chapter VII, is a fair ex~mple of what may 
happen in the case of constitutional amendment. The Connect-
icut experience with its first and second statutory home rule 
provisions , virtually ineffective, also discussed below, is 
a good example of the fate of such statutory provisions. 
The problem is essentially this: Home rule statutes 
and home rule amendments, in order to be effective, must be 
able to stand court tests on many different points. Once 
these provisions fall into the hands of the ·judges, the 
traditional rules will be applied to them. Judges decide 
cases on the basis of cases extending back fifty or a hundred 
years or more. Such cases will usually predate the home rule 
amendment, charter, or statute. They will have been decided 
upon the basis of a centralized theory of sovereignty for the 
most part. That is, the rules evolved in the cases in which 
towns and cities disputed their rights to freedom to conduct 
their own afrairs free from legislative interference on one 
ground or another will determine right now, at the present 
time, how current home rule statutes will be interpreted when 
put to the test. The old decisions, which might seem dead to 
those unacquainted with these principles, determine the 
progress of home rule in a particular state more than any 
amount of Practical politics or current comment. The import 
for present government is plain. If the judges turn to the 
theorists mentioned in the preceding ca.ses in their states, 
they will almost certainly encounter the theory of ffudge 
Dillon or a copy of it. If they turn to later editions of 
Judge McQuillin's work, they will find that stripped of most 
of the early theories espoused by that local-right stalwart, 
and reclot~ed in the ideas of subsequent editors more able 
to compile cases and to appreciate the reasoning therein 
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than to appreciate the social teleology involved, or the 
political theory therein espoused. As Professor Harvey 
Walker has pointed out,88 most of these compilers lack any 
social science training at all, and those who have any, have 
the merest mechanical undergraduate training in the subject. 
In law school, they rarely study municipal or state and local 
government law. If they do, they study it for the most part 
from a text which reflects the philosophy of Professor Dil-
lon and the old common-law commentators, or from a modern 
text which tries to be "objective'! 
Home Rule: Solutions to the Problem 
As has been explained above, home rule statutes or 
88walker, op. cit., pp. 578-8. 
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constitutional amendments will not succeed in their ends 
unless battle is joined with the New England courts on their 
own legalistic grounds. Austinian concepts of monolithic 
sovereignty, the idea that the constitution is a limiting 
document and the municipal charter a granting document, 
Dillon's Rule and the generations of judicial decisions it 
spawned in the New England courts, the continuing influence 
of the law treatises on the subject--all of these must be 
dealt with squarely and decisively if home rule is to be 
meaningful. If these concepts are not dealt with, the courts 
will conti nue to interpret home rule provisions and munici-
pal powers according to the same rules and within the same 
framework as before. 
To secure meaningful independence of local action, 
the state constitution must be amended systematically to 
offset or abolish the hindering principles of the past, one 
after the other. Three or four amendments would probably 
accomplish the task. One such amendment might repeal Dillon's 
Rule and instruct the courts that home rule statutes are to 
be regarded as remedial statutes, to be interpreted as broad-
ly as possible to secure the ends for which they were adopted,89 
89under the common law rule, statutes in derogation 
of the common law are to be strictly construed. Since stat-
utes virtually by definition are in derogation of the common 
law, almost all of them are strictly construed. On the other 
hand, if a statute is remedial, as described by the legisla-
ture or interpreted by the court, it will be construed as 
and the same for home rule statutes and charters as well. 
Another a~endment defining the American municipal corpo-
ration precisely as such a corporation was defined by the 
English courts in the eighteenth and early mineteenth cen-
turies might secure astounding results, if the language 
were made so clear as to be unmistakable, and if the intent 
were stated therein. An amendment defining exactly what 
the private character of a municipal corporation was, and 
what constitutional provisions of federal and state consti-
tutions were deemed directly applicable would .be an inter-
esting and effective one, especially in light of the rule 
of Erie R. co. v. Tompkins, 90 that the state law on a sub-
ject is to bind all federal courts sitting in that state in 
matters of substantive law, and is to bind other federal 
courts as well as to cases originating in that particular · 
state. 
There is only one practical difficulty to put to 
89(continued) broadly as possible. See Clyde E. 
88 
Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1954, especially at p. 10, 
where he quotes a commentator of the Jacksonian period as 
saying "In the hands of judges like Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, 
the common law became a bottomless reservoir of reasons why 
no one should do anything." See also Roscoe Pound, The 
Spirit of the Common Law, Boston, Marshall Jones Co.~921, 
and, same author, ncommon Law and Legislation", 1908, 21 
Harvard Law Review 383. 
90Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 u.s. 64, 58 
S.Ct. 817 , 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114, A.L.R. 1487. 
flight dreams of Utopia, however. This is the practical 
political problem of recruiting popular support for such a 
constitutional amendment. The mere thought of starting a 
popular movement to repeal Dillon's Rule, or to redefine 
the legal and constitutional position of the American muni-
cipal corporation would be enough to bring down the house 
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in a meeting of practical politicians. It is possible, how-
ever, to drum up considerable support for a home rule consti-
tutional amendment. If one could word such an amendment 
cleverly enough, he might provide it with a little protec-
tion against the judicial salvos which would otherwise rid-
dle it rather thoroughly. However, it is difficult to ex~ 
plain to the non-political scientist or the non-lawyer ' just 
how relatively ineffective a home rule amendment ca.n be in 
practice. The ordinary citizen expends every effort, and 
conceive s of the goal as having been won and Utopia achieved 
if the electorate adopts the home rule constitutional change 
at the polls. His disappointment is bitter when he realizes 
that forces literally beyond his comprehension have snatched 
a good part of his victory from him. Hence, the author has 
stated earlier in this chapter that only in a state with a 
tradition, of reserved or inherent local rights is a home 
rule constitutional amendment likely to be substantially ef-
fective as originally intended. Yet, as also pointed out, 
a state with such a tradition does not much need such an 
90 
amendment. 
Practical comment to the effect described above is 
not lacking in the literature of' political science and its 
companion field, public law. For instance, Professor Arthur 
B. Winter, describing the course of municipal home rule in 
those twenty-seven states which had adopted it by constitu-
tional amendment as of 195791 gives it as his clear opinion 
that the cases which had disputed the claimed right to local 
self-government in the nineteenth century were the same 
cases which governed the application of the constitutional 
home rule amendments in those states. The amendments were 
little more effective than the tradition of local independ-
ence in the particular state. The courts in his own state, 
Nebraska, for instance, had ruled that in matters of state-
wide concern, statutes took precedence over home rule amend-
ment. What was local and what was state-wide was to be de-
termined only case to case, on the basis of the judicial 
precedents. Dillon's Rule was applied to all such cases, 
and the Nebraska towns were and are held to have only those 
powers expressly given, necessarily or fairly to be implied 
or incident to granted powers, and those essential to the 
declared objects and purposes of the municipal corporation. 
91Arthur B. Winter, "Municipal Home Rule, A Progress 
Report?", 1957, 36 Nebraska Law Review 447. 
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Professor Winter's conclusion is that home rule in Nebraska 
is pretty well negated by the courts• adherence to Dillon's 
Rule and to their past cases. 
Similarly Professor Walker stated in an article 
four years ago: 
Except in Texas and perhaps in California, there is a 
clearly discernible tendency on the part of the courts 
to undermine the solid foundations which the cities 
thought they had secured through the grant of munici-
pal home rule. As a result, today in many states little 
is left other than the power to adopt a charter specify-
ing the framework o~2local government, and even this is sometimes impaired. 
After considering much the same problems here presented, he 
presented his proposed solution--"to kill off the bases of 
legislative domination", as he expressed it. He proposed 
four steps to accomplish this end. First, i he said, Dillon t s 
Rule should be repealed by constitution or statute, and ultra 
vires (the idea that activities not prohibited by charter, 
constitution or law, but also not permitted either, are there-
fore beyond the authority of a municipality to undertake} 
abolished. Professor Walker's second proposal was to elimi-
nate the distinction for all purposes between governmental 
and proprietary functions, and to establish the idea of con-
current power. This would mean that a municipality would no 
longer be closed out of a particular governmental area be-
cause the state government has chosen to act in that area. 
92walker, op. cit., pp. 573-5. 
Third~ he said, make every level of government pay for its 
own expenditures from its own revenue. His fourth step 
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would allow creation, change and abolition of local govern-
ment and/or functions only by the consent of the residents, 
either directly or through their local government represent a -
tives. 
Professor Walker's program, which is treated in it s 
other aspects later in thi s chapter~ is quite an ambitious 
one. If followed, it would almost certainly succeed in 
destroying the worst evils which beset municipalities. How-
ever, the s ame difficulties would face Professor Walker' s 
plans as would face the author's: i.e., how to secure po-
litical and grass roots support or enthusiasm for such tech-
nical proposals as one to repeal or forbid the application 
of the ul tra vires rule as regards municipal corporations. 
Home Rule: Analysis and Prediction of Trends 
Against this background, then must be placed the 
past, pr.esent and prospective home rule experience of the 
New Engl and municipality in the twentieth century. From 
the historical and legal evolution of the status of the 
municipality, which will be detailed in the succeeding chap-
ters of this dissertation, the events of the past, present, 
and future become meaningful parts of a pattern. 
Thus in Vermont and New Hampshire it would be 
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anticipated that no strong home rule movements would or will 
arise. In these two states the tradition of town freedom 
runs deeply, the socio-economic situation is such that no 
great problems of urban sociology or uneven taxation pre-
sent themselves, and the constitutional pattern of the state 
recognizes strongly and clearly the existence and desirabil-
ity of certain rights to local self-government in local af-
fairs. I t was to be anticipated, and it will be shown to 
have eventuated, that these states would pursue their slow 
and orderl y courses, adopting such improvements in local and 
admini strative structure as had proved their worth, but con-
servative l y and pensively. 
I t would likewise be anticipated that in Rhode 
Island and Connecticut, where the tradition of local inde-
pendence r an deeply, though almost beyond the pale of judici-
al recognition, the towns would move for home rule statutes 
and const.itutional amendments to secure for themselves that 
recognition of local rights denied admission elsewhere. This 
is likewise what has transpired. 
In Maine and Massachusetts, where the tradition of 
legislative supremacy ran most strongly, and the social and 
judicial tradition of local rights was weakest, 93 it would 
93cf. the standard handbook for Massachusetts town 
officers in the early part of the twentieth century, James 
s. Garland, New England Town Law, Boston, Boston Book Co., 
be anticipated that home rule would have the least chance of 
success in adoption, and in practice, after adoption, though 
it might be . sought by reform groups. As well, it would be 
anticipated that the legislatures of these states would at-
tempt to find a palliative to turn the force of such home 
rule movements as might develop, leaving the legislature 
still supreme. This also is what has happened in those 
states. 
A.M.A. Model Home Rule Plan 
There have been numerous analyses made of the rea-
sons for s uccess or failure of home rule movements. Several 
approaches have been used in the several states, and several 
model plans and suggestions have been put forth, designed to 
meet or bypass one or more of the obstacles described above. 
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Perhaps the best-known of the model home rule plans are those 
93(continued) 1906, p. 29: "Connecticut gives the 
broadest authority to towns •••• In Massachusetts, by-laws do 
not go int o effect unless approved by the attorney~general 
of the Commonwealth. In Maine, the approval of the county 
commissioners or of a judge of the supreme judicial court, 
is required to give them validity." Recently the town 
manager of Stoughton, Massachusetts, commented: "We have a 
state in which there is little self-government. Massachu-
setts is generally considered one of the most centralized 
states in the entire nation." Robert J.M. O'Hare, "Real 
Home Rule for Massachusetts Communities", in ProceediAAS 
of the Tenth Governor's Conference, June 3-4, 1958, BUreau 
of Government Research, Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst 
(Mass.), 1958, p. 44. 
suggested by the American Municipal Association94 and the 
National Municipal League.95 
95 
The American Municipal Association plan, drafted 
largely by Dean Jefferson B. Fordham, would amend the consti-
tution of a state adopting the plan, to do away with the 
ultra vires concept as applied to municipal powers. Of course, 
an adopting municipality would be empowered to draft its own 
charter. The basic theory of the A.M.A. plan is to avoid any 
possible application of Dillon's Rule by eliminating the base s 
94American Municipal Association, Model Constitution-
al Provisions for Municipal Home Rule, Chicago, The Associa-
tion, 1953, (title :page says "Jefferson B. Fordham on behalf' 
of' the As s ociation"). 
95National Municipal League, Model State Constitution, 
New York, The League, 1921; 2d ed., 1928; 3d ed., 1933; 4th 
ed., 1941; 5th ed., 1956 (revised 1948). The author has drawn 
particularly upon the texts of the f'ourth and fifth edi tiona, 
and the explanatory notes therein, by John A. Fairlie at page 
47 of the fourth edition, and by Arthur W. Bromage at page 
45 of the f ifth edition. The l ocal government sections here 
discussed appear on p ages 17 et seg. of the fourth, and 15 
et seq . of t he fifth editions. An extensive and technical 
analys i s of h ome rule plans of the past several decades, with 
comment, citations to periodical and scholarly literature, 
and s.nal ysi s of court decisions and practical results will 
be found in Jefferson B. Fordham, Local Government Law, Brook-
lyn , Foundation Press, 1949, pp. 36-175. See also the series 
of' articles in the 1932 issue of the National Municipal Re-
view, vol. 21, for a presentation of home rule plans and the-
ory of that date. The Chicago Home Rule Commission, Reports, 
Chicago, The Commission, 1954, especially Report -193 et seg., 
and 222, are probably the best recent survey of' home rule the-
ory and practice. Dean Fordham recommends these highly, but 
is understandably annoyed that the Commission :fi'·ailed to dis-
cern his basic purpose in writing the A.M.A. model provisions. 
Jefferson B. Fordham, "Local Government in the Larger Scheme 
of Things", 1955, 8 Vanderbilt Law Review 667, at 676. 
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for conflict between the local unit and the state. The local 
unit would be empowered to exercise all powers not denied to 
it by chart er, statute, or constitution. However, no speci-
fic powers are reserved to the municipality beyond the reach 
of the legislature. The legislature might enter any fie l d 
at all, by general statute, and close that area to municipal 
activity. Classification by population would be allowed, 
but at least two cities would have to be in every population 
group; al s o, all powers conferred by law upon any municipali-
ty of a given population class would automatically be con-
ferred upon all local units . within that class. Only munic i -
pal! ties already in being under a general law would be eligi -
ble to take advantage of these provisions, and the adopt i on 
o'f a "limiting" charter would be necessary be'fore a munici-
pality could enjoy any o'f the rights provided. It will be 
noted that this type of home rule provision would automat-
ically do away with the Dillon's Rule split between powers 
essentially local as opposed to powers of statewide concern. 
It would not be left to the courts to decide which activities 
are of local and which of a state-wide character. Until the 
legi s lature acted, all areas would be open to local activity, 
as long as such activities were not forbidden by charter or 
constitution. Once the legislature had acted, the area 
would be open or closed to the local unit as the legi s lature 
might determine. The legislature would be clearly supreme, 
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when it chose to act. 
The essential problem presented by the practical 
application of Dillon's Rule is the distinguishing of powers 
properly belonging to the state from those belonging to the 
municipality. It will be recalled f'rom the discussion above, 
that always associated with Dillon's Rule in practice is the 
doctrine that once the state has acted in a legislative area, 
that area is closed to action by local units unless the 
statute specifically preserves to local units the right to 
act in the area. No matter how clearly phrased the charter 
is, or the state constitution, or an enabling statute, the 
question of' deciding whether a particular activity is state 
or local will arise again and again. This question will 
arise because no drafter of such documents can foresee all 
possibilities of desired local activity. Again, the question 
recurs in subtly changed form, when the state has legislated 
in a certain field, in deciding whether the local legislation 
is actually in the same field, or in one similar, but dif-
ferent enough not to preclude local action. The judges have 
great difficulties in making the distinction, and as in other 
cases, tend to turn to standard legal encyclopedias, cases 
from other states, and most important, to their own past 
decisions, in defining which activities are which. 
Yet, even with this constant definition and rede-
f i nition, what is state and what is local will differ consider-
ably from state to state. Even a judge desirous of inter-
preting a home rule provision liberally may not even be 
aware that he is piling one single small stone upon what is 
to become the funeral cairn of that self-same home rule pro-
vision, when he turns to the previous decisions in his own 
state to see whether a city may or may not do a certain act, 
and accepts the definition given in previous cases as to 
whether a particular act is of state-wide concern or of only 
local interest. A compilation of what had been held to be 
state and what local was made by the Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Library in 1925, 96 covering ten home rule states. 
The study clearly indicated the influence of previous de-
cisions in determining the home rule pattern of the states. 
It is virtually a catalog of those function~ which cities 
thought they had been given authority to undertake, but which 
were closed to them by judicial interpretation. 
This problem of defining state and local functions 
and distinguishing them one from another affects all of the 
home rule plans which have been offered. The American Muni-
cipal Association home rule constitutional amendment has as 
one of i .ts outstanding features the entire avoidance of judi-
cial definition of such functions. Professor Fordham has 
96Henry G. Shellow, What Have Been Held to be State 
and Local Functions Under Home Rule Provisions of State Con-
stitutions, Madison (Wis.), Wisconsin Legislative Reference 
Library, 1925. 
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reiterated continuously in his writings the fact that there 
is hardly any such thing as a matter solely of interest to 
a local community, or a matter of strictly state-wide con-
cern. Most practical situations involve a decision as to 
whether a particular activity is more state-wide, or more 
local, rather than the absolute question as to whether an 
activity is of its nature local or state-wide. Yet, if a 
concern is local, most commonly in home rule states the 
area is closed to the state legislature. If it is state-
wide, the area is closed to the local community. Judges 
must make black and white decisions in a field where only 
grays are presented for their inspection. The A.M.A. plan 
purposely closes no field to the legislature, closes no 
field to the local unit, and leaves the ultimate choice to 
the legislature, which it can exercise only by occupying a 
field entirely. Concurrent activity is permitted in any 
field not clearly closed off by positive action of the le-
gislature. The National Municipal Association home rule 
plan, discussed below, prefers the traditional pattern where-
by the judges decide what is state and what is local. It 
attempts to guide the judges to more liberal decisions as 
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to activities permitted to the localities, first, by language 
intended to accomplish this, second, by permitting concurrent 
action unless by positive action the legislature specifies 
otherwise, third, by specifying a long list of powers intended 
to be strictly local, with specific instructions to judges 
to interpret these powers widely, virtually as remedial 
statutory language, and fourth, by permitting municipalities 
to act in any area not denied them positively by charter, 
constitution, or general statute. 
The A.M.A.-Fordham plan may seem a strange sort of 
home --rule suggestion, since the local unit is left with 
nothing, and the legislature would have even broader poten-
tial control over the local unit than most legislatures have 
today. Professor Fordham has explained that he considers 
this sort of constitutional provision necessary because only 
thus can the metropolitan area problems of American cities 
be solved. The legislature must be the agency for a constant 
redistribution of power between state government and local 
units. In a series of articles, 97 Professor Fordham explains 
97 Jefferson B. Fordham and Joe F. Asher, 11 Home Rule 
Powers in Theory and Practice", 1948, 9 Ohio State Law 
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Journal 18; Fordham, "The Challenge of Contemporary Problems", 
op. cit.; same author, "Home Rule-~A.M.A. Model", National 
Municipal Review, 1955, 44:137; same author, "Local Govern-
ment in the Larger Scheme of Things" (part of A Symposium 
on Local Government Law), 1955, 8 Vanderbilt Law Review 667; 
same author, "Introduction" (to a Symposium on Metropolitan 
Regionalism:. Developing Governmental Concepts), 1957, 105 
Univ·. of Pennsylvania Law Review 439; same author, "Challenge: 
Legislatures", 1958, National Municipal Review, 47:551. It 
is of interest to note that another author, John P. Keith, 
"Home Rule--Texas Style", 1955, National Municipal Review, 
44:184, in criticising the A.M.A.-Fordham plan points out 
that even the early volumes of McBain and McGoldrick (re-
ferred to earlier in this chapter) preferred specific enumer-
ated powers tot he uncertain ones which a legislature might 
give. Keith clearly prefers the enumerated powers of the 
N.M.L.-type plan. 
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that the legislature must be trusted, because only through 
this body can the jungle of local government units and 
special districts which surrounds American cities be cleared 
and made orderly. The problem is essentially that of metro-
politan home rule, rather than municipal home rule. If any 
reforming is to be done, it should be directed to reforming 
the legislature rather than to removing certain local units 
more or less completely or effectively from its control. 
wnicameralism is suggested, and other steps to improve the 
quality and procedure of state legislative bodies. More, 
rather than less legislative control is the A.M.A.-Fordham 
solution to the problems of the nation's municipalities. 
The A.M.A . plan excepts from control of the legislature only 
the mechanical features of the local charter itself: the 
municipal executive, legislature and administrative structure, 
personnel, and internal procedure. The only guarantee against 
legislative despoliation of any or all municipalities of the 
state is the provision of section ten that no increase may be 
made in municipal expenditures unless approved by the city 
legislature or by a two-thirds vote of all the members of 
each house of the state legislature, unless the legislature 
provides the funds for the proposed expenditure at the same 
legislative session. 
Upon analysis, it will be seen that Dean Fordham's 
plan does little more than abolish the ultra vires doctrine 
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in regard to municipal powers. At the same time, it strips 
the municipality of whatever guarantees it may have, whether 
in constitution or judicial decision, in the name of solving 
the metropolitan problem. Professor Fordham shows a trust 
in the legislature which few other experts in the field seem 
to share. Professors Arthur W. Bromage98 and Harvey Walker99 
in particular show positive distrust of current state legis-
latures, and are very dubious about the prospects that those 
bodies can or will be improved. 
As to the practical chances of success of the A.M.A.-
Fordham plan, two governmental experiences are relevant. 
Article VI, section 39-a of the West V~ginia constitution 
concerns a ho~e rule provision drafted by Professor Fordham, 
and is intended to confer upon any munic:i.pality which adopts 
a charter under such an amendment, the power to pass all 
ordinances in relation to local affairs not forbidden to it 
by constitution, charter, or general law. Classification 
is permitted. The relevant portion of the West Virginia 
98see footnote 95 above; Arthur W. Bromage, "Home 
Rule--N.M.L •. Model", 1955, National Municipal Review, 44:132; 
same author, "The Home Rule Puzzle 11 , 1957, National Municipal 
Review, 46:118. See also Karl Peterson, Jr., 11Home Rule--
Press View", 1955, National Municipal Review, 44 :143. 
99Harvey Walker, "Let Cities Manage Themselves", 
1947, National Municipal Review, 36:625; same author, " Muni-
cipal Government in Ohio Before 1912 11 , 1948, 9 Ohio State 
Law Journal 1; same author, "Toward a New Theory of Municipal 
Home Rule", 1955, 50 Northwestern Law Review 571. 
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amendment reads: 
Under such general laws, the electors of each munici-
pal corporation, wherein the population exceeds two 
thousand, shall have power and authority to frame, adopt 
and amend the charter of such corporation, or to amend 
an existing charter thereof, and through its legally 
constituted authority, may pass all laws and ordinances 
rela·ting to its municipal affairs: Provided, That any 
such charter or amendment thereto, and any such law or 
ordinance so adopted, shall be invalid and void if in-
consistent or in conflict with this Constitution or the 
general laws of the State then in effect, or thereafter 
from time to time enacted. 
Hence, the provision is intended to make the local charter a 
limiting rather than a granting document, both as interpreted 
by the author of this dissertation and by a commentator in 
that state, Harold J. Shs.mberger.lOO He pointed out that 
the amendment, drafted by Professor Fordham, and intended 
to be a "limiting" amendment, had been effective from 1936, 
the date of adoption, to 1954, the date of the article, only 
to allow municipalities to draft their own charters. The 
legislature interpreted the amendment as a "granting" one, 
and the West Virginia courts adhered rigidly to Dillon's 
Rule and to their precedents. The A.M.A. plan certainly 
spells out the home rule provision in much more exact 
lO~arold J. Shamberger, "Home Rule Still a Farce", 
1954, National Municipal Review, 43:523 . The Mott work re-
ferred to by Shamberger is Rodney L. Mott, Home Rule for 
America's Cities, Chicago, American Municipal Association, 
1949, p. Is. It should be pointed out that the language 
used in the A.M.A. home rule model plan is so clear and de-
finite as to be virtually unmistakable, even to the most 
hidebound judge. The West Virginia amendment language is 
quite inexact and capable of misinterpretation. 
language and far greater detail, but the West Virginia ex-
perience is calculated to give those considering such a 
plan some pause. Shamberger agrees with Rodney Mott that 
the solution to such treatment of home rule amendments by 
the legisl ature and the courts lies in forming aggressive 
associations of municipalities, since home rule seems to 
have succeeded best in states which have such associations. 
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However, it is submitted that such associations can do little 
to overco.me drafting difficulties and the pattern formed in 
the states by the antecedent circumstances prior to the 
adoption of home rule. 
The second relevant experience which might be cited 
is that of the municipal corporation in England. The author 
pretends no expert knowledge in this area, but it appears 
that the English courts regarded the charters of municipali-
ties in that country as limiting rather than granting docu-
ments until the middle of the nineteenth century, and prob-
' 
ably continue to do so today. The view of the courts is a 
moot point, however. Parliament, being the repository of 
all governmental power, and being unbound by a written con-
stitution, has chosen to occupy the field entirely.lOl Hence, 
lOlsee Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Problems, New 
York and London, Macmillan Company, 1903, where Professor 
Goodnow points out at page 95 et seq. that such administra-
tive control was first introduced into English local govern-
ment by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, and was speedily 
there being no area not preempted by parliamentary action, 
there remains no area of discretion within which a munici-
pality may act. The analogy to the Fordham-A.M.A. plan is 
rather close. The English Parliament chose to occupy the 
entire field of local government, where there were no re-
straints placed upon it, despite the liberal pattern of 
judicial decision. The A.M.A. plan would put few restraints 
upon the state legislature, even though it would enforce up-
on the courts a similar liberal pattern of decision. The 
end result might be the same, for better or worse. It would 
seem that few home rule partisans would regard such an 
eventuality as a satisfactory one. 
N.M.L. Model Home Rule Plan 
The National Municipal League has put out a model 
lOl(continued) expanded to include the whole field 
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of local government by such laws as the Municipal Corporations 
Act of 1835, the Consolidated (Public Health) Act of 1875, 
Police Acts of 1856 and 1888, Local Government Act of 1888, 
and many others almost too numerous to mention. See also 
Jefferson B. Fordham, Local Government Law, op. cit., pp. 
8-9. The author is particularly indebted to Professor Lashley 
G. Harvey of Boston University for pointing out that by the 
time of the Local Government Act of 1933, Parliament had ef-
fectively occupied the whole area of local government, and 
for referring him to: William A. Robson, The Development of 
Local Government, rev. ed., London, G. Allen and Unwin Co., 
1948, p. 237; William o. Hart, Introduction to the Law of 
Local Government, 4th _ed., London, Butterworth and Co., 1949, 
pp. 211 et seq.; J.H. Warren, Municipal Administration, London, 
Sir I. Pitman and Sons, 1948, p. 30. The author has drawn also 
upon: William Anderson (ed.), Local Government in Europe, New 
York and London, D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939, pp. 72 et seq.; 
and G. Montagu Harris, Local Government in Many Lands, London, 
P.S. King and Son, 1933, pp. 233 et seg. 
home rule plan as well, and has revised and rewritten the 
plan over the years.102 This plan is more "conventional" 
than the A.M.A. one, since it sets forth the powers of muni-
cipalities as to local affairs, property and government in 
broad terms, this describing the power of the local munici-
pality as to local affairs as complete. The language might 
well be interpreted as being "limiting" in character. How-
ever, the plan contains its own corrective for those courts 
which might feel bound by their own precedents and by Dil-
lon's Rule, in that it provides a ls.rge enumeration of powers 
declared specifically as local in character. Hence, even in 
a state where those powers of statewide character have been 
very broadly defined, while those local in nature have been 
correspondingly narrowly defined, according to a strict ap-
plication of Dillon's Rule, there is no question as to which 
areas are to be deemed local; of course, such constitutional 
language cannot be ignored by any court, no matter what it3 
precedents. The legislature may pass general laws of state-
wide application, but only if they are uniformly applicable 
to every city. 
Arthur W. Broma:ge, in commentingl03 on this N.M.L. 
planwhich he had helped to draft, states frankly that it 
102see footnote 95 above. 
103Bromage, "Home Rule--N.M.L. Model", op. cit. 
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constitute's the municipality as an imperium. in imperio, a 
sovereignt~ within a sovereignty. This is the result so 
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dreaded by Professor Fordham and by Judge Dillon and the state 
courts which follow his rule. Professor Bromage also states 
frankly that litigation will undoubtedly result under this 
plan, and t hat a heavy potential burden will thus be put upon 
the courts. He has no hope for reform of the rural-dominated 
and otherwise untrustworthy legislatures. While he has no 
great faith in the judicial process, he clearly prefers to 
trust the courts rather than the legislatures. The defenses 
against legislative interference in local affairs are purpose-
ly made intricate. He recognizes that any success which the 
N.M.L. plan may enjoy will depend upon the antecedent pattern 
of judicial decision within the individual states. 
It must be recognized that the ultimate success of ••• 
home rule articles in existence among the states, 
rests 'upon a wider and broader sweep of judicial inter-
pretation •••• No const itutional language can finally 
settle all the controversies which may arise between 
the pd,wers of the state in matters of statewide interests 
and the authority of local self-government.l04 
In a later article,l05 Professor Bromage reviewed 
the different forms of existing home rule constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and commented upon the experience of 
the various states with such provisions. He distinguished 
l04I id b ., pp. 136, 158. 
105Bromage, "The Home Rule Puzzle", op. cit. 
four basic patterns: 
(i) Self-executing constitutional provisions, which 
he considers best. 
(2) Mandatory non-self-executing constitutional pro-
visions, as used in 1fichigan. This type of pro-
visions orders the legislature to set up plans of 
home rule. It appears to work well, but gives the 
legislature certain opportunities to affect the 
operation of home rule. 
(3) Permissive non-self-executing constitutional 
provisions, as used in Pennsylvania. The legisla-
ture may, but need not set up home rule standards 
and procedures. This plan is not as sure in opera-
tion as the above, and many years may pass before 
tl1e legislature may elect to set up home rule 
statutes. 
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(4) Legislative, or statutory home rule, which he 
d~scribes as "a slender reed .. " Courts have often 
struck down this type of statute as an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power, as in Michigan in 1899 
and Wisconsin in 1911. The courts have also ef-
fectively nullified legislative home rule in Florida. 
These patterns are the only possible routes to home rule, and 
one interested in maximizing the chances of success of a 
particular home rule movement might well give attention to 
the first pattern of adoption. Dean Fordham calls any type 
of constitutional home rule provision which leaves anything 
for the legislature to do, "legislative home rule." This 
is confusing, and the classification of Professor Bromage 
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is much to be preferred. A system which does not distinguish 
between types two and three above, and describes the fourth 
as statutory home rule is not exact, and invites confusion 
of the logically identical "legislative" and "statutory" 
classifications. 
Home Rule .in Practice 
In a rather strange series of decisions, entirely 
outside the ordinary pattern of judicial rulings on municipal 
powers, the Texas Supreme Court (civil} in the era after 
World War II rejected its own clear line of cases in the 
pattern off Dillon's Rule to adopt the position that Texas 
I 
home rule imunicipalities might exercise all powers not denied 
to them by constitution, general statute, or charter.l06 
With no obvious reason for doing so, the court reinterpreted 
the Texas constitutional provision, Article XI, section 5, 
on home rule in such a fashion that the state turned almost 
l06 John P. Keith, "Home Rule--Texas Style", op. cit.; 
same author, City and County Home Rule in Texas, Austin 
(Texas), Univ. of Texas Institute of Public Affairs, 1951, 
P• 86 et seq. 
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overnight from one in which home rule municipalities were 
no better bff in regard to constitutional status vis a vis 
the legislature than municipalities in most other home rule 
states, to one which had adopted by court decision the A.M.A. 
type of ho~e rule plan. This action by the Texas courts is 
even more remarkable when one discovers, on reading the con-
stitutional provision, no word or phrase which would ordi-
narily be construed as conferring such status on such muni-
cipalities. Both Texas and Ohio are among the states with 
a variant judicial tradition of some s·ort of inherent local 
right of self-government. These Texas and Ohio cases were 
similar to those in the Michigan and Connecticut pattern 
commented upon above in this chapter, and in the later chap-
ters of this dissertation. It appears that the Texas ex-
perience may be an instance in which such antecedents in a 
state have determined the pattern of state-local relations, 
and predetermined the fate of home rule provisions adopted 
decades after the pattern was established. The author of 
this dissertation has not done the exhaustive research neces-
sary to trace the early history, tradition, judicial pre-
cedents, and the like, which form the patterns of influence 
in the part.icular states outside of New England. However, 
it is intevesting to note that of' the eleven states usually 
spoken of a!s having advanced some sort of inherent right 
theory as a dictum or rule of decision of the state supreme 
court, f'i ve1 , Michigan, New York, Ohio, Texas and California, 
are usually regarded as having effective home rule provisions, 
enf'or ced 1a:rgely according to tbe intention of' the drafters. 
Nebraska II'Il.lP-icipalities do not seem to :have been so fortunate. 
The Nebraska supreme court bas strictly limited the eff ect 
of the home[ rule provisions by an application of earlier pre-
cedents formed under the influence of' Dillon's Rule, with its 
accompanying theory of government. Neither Iowa nor Indiana 
I has as yet adopted home rule, and as in the case of New Ramp-
shire and Vermont, seem to have no pressing need to do so, 
since judic[al decisions have construed local powers sensibly. 
Kentucky ana Montana still follow the inherent right doctrine, 
at least where necessary to prevent the worst legislative 
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abuses, and give a liberal interpretation to local powers. 
Pem~sylvania merely used the idea in one 1937 case, and the 
inherent right idea definitely seems not part of its tradition~ 07 
Prof'esaor Arthur B. Winter in two recent articles108 
has traced the attitude of the Nebraska Supreme Court toward 
I 
lOV 
· Jefferson B. Fordham, Local Government Law, ~ 
cit., pp. 4.3-50, cites most of the relevant cases. See also 
'J'OEi1 R. Kerstetter, 11 Sta tu.s of Municipal Home Rule", 1956, 
Public Mana~ement, .3€3::74, where the fact that the governor of' 
New York recently set up a special commission to study encroach-
ments on the operation of the home rule constitutional prov-
isions by the legislature, and particularly by the courts, is 
emphasized. , 
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Arthur B. Winter, "Municipal Horae Rule ••• ", ~ 
cit.;: same author, 11 Home Rule Neglected", 1958, National Mun-
ICIPal Revi~w, 47:451. The poll referred to in the text is 
reported in , the latter article. The Winter findings have also 
been discus§ed in some detail earlier in this chapter. 
the Nebraska home rule .constitutional amendment, Article XI, 
section 2~ adopted in 1912. From adoption until the mid-
1920's, the court was hospitable to the home rule idea. · From 
I 
roughly 1~22 to the present, the weight of the previous 
Nebraska cases in the Dillon tradition made itself felt in 
the definition of those activities considered state-wide, 
upon which the legislature could act as it wished, and those 
considered local. Professor Winter stated that little is 
left of t~e original constitutional grant of home rule. 
Noting that few adoptions of home rule charters had been 
made in his state in recent years, and being aware of the 
stringent , judicial pattern which had so restricted the in-
tention of the drafters of the home rule amendment, he de-
cided to poll local officials in Nebraska's non-home rule 
but eligible municipalities in the five thousand or above 
I 
population class. Answers to the questionnaires sent to 
I 
either mayor, manager or city clerk in every one of such 
I 
municipalities indicated that not one of these officials 
' 
thought the judicial pattern important enough to mention it 
as a hindrance to adoption or a reason for non-adoption. 
Returns were almost complete, so Professor Winter was forced 
to conclude that most of the local officials most directly 
concerned with local government were unaware of the existence 
of the judicial pattern which did much to negate the home 
rule provision. 
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The Ohio home rule experience is unique in recent 
times, and has been commented upon extenst ve ly •109 In the 
Ohio constitutional convention of 1912, the committee on 
municipal government recommended that the rule of strict 
interpretation of powers granted to the local governments 
by the legislature (Dillon's Rule) be discarded in favor of 
the rule that cities shall have powers to do all things with 
reference, to local government that are not prohibited. The 
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Ohio state courts, in considering the home rule constitution-
al provision, have looked to the convention debate, and have 
concluded that not only are cities and towns framing new 
charters to be given the benefit of this new rule, but the 
rule is to be considered applicable to all cities, whether 
they adopt new charters or not. Coupled with rejection of 
Dillon's Rule is a broad grant of specific local powers. 
The constitutional provision is self-executing, and provides 
for and allows exercise of any and all of these powers whether 
the municipality is organized under a uniform general law, 
under local option under an optional charter statute provid-
ing alter n at e model plans any one of which may be selected 
by the local unit, or under a home rule charter framed and 
1°9see e.g., Fordham, "Home Rule--A.M.A. Model", 
op. cit., p. 139; Fordham and Asher, "Home Rule Powers ••• ", 
op. cit., entire article; Bromage, "Home Rule--N.M.L. Model", 
op. cit., p. 135 et passim. 
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adopted locally. To complete the "idyllic" Ohio picture, 
the s t ate courts have rejected their earlier line of decisions 
in the traditional Dillon Rule pattern, and have gone even 
further, adopting the so-called "head on clash" rule for in-
terpreting local powers.llO Local ordinances and other ex-
ercises of powers are not to be deemed inoperative or void 
merely because they are inconsistent with statute, but only 
if they are in direct conflict with statute. Such conrlict 
can .only arise when the legislature acts directly and posi-
tively in an area or on a subject. Legislative attempts to 
forbid municipal action in an area or on a subject are in-
effective; legislative preemption of a field is almost im-
possible unless the legislature truly occupies every part 
of the field by positive legislation. This theory works 
quite well in actual practice. During the year in which the 
author of this dissertation lived and taught in Ohio, he en-
countered only one potentially unfavorable part of the Ohio 
home rule pattern. Pressure groups and avid partisans of a 
llDvillage of Struthersv. Sokol, 1923, 108 Ohio St. 
263, 268, 140 N.E. 519, 521; see also Morris v. Roseman, 
1954, 162 Ohio St. 447, and Village of Perrysburg v. Ridge-
way, 1923, 108 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670. The author does 
not wish to overstate the position of the Ohio courts. The 
"head-on clash" doctrine has been avoided and watered down 
in many Ohio court decisions, but local units still are al-
lowed by the Ohio courts to regulate their local affairs in 
a way unprecedented in American jurisprudence. For extensive 
comment on the Ohio experience, see the entire issue devoted 
to a symposium on Ohio's home rule and local government pat-
tern, beginning at 8 Ohio State Law Review 1 (1948). 
particular type of prohibition or activity, being rebufred 
or ineffective in the state legislature, tend to turn their 
activity to individual cities and towns, in many cases in-
, ' 
fluencing local legislative bodies to adopt measures whi ch 
in most states would be deemed proper only for state legis-
lative action. Since such local ordinances are often con-
sidered and passed with little public notice, a shadow area 
is created for pressure group activity, and the ordinary 
citizen, who wishes to protect himself against harassing 
legislation, must literally be constantly active, alert and 
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well-informed. He has many legislatures to watch, in effect , 
and the problem is made complex where he does business in 
one or more cities, lives in others, owns vacation facilities, 
boats, firearms, or the like in other locations within the 
state, and so on. Fortunately, the powers of the rnunicipali-
ties are held to extend only to affairs of public safety, 
welfare, internal organization and order and the like, and 
not to areas of private law such as contracts and real pro-
perty law. 
Home Rule and the MetroEolitan Problem 
The Ohio pattern described above is an interesting 
one, since the constitutional provision is an N. M.L.-type 
one, interpreted by the courts as including local powers even 
broader than those of the A.M.A. one. It demonstrates clearly 
that the t wo patterns are not inconsistent. The only "fail-
ure" of the Ohio pattern is that it does not cope well with 
the metropolitan area problem which is stressed in recent 
comment. 
The A. M.A. plan, according to its author, is in-
tended to bring about metropolitan rather than municipal 
home rule. It is a bit strange to think of Professor Ford-
ham as an opponent of home rule, but it is clear from his 
writings that his main interest lies in a solution of the 
problem of the multitude of cities, towns, special purpose 
district s , authorities and other units which one finds shar-
ing the responsibility for governing almost every American 
city. He might best be described as an opponent of conven-
tional concepts of home rule, but a believer in and advocate 
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of a larger sort of home rule, embracing the whole metropoli-
tan area. His ideas to this effect appear first to have been 
stated in a periodical article of 1932,111 which his experi-
ence with the West Virginia home rule constitutional amend-
ment led him to write. 
Other less systematic authors have called for a 
solut ion to the metropolitan area problem, usually through 
t he abol i shment of the varied units in favor of a single 
lllJefferson B. Fordham, "The West Virginia Munici-
pal Home Rule Proposal", 1932, 38 West Virginia Law Quarter-
~ 235. 
governmental unit organized under the principles more com-
monly thought of in connection with municipal home rule. 
Joseph H. Crowley, in a 1950 article, 112 states that muni-
cipal home rule is not enough, and that only metropolitan 
home rule can solve the prob:em of the cities • He has no 
little faith in state legislatures, since any metropolitan 
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solution which the legislature might achieve would be steadi-
ly weakened by a "hacking-away process", as in the case of 
municipal home rule provisions, and by adverse court deci-
sions. He suggests that the county be reorganized and adapt-
ed, apparently by direct constitutional amendment, to serve 
as the b a sic unit of metropolitan government. 
Thomas H. Reed, a self-styled disillusioned former 
home rule advocate, appears to agree with the Fordham solu-
tion.ll3 He speaks of the present day apparent "immortality 
of small units of government", and says that only the state 
government can reorganize the metropolitan area effectively. 
The legislature as a "higher and impartial power", would 
determine the new pattern of the metropolitan government. 
ll2Joseph H. Crowley, "Home Rule for a 'Whole City'", 
1950, National Municipal Review, 39:178; see also Rodney L. 
Mott, "strengthening Home Rule", 1950, National Municipal 
Review, 39:172, for advocacy of a federal plan of government 
within a particular state. 
113Thomas H. Reed, "Challenge: Metro Puzzle", 1958, 
Nati.onal Municipal Review, 47:546. 
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Local units will never agree, so an imposed union is neces-
sary. He refers to the creation of the Toronto federal area 
by fi at of the Ontario provincial legislature as a pattern 
which might be emulated. There seems to be reasonabl y gen-
eral sati s f action with the Toronto _system, he maintains, 
though the local units constituting the metropolitan govern-
ment would never have agreed voluntarily to the union. He 
sums up: 
We (r eformers) did not intend to confer immortality 
on every incorporated place and in consequence to 
block a constructive solution of the metropolitan 
problem. We must restate the home rule idea so as 
t o give local self-government to every unit as es-
tablished by the state but not to guarantee perpetuity 
to the existing boundaries of any unit. 1 14 
There are other practical considerat ions to be taken 
into account in ·considering this metropolitan problem. The 
Connect icut home rule statutory provision offers mild in-
cent i ve s t o charter towns to consolidate with other local 
unit s. It would seem that this latter pattern, augmented 
and carefully considered, might well be added to the Ohio 
plan t o meet the metropolitan problem. There must be i n-
centives added, to make satellite cities and towns more 
willing to attach themselves to the core city. SucA pro-
vi s ions must. include ones designed to preserve representa-
tion in the legislature for each unit and to guarantee 
114Ibid., PP• 548-9. 
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continued employment status for officers and employees well 
into the future, to guarantee a certain level of local govern-
mental services, and the like. In a permissive situation, 
local units will join themselves together in larger govern-
mental complexes only if they do not lose what they already 
have, and if they will gain something in addition, preferably 
in the way of a reduction of taxes as well as the provision 
of better services. The other alternative is that of force-
ful integration, as in the case of Toronto. Such forceful 
integration is obviously implied within the A.M.A.-Fordham 
plan. This plan is carefully drafted so that it guarantees 
nothing about the status or boundaries of a local unit, and 
lea.ves to the legislature full power to merge, consolidate 
and otherwise form the local governmental units of a metro-
politan area into a lesser number of units or a single unit. 
Integration is usually desirable and necessary, but the 
author prefers voluntary and permissive integration on a re-
ward basis, with the balance to be redressed in the future, 
to forcing the integration of local units through the com-
pulsory agency of the typical state legislature. The author 
also believes that cities can become too big in human and 
social terms, as well as more expensive to administer than 
the constituent units in aggregate. His residence in New 
York City, for instance, during which time he was concerned 
indirectly with and conversant with the problems and adminis-
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tration of that unit, has led him to believe that that city 
might better be administered in terms of its boroughs as 
independent cities. The metropolitan problem of New York 
City might best be solved by some sort of federal plan like 
that of Toronto or London. 
Professor Harvey Walker, in a provocative recent 
study,ll5 suggested in effect that the law of private corpo-
rations be applied to local municipal units.ll6 The other 
aspects of his article are commented upon elsewhere in thi s 
chapter, but in addition to his particular suggestions, it 
is of great interest to note that the overall effect of the 
adoption of all his points would be to give the affected 
municipality the approximate legal status which a business 
corporation enjoys under a modern, well-drafted charter. 
Most striking of the points put forth is Professor Walker's 
advocacy of a non-legislative, virtually automatic process 
for the incorporation of political units: 
A municipal corporation may be formed by the petition 
of any five hundred voters living within a determinate 
geographical area, described in the petition, provided 
the area contains an average population of at least 
~ive hundred persons per square mile, an assessed valu-
ation of property subject to tax of at least two thou-
sand dollars per capita and a total population .of not 
115walker, "Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home 
Rule 11 , op. cit . 
116Ibid., pp. 583-4. 
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less than one thousand persons. Such petition, which 
shall indicate the name desired and shall be accompanied 
by an accurate map of the territory 'to be incorporated 
shall be presented to the local court of general trial 
jurisdiction. If the judge shall find that the petition 
is in proper form, and all of the foregoing conditions 
have been satisfied he shall enter upon his journal an 
order of incorporation and furnish a copy thereof to the 
petitioners, to the secretary of state, to the local re-
corder of deeds and the local taxation and election auth-
orities.ll7 
This is "atomization" with a vengeance. It is difficult to see 
how any metropolitan area could be kept under one municipal gov-
ernment after such a law or constitutional amendment were 
adopted. Essentially, the task of the metropolitan complex 
is to cope with the problems presented by the concentrated 
mass of people, industry, and all the rest of the too-familiar 
pattern. The metropolitan problem is also, to some extent, one 
of securing a sound tax base, and reassessing the burden of the 
slums, blighted areas, public buildings and other facilities of 
the core city upon those who gain their livelihood, services 
and recreation therefrom. The core area of a great city, despite 
its stores and business establishments, cannot support the 
cost of the services necessarily rendered to the "fugitive 
populationn, which night l y leaves the core city, and cannot 
bear the burden of the inevitable skid row, cheap rooming-house 
district, and its concommitant relief rolls. It appears 
to the author that the heart of the metropolitan problem lies 
117 I~id., ibid., in Walker ' s footnote 48. 
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in the ex:t.ension of the core city's tax base, whether it be 
a real property tax, income tax, or whatever, to cover this 
fugitive population which has caused the metropolitan pro-
blem. The metropolitan problem at present is precisely that 
the wealthy suburbs enjoy their low tax rates and valuations 
only by the device of shifting the burden to the core city. 
People will seek their own advantage in such a 
situation, and it is almost certainly true that the moderate-
ly wealthy and wealthy neighborhoods would withdraw from the 
core city of which they are a part if they were permitted. 
Professor W'laker' s is therefore a negative approach. In-
centives must be offered which will _promote the governmental 
unification of the metropolitan area. Professor Walker's 
plan would give direct monetary prizes to those most success-
ful in atomizing the metropolitan area. The practical goal 
if such a plan were adopted would be that somehow home owners 
or neighborhoods would attempt to disassociate themselves f rom 
poorer home owners or neighborhoods and attach themselves to 
wealthier ones. The tendency would always be toward the 
smallest unit permissible, so that no person would be forc e d 
to pay more taxes than other persons of like circumstances. 
The author is of the opinion that the resulting governmental 
pattern would be one of scores of cities each of about a 
thousand persons, or somewhat more, and of just sufficient 
r eal propert y to meet the minimum valuation requirement. I n 
the center of this mass of communities would be the core 
city, now consisting of little more than business buildings, 
governmental installations, and the surrounding slums, cheap 
rooming-house districts, tenements, and poorer single and 
multi-family dwelling-houses inhabited by the urban lower 
class. 
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This is too high a price to pay for freedom from 
legislative interference. Some sort of non-legislative , 
virtually-automatic process for incorporating municipalities 
is possible, but it must be cast into a mold which will en-
courage the governmental and functional unification of the 
metropolitan area rather than its dissolution. As has been 
indicated, the author tends to agree with Professor Walker 
as to his other proposed solutions to the home rule prob lem, 
but does not agree with this "private incorporation act" as 
set forth. Professor Walker criticizes the A .. M.A.-Fordham 
plan of home rule quite harshly,ll8 but the author has the 
feeling that the extremes presented in the theories of each 
do more to delay than promote a true solution of the metro-
politan area problem, and the formulation of the most effec-
tive home rule plan. Since Professor Walker's suggestions 
in this respect are necessarily circumscribed by the limita-
tions of space of the periodical article in which they are 
118Ibid., pp . 580-2. 
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presented, it is possible that some other part of his theory 
might tend to offset the criticism offered ab'ove. The author 
would agree with him when he states that creation, consoli-
dation, and other changes in the status of local units should 
always be at the free will of the majority of the residents 
or their elected representatives, and never by external pres-
sure or compulsion by the state. Professor Walker even sug-
gests state subsidies to lead local governments to undertake 
the changes desired by the state or its proper agents. The 
author balks at the idea of subsidies, but agrees that some 
sort of system of benefits or rewards is best-calculated to 
solve the metropolitan unification problem. 
Statutory Home Rule 
The alternatives posed by Professors Bromage, Ford-
ham, Walker, and other writers would seem to indicate that 
one must choose between trusting the legislature or trusting 
the courts. Professor Fordham chooses the legislature, the 
others, the courts. The author would prefer to choose nei-
ther. Resort to the courts cannot be avoided, but it would 
appear that a well-drafted self-executing constitutional 
amendment might not only succeed in transferring a modified 
Ohio situation and result to another state, but might also 
offer such incentives to union that the multiplicity of 
governmental units in the metropolitan areas might be reduced 
in number. 
Three of the states which have most recently adopted 
home rule have chosen a legislative(statutory) pattern, de-
spite the fact that all had the opportunity to write home 
rule into their constitutions in the course of recent major 
revisions and/or adoptions. The Connecticut experience is 
detailed in Chapter VII, below. New Jersey, like Connecti-
cut, has recently made a major revision of its constitution, 
and has chosen to leave the resolution of the home rule pro-
blem to the legislature, despite consideration of the problem 
by the constitution writers and revisers. The relevant 
portion, Article IV, section 7, paragraph 11, of the New 
Jersey constitution of 1947, provides that provisions of the 
constitution and of statutes concerning municipal corpora-
tions are to be liberally construed in their favor. Such 
powers are to include those expressly granted or fairly to 
be implied and not inconsistent with nor prohibited by con-
stitution or law. This paragraph, if intended to accomplish 
the removal of Dillon's Rule from the New Jersey· court de-
cisions, seems not destined for success. The first sentence 
is in effect a repeal of the Rule, while the second seems to 
reimpose it.119 Alaska's constitution of 1956, drawn up by 
119For recent analyses of the New Jersey experience 
under this provision and the home rule statute subsequently 
adopte~, see Bayard H. Faulkner, "New Road to Home Rulen, 
1955, ~ational Municipal Review, 44:189, and Benjamin Baker, 
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a distinguished group of experts in state and local govern-
ment, has adopted an A.M.A.-type provision requiring in 
Article X, section 1 that a liberal construction is to be 
given to the powers of local governmental units. Article 
X, section 11, states that home rule boroughs and cities 
may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law 
or charter. Section 9 of the same article provides for com-
pulsory home rule for first-class cities and boroughs (coun-
ties), and section 10 allows the legislature to extend home 
rule to other boroughs and cities if it wishes. It will be 
interesting to see what interpretation a new state court, 
unbound by precedent except as it chooses to be bound, will 
make of this. 120 
The only part of the Hawaiian state constitution 
referring to municipal home rule occurs in Article VII, 
section 2, which states that each political subdivision is 
empowered to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-
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government within limits and under procedures prescribed by 
law. One might call this merely an instruction to the state 
courts not to hold any home rule statute which the legislature 
119 (continued) "Cities on Their Own", 1955, National 
Municipal Review, 44:193. 
120see comment by one of the drafters, John E. Bebout, 
"Charter for Last Frontier", 1956, National Municipal Review, 
45:158. 
might pass in the future invalid as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of powers. 
Conclusion 
Thus, from the analysis of the underlying theory 
of home rule presented in this chapter, it will be seen that 
the major problem facing the drafters of any home rule pro-
vision is the determination of the constitutional position 
of the municipality in relation to the state. Again and 
again, whether one turns to the political scientists active 
in the field, to the political or jurisprudential theorists, 
to the relevant constitutional provisions, or to the model 
plans of the good government organizations, he is faced with 
the fact that it is always the pattern of antecedent con-
stitutional theory and judicial decisions with which he must 
cope if he wishes to solve the problem of home rule for a 
particular state. 
No home rule plan can be written or adopted in a 
vacuum. The tap roots of home rule lie hidden deep within 
the soil of a state's constitutional theory. The home rule 
partisan must be prepared not only to explain the written 
document itself by which home rule is to come into being, 
but he must be able to set that document into its background 
like a master landscape architect sets a new plant or tree 
into an existing milieu. The problems which his suggested 
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home rule provision will race are not merely those raised 
in the document itselr, but those which have grown and de-
veloped through the years or his state's existence. Even 
an early home rule amendment of Jerrerson B. Fordham was 
not able to stand against the precedents or the West Vir-
ginia legislature or courts. The environment within which 
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a home rule provision will grow is strong, overwhelmingly 
strong, and the amendment must be perrect at birth ir it is 
to flourish according to -its predetermined growth pattern. 
Only a man who knows the environment, has taken it into ac-
count in planting the seed, and has prepared the seed before-
hand so that it is hardy enough to meet the inescapable 
rigors of environment, can be assured that the growth pat-
tern will be as desired. 
For this reason, the author believes that an in-
quiry into the antecedents or home rule in New England is a 
necessary prelude ir one is to understand the sort of home 
rule provision which is necessary- its chance of adoption, 
and its ruture hope of success. The home rule constitution-
al amendment of Rhode Island was drafted according to a well-
accepted pattern, and was believed by its partisans to have 
solved the home rule problem in that state. As will be shown 
in Chapter VII, the amendment was poorly designed to stand 
or to prosper within its environment, and its environment 
blighted it before it was two years old. An amendment, 
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drarted with an understanding of the pattern described above, 
and to be more fully developed in this dissertation, would 
almost certainly have survived and prospered better. The 
right to draw a charter is a small consolation when the 
possible prize is independence of action in local affairs. 
A home rule provision drawn in ignorance of the prevailing 
I 
r 
l 
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drafted with an understanding of the pattern described above, 
and to be more fully developed in this dissertation, would 
almost certainly have survived a.nd prospered better . The 
right to draw a charter is a small consolation when the 
possible prize is independence of action in local affairs. 
A home rule provision drawn in ignorance of the prevailing 
climate of American practice, and of the antecedents of 
home rule in the particular state, will almost certainly 
end up within a few years as nothing but a charter-framing 
privilege. So it has been in the great majority of home 
rule states, but it need .not be in the future . 
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CHAPTER III 
BEGINNINGS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE COLONIAL ERA: 
FOUNDING TO 1775 
Towns in New England did not spring full-blown from 
the written documents which the colonists brought with them 
from their kings and proprietors, nor did they exist in der-
inite rorm in the minds of the colonists themselves, regard-
less of how politically sophisticated and learned in the folk 
ways of the Anglo-Saxons, Teutons, or Swiss they might have 
been. Rather, they "just growed" --as often as not the off-
spring of those silent charters and grants which made no men-
tion of the pragmatic orderings of the frontier settlements 
the product of lack of roads and communications which made 
every mile a formidable obstacle. The very distance made it 
impossible for the parent colony to govern a nascent commun-
ity in its local affairs, or to ai'd it to overcome or cope with 
the ever-menacing enemies Indians, New England weather, the 
warring French. The bonds to England were loose, the central 
colonial control spasmodic, and the colonial legislature often 
irregularly constituted. In these frontier days the colonists 
had more important things to do than to concern themselves un-
duly with the niceties of colony-town division of powers. 
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But the New England town has left a record of its 
growth from infancy to maturity . There are the colonial 
records , charters and constitutions, laws of the various 
periods , local and state histories , town rec ords, and obser-
vations and letters by men of' the times. This chapter l-Iill 
discuss the growth of towns into governn1ental units in each 
of the areas which were later to become the six New England 
states. A tor tuous and twisted pattern emerges: while the 
records available are all too imperfect and sketchy to present 
a complete picture , in quantity they are so inm1ense that con-
stant selection is necessary. Frontier days are not days of 
orderly observation . Yet by the disjointed wr i tten records 
plus the contemporaneous observat ions of the t imes , mu s t the 
student of today attempt to understand how the early New 
England tmvn came to be and what position is occupied in re-
lation to the central colonial authority and the Crown. 
What was this relationship prior to the ~~erican 
Revolution? Some observer s, including Alexis de Tocqueville1 
and the advocates of local self- government as an inherent right 
described the . early tmm as a fierce "republic" or independent 
1 
Alexis de Tocqueville, The Republic of the United 
States of America and Its Political Institutions (Henry Reeves , 
translator, with notes by John c. Spencer), 2 vols., New York , 
Barnes and Co., 1839, particularly vol. 1, Chapter 5. 
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nation with many attributes of sovereignty, not only scarcely 
dependent upon the parent colony, but often independent of 
it. On the other hand, jurists , legal theorists and the more 
modern social scientists have conm1only regarded the New England 
town as a creature of the state , no different from the town 
in any other part of the country as far as rights are concerned. 
It made no dif ference, they said , that the New England towns , 
particularly in Rhode Island and Connecticut, not only existed 
prior to the state or colony, but even by their acts of join-
ing together "made" the colony which was later to become the 
state. Regardless of which came first, colony or town, the 
to"t-ms were public corpors.tions just as were towns elsewhere , 
and could claim no vested rights against the state. These 
opposing theories of the nature of the town and the resolution 
of the problem in the late nineteenth and early t-~1entieth 
centuries are discussed below, particularly in Chapters IV 
through VII , and have also been considered in Chapter II . 
The years prior to the American Revolution were 
years formative of institutions of government , both central 
and local. As will be demonstrated below, the political 
situation of t he towns and of the colonies was an a..-rnorphous 
2 
2 
Such as the jurists discussed by Amasa H. Eaton, "The 
Right to Local Self- Governmentn , 1900, 13 Harvard Law Rev . 441, 
470 , 638 {series of three articles) . For others , see below, 
Chapters V, VI, passim, and the discussion of the legal theorists 
in Chapter II. 
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one . The geographically-isolated colonial towns oft en performed 
acts which today would be regarded as typical of sovereign 
powers. Yet in the same era, t owns were at times subjected 
to the most degrading kinds of local, special and private acts 
and confiscations by the colonial legislatures, insofar as 
those often disorderly, often irregularly-selected bodies can 
be called legislatures. The legislatures abolished and created 
towns at will, meddled in town internal affairs, enacted laws 
taking away i mportant rights , and otherwise trea ted towns with 
scant respect. There were other situations in which to\vns 
acted as though they were sovere i gn entities. This was a 
frontie r society. 
Massachusetts 
Scholars3 have traced and documented town-state h istory in 
3Am.ong the histories of the colony and state to which 
the author is indebted are the following: Charles F. Adams , 
Three Episodes of Massachusetts History~ The Settlement of 
Boston Bay; the Antinomian Controversy; A Study of Chur ch and 
Town Government, 2 vols., 1903 ed., Boston, New York and Cam-
bridge (Hass .), Houghton, }1ifflin and Co.; Hannah Adams , f::. 
Summary History of New- England , Dedh~~ (Mass.), H. Mann and 
J.H. Adams , print~rs for the author , 1799;; Harry A.. Cushing, 
History of the Transition from Provinc ial to Commomvealth Gov-
ernment in Massachusetts , Columbia Univ. Studies, New York , 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1896;. Louis A. Frothingham, Brief His-
tor of the Constitution and Government of Massachusetts, 1s t 
ed., Cambridge Mass. , Harvard Univ. Press, 191 , 2d ed., 
Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Houghton, Mifflin and 
Co., 192.5; Albert B. Hart, Editor, Commomvealth History of 
Massachusetts, 3 vols., New York, States History Co., 1929; 
John s. Barry, The History of Massachusetts, 3 vols., Boston, 
Phillips, Sampson and Co., 1855. Also extr emely valuable as 
a guide to the history and legislation of the colonial and more 
modern periods is John F. Sly r s Tmvn Goverrunent in Massachusetts 
(1620 - 1930}, Cambridge (Mass.) , Harvard Univ. Press, 1930. 
Massachusetts with great detail, and argued at length over 
the genealogy of the town, and its place in the colonial 
governmental structure.4 Professor MacLear, scanning the 
records of tre early colonial era, noted that the towns 
of Watertown, Roxbury, and Dorchester were founded with-
out any authorization froM the government of the colony, 
but that they were not permitted to enjoy their independence 
for any length of time .5 The colonial records first mention 
towns on September 7, 1630, when it was ordered that Tri-
mountaine should be called Boston, Mattapan, Dorchester, 
3J."1d the "'towne upon the Charles Ryver" 1 Watertown. 6 Not 
4 Charles F. Adams, "Genesis of the Nassachusetts 
Town 11 , Mass. Historical Society Proceedings, 2d aeries, 
vol. 7, pp. 172-211, with remarks on the Adams' paper by: 
A. c. Goodell Jr., pp. 211-214; Mellen Chamberlain, PP• 
214-242; Edward Channing , 242-263, and the earlier papers 
"The New Hi storical School and the Origin of Towns in 
Massachusetts," T'1ass. Historical Society Proceedings, 2d 
series, vol. 5, by Mellen Chamberlain, pp. 265-Bo, and 
A.C. Goodell Jr., pp. 320-31. Joel Parker, "'The Origin, 
Organization and Influence of the Towns of New England", 
Mass. Historical Society Proceedings, vol. 9, p. 14, 1866. 
5Anne B. !'lacLe ar, Early New England Towns: A 
Com arative Stud of Their Develo ment. New York, 1908 
Columbia Univ. Studies in History, Economics, and Public 
Law, vol. 29), p. 20. 
6 --1'-'Iass. Colonial Records, edited by Hathaniel B. 
Shurtleff, 5 vola., Boston, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
1853-54, vol. 1, P• 75. 
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Ul~til March , 1636 did the General Court enact general legis-
lation relating to the power of towns to act in local matters. 
The words of the statute hint at much in the early development 
of town powers: 
~fuereas particular townes have many things which 
concerne only themselves , & the ordering of their 
owne affairs and disposeing of businesses in their 
owne towne , it is therefore ordered , that the free-
men of every towne , or the major parte of them, 
shall onely have power to dispose of their owne 
lands , & woods , with all the previlidges & appur-
tenances of the said townes , to graunt lotts , & make 
such orders as may concerne the well ordering of 
their owne t ownes , not repugnant to the lawes & 
orders here established by the General Court; as 
also to lay mulks & penaltyes for the breach of 
theis orders , & to levy and distreine the same , not 
exceedeing the some of twen ty shillings; also to 
chuse their owne particular officers , as constables , 
surveyors for the highwayes , & the like ; & because 
much business is like to ensue to the constables of 
several townes , by reason they are to make distresses , 
and gather fynes , therefore that every towne shall 
have two constables , where there is neede , that soe 
their office may not be a burthen unto them, & they 
may attend more car efully upon the discharge of their 
office , for which they shalbe lyeable to give their 
acc ompts to this Court when they shalbe called there-
unto.7 (italics mine) 
The word 11 only11 may be various l y interpreted . One 
scholar says that the word makes of the statute not a grant 
of pm-Ier , but only a limitation of pov1er ; yet he notes that in 
8 
the 1660 revision of the statute , the word 11 only11 was omitted . 
7Ibid ., p . 172 . 
8
chamberlain, "Genesis of the 11assachusetts Tmm11 , 
op . cit ., p. 236n. 
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This mi ght indicate that the legislators themselves regarded 
the word as mere surplus age. This lends weight to the t heory 
t hat the statute represented either an attempt to limit broad 
powers , or, more likely, was a formal recognition of powers 
and rights already exercised by the towns . Professor John F . 
Sly, writing of the colonial regulations affecting towns , said: 
Most of the political changes that have a place i n t he 
r ecords of the Colony, received their initial impetus 
from the tm<Ins themselves -- indeed , much of the leg-
islation is merely the authorization and regulation of 
practi ces long before utilized. vlhat ever may be the 
political influenc e f rom 'the top' that modern methods 
have made possible, the vast majority of local regula-
tions that hold over from the eighteenth century and 
before (as well as many of more recent origin) are 
merely the reflection of local practices that have 
~ound their fruition but not their beginning in legis -
lative acts. Modern t heories of centralization may 
justify, condemn and even guide the process , but it 
is very largely the slow adjus tments and experiments 
of perplexed communities that have brought about the 
multiplicity of statutes pertaining to themselves. 
No t that state legislators are mere copyists -- they 
regulate , adjust and stimulate -- but neither are they 
always originators.9 
The addition of the words "& the like" in referring to town 
officers sh ows a recognition by the l egislature that towns 
had long since been electing var ious other officers , and would 
continue to do so under the 1636 statute , each acc ording to 
its cus toms and needs . 
The ' s tatutes empo-v1ering phrase , "& make such orders •• • 11 
is similar to the general empowering clause of corporate charters , 
including the royal charter to Massachusetts Bay under seals of 
9sly, op. cit ., pp . 222-3. 
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March 4,1629, which established a governmen t for the company ihus:: 
•••• from henceforth for ever, there shall be one 
Governor, one Deputy Governor, and eighteene Assist-
antes of the same Company, to be from tyme to 
tyme constituted, elected, and chosen out of the 
freemen of the said Company, for the tyme being, 
in such manner and forme as hereafter in theis 
presentes is expressed. Which said officers shall 
applie themselves to take care for the best dis-
poseing and ordering of the generall buysines and 
affaires of, for, and concerning the saide lande s 
and premisses hereby mentiom d to be graunte d ., and 
the plantacion thereof, and the government of the 
people there.lO 
The governor or deputy governor , and such of the assistants 
and freemen of the company as m"ght assemble in a General 
Court were empowered 
to make, ordeine, and establishe all manner of 
wholesome and reasonable orders, lawes, statutes, 
and ordinances{L direction~d instructions no"£ 
contrarie to t e lawes of this our realme of 
England, as well for setling of the formes and 
ceremonies of government and magistracy fitt and 
necessary for the plantation and the inhabitantea 
there, and for nameing and stiling of all sortes 
of officers, both superior and inferior, which 
they shall finde needefull for that governement and 
plantation, and the distinguishing and setting forth 
of the severall duties, powers, and lymyttes of 
every such office and place ••• and for the direct-
ing , ruling, and disposeing of all other WAtters 
and thinges whereby our said people, inhabitantes 
there, maie be soe religiously, peaceablie, and 
civilly governed, as their good life and orderlie 
conversation maie vzynn and incite the natives of 
country to the knowledg and obedience of the onlie 
true God and Savior of mankinde, and the Christian 
.fayth, which, in our royall intention and the ad-
venturers .free pro.fession, is the ~incipall ende of 
this plantation.ll (italics !11ine). 
lOMass. Colonial Records, vol. 1, p. 10. 
11Ibid., PP• 16-17. 
The similarity between t he tt such orders as may 
conoorne the well ordering of their owne townes, not 
repu~Lant to the lawes & orders here established by t he 
Gener al . Court" of the 1636 statute, and the uall manner 
of whole some and reason able orders, lawes, statutes, and 
ordinances, directions, and instructions not oontrarie to 
the lawes of ••• England" of the royal charter lend 1-lt:iight 
to later a rguments, discus sed in Chapters TI.:, V, Vf., tha t 
the New England town had certain attributes of a privat e 
corporations and that rights once vested in it could not 
be dive sted without its consent. The Massachusetts Bay 
colony was a corporate profit-making venture, and the 
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royal charter a corporate charter. If the statute of 
1636, and its later version in 1660, in following somewhat 
the s arne wording intended to endow the towns with corporate 
(i.e., non-divestable) powers in regard to the "many 
t hings which concerne only themselves, & the ordering of 
t heir owne aff aires, and disposeing of businesses in 
thei r owne towne s", the towns had good cause to complain 
when l ater legislaturespass ed "ripper bills 11 and other 
legislation meddling in the purely local affairs of towns, 12 
12 A ft " C.F. dams, Genesis ••• , op. cit., tends to view 
the town as created along the lines of its oorporate parent, 
i. e ., the Massachusetts Bay Company. However, Channing , 
in his remarks, op. cit., p. 262 expresses strong doubt 
and later courts confirmed the legislative action on the 
basis of the wording of these "ancient charters". 
Regardless of whether the analogy to the corporate 
charter is valid, this early legislation did appear to 
recognize that certain matters were local in their nature, 
and that the townspeople should have power to deal with 
these thin gs , conformab~y to general laws, in their own 
way. The author has found only one early example of the 
colonial government's questioning a town's exercise of 
powers. On August 1, 1637, the General Court questioned 
"whether townes have liberty to restraine particular men 
from sayle of their lands or houses, nl3 but there is no 
indication of how the question was resolved. This is 
another case where the .written word may not tell the 
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entire story. Hovrever, many colonial towns did r estrain the 
12 (continued) that this was the case, and Chamber-
lain, op. cit. observes in a footnote, p.236, that Governor 
Winthrop was a lawyer and knew that a corporation, such as 
the . Massachusetts Bay Company, had no power to create a 
corporation, that being a royal prerogative. But he also 
notes that Winthrop had admitted his policy to be to enact 
as little po-s:b"ve. legislation as possible, but to "'raise 
up laws by practice and custom'" so as not to transgress 
the limitations in his charter, .and questions whether the 
colony, by the mere act of naming the towns did not in fact 
thereby incorporate them. Ibid., p. 236n. Adams quotes 
Winthrop more fully, P• 195n. cr. Sly, op. ci~, pp. 62-70. 
13 -Massachusetts ColonialRecords, vol. 1, p. 201. 
Note the similarity to modern zoning disputes. 
sale of lands and property before and after this inquiry. 
The central colonial _government in the early 
seventeenth century differed markedly from modern state 
government. For instance, the Supreme Judicial Court 
was dealing with petty matters, many of which would later 
lie within the province of minor law courts or local 
ordinance and police powers: ordering a servant whipped 
for disobedience,l4 ordering a man whipped for shooting 
fowl on Sunday, 15 fining a medical charlatan, 16 ordering 
a servant whipped for uttering mallitious & scandilous 
speeches, whereby he sought to traduce the Court, s.s if 
they hadd taken some bribe", 17 ordering an Indian to for-
feit a beaver skin for shooting a swine belonging to Sir 
"18 Richard Saltonstall, and settling countless other dis-
putes having to do with the morals, finances and good-
ordering of settler and Indian alike. 
\vhether or not the act of September 7, 1630, naming 
the three towns, in fact constituted an incorporation of 
those towns as urged by some historians~9 the legislature 
l4Ibid., p. en. 
l_tiibid., p. 82. 
16 Ibid., P• 83. 
17~., p. 84. 
18Ibid., p. 88. 
19see discussion in footnote 12, above. 
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did not hesitate to enact general laws imposing burdens on 
those ill-defined entities, and special laws excepting 
certain of them from these burdens. On March 22, 1631, 
the assistants order that every tow.n, before the follow-
ing April, 
••• take espetiall care that every person within 
their towns • • • (be) furnished with good and suf-
ficient armes allowable by the captain or other 
officers, those that want & are of abilitie to buy 
them themselves, others that are unable to have 
them provided by the towns, for the present, & 
after to receive satisfaction for that they dis-
burse when they shalbe able.20 
Other acts order each town to keep a watch of' tvro men a 
night, 21 to provide a place for gunpowder at their CMn 
charge and under penalty for neglect,22 to provide standard 
weights and measures,23 to set out its bounds w.tthin a 
year after its bounds are granted,24 and to keep a barrel 
of gunpowder if the town were a frontier one. 25 Towns 
desiring special laws exempting them from the requirements 
of general acts apparently sought special dispensation. 
On June 4, 1639, the General Court granted Hingham liberty 
to use its meeting house for a watch house, and Dorchester 
20 
Massachusetts Colonial 
_.._ __ _.~R_. ~e~c~o~r~d~s, vol. 1, p. 84. 
21 120. ~., p. 
22Ibid., p. 138. 
23Ibid _., p. 148. 
24~., P• 319. 
25!.!2!£.' P• 328. 
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permission to use Sergent Collicot 1 s house for a watch 
house. 26 On that same date, in disciplining those towns 
which failed to perform duties assigned them, the court 
fined: Roxberry for defectiveness of the Muddy Ryver 
Bridge; Boston for defective highways; Cambridge for want 
of a pound; Deedham and Con cord for not provi. ding a pair 
of stocks; Concord for neglecting to have a watch house; 
and Waymouth for 11 their bad way at the steping stones 11 • 27 
However, mere geographical distances and the dif-
ficulty of travel and communication, if nothing else, 
prevented any close day-to-day supervision of town affairs 
by the central authori~. Historians report that Endicott 
at Salem could not visit Winthrop in Boston in 1631, 
because nhe was not vigorous enough at the moment to 
risk the inevitable wading the journey involved, n and in 
1632, in order "to establish a union it between the colonies 
of Plymouth and Boston, ttthe governor, accompanied by the 
pastor of Boston, walked forty miles through the woods as 
far as Plymouth", where Plymouth's Governor Bradford 
"received them with great respect, and the interview pro-
duced a permanent friendship between the two plantations.n28 
26Ibid., p. 267. 
27 Ibid., pp. 266-67. 
28william B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of 
New England1 162g-1789, 2vol s., Boston & N. Y. , Houghton, 
M:tf.fl:tn & Co., 1 ~. 91 ~ vol . 1 , p . -.1 0 .. Hru<..nah Atia.ms , op . c:J.t . 
p. 31. 
In an in!tensi ve study of Quincy, ~1assachusetts, Charles 
F. Adams· stated that the outer world made itself little 
felt in ,the remote village :connnunity, and the village 
communit~ in no way influenced the outer world. 29 Further, 
he cl a. in~e d t ha. t the one thing tha. t makes c ar efu 1 study 
of the e ,arly towns w:or thwhile is U'the complete absence 
from their growth of all paternal or fostering care. Each 
worked out its own problems, as best it couJ. d, and the 
result was marked individuality.n30 These problems in 
colonial Braintree and Qui~cy included such important 
ones as religious .heresy, land titles, internal improve-
ments and means of communication, education, temperance, 
pauperism, care of the insane, public lands, currency, 
taxation, and municipal debt.31 
Each town presumably dealt with these problems, 
and more, as they rose, without feeling the necessity of 
going to the central colonial government for authorization. 
It is ~doubtedly this self-sufficiency which later · led 
deTocqueville to say of the New England town: 
In this part of the Union the impulsion of 
political activity was given in the townships; 
and it may almost be said that each o.f them 
29c. F. Adams, Three Episodes ••• , op.cit., v. 31 
p. 592. 
30ibid., p. 811. For a favorable review of the 
Adams town study, see ~.Yilliston Walker, "Study of A New 
England Tow·n", 189.3, Yale Literary Review 1:368. 
31 Adams, ibid., p. 812. 
originally formed an independent nation. When 
the kings of England asserted their supremacy, 
they were contented to assume the central power 
of the state. The townships of New England re-
mained as they were before; and although they are 
now subject to the state, they were at first 
scarcely dependent upon it. It is important to 
remember that they have not been invested with 
privileges, but that they seem, on the contrary, 
to have surrendered a portion of their independence 
to the state. The townships are only subordinate 
to the state in those interests which I shall 
term social, as they are common to all the 
citizens. They are independent in all that con-
cerns themselves; and among the inhabitants of 
New England I believe that not a man is to be 
found who would aclmowledge that the state has any 
right to interfere in their local interests. 
The towns of New England buy and sell, prosecute 
or are indicted, augment or diminish their 
rates, without the slightest opposition on the 
part of the administrative authority.32 (second 
italics mine). 
DeTocqueville, however 1 was not quite the dewy-eyed idealist 
that tho!se advocates of town powers make of him by quoting 
only thi's portion of his remarks on the New England town. 
He con ti:nue d: 
They (the towns) are bound, however, to comply 
with the demands of the community. If the state 
is in need of money, a town can neither give nor 
withhold the supplies. If the state projects a 
road, the township cannot refuse to let it cross 
its territory; if a police regulation is made by 
the state, it must be enforced by the tot~. A 
uniform system of instruction is organised all 
over the country, and every town is bom~d to 
establish the schools which the law ordains •••• 
Strict as this obligation is, the goverrunent of 
the state imposes it in principle only, and in 
32Alexis deT~cqueville, Arne ric an I nstitutions . ·and 
The ir Influence, with notes by John c. Spencer, New Yorlr;--
A.S. Barnes & Co., 1851, p. 62. · 
its performance the township resumes all its 
independent rights. Thus, taxes are voted by 
the state, but they are assessed and collected 
by the township; the existence of a school is 
obligatory, but the township builds, pays, and 
superintends it."33 
And, ag ain, · 
The township of New England possesses two advan-
tages ••• namely, independence and authority. Its 
sphere is indeed small and limited, but within that 
sphere its action is unrestrained;: and its indepen-
dence would give to it a real importance, ev~~ if 
its extent and population did not ensure it.J4 
Unfortunately, de Tocqueville does not define his terms more 
fully. Would he have considered the law requiring each 
town to keep a watch of two men each night, and the other 
laws mentioned above local in nature, or "social11 and thus 
subj ect to legislative control? Presumably orders requir-
ing that gunpowder and muskets be kept on hand would be 
classified as "social" in nature, since they were probably 
passed as much for the protection of the entire colony as 
for the defense of any one of its settlements. However, 
even those colonial laws which might be thought of as 
interfering with matters primarily local in nature were most 
often made operative in all towns alike . Further, the 
details of carrying the laws out were left to town offici a ls. 
33Ibid., PP• 62-63. 
34Ibid .. , P• 63. 
Unlike the nripper bills" of the nineteenth and 'twentieth 
centuries, the legislature did not prescribe the materials 
of which the town meeting house should be built, nor set 
up a committee, independent of the local authority, to 
build the required structure and levy taxes for the purpose?5 
The state might legislate that all towns over one thousand 
population must collect garbage, but would leave to the 
town the decision whether garbage collection day would be 
Monday or Friday, how the service should be financed, and 
who should do the collecting. By contrast, a 1912 Mass-
achusetts statute regulating Boston's local affairs, author" 
ized the city's park commissioners 
••• upon the request of the school-house commis-
sioners of the city, with the approval of the 
school committee of the city, to permit the 
erection of a building for the High School of 
Commerce within the limits of Back Bay Fens in 
the City of Boston. 
This drew from Harvey M. Shepard,36 former president of the 
Boston City Council who _ had also served four years as first 
as sistant attorney general of Massachusetts, the angry sug-
gestion that, 
35This was done by the Pennsylvania legislature in 
the case of the Philadelphia city hall. For details, see 
the chapter on the post-Civil War era, below. 
36Harvey M. Shepard, 11The Thraldom of !1assachusetts 
Cities", 1912, National Municipal Review 1:182, quoting the 
statute at p. 185. 
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When anyone, who is familiar with the early history 
o~ ~fussachusetts, compares the legal position of the 
towns then \-Ti th what it is now, he may 1.-1ell wonder if 
it is the same commonwealth . The contrast between 
their freedom before the Revolution and their present 
subjection is startling , and with few parallels in 
history . Host of the towns are older than the state 
government ; and their powers come not under any grant 
from it , but by virtue of t h e right of' local self-
gover nment which "'ras brought over from England by our 
ancestors and which rests upon the magna charta. Town 
government was recognized by the state ; it was not 
created by it . But nm.; a tov-rn in most respects, and 
a city altogether , is in a position of utter helpless-
ness • • • • Its legal standing is that of an infant or of 
a ll.matic . 37 
From t he lack of early statutes concerning purely 
local matters and services , it is logical to assume that the 
municipalit y was left free to develop and regulate them as 
38 it saw fit . In accord with this t heory, William B. Weeden 
reports that prior to 1637 Massachusetts towns had been work-
ing out customs and local regulations pertaining to fences . 
In 1637 t he General Court attempted to formulate these fencing 
practices into a detailed statute . 39 The legislature repealed 
this earlier order in 164~ by a more general statute , and a 
year later repealed this in turn and gave control of fencing 
. 40 
to the selectmen of the tovrns - causing historian Weeden to 
comment: 
37Ibid. , p. 182 . For even more ex treme examples of 
interference by the Massachusetts General Court in local affairs , 
see James R. Douglas , Home Rule and State Administrative Super-
v i sion of Hunicipalities in the United State~, Berkeley, Univ-
ersity of California unpublished Ph . D. dissertation, 1917 , pp . 
64- 67 . 
38weeden, op . cit ., vel. 1 , p . 
39~~ss . Colonial Records , vol. 
4°Ibid., vel . 2 , pp . 15, 49 . 
60. 
1 , p . 215 . 
The reason for this (repeal of the fencing 
acts) was the bad working of the statutes in 
actual practice. It is probable that the 
careful mechanism instituted by townspeople 
like those of Dorchester, when applied gener-
ally by the arbitrary power of the Court, would 
not fit communities of a more heterogenecus 
character . 41 
This would appear to be a plain attempt by the 
legislature to regulate something which de Tocqueville 
might well include within his list of "local matters 
(though it might be argued that keeping the animals from 
one town from straying into the lands of other persons or 
towns would be a "social" matter). However, the legis-
lature did not hesitate to enact the legislation, nor is 
there any indication that the towns protested that having 
the power taken from them was an illegal invasion of their 
long-honored looal rights. At any rate, the legi lature 
in 1 647 repeal ed t:te act of 1637, 42 ·thus vacillating between 
very detailed legislation and more general l ·egislation in an 
area of action originally left to the towns. 
Whatever might have been going on behind the scenes, 
the author has found only one clearcut case in the pre-
Revolutionary period in Massachusetts in which town resisted 
colonial authority as such successfUlly. Early in 1632 a 
tax of sixty pounds was assessed upon the settlements in 
order to pay for frontier fortifications ( 11 a pallysadoe") 
41 Weeden, op . cit., vol, 1, p. 60. 
42Ma.ss. Colonial Records, vol. 2, p. 49. 
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at the "new towne. The inhabitants o~ Watertown a 
~irst declined to pay this tax, which had been assessed 
by the board of assistants, on the ground that English 
freemen cannot be taxed without their consent, and sent 
some of the townspeople to Boston to protest on February 17, 
16:32. A.t the meeting, Governor Winthrop is reported to have 
expounded the nature of the Assistants' powers by saying 
that the government of Massachusetts was not like that of 
an English city, where the 
"mayor and alderman have not power to make 1 aws 
.or raise taxations without the people." On the 
contrary, the Massachusetts government was "in 
the nature o~ a parliament," the Assistants 
being chosen by all the freemen, who could at 
the General. Cwrt, "consider and propound any-
thing without being subject to question. n44 
Nevertheless, it has been claimed that the Watertown resis-
tance to tm tax 
led to a change of government, in that two 
deputies were sent from each settlement to 
advise with the board of assistants, and the 
1~ 
4:3 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 9:3. The date of this statute is 
given as l~by Fiske and by Channing, both cited below, am 
elsewhere variously as 16:31-16:32 and 1632. One of the diffi-
culties in dealing with materials from the colonial era is 
that the records were written at a period when the Julian 
cal en dar was in use. The legal year commenced on Conception 
Day, March 25. See the introductory remarks by Nathaniel B. 
Shurtleff, Mass. Colonial Records, vol. 1, p. x. Therefore, 
double dating, such as the March 6, 1631.-16:32 date given for 
tm meeting at which the tax for the Newtown fortificatiOns 
was ordered, means tba t the event occurred 1n the legal year 
1631 but the historical year (which commences on January 1) 
1632. This has caused great confusion, since scholars some-
times use one date, and some times another. The au thor has 
cited the historical year, wherever possible, in ac8ard with 
modern practice. Newtown(e) was the early name for ambriage. 
44cha nnl:r:g, "Genes is ••• , " op. cit., p. 262. 
pcwer of choosing annually the governor and ass~ants was resumed by the freemen,45 
eventually resulting in the creation of a house of represen-
tatives.46 Another historian, who unfortunately placed an 
impressive bibliography at the end of his bt:>ok but did not 
footnote, had a slightly different account of how the 
Massachusetts house or representatives crone to be. Alexander 
Johnston maintained that early in 1632 the Massachusetts 
Court of Assistants assumed control of the settlement of 
town boundaries and the control of town interests w1 thout 
any authority either from the charter or from the towns, 
just as earlier the assistants had usurped control of the 
admission of inhabitants to the towns. 
Dissatisfaction ••• first took the shape of 
assertion of local liberty, or town freedom 
rather than of individual freedom.. There were 
attempts at independent town action before 1634; 
but the curious and perhaps significant fact is that 
nearly all of them took place in the three towns 
which afterwards made up the Connecticut secession. 
T:te towns in 1634 informally sent two deputies each 
to Boston to get a sight of the patent. The sight 
was enough to expose the usurpation of the assis-
tants; and at the general court in May the freemen 
would make no elections until their deputies had 
been recognized as a factor in the government.47 
45 John Fiske, The Beginnin~s of New ~land, or the 
Puritan Theocracy in Its Relatlono civil anRellgiou.s 
Libert! (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1889), 
pp. 16 -106. 
46Ellen Mudge Burrill, A Monograph on the Charters 
and Constitution of Massachusetts {Lynn, Mass.: Nichols & 
S n Co., 1932), pp. 22-23. 
47Alexander Johnston, Connecticut: A Study of a 
Connnonwealth-DEmocracy (Boa ton and New York : Houghton, 
Mifflin & Co., 1887), 2d ed. (1903), p. 67. 
Whatever the reason for the house of representatives, 
it apparently resulted from dissatisfaction in the towns. 
Although the colonial records do not mention the February 17 
meeting, they do record that on May 9, 1632 
It was generally agreed upon, by erection of 
hands, that the Governor, Deputy Governor , and 
Assistants should be chosen by the whole Coort 
o:f Governor, Deputy Governor, Assistants , and 
freemen, and that the Governor should alwaies 
be chosen out of the Assistants.... Tt was 
ordered that there shoold be two of every planta-
tion appointed to conferre with the Ccurt aboot 
raiseing of a publique stoeke : --(persons named). 48 
Burr:tll observed that 
Tm feeling was growing among the freemen that 
all laws shculd be made at the General Court, 
but as their number was steadily increasing, 
the idea of oh oosing representatives seemed to 
receive general favor in the towns. The legis-
lative functions were apparent! y surrendered by 
agreement among the magistrates and :f'reemen. At 
a ~eting of the General Court, May 14, 1634, 
twenty-four delegates took their seats. They 
demanded a representative form of government and 
resolved among other things, that none but the 
General Court had power to choose and admit free-
men, to raise money and taxes, dispose of lands , 
make and establish laws, elect and appoint officers. 
Thus, a House of Representatives was established •••• 
:tt was to the refusal of Watertown to pay their 
proportion of this tax, because they were not 
represented in the body which imposed it, that 
rur Hcus e of Representatives primarily owes its 
origin.49 
The orders of the historic May 14 meeting, which the to m 
representatives attende~ reserved no rights to the towns as 
such, al thrugh, possibly considering swine control a local 
48Mass. Colonial Records, vol . 1, p. 95. 
49Burrill, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
matter, they did repeal all former orders conc~erni."'lg swine, 
so that 
every towne shal have liberty to make such 
orders about swine as they shall judge best 
f'or themselves, and ••• if the swine of one 
tow.ne shall come within the lymitts of another, 
the owners thereof shalbe lyeable to the orders 
of that towne where their swine soe trespasseth. 50 
And they stated that in levying all rates and public charges, 
the towns shruld levy against every man according to his 
estate and ability, and not according to the number of per-
sons in his household. 51 The provisions for town election 
Qf representatives stated that 
it shalbe lawfull for the freemen of' every 
plantation to chuse t o or three of ~~ach towne 
l!:teit!'~ . fliVJ~l:"ll ~ene:tal ~curt, !"D con~•ft! · . Ml: 
.prepare such public l:us iness as by tb3m shalbe 
thought fitt to consider of att the 11exte General 
Court, and that such persons as shal be hereafter 
soe deputed by the freemen of (the) several planta-
tions, to deale in their behalfe, in ye publi que 
affayres of tre commonwealth, shall have the full 
power and voyces of all the said freemen, deryved 
to them fort he makeing and establishing of' lawes, 
50Mass. Colonial Records, vol . 1, p. 119. However, 
apparently inter-town disputes over swine depredations 
reached such a level that on July 8 , 1635, a committee was 
appointed to draw up an "order abru te swine, & returne the 
same in to the Crurt," and new regulat ions were made as to 
town pounds for swine . Ibid., pp. 149-50. Additional orders 
concerning swine were passed !'rom time to time (ibid .. , pp . 157, 
181, 187 , 188, 189) before the General Court once-more 
repealed all former orders against swine , and gave the power 
once more to the towns. Ibid., p. 215. This order, however, 
dete~ined ~ich persons ana-which tow.ns should be liable in 
case of varying types of trespass by the an:i.mals. 
51 Ibid., p. 120. 
granting of lands, etc., and to deale in all 
other affaires of the commonwealth wherein the 
freemen have to do, the matter of election of 
magistrates and other officers onely excepted, 52 
where n every freemen is to gyve his owne voyce . 
(Italics mine .) 
It might be argued that this limited the legislature to 
affairs concerning the conmonwealth only, and that it excluded 
local matters·. However, the same meeting of the ccurt ordered 
that the settlement of Winnesemet should join itself either 
to the town of Charleston or to Boston before the next General 
Court. If Winnesemet did not act by the date specified, the 
General court threatened to join it with one ,,f those two 
towns. 53 The order tm t a watch of two men bta kept each 
night in every town was repeated. 54 Of the Watertown refusal 
to pay the tax, nothing more appears in the records. Pre-
sumably, its contention for representation being well taken, 
the town paid the tax. 55 
52Ibid., 118 19 pp. - • 
53Ibid., PP• 119-20. 
54Ibid., p. 120. 
55An interesting postscript is that on May 6, 1635, 
the legislature granted liberty to the inhabitants of Water-
to(w)n to 11remove tmmsel ves to any place they shall thinke 
meete to make choise of, provided they continue still under 
this government ." The inhabitants of "Rocks bury11 were g1 ven 
the same permission . Ibid., p. 146. On October 7, 1640, the 
Watertown and Lynn constables were fined for not returning 
their warrants and names of their deputies. Ibid •, p. 301. 
Earlier the town's freemen had been fined "f~nding 
Mr. Browne away, being to have attended the Cc:il.rt," (ibid., 
p. 273}. The town had also been fined for bad roads arur-for 
failing to provide the stocks required by law. Ibid., pp. 247, 
267 . -
On March 4, 1635, the General Court fined the town 
of Saugus "for refusing to pay their levy, " Salem for not 
paying its tax levy on time, and Mr. Pinchen for refusing to 
pay his part "of the last rate for Rocks bury, withotit dis-
treyneing, because, as hee alleadged, that towne was not 
equally rated with otbers."56 Whether the two tow:1s refused 
to pay in protest against the t ax or whether their failure 
to pay was a result of the economic difficulties 57 of the 
times, does not appear from the record . The legislature 
remitted all three fines, indicating some sort of justifying 
clrculils t ances. 5S The order 
of tre 
••• that the constable of every plantation shall 
deliver to the deputyes to be chosen for the 
nexte General Court a coppy of their towne rates, 
to be cons ide red of by them, to the end th.a t t mse 
townes which have been over r ated in the 900 pound 
levy may, in the nexte levy, receave g~ua.ll satis-
facti on for the t -yme past and to come 
same date might indicate that Mr. Pinchen's complaint 
was well taken, at any rate. 
Records of the time were fragmentary; pages were 
sometimes torn out and destroyed and many of the entries are 
illegible or cryptic. In such a situation it would be sur-
prising if the towns did not go their own way with little 
56 Ibid., p . 136 . 
57Tbe Colonial Records a t about this time indicate 
that tmre was a scarcity of .food and money , ani that prices 
were high. See, e.g. , the order , p . 140, forbidding any 
person to take corn or meal out of the jurisdiction. vol. 1. 
58Ib id. , p . 136. 
59~., p. 138 . 
real interference from the central govemment, and if they 
did not regard it as · necessary ;to secure permission from 
the legislature to do this or that. Some towns sought per-
miss ion to do a thing; others did not; and some towns made 
the motions of seeking approval for their acticns, but the 
records do not show whetbsr permission was evc~r given for 
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the town's subsequent action. In 1743, the town of Sheffield 
petitioned the General Court for a grant of certain land, and 
1n due time took possession of that land. Yet a historian 
comnented more than a hundred years later: 
It is presumed that the Court granted the prayer, 
for, al th01gh no record of it can be .found, that 
tract has always been considered as e. portion of 
the town, and, in fact, is a very valuable agri• 
cultural const ituent of its territory.60 
If land grants were so carelessly treated, it can be suggested 
that other decisions, ecpal1y important, might have been ·1 ef't 
01t of the records. Such was the state or confusion and lack 
of central control that the Massachusetts judges of a later 
era were to refer to the colonial era as one of anarchy as 
far as town powers were concerned. 61 Not un·til 1641 was there 
e below, Ch. V. 
even a code of written laws which a town could consult. 62 
The situation was not only ill-defined and anarchistic as 
far as town-colony intergovernmental relations were con-
cerned, but even the relationship between the English 
colonies was nebulous and strained. The various colonies, 
nominally all under the contro~ of the Crown, engaged in 
econcm.ic warfare. First one colony and th9n another 
sought to discriminate against the products of its neigh-
boring colonies by tariffs, economic reprisals and the like. 63 
Since the Crown was unable to keep the colonies themselves· 
in harmony, it is r.ot too surprising that it should largely 
have let the towns go their own way. 
Judged by the spheres of rightful exe,rcise of tC7Hn 
power as delineated in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, some of the actions of the colonial towns might 
have been considered as encroaching upon the sovereign 
powers of th9 central government. However , in colonial 
days things just muddled along, and a town's actions were 
seldom questioned else~here . There were no ringing decisions 
by the courts elaborating on the position or. c·ons·t .it1;1.tioiuH ;status 
which the town should occupy in the ever-changing govern-
mental complex of the time. The towns exercised their 
narrow local duties, enclosed the commons, cared for the 
town ne'er-do-wells, fenced in the swine, and built their 
62 Burrill, op . cit., p. 23; Mass. Colonial Records, 
v.ol. 1, p. 346. 
63weeden , op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 593-94. 
dirt roads and swaying bridges. The type of powers left to 
the towns were of such a nature that the legislature had 
no reason to interfere. Even when a town overstepped its 
bounds, word of the action must often have failed to reach 
the responsible colonial authorities. 
For example, the town of Braintree in 1736 took 
extraordinary action in face of an "emergency in public 
affairs. n64 Thomas Vinton, a manufacturer, bad built a 
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dam across the Mona.tiquot River. Althrugh he abandoned his 
manufacturing enterprise, the dam remained and obstructed 
the pmssage of the alewives (fish) up the river during the 
spawning season . Tre townspeople brrught the issue up at 
the town meeting of March 10, 1736, and appointed a com-
mittee to arrange with Vinton for a surrender of his rights. 
Vinton, however, said he would not sell his rights in the 
river no matter what the terms made by the town. The town 
then voted one hundred pounds, if need be, to defray the 
charges of defending the townspeople's rights i n the river. 
A second committee was appointed and authorized to submit 
the matter to impartial referees. When this second 
committee secured no action, the town meeting met again 
on August 23. After voting that tt all such things as 
obstruct the Passage in Monaticut River , in any part thereof, 
be removed, n the town meeting chose a new committee, headed 
by one "Honble . Leonard Vassal, Esq. " This committee took 
64charles F. Adams gives a full account of this 
incident . "Three Episodes ... , " op . cit., vol. 2, pp. 831-34. 
direct action end pulled the dam down. With Mr . Vinton 
threatening to bring a lawsuit against the persons 
responsible, another town meeting was held on September 14 
and it was voted that the committee which had torn down the 
dam was empowered to . defend all individuals against any 
action which Mr.o Vinton might bring, "excepting any charge· 
Mr . Vinton shall or may recover of any person or persons 
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by making out a Riot. " Three weeks l ater, at yet another 
special town meeting, it was voted to offer the manufacturer 
three hundred pounds in town bills of credit if he would 
gl. ve the town a quit claim to his river rights and would 
discontinue legal proceedings against those who had destroyed 
the dam. Vinton agreed, and a three hundred pound tax was 
levied. A group of townspeople, claiming the earlier meet-
ing had not been warned according to law, and feeling that 
Vinton had been dealt with too liberally, entered protests 
against the tax. Twenty~four persons insisted on having 
their names recorded in opposition to the measure. 
In a later era , the protesting taxpayers would 
probably have gone to court and won a judgm.ent saying that 
the town action in this case was beyond its powers. The 
committee, in destroying the dam, was actir~ outside the 
scope of its authority and damag ing private property. The 
town in such a situation had no right to vote town funds 
to prevent action being taken against these persons. 
It is also noteworthy that the taNil did not petition 
the colonial government to have the offending dam removed . 
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Presumably, the river was a navigable one, and thus within 
the province of the provincial government to regulate. Also 
the early statute books abound .with colonial regulations on 
hunting, fishing, trapping, etc . The town, however, in the 
spirit of the times, went its own way and solved its own 
problems withc:ut recourse to the central government nor to 
the formalities of a law suit. 
The colonial town possibly felt that it was not 
subject to control to any great extent by the colonial legis-
lature. This state of mind probably was a product of the 
fact that the. legislature rarely interfered, and this lack of 
interference in turn resulted from a quasi-private character 
d 1 al f th i d b th towns • 65 an narrow oc scope o e powers exerc se y e 
The average townsman was not a constitutional lawyer, and 
if the towns sometimes entrenched upon the powers of the 
central government, it is understarxiable. But towns fre-
quently petitioned the General Court for permission to take 
certain action, or to have referees appointed to settle inter-
town brundary disputes. 
65James R. Douglas, 1Iome Rule and State Administrative 
Supervision of Municipalities in the UniteCl States_, unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, 1917, University of California, 
Berkeley. Mr. Douglas develops this theory extensively (see 
especially p. 34). Illustrative of the type of petty 
business which occupied the attention of the town legislators 
is the fact that even the town of Boston maintained a town 
blll fer breeding purposes until 1722, and much of Bos.ton 's 
town meeting business concerned herding flocks and managing 
droves of cattle upon the commons. Weeden, op. cit., vol. 2, 
PP• 522-24. 
courts in the nineteenth century, in describ ing 
the town e.s e. creature of the legislature, often pointed 
cut that the legislature created, abolished, and divided 
towns at will even in the colonial era . 66 Yet on closer 
examination it appears that many -of these boundary changes, 
cree.t ion of new towns within limits of the old, etc .. were 
actually the result of petitions by the townspeople them-
selves , and not merely orders impos ed from withcut . Josiah 
Holland's his tory of one hundred Western Mas::Je.chusetts 
towns reports those rare instances in which e ach one of 
the towns petitioned the legislature. 67 Time and time again, 
it is recorded that a number of families, separated from 
the rest of the town by an icy river, a mountain without 
decent roads, or e. near impassable swamp , and finding it 
almost impossible to attend the Sunday church services and 
the town meetings withoo.t great hardship, petitioned the 
court, asking to be set off from tbe rest of the town. 
Often the old town itself joined 1n the petition . In many 
instances, the General Court appointed an impartial committee 
to set rut the bounds of the new entity. Rarely does the 
e.ccwnt of' the incident indicate any real opposition on the 
part of the people of the locality. 
The charters and laws relating to the early towns 
in both t:te Massacbus etts Bay and Pl-;ymou th col onies and the 
66see Chs. V and VI below; also Goodell, "New 
Historical School," op . cit ., p. 330. 
67 Holland, op. cit ., vol. 2, passim. 
records of the towns then in existence have been so well 
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recorded and analyzed elsewhez•e that there is no need for 
them to be repeated here. But tl::e Massachusetts towns of 
today often refer their origin, organization, and powers of 
local government to the powers actually exercised by the 
early emigrants in both colonies, imperfect thru.gh the 
records of those powers may be. Latter-day jurists to the 
contrary notwithstanding, the laws and charters of the 
period were not the full measure of tre se powers. Towns 
were not 
••• contrived in the closet, nor in the hall of 
a legislative assembly; and brought into exis-
tence, with the powers and duties which we find 
attached to them, by the enactment of e. law for 
that p.1rp os e. They did not burst in to mature 
life by any previru.s contrivance. But like 
most other useful machinery, they had their 
origin in. the wants of the time, and came into 
existence by e. gradual progress from imperfect 
beginnings .69 
68 Joel Parker, "Origin ••• , " op. cit.; John F. Sly, 
Tonn Government in Massachusetts, 1620-1930 (Cambridge , Mass .: 
Harvard University Press, 1930), Harvard Political Studies; 
papers and remarks on "Genes is ••• , " op. cit; • , by C. F . Adams , 
Chamberlain, Channing, and Goodell; George E. Howard, Loc al 
Constitutional Histor of the United States : Develo ment of 
TownshiE, Hun re an e B t more : Jo s Hopkins 
University 1studies fu HiStorical and Political Science), 
1889), pp. 50-100. John F. Sly, "Geographical Expansion and 
the Town System," Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, 
vol. 2, ed . by Hart, OE• cit., pp. 96-121; Andre~ McFarland 
Davis, ttcorporations in the Days of the Colony, " Massachu-
setts Colonial Society Proceedings, vol. 1 (Boston, 1895), 
pp. 183-215. 
69Parker, OE• cit., p. 20. 
The part played by the Massachusetts town in the 
events leading to the American Revolution, particularly the 
memorials passed by the towns ·regarding independence, and 
the instructions which they gave to their General Court 
representatives, who felt themselves bound thereby, will be 
traced in more detail in the next chapter. The resolution 
approved at the October 4, 1774 Ashfield tow.n meeting is 
typical: 
That we will take the law of God for the founda-
tion of the forme of our Government • • • that it 
is our opinion that we do not want any Govinor 
but the Govinor of the Universe & un:l er him a 
States General to consult with wrest of the u.s. 
for the good of the whole--that the Assembly of 
this State consist of one Elective body, the 
members of which body shall be Annually elected--
that all Acts passed by the General Court of the 
State respecting the several towns be sent to tfu 
several towns for their acceptance before they 
shall be in force • • • that it is our otinion that 
each tow.n Is fcivested with a native au horitt to 
chUse a Committee or Nurilber of Jud~es consis ing 
of a number of understanding & pru ent men that 
shall judg & determine all cases between man & 
man, setel Intestate estates, & collect all debts 
that have been contracted or may be contracted 
within their Limits & all Controversies whatso-
ever excep-t 1n the ca.ae . ot. murder & then it will 
be necessary to call in eleven men from eleven 
neiboring Towns that shall be cose (chosen?) for 
that purpose annually to jug & condemn such 
murderers.70 (Italics mine.) 
nti-English sentiments were not nevJ in the towns. 
Sir Edmund Andros, governor from 1686 to 1689 had much 
difficulty with tl::e towns. When he imposed a poll tax, 
excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, and heavy property 
70Louis A. Frothingham, Brief History of the 
Constitution and Government of Massachus ett::;, ls t ed. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916), p. 20. 
taxes, many of the towns pe titioned for exemption and some 
71 
even refused to collect the new taxes. In disput es with 
the towns over land titles , Andros told the colonists that 
since their former colonial charter had given them no right 
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to establish local communities for the purpose of government , 
towns had no legal existence in the colony.72 He told a 
comm.i ttee from Lynn that "there is no such thing as a town 
in the whole country ,n and that the Lynn land records were 
"not worth a rush.n73 
Under his administration, an act was passed making 
it unlawful for town inhabitants to meet or confer in town 
meeting nunder any pretense or color whatsoevern except .for 
the annual May election of tovm officers . With the accession 
o.f William o.f Orange in 1688, Andros -r.v-as imprisoned and his 
government overthrown. The new charter granted in 1691 rec-
ognized the town system by providing a General Court to which 
each town was to elect two-representatives . It did not guar-
antee local self- government and the entire supervision of 
tov-1ns was placed under the authority of the Province. The new 
governn1ent in 1692, as one of its .first acts , did enact a 
general charter of town government. However, this law re-
qu ired all tmvn orders and by-laws be approved by the court o.f 
quarter sessions (justices of peace , appointed by governor and 
council. Justices of the peace were authorized to call 
71 C!1 "G h" 1 n • t 98 ~ y , eograp lCa ••• , op . Cl ., p. • 
72Ibid . For a detailed account o.f Andros' disputes with 
the towns , see the same author 's Town Government •.• , pp . 78-81. 
73Burrill, op. cit. , pp . 16-17. 
town meetings when the selectmen unreasonably refused to do 
so, to fine the selectmen for neglect of certain of their 
duties, to act in conjunction with the colonial officials 
in assigning slaughter hoo.se s 1 tes in certain towns am in 
appointing the town watchmen, and to act with the selectmen 
or overseers of the poor in binding out apprentices and 
setting tm poor to work. This was, there fore, a policy of 
far closer super vis ion of the towns by the .central govern-
ment than had existed prior to the Andros administration. 74 
With tm excepticn of Boston, the c:olonial towns 
1a rgely ccntinued to go their own way with little inter-
ference. In the case of Boston, the Suffolk County Ccurt 
of General Sessions of the Peace, with its absolute veto on 
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the town orders and by-laws and its supervisory powers, 
reportedly greatly irked the Boston selectmen. Whenever the 
selectmen were charged with sane delay, as in the la.y:Jng out 
of tom ways, tha power to act was vested in the ccurt, which 
exercised it. 75 
Writing in 1773 of the act passed in 1694 regular-
izing town powers, Governor Thomas Hutchinson (colonial 
governor in 1771-74 and an historian in his own right} says : 
By a law tmde soon after our own charter and 
unfortunately allowed by the Crown, every town 
is a dis tine t corporation, and a l though their 
powers are limited to matters of public con-
cernment to the town yet when the inhabitants 
74
sly 1 ttGeographical ••• , " o;e . cit . , pp. 97-101. 
75 Sherwin L. Cook, " Boston: The Eighteenth Century 
Town, " Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, edited by 
Hart, op . cit • , vol • 2 1 p. 2 36. 
are once assembled they ta~g upon themselves 
all matters of government. 
As the Revolution approached, town meetings began 
memorializing and petitioning, ~laiming their natural 
rights as Englishmen were being infringed by the Crown. 
As early as 1731, the Boston town meeting instructed its 
representatives to the legislature against legislating 
a regular salary for the royal governor "lest it make the 
governor mere independent of tm citizenship. n77 Newbury• s 
town meeting in 1754 debated the proposed act for granting 
the Crown an excise on wine and spirits distilled ar 
retailed and consumed in the province, and voted that the 
part relating to the ccnsumption of spirits in private 
families "is an infringement on the natural rights of 
78 Englishmen." Thus the Massachusetts towns, from an 
early date, in their debates on matters of province-wide 
concern, in their opposition to Andros, in their instruc-
tions to their representatives in the legislature, reflect 
the rising spirit of national! ty which was to eventuate in 
town memorials supporting the caus~ of American independence, 
and denouncing the Crown. 
In the earlier days of the colony, the General Court 
had demanded respect for its orders. When Salem wrote letters 
76Letter of April 7, 1773, to one Colonel Williams, 
quoted in an address by Arthur Lord, "The Representative 
Town Meeting in Massachus etta, " 1918, 4 Massachusetts Law 
Quarterly 49, p. 51. 
77cook, op. cit., pp. 249-50. 
78 
eeden, op. cit., vol. 2, pp . 672-73 _. cj_uo.t:tng 
Governor Hutchinson. 
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to other towns to ga.ln their support .for Roger Williams, 
later founder of Rhode Island, the legislature refused to 
allow Salem deputies to sit in the General Court until the 
majorfty of the town's .freemen disowned the letters "wherein 
they have exceedingly reproached & vilifyed the magistrates 
& deputies of the general court. 1179 As the Revolution 
neared, the towns grew more demanding of their privileges 
of free speech. 
In conclusion, it cannot be said that town powers 
in colonial Massachusetts were clearly defined, but neither 
can it be said that the central colonial authority was_ a 
permanently established government capable of enforci ng its 
orders or desirous of supervising the towns. In a virtual 
state of nature, the towns were left to pursue their own 
affairs, and rarely was there any head-on clash with the 
legislature , parti cula.rly once the legislature was con-
stituted of previously instructed delegates of the towns 
themselves. Neither is there any indication that the older 
toms which were so independent in origin stood in any 
different relationship to the colonial authorities than 
those towns for whose inception the government was respons-
ible. On the contrary, such laws as the 1639 one by which 
the General Court decreed that it or any two magistrates 
cculd determine any questions about the support of poor 
persons and families, and could "dispose of all onsettled 
79Mass . Colonial Records, vol. 1, pp . 156-58. 
persons into such towns as they shall judge to bee most fitt 
80 for t he maintenance of such persons and families" · applied 
to all of the towns equally , old as well as new. 
Connecticut 
The town was so important a factor in the formation 
of the colony of Connecticut that the state even today is 
frequently described as a federation or confederation of 
towns . So dominant are the towns in both houses of the leg-
islature that it is difficult at times to find where state 
government ends and local government begins. 
In 1887, follm.ring the widespread interest in the 
New England town generated by publication of English trans-
lations and condensations of Alexis de Toc queville 1 s books on 
America , another controversial book81 focused attention on 
the Connecticut town. The author, Alexander Johnston, was 
as enthusiastic a partisan of the New England town as was his 
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French pr edecessor. He exan1ined Connecticut history in light 
of his thesis that the Nutmeg State is a federative democracy, 
••• be ing mainly a federation of tov-rns, with 
neither so much of the centrifugal force as in 
Rhode Island, nor so much of the centripetal 
fo~ce as in the other colonies , maintained for 
a century and a half that union of the democra-
tic and federative i deas which h~s at last come 
to mark the whole United States . 2 
80 Ibid., pp . 107 , 264. 
81 
Alexander Johnston, Connecticut : A Study of a Common- . 
wealth-Democracy, Boston and New York , Houghton, Mifflin and Co8 , 
1887, 2d ed. , 1903. 
82
rbid ., 2d ed., p. viii . 
His statements have been so often quoted by partisans of 
the doc trine of inherent right to 1 oc al self-government, 
83 
repeated in commentaries on New England, and criticized 
by other historians, 84 that tl:ey have probably been read 
in one form.or other by most persons researching the 
problem of town-state intergovernmental relations. 
Johnston maintained that Connectieut•s town system 
was more independent of cutside control than that of Massa-
chusetts, and the principle of local governm.ent had a more 
complete recognition there than in the older colonye 85 In 
Massachus etta there were attempts at independent town acticn 
before 1634 , "but the curious end perhaps significant fact 
is that nearly all of them took place in the three towns 
(Cambridge, Dorchester, Watertown) which afterwards made up 
the Connecticut aecession ."86 In Massachusetts, after the 
83see, e . g ., Fiske , Beginnings ••• , ap . cit.; -PP ~ 127-28; 
Charles M. Andrews , "The River Towns of Connec t icut , ' Studies 
in History and Political Science {Baltimore: Johns HopkinS---
University, 1889), pp .. 29, 122 . 
84odell Shepard, Connecticut Fast and Present ( New 
York and London : Alfred • Knopf Co ., 1939), pp. 119-20.; 
Chamberlain, "Genesis ... , " op. cit.,, p. 217; Chamberlain, 
nNew Historical School •• • ," op . cit . , pp. 269-78; Goodell, 
"New Historical School ••• ," op . c!tq pp .. 320-31. 
85Johnston, op. cit ., p. vi. 
86rbid., p. 67 . Professor Johnston's theory that 
these "threerull y organlz ed Massachusetts towns passed out 
of the jurisdiction of any commonwealth_ and proceeded to 
build up a commonwealth of their own" (ibid , p. 12) was 
strongly attacked by Chamberlain , " New HIStorical School ••• ," 
op . cit ., pp. 274-77, and Goodell, ttNew Historical School ••• , " 
op. cit., pp. 328-29. 
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real ~eginning of government, the town was subordinate to 
the colony, and though the independence of the churches 
forced a considerable local freedom there it was not so 
fundamental a fact as in Connecticute 87 Johnston continued : 
The independence of the town in Conz:Eoticut was 
a political fact which has colored the · whole 
history of tre conmonweal th, and, through it, 
of the United States.... Here the three originel 
towns had in the beginning left commonwealth 
control behind them when thew left the parent 
colony. They had gone in to the wilderness, each 
the only organized political power within its 
_jurisdiction. Since their prototypes, the little 
tuns of the primeval German forest, tmre had 
been no such examples of the perfect capacity 
of the political cell, the "town ," for self-
government . In Connecticut it was the towns 
that created the commonwealth; and the conse-
quent f ederative idea bas steadily influenced 
the colony and state alike. In Connecticut, 
' the governing principle, due to the original 
constitution of things rather than to the 
policy of the commonwealth, has been that tM 
town is the residuary legatee of polit ical-
power; thiit it is the State which Is called 
upon to make out a clear case for powers to 
which it lays claim; end that the towns have a 
~rima facie case in their favor wherever a 
~oubt arises. In other States, tower runs 
f rom the State upwards ana from he State 
downwaras; ·in Connect lout, the towns hli ve 
81 wats been to the commonweil th as the common-
we81 h to the Union.88 (Italics mirie .. ) 
The first settlement of the colony had been instituted 
under a commiss ion from the Massachusetts General Court.89 
87 Johnston, op. cit., p. 61. 
88 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
89For detailed studies of the Connecticut town, see 
the symposium is sue "Beginning of the Connec ti cu. t Towns," 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Oct. 1590 ; Edwin M. Bacon, The Connecticut River 
and the ,Valley or Connecticut (New York and London: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons and the Knickerbocker Press, 1907); 
However, al thrugh the new towns of Hartford, Windsor, and 
Wethersfield were still under the jur 1s diction of Massa-
cl:nlsetts the idea of local self-government was so strongly 
implanted that the pioneers, 
unable to give up the idea of crurts of their 
own • • • elected two men from each of the towns 
for the transaction of ordinary business, {and) 
••• for extraordinary occasions, such as decid-
ing upon war am peace, and making Indian treaties , 
they were joined by three others from each town, 
making so-called committees.90 
The first such "connnittee meeting " or general ccurt 
was held on May 1, 1637 and several more were held before 
the voluntary c anpact or constitution ot January 1638-1639 
91 
established a permanent farm of government. The 1639 
of Nevi 
and Ins titu-
on : New Yor : 
Brown and Gross , 
~~~--~--~~~~~-R~e~c_o~r_d~s, vol. 1, 
chart~r was later to fo~ the basis of the Charter of 1662, 
and then the Constitution of 1818 under which the state is 
still gove.rned. 92 The makeup of the legislature under this 
early compact was such that the towns, in town meeting, 
chose their delegates to the semi-annual conventions or 
general courts. With elections held every six months, and 
meetings of the General Court held immediately afterward, 
the unicameral legislature was little more than the agent 
of the towns. Thus, the importance of any of the early state 
legislative records fades considerably in any attempt to 
guage the relative standing of state power and local right 
to s lf- government. Yet, even with the basis of representa-
tion being such as to make the General Cru.rt little more 
then a meeting of sovereign towns , the author has . been unable 
to find in his search of the laws from 1638 to 1818 any 
inst~ce in which the General Court legislated in any matter 
of purely local concern.. The laws of this era, from 16:38 
I to tb$ adoption of the Constitution of 1818 by which the 
stat e 1is governed today, concerned state-wide concerns, with 
no single indication of any t~e or "ripper" bill or the 
i 
like . The legislature was undoubtedly supreme, but it was 
a legislature very much like that of the United States under 
the Articles of Conf'ederation. 
The"Constitutior:l' of 1638 described the General 
Court in this fashion: 
92Ibid., p. 5. 
1. It is ordered, sentenced and decreed, 
That there shall bee yearly two General! 
Assembly's or Courts, the one the second 
Thursday in Aprill·, · the other the second 
Thursday in September following: The :first 
shall bee called the Courte o:f Election, 
wherein shall bee yearely chose, from time 
to time, so many magistrates am other pub-
lique officers, as shall bee :found re~isite, 
whereof one to be chosen Governor for the 
yeare ensuing, and untill another bee chosen, 
and no magistrate to bee chosen for more than 
one ye are; provided always , there bee six 
chosen besides the Governor, which being chosen 
and sworne according to an oath recorded for 
that purpose, shall have power to administer 
j t a tice according to the lawes here es t ablished, 
and :for want thereof, according to the rule of 
the word ot Gad; which choyce shall bee made by 
all that are admitted Freemen, and have tAken 
the oath of fidelity, and do cohabit within 
this jurisdiction, having beene admitted 
:I-nhabitants by the major parte of t:m to n 
w~re they live or tm major parte of such 
as shall bee present.93 
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It will be noted that there was no separation of po ers. 
All public officers, vhether executive or judicial, includ-
ing the Governor, magistrates, and other o:fficers, were 
nominated by the General Court, and elected by plurali'lty 
vote of the qualified voters, apparent! y in town meeting, 
:for one-year, nan-renewable terms of of:fice. 94 The Consti-
tution continued : 
22), 
of 1638, art. 2, in Conn. Code 
• • • to the aforesaid Courte of Election, the 
severall Townes shall send theire Deputyes, 
and when the Elections are ended they may 
proceed in any publique service, as at other 
Courtes; allso, the other Generall Courte in 
September, shall bee far making of lawes and 
any other publique occa.ssion, which concerns 
the good of the Commanwealth.95 
17·.3 
The governor was at'dered, either himself or thrrugh 
the secretary, to send summons to every town c ons t a.b le at 
least a month prior to the time of the two " standing Courts " 
to call them i nto sessian.96 Despite the fact that the 
regular General Crurt met twice a year for an appreciable 
time, the executive and mag 1 trates were intended t o look 
t o the legislature in time of emergency: 
nd all so, if the Governor and the greatest 
parte of the magistrates see cause, uppon any 
speciall oqcassion, to call a General Courte, 
they may give order to the Secretary ~ o to doe, 
within fourteene dayes warning, and if urgent 
necessity so require, uppon a shorter notice, 
giving sufficient grounds for it, to the 
Deputys, when they meete, or else, bee questioned 
for the same.97 
If the magis trates or the governor did not call a regular 
session, or call the legislature toget~er when an emergency 
threatened, the General Court was given the absolute right 
of self-help: 
• • • and if tm Governor and major parts of the 
Magistrates, shall either neglect or refUse, to 
call the two Generall standing Courts, or either 
of thsm; as allso, at other times, when the 
occassions of the Commonwealth require; the Free-
men thereof, or the major part of them shall 
95rbid., art. 5, p. 14. 
96Ibid., art .. 5, p. 14. 
97Ibid . 
-
petition to them so to doe, if it th n be ither 
deni~d or ne cted, th aid Fre men or the 
m jox· te of t m sbs.l.l h ve po r to g1v 
order to th Const bles th seve all o s 
to do the s e , and so many e t to et r 
and choose· to the elves a mod rat or, and may 
proce d to doe 9IlY ct of po er hich y other 
en rall Ccur t may. 98 · 
This last provis.i.o. of t 1e cons titut1 n occasioned th 
remark by Johnston that the town constabl , 
••• migh even becane the instrum nt of 
legal revolution, in o se the Lovernor nd 
g1str ·tes reru ed to call the regul r meet-
ing o the ener court, or, on p t1tion of 
the free en, a special neeting ~ In t l ca e , 
the constitution provid d that the :trre m w re 
to in tr ct th oa1 tables to or lections 
of deputie , w o er to constitute .a ener 1 
court thems lv , excludi the gov rnor and 
magistrates. This pow r never as x rcised, 
but it i an extr ordin r f ture n con tl-
tutional law ~ It was the Connect cut mode of 
en uring r cognition o t e d ct r pre enta-
tives of the towns.99 
?o inting to the f ot t t the constable w 
r ired to publish the co en al th 1 WS to ht town, 
keep the "publike pe ce" of the town nd COt:mlOn th, 
levy t town• share of the conrnonweal t t x tion, and 
go from 'ho se to ho e" to notify the fr In n of g ner 1 
court meetings nd of t time pl ce for el ctions of 
deputies to t e legislature, Johnston s in the ano ient 
and honor ble of ice of omstnble the conn ot:in link 
bet een common alth and t "little to re ubl1cs."100 
98rbid., PP 14-15 . 
~9 Johns ton, on , p .. 7 • 
..;..r.....;._..;;..;;;...;;. -
100~ •• p 78 . 
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The pattern of representation in the legislature, 
established by the 1638 Fundamental Orders, emphasized the 
confederative makeup of the "Connecticut Colonies "; 
••• yndsor, Hartford and Wethersfield, shall 
ha.v e power, each Town , to send foure of the ire 
Freemen as theire Deputyes, to every Generall 
Ccurte, and whatsoever other Townes shall bee 
hereafter added tot his jurisdiction, they shall 
ha. ve so many Deputyes , as the Coo.rte shall judge 
meete : a reasonable proportion to th number of 
Freemen, that are in the said Towne, being to 
bee attended therein; which Detutyes shall have 
the power of the whole Towne, o five their 
voates ana allowance to ill suchawes and orders, 
as may bee for the publique good, end unto which 
the said Townes are to bee bound .101 ( Itali.cs 
mine . ) 
The charter granted by Charles II 1n 1662 continued the 
same plan of representation, but reduce the numb r of 
flepresentatives .from each town f':vom foull' to tw·o. The provision 
of tm Constitution calling for representation of new to'Wll 
as admitted in rough proportion to their population has 
never been followed . If it had, three centuries of rotten 
borough representation in Connecticut might have been 
avoided, or their evil lessened. The pattern then, from 
all that appears, was to assign .four deputies as the quota 
which each town was to send to the General Court. By 1713, 
Connecticut had settl ed forty-five towns under t s own 
jurisdiction, and had about fifteen thrus and inhabitants. 
Forty of these towns sent deputies, and the house of repre-
sentatives, when full, consisted of eighty members .l02 But 
of 1850 
101 ' 
Conn . Con titution of 1638, art 8, in Conn. Code 
• • • 1 pp • 15-16. 
102Benjamin Trumbull, it 1 2 476 1 op • c • , vo • , pp • , 5 8 . 
at the beginning of the Seven Years' war in 1756, either 
due t o poverty and inability to pay the deputy's salary, 
or due to lack of interest, eighteen towns or t be sixty-
eight in Connecticut., and fi tty-eight or the me hundred 
fifty-three in Massachusetts failed to send representatives 
to their general courts.l03 
A practical student of Connecticut politics, Clarence 
Deming, has pointed out that although the Connecticut courts 
hav ruled that the towns have no inherent po ers 1 and al-
though in 1 egal. theory the town in Connecticut is a mere 
creature of the state with not the slightest right to pro-
test any act done t o it by the state legislature, neverthe -
less as a practical matter, "the towns still rule the state 
in Connecticut."104 The basis of representation .in the 
General Assembly assures that state of affairs, he wrote. 
Commenting on the Fundamental Orders of 1639, Deming stated: 
Throughout this antique con stitution the idea 
of town entity in the little federation as well 
as of t ovm autonomy is conspicuous. In mattexos 
apart from the s anewha t vague authority granted 
under the c om).:ll ct, the towns had control or 
their local affairs. The tttown unit" was recog-
nized in the arrangenent for separate sets of 
deputies from each, elected at town meeting; and 
103James T. Adams, Revolutionart New England, 1691-
1776 (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press,923), p. 252; 
cushing, op. cit., p. 21. It has been reported that there 
was a close relationship between payment of taxes and 
representation in the Connecticut legisl ture. No town 
sent deputies unt:U it could pay its public charges . 
Clarence M. ebster ; Town Meeting Country (New York: Duell, 
Sloan and Pearce, 1945) , p. 9§ . 
104 Clarence Deming, "Town Rule in Connecticut," 
Political Science ~uarterly (1889) 4 :408e 
there was a provision by which the towns, in 
case the governor and the magistrates usurped 
powers, could, acting in separate capacities, 
create a new 1 gislative body . The old consti-
tution, however , did little more than rat ify 
a system of town rule that had existed previously 
as the natural outcome of the condition of inde-
pendence and 1s ola tion in which the early 
Connecticut s ttlements were placed. It gave 
popular consent !llld formal certification to an 
antecedent fact . ~U5 
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Not writing as a partisan of inherent rights but as 
a person interested in legislative reform who regarded the 
influence of the towns in the legislature as a positiye 
evil Which ~xisted despite all efforts on the part of 
reformers and of the Connecticut crurts , Deming described 
the abortive attempts at the 1818 constitutional convention 
to loos n the holds of the towns thus : 
The too meagre journal of the constitutional 
convent ion of 1818 smws that Robert Fairchild, 
of Stratford, offered a motion to give two 
representatives to towns of foU.r thoo.s ands or 
more, and to all other towns one; but it was 
def'eated . The motion was renewed, w1 th twenty-
five hundred and then w1 th two thcus and sub-
stituted for four thousand; but in both cases it 
was voted down. A clause setting forth that the 
legislature shrul d have power to reduce the 
number of representatives, provided that there 
should el ways be one from each town, met the same 
fate; and the pro~~sians for representation , as 
they now stand in the body of the constitution, 
were adopted by a vote of 112 to 72. By a vote 
o:f 127 yeas to 52 nays tovm rule in the l(!gia-
lature was still further eJq:>anded by allowing 
a simple majority 1n the legislature to override 
the governor's veto . The hold of the towns on 
the legislature was clinched by making it imposs-. 
ible to amend the constitution except by a 
majority vote in the lower hru.se, a two-thirds 
105 ~., pp. 410-11. 
vote of both houses in the legislature next 
succeeding and finally a ratification by the 
people . As Connecticut legislatures were 
made b iennial in 1886, ·the gauntlet of time 
which a constitutional amendment must run is 
doubled and town rule still more s trongly 
riveted on the state. The foregoing review of 
the method of constructing Connecticut legis-
latures shows the persistent dominance of the 
town through all the constitutional changes . 
In just ice to the men who framed the present 
constitution in 1818, it must be said t M.t they 
did their work in the deep shadow of' th t own-
ship tradition. They had seen at plan du~ing 
one hundred and seventy-nine years successful 
b oth in its relations to the commonwealth and i n 
its local autonomy ••• and ven · as early as 1818 , 
historians and statesmen had begun to lavish 
praise on the town idea as developed in the 
Connecticut poll ty . In 1818, no grave :inequali-
ties of the towns had begun to disturb their 
federative poise.l06 
The Fundrunental Orders of 1638 omitted any refer-
ence to .Great Britain or to a king . The Connecticut 
colonists held their land by grant from the rorm.er owners, 
by purchase from the Indians, and by right of settlement. 
They acknowledged no allegiance to anyone , saving only the 
.otbar New England states, with which they occasionally 
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entered into allegiance for protection against the Indians, 
trade, or the like. The Fundamental Orders exacted allegiance 
only to "the government of the juris diction of Comecticut. " 
The only "supreme authority" it recognized was that or the 
body of· rreemen and the general court in which the freemen 
of t~ t ovms are represented by their deputies. It demanded 
obedience to no laws except such as " are or shall be made 
106Ibid., 414 15 pp. - • 
by lawful authority here established--and ~or want thereo~, 
the rule o~ the w::> rd o~ God .. " T:Qe Connecticut residents 
were, ~or all purposes, citizens o~ an independent city-
state, made up o~ three component cities, with a combined 
populat im of about eight hundred in the early years. In 
their early records, they talked o~ tmmselves as English-
men to distinguish themselves ~om the other Europeans and 
from the Indians , 107 thcugh they professed no allegiance t o 
England. However, the desirability of obtaining protection 
~rom their enemies , combined w1 th the great comnercial 
advantages to be gained, and with the cultural and language 
ties, led them inevitably to seek ties with England. In 
1661, the colony sent Governor Win throp to the c curt of 
179' 
King Charles II, to seek treaty or alliance. He succeeded 
in obtaining a charter so liberal that the state continued 
to operate under it until 1818. The charter, in e~~ect, 
merely gave a grant of a vast extent of territory, continued 
the earlier constitution o~ the three river towns in force, 
and le~t the colony completely in charge o~ its own af~airs, 
with practically no inter~erence ~rom England.108 
107 See any o~ the Connecticut Codes of the seventeenth 
century. For a speci~ic instance, see Smucker, op. cit., 
" Indians ," p. 101 . 
lOPL . 
-Deming, op . cit ., p. 411; J. Hammond Trumbull, 
op . cit ., pp. 10-11 cites the instructions given to inthrop 
by the general crurt which submitted the dra~t o~ the charter 
to Winthrop ~or approval by the King to prove that the charter 
was in e~~ect not the char ter o~ King Charles, but a charter 
o~ the people themselves . The Charter o~ the ncient Colony 
(i.e., the 1662 charter ) is reproduced in Connecticut, Acts 
and Laws o~ the State o~, Hartford, Hudson and Goodwin., 1796, 
pp. 1 rr. 
The changes in t~ commonwe alth ' s cons t i tuti on 
a.ffeeted tm towns very l i ttle, although t he c harter of 
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1662 gave the colony a legal basis independent of the towns 
and superior to them in l aw. 1 09 Howe ver , the central govern-
ment gradually began to assume more of tm functions of a 
. colony. Johns ton traced the gradual e volu t ion of the colony 
from confederation to federation : 
Before the grant of the charter (in 1662) , the 
general cour t of Connecticut had begun t o show 
the characteri stics of a r eal commonwe alth 
government . No exact point of time can be 
stated at w hie h the transformation t ook place; 
but there is a plain difference between the 
g enerally recommenda t ory tone in Which the court 
was in t he habit of addressing the tORns in 1640, 
and the decidedly mandatory tone into which it 
had grown in 1660 . As sooh as t he charter had 
given it the consciousness of a legal title to 
existence and author i ty apart f r om its town 
units , i ts drift in the assumpt ion of powers 
heretofore left to the t owns became scmewhat 
stronger, until the essen tial commonwealth 
i nterests had b een b r rught under i ts jur i s -
die ti on. And ye t 1 t never 1 os t t he influence 
of tm forces which had founded the colony. llO 
He was careful to add , thcugh unfortunately not citing any 
spec if' ic instances : 
The Connecti cut to\ms , while they were generally 
content to confine their work to the matters of 
purely local int erest which had been left to them 
b y the general assembly, had never any hesitation 
1ri resistd~ ...... p y . all peaceable means , any a etion 
of t he s upreme legislative body which seemed to 
them unjust; and the general assembly, in its turn , 
was always disposed to treat such t own resistance 
mildly, and to seek for an accommodation rather 
than resort to f o rce .lll 
109 Johnston, op .. cit ., p .. 75. 
110Ibid. , p . 192 . 
111~., pp . 192-93 . 
Neither the Fundamental Orders nor the royal 
charter defined the powers of the towns. Johnston main -
tained that the r eaaon for this was that the towns, "being 
preexistent and theoretically independent bodies, had all 
I 
powei-s not granted to the commonwealth. "112 The General 
I 
Court, however, on October 10, 1639, proceeded to pass a 
series of orders securing to the towns the powers of 
' 
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selling their lands ; of choosing their own officers; of 
pas~icng local laws with penal ties; of assessing, taxing, 
and dis training for nonpayment ; of choosing a loeal court 
of three , five, or seven persons with power to hear and 
determine causes arising between inhabitants of tm towns, 
and involving not more than forty shillings ; of recording 
titles , bonds, sales and mortgages of lands within the town 
and <?f mmag::tng all probate business arising w1 thin the town .113 
John*ton, noting that these orders were often celled an 
incotporation of the towns by the general court, urged that 
I 
use of the word "incorporation n to describe them 
I 
can hardly be defended. All these privileges 
belonged to tl:e towns already; and tm orders 
of October 10, 1639, are much more like the 
first ten amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, a Bill of Rights, originat-
ing in the jealousy of the political units .ll4 
Professor Johnston ' s assertions of town dominance in 
Conn~cticut were undoubtedly overstated, as historians 
contemporaneous with Johnston, notably Chamberlain and Goodell 
112Ibid., p. 75. 
113Ibid. 
114Ibic!_. , p., 76 .. 
have proven so welle Nevertheless the ideas he and 
de Tocqueville espoused, and notably his equating the 
' pos:!:tion of the town vis a vis the state with that of the 
state in its relationship to the federal government of the 
Unitied States, continue to crop up along with tm other 
myth:-like assertions the. t somehow the old towns in New 
Engl~d occupy a unique position in town-state inter-
governmental relations. 
The three towns on the Connecticut River did rot 
nake up the whole of the history of Connecticut local 
government in the seventeenth century. New Haven was founded 
as a , separate colony in 1638, and remained as such until 
1664 '. This colony was not a flourishing one, and the influ-
ence ' which it exerted on the c curse of Connecticut his tory 
was qot nearly so great as the influence of the conf'edera-
' 
tion . of Hartrard, Wethersrield, and Windsor . New Haven 
represented a difficult problem for the state, since it 
' 
exhibited from time to time what were termed definite 
I 
sece~sionist tendencies •115 The. tr~dition that t m tovm 
was somehow ird ep endent from the rest of the towns of the 
state:, and that it retained a peculiar sort of inherent 
and ~eserved power made itself evident in some of the 
recar:ds of the state in the seventeenth and eighte nth 
115
see, e.g., Charles H. Levermore, "The Town and 
City Government of New Haven, 11 studies in Historical and 
Poli ttic a1 Science, 4th series, no. X ( BSl timore: Johns 
Hopkins University), pp . 29, 23, 25~ 
centuries . Yet, the early history of New Haven was to 
recJive almost no attention from the courts of Connecticut 
dur~ng the nineteenth century when the is sue of local sel:f.;. 
government was being decided. The courts were to treat 
New Haven, logically enough, as any other town of tm state . 
The legislature was not as even-handed as the courts 
had been. New Haven's first ' city charter, the Act of 
January a, 1 '784, 116 srowed the other towns' fear of ·a 
reversion by New Haven to its early way of independ nt 
I 
thinlking . For instance, before a city ordinance could 
becqne effective, it bad to be ratified by the citizens, 
publ·ished in the newspapers for three weeks, and, subject to 
veto by the Superior Court of New Haven County, it beceme 
effe;cti ve . Again, the mayor , thrugh elected in the first 
I· 
inst~ce by the people, held his office during the pleasure 
of the General Assembly. This provisicn tended to make one 
man mayor for life, and also verys olicitous of the General 
Assembly. Not until 1826 was the charter changed by private 
act to make the mayor's term of office one year, and to elect 
him yearly by regular vote of the electors. Nevertheless, 
I 
New Haven is of little importance in any historical survey 
of the development of the law of local government. Only its 
traditions are important, and these have left but slight 
traces on the pages o:r the historical documents of the period. 
116conn. Private Acts, vol. 1, p. 406 ; New Haven City 
Yearbook, 1876-78. 
The foreword to the 1808 editiOn of the Connecticut 
publie statutes presented this flat statement of how complete 
was 1the relinquishment by the New Haven colony of its former 
laws upon its merger with New Haven: 
Thcugh two former colonies are united in this 
state, we are indebted to but one government 
for our laws. New Haven, at the union, brought 
a rich portion into the political family; but 
with her good name, she relinquished her system 
of jurisprudence . So entire was the relinquish-
m.ent, that not a single statut,e pro vis ion was 
retained . To this concl usion we were led, in 
the first instance , partly by some examinations 
of the New Haven records, and partly by our 
success in tracing the several acts, which were 
afterwards in f or ce , to a different origin . We 
have since been informed, by the venerable 
historian of Connect i cut, that such also was 
the result of his r esearches ell7 
Unli:Je the situation in Massachusetts . the Connect icut 
stat'?-te books until around the middle of the nineteenth 
century contain no '!t-ipper" bills or other laws meddling in 
the internal affairs of particular t owns. A search by the 
I 
author through the session laws passed by the General 
Assentbly of " His Majesties Colony of Connecticut," and 
thr~gh the Code of 1650, failed to reveal a single instance 
I 
of purely local legislation. For instance, the session laws 
or 1702 were found to contain only a provision that towns are 
to run their boundaries once a year to avoid disputes,118 a 
provision making towns liable t:or injuries and deaths on 
bridges or highways within the town, caused by improper 
117connecticut : Publ ic Statute Laws of the State of, 
Hartford, Hudson and GoodWin (1808), bk . 1 , pp. iii-lv. 
118conn. Session Laws,· 1 702, P• a. 
,/'" 
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building or maint~nance , 119 a provision that children are 
I 
to pe educated to read and write, and in sane useful trade, 
and the sel. ectmen are required to remove unruly children 
frotn the custody of their parents and. place them in the 
care of masters who shall be responsible for educating and 
teaching a trade, boys to 21, girls to 18,120 and a provi-
sio~ setting out several counties.121 
The session laws of 1703-1717 proved equally barren 
of anything in the way of local legislation. A provision on 
pig~ 140 is as close to being specific town legislation as 
anypl:l.ing in the session laws, yet is general in scope and 
I 
intent: 
••• that the select-men ••• as often as there 
shall be need of ••• money in the Treasury of 
any Towne ... . and the inhabitants of the Towne 
at any Town-meeting (whereat such want of a 
supply is nade known to them by their Sel act-
men) shall refuse, or neglect to grant such 
supply, shall be and ere hereby fully Authorized 
and Impowered to assess the several inhabitant s 
of the said Town ••• for Raising such Sum ••• as 
shall be necessary .. 
The statutes (the session laws are codified, and extend over 
long periods , so that they are in effect statutes, and not 
rep9rts of actual laws passed at each session) of 1717-1724 
contain no special local legislation.. By provision on 
page 242, the land north of Wallingtord is annexed to 
Hartford County, and a pro vis ion on page 28 5 annexes 
119!lli·, p .. 9. 
120~., p .. 15 .. 
121~ .. , p •. 22. 
-------------- --- ~ 
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Litchfield to Hartford County, and other described lands to 
New Haven County. The 1726-1734 session laws similarly lack 
examples of special or local legislation. The la~ors of 1791-
1795 contain the first traces of local legislation, although 
the l egislation is still well within legislative power to 
pass laws which affect the well-being of the state or which 
concern subjects properly part of state jurisdiction or con-
cern. Thus on page 414, the Middletown City Council is em-
powered to tax and to make laws relating to the mode of tax 
collection, and, on the same page, the town of Net-r Haven is 
authorized to make laws relative to the workhouse in the town. 
"Ripper" legislation cannot be traced to a time earlier than 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Earlier than that , the 
ses~ion law-statutes are bare of special l egislation, with 
the exception of the act incorporating the City of New Haven . 
In the succeeding years , it was to be the Connecticut C C1l r ts, 
in judicial decisions stripping any ve stige of inherent, vested , 
I 
reserved, or other rights to local self-government from the 
municipalities, which would open the door to legislative plun-
der . The colonial and post-c·olonial years were times of laissez-
faire as far as town-state relationships were concerned. The 
colonial Connecticut town was left alone to pursue its own a~~airs 
and participated even more directly in the affairs of the state 
than was the ·case with the local units in colonial Massachusetts. 
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
Alexis deTocquevil l e's description of the New Englandtown 
' 
122 
as an "independent nation" appears peculiarly apt when 
applied to the early Rhode Island situation. As Lord Bryce 
observed , not only was it the Rhode Island towns that "made 
the state," but the state itself was more than once resolved 
into its component parts, the towns . 123 
Even after the colonial towns reluctantly united, 
obedience to the central suthority was so spasmodic that one 
despairing his tor ian found it necessary t o tabulate " the 
periods of segmentary and complete existence on the part of 
wha. t is now Rhode Island " thus : 
(1) 1636-1641, Providence, P'ortsmcuth, and Newport, 
distinct sovereignties. 
(2) 1641 - 1647, Providence, Aquidneck, and arw1ck, 
distinct sovereignties. 
( 3 ) 
(4) 
(5) 
1647-1651, the Colony of providence Plant at ions , 
a distinct commonweal the 
1651-1654, Providence-Warwick (the Mainlands) and 
Partsmcu t h-Newport (the island), 
distinct commonwealths . 
1654-1686, the colony of Providence Plantations , 
a dis tinct commonweal th.l24 
122Alexis de Tocquevi1le, Republic of the United States 
of America end Its Political Institutions (trans. by Henry 
Reeves; notes by John c. Spencer ) {New York : A. s. Barnes and 
Co., 1839), vol . 1, p. 67 . 
12~ord James Bryce , The American Commonwealth, 3d ed. 
(London and New York : Macmill an and Co . , 3d ed . , 1895), vol. 1, 
p. 621, note 1. 
This same scholar described Rhode Island as composed of 
a group of separate sovereignties, e ach highly centrifugal 
in tendency, led, under gri nding necessity, reluctantly to 
unite in a precarious union , 125 thus expanding the ori g inal 
thesis expounded in all of its intricacies by William • 
Foster of the Johns Hopkins "New Historical School" in l886.126 
Foster speculated that , a l thoo.gh in the South it is 
the states which rival the national gove r nment, in the New 
England states the town h~~ been a l most a s formidable a 
rival to the state. lthough Providence was formed in 1636, 
t hen fur.tsmoilth, NeY~port and arwick, it was not until 1647, 
more than ten years fter the beginning of Roger Williams t 
first settlement, that the four to s came together under 
a comnon govemment, and that such an entity as a 'col ony 
ot: Rhode Island " existed. This first central government, 
Foster maintained, was the result of several factors : the 
danger of a common opponent without, common purposes animat ing 
the settlers in the varioo.s towns, and the absolu te need , in 
their internal administration of "something to give stringency 
to their laws as among themselves.nl27 
125rbid., vol . 2 , p . 52 . 
126william E .. Foster , 'Tovm Gove r nment in Rhode 
I land," Studies in Historical and Political Science , 4th 
series (Bal timore : J ohns Hopki n s univers lty , 1886), vol . 4, 
pp. 74- 102 . 
127Fos ter cp. ot es a. Judge Staples as making this 
statement in the Proceedings of the First General Assembly 
of Rhode Island, p. vii . 
Up to this date, however, t m town of Providence, 
dating from 1636; the town of Portsmcuth, dating 
from 1638; and tl:e town of NeY~port, dating from 
1639; all three of them during a part of this 
time (and the town of..,Providence during the v.hole 
of it), existed as independent communities : more 
so than the two neighboring towns of Salem and 
Ipswich in the Massachusetts Bay Colony,--more 
so than t~ towns of Boston and Springfield in 
the same colony. To find an analogy, in fact, 
we cmnot stop short of c omparing colony with 
colony, or colony with one of these towns. The 
town of Providence was, in fact, until 1647, as 
much an independent, self-centered community as 
the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, or the Colony 
of Maryland.. Was there not resistance to the 
proposed consolidation? we may be sure that 
there was. It is not to be imagined that so 
great povrer would pass from the hands of the 
several toms without a struggle . The union 
was, however, seen to be inevitable, and it was 
finally brought abcut; but in such a way ••• 
(that) it might be said of the union of towns 
which the meet 1 of the first General Assem'61 
o e Is an 7 
Foster's statement that the union was nextorted 
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from the grinding necessity of frur reluctant towns" 
:indicates that the towns .would II' obably give up no more of 
their rights than absolutely necessary t o accomplish their 
common purpose . Unlike the Connecticut settlers who planted 
Hartford under a commission from Massachusetts, unlike the 
Plymouth settlers who early formed thEIIls elves into a "civil 
body politic, n unlike the Massachusetts Bay Founders who 
began with a charter, the Rhode I sland founders organized 
their town s first into political entities before joining 
t~m together in a league for mutual protection. These facts 
128Fos ter, op.. cit • , p • 11 • 
of history have made it impossible :fol" an claim that the 
legislature "created" the towns .to be, aubs;tantiated. 
The colonial Rhode Island towns, settled by leaders 
v.ho possessed " incompa tabil ity of temper" and t exaggerated 
separatism, rr reflected the independence and separatism of 
their found rs . Unlike the other New England colonies, the 
res,idents of Rhode Island smwed little tendency to organize 
in ,the matter of the usual local institutions such as meet ing-
hwses, cemeteries, school-houses, churches, and the like. 
They buried theird ead in their own fields, and met in barns 
or rields, and insisted on separation of civil and religious 
functions ~ 129 
The firs t voluntary written compact of government 
entered into in a Rhode Island town was that of Providence 
in which thirteen of the founders or the town covenanted in 
16:36 : 
We whose nrunes are hereunder, desirous to inhabit 
in the town of :Providence, do promise to subject 
ourselves in active or passive obedience to all 
such orders or agreements a s shall be made for 
public good of the body, in an orderly way, by 
the major assent of the present inhabitants, masters 
of families, incorporated together into a town 
fellowship, and such others, whom they shall admit 
unto them, only in civil things .l30 · 
The last four words of the providence charter were 
to become famous far setting farth the doctrine of separation 
of church and state . Claiming their lands only through 
129l£!£., pp. 81 - 84 . 
130Rhode Island Colonial Records, vol . 1, p . 14. 
purchase from the Indians, end rot through any title or 
authority from the English Crown, the Providence charter 
omitted any reference to England or to its sovereign. 
I 
The Portsmru th (Pocasset) cha.rter or 1638 1 ikewi s e omit ted 
any reference to the Crown: 
We whos e names are unwritten do here solemly 
in the presence or Jehovah incorporate our-
selves into a Bodie Politick and as he shall 
help, will submit our persons, lives and 
estates unto our Lord Jesus Christ, the King 
of Kings and Lord of Lords and to all those 
perfect and most Absolute lawes . of his given 
us in his holy word o:f truth, to be guided and 
judged thereby. --Exod . 24; 3,4 ; Chron. 11:3; 
2 Kings 11 :17 . 131 
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The following year, 1639, illiam Coddington and other 
Portsmou th residents voluntarily recognized the sovereignty 
of lthe English king by covenanting : 
We whose names are underv~itten doe acknowledge 
ourselves the legall subjects of his Majestie 
King Charles, end in his name doe hereby binde 
ourselves into a Civill body politicke, unto ' 
his lawes according to matters of justice •••• 
According to the true intent of the foregoing 
instrument wee Whose names are above particularly 
recorded, do agree Joyntly or by the major voice 
to governe ourselves by the ruler or Judge 
amongst us in all transactions :for the space and 
tearme of one yeare--he brgaving himself according 
to the tenor of the sam. 2 
Before they le:ft from Pocasset in early 1639, the 
Newport founders put their signatures to a voluntary compact 
of government :in the Rhode Island tradition: 
l31Ibid ., vol . 1, p . 52. 
132rbid., vol . 1, p. 70 . 
It is agreed by us whose hands are under-
written, to propagate a Plantation in the 
midst of the island or elsewhere: nd doe 
engage ourselves to bear equall charges, 
answerable to our strength and estates in 
common: and that our determination shall 
be by major voice of Judge and elders; the 
Judge to have a double voice.l33 
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Warwick was settled in 1642-43.. Unlike the other 
settlers, those who founded Warvlick did not farm any agree-
ment of association of any kind . 134 They alone claimed that 
i . 
they had no right to erect a government without authorization 
from parliament or the crown.. Warwick continued without any 
local officers or government until the charter of 1643 was 
accepted and en organization perfected under the charter in 
I 
1647. 
Tm colonial towns, operating under their separate 
se!f-formed compacts of government, entirely independent 
of ~ngland or of any authority de.rived from it, exercised 
such judicial powers as they fcund necessary for their 
I 
peac e and safety. Thus, by major assent of tm freemen 
sitting in town-meeting, one Joshua Varin was tried, con-
' 
vic ted, and disenfranchised for not all owing his wif' e to 
hear Roger Williams preach a sermon .. 135 In Providence, the 
administration of justice was committed to the whole body 
133Ibid. I p. 87. 
134 These charters, earlyc anpacts, and associations 
are 1quoted and dis cussed in Amasa Eaton, ••The Right to Local 
Self-Government," 13 Harvard Law Review ( 1900}, 441, 470, 
638 (a series of tbree articles}, especially in the initial 
installment , pp. 448-54. 
135Rhcde Island Colonial Records, vol. 1, p. 87. 
of citizens. At a later stage, two dep1ties were chosen to 
sit as judges.l36 In Portsmouth, the citizens elected one 
. 137 i d :Vill ism Coddington, Esquire, as judge, and des gne.te 
three elders to associate wi th him in "the Execution of 
Just ice and Judgment • n The judge and el ders were , never-
theless, required to make a q\larterly account o:f their rulings 
to the town-meeting , end at times the town-meeting itself 
exercised judicial functions. Thus, i n September, 1638, the 
Portsmouth town-meeting summoned before it eight inhabitants , 
and tried, c onv ia ted, and sentenced them :for rioting and 
drunkenness.138 After part of the Portsmouth inhabitants 
le~t to found Newport, seven assistants were appointed to 
act as a court of limited jurisdiction, and a qlarterly 
cou:rt of trials with a jury was established by the rema:inder. 139 
Similarly, the town of Newport established a judicial system 
of its own, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
Newport and Portsmouth united in 1640, under the 
agreement by which a governor was elected. in one town with 
two assistants , While the other town chose a deputy governor 
and two other ass is tents . · pparently the two towns alter-
nated, one electing the governor and the other the deputy 
governor each year, c ~~ ing Eaton to comment : 
136Foster, op. cit ., p . 92; R. I . Colonial Recor ds 
vol. 1, 52. 
, 
p. 
137R.I. Colonial Records, vol. 1, P• 52. 
138rbid., vol . 1, p. 60. 
139rbid., vol .. 1, p. 90. 
••• these two towns were not fused into one 
town, but each continued its o\vn separate 
existence, forming a union only for their 
common objects, bllt leaving to each one the 
management of its own local affairs . This has 
always been t he leading charactBristic of 
American union whereever found . 1 40 
The document of union specifically ordered, that "each 
ToWne shall . have the Tram action of the a.ffaires tha. t shall 
fall within their own Towne. n141 Thus, in this early state, 
th~ to.vns carefully reserved to tl:ems elves their right to 
lm al self-government, despite their common governnsnt, 
consis ting of a legislature , an executive, and a judiciary, 
and a state seal, and despite the fact that the chief of 
the legislative, executive and judiciary powers continued 
to be exercised by the body of the people in their town -
meet ings. 
The parl.iamentary charter of 1643-44, the royal 
charter of 1663, and the written constitution of 1842 all 
feJ.lled to include any express reservation of tm right to 
local self- government, although Amasa Eaton contended that 
such reservation 
has ever been the custom in Rhode Island •••• 
And, as a matter of fact, the towns of Rhode 
I s land have continued evel s ince thus to 
manage their own affairs. 43 
140 Eat on, op. c it • , p. 4 52 • 
141 
R.I. Colonial Records, vol. 1, p. 106. 
142 . Hannah Adams , op. cit., p . 63. For a detailed 
description of the government and i ts functiOning, see 
Eatpn, op. cit., pp. 452-54:, and R.I. Colonial Records, 
vol. 1, pp. 100-116. 
143Eat on, op. cit., p. 453. 
Desirous of a change in the ill-defined status of 
the t ~own .. colonies, a group of the colonists obtained a 
patent from England in 1643-44, which fully recognized 
the p'owers of the four towns and united them. Under the 
p .. tent,all laws were to be discussed in the towns, and only 
a£ ter all four of the towns had acted, each by itself, upon 
the proposed law and favorably considered it, and mt before, 
was the measure to be passed upon by the General Assembly. 
Thus, the General Assembly, at this stage, could hardly be 
calletl sovereign in the legislative field; indeed, its 
.function was merely one of final ratification.1 44 , In 1647 
the general assembly of Rhode Island province erected a form 
of c i~ll governrrent vesting the supreme power in the people 
assembled . A court of six commissioners chosen by the four 
towns ·of Providence, Portsmouth, Newport and Warwick had 
legislative authority, and their acts were to be in farce 
until repealed in timely fashion by a majority vote of the 
freemen of the pr.ovince collected in their town - meeting. 
·A president and four assistm.ts chosen annually, were 
preservers of the peace, with all civil power. By a special 
commission, they were judges of the court of trials, assisted 
by the two wardens or justices of the particular town in which 
144n.r . Historical Society Col lections , vol . 7, p. 45 . 
Governor Hopkins reports that the situation under the patent 
was such that the idea arose that "some towns had heretofore 
repealed acts of the General Assembly. tt Ibid . 
145Hannah Adams, it 91 op .• c • , p . • 
the crurt as convened f'rom time to time •145 
The 1647 provisions only further emphasized the 
separatism of' the towns . Conf'irming the Magna Charta, the 
commonwealth subordinated the executive . to the legislative 
and permitted judicial appeals to the general assembly. 
-
They also reserved to the towns the powers of determining 
the q1alifications of voters , initiating all legislation 
(either in town or gener&l court meeting) , apportioning and 
collecting general and local taxes, and of' participating 
through the town magistrates in the dispensation of justice 
by the colony's Court of Trials.146 Whereas in 1650 towns 
were allowed only ten days in which to disapprove an act 
of the legislature, in 1658 they were allowed twenty, and 
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in 1660 "four -score and six dales ," or three months. Further-
more , in 1660, the act of 1658 providing that a law could 
only be annulled by the vote of a majority in each town 
was amended so that thereaf'ter a law might be annulled by 
the vote, transmitted through the towns, of a majority of 
the f'reemen of the colony.147 
Gradually the t own - state system inaugurated by the 
provisions of 1647 was modified to give the rapidly disinte-
grating colony more stature . 
145mmnah Adams, op . cit ., p. 91 . 
146Richman, o:e ~ cit ., vol. 2, p. 49 . 
147Ibid., p . 49 ; R.I .. Colonial Records, vol . 1, pp . 306' 33-s:---
In 1652 and 1654 it was required that before town 
freemen could exercise the privileges of colony fre emen 
they had to be admitted by the colony. 1 48 I n 1655 the 
General Assembly passed an act that henceforth the legis-
lature itself would commission those in each town who were 
to "make ye rates, " and " give forth warrants :for ye 
1 49 gatheringe of them .' This act was followed, in 1656, 
by an order that 
noe law or order apoynted and ordayned by ye 
generall and publicke uthoritie of this 
Col onie shall be any wayes obstructed or 
neglected under pretence o:f any authoritie o:f 
any of ye towns Charters . 150 
Government under the pa. tent proved so unsuccessful 
that, in 1651, the colony fell apart complete! y, and 
reverted to the earl ier separate town governments unt il 
1654 . Dur:tng this period , Providence and Warwick :formed 
a separate government , and :f'ortsmru th and Newport acted in 
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concert . The Charter o:f 1663 was brought back from Englanl 
by Roger illiams and John Clarke ~ The union of the :four 
towns :for a second time was the result o:f the boa tili ty of 
the colonis ts in Connecticut and Massachusetts, and their 
steady encroachments on the territory which the Rhode Island 
towns cla.imed. When Roger illiams embarked for England in 
1663, he was forced to take passage in a Dutch ship sailing 
148Ricbman, op . cit ., p . 19. 
149 
R. I. Colonial Records, vol . 1 . p . 306. 
150Ibid., p .. 333. 
from New York since even the Massachusetts colony refused 
him permission to pass through its limits or to take 
passage in its ships .151 
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Very general in its provisions, the 1663 charter 
did not change the rela tion of the towns to the colony, and 
ccnferred v1rtually complete independence upon the colony. 
The only restriction was that 
the laws, constitutions, and punishments for 
the civil government of the said Plantation 
be conformable to the 1 aws of Eng lend, so far 
as the nature and constitution of that place 
will admit •1 52 
Under the early forms of government, the power of 
the town-based General Assembly was very prominent as 
compared with that given to the executive or judicial 
departments. The legislature, as constituted in 1663, was 
to be elected so often as once in six months . 153 I n order 
to keep the legislators within their powars, the charter 
was to be read formally at every meeting of the assembly. 
Further , there were attempts to connect the semi-annual 
session of the colonial government as fully e.s possible 
151Eaton, op. cit ., pp. 572-74 . For a copy of 
reports from the King's commissioners concerning the hostile 
Massaclru.setts acts against the Indians end the Freemen of 
Rho:ie Island, see ibid .• , pp. 573-74. 
152 Ibid., p . 572. Foster, ol .. cit . , pp. 94-98, 
discusses tne-iaricus charter provis ons end the historical 
background . 
153R.I. Colonial Records , vol. 2, p . 9. 
with the actual, individual , undelegated suffrages of 
every citizen of every town. Thus, originally all citizens 
of the state personally assembled at Newport, and there in 
solemn council cast their votes for those whom tmy decreed 
should deliberate for them for the fo llowing six months. 
The voting finished, the citizens returned to their homes, 
leaving the newly-elected legislat ors to continue the 
legislative sessionv As population in the state increased, 
tho system of voting in one assembly in Newport had to be 
mcd if led so as to permit votes by proxy. Yet, so strong 
was the custom, that the votes of the citizens, personal 
J.99 
and _by proxy, continued to be cast at Newport until 1760 v1 54 
An indicatim of the prominent place occupied by 
the legislature under the colonial government is the governor's 
position as a rrere member of the General Assembly, with no veto 
power at all. 
In 1886, the gpvernors of Rhode Island, Delaware, 
North Carolina, and Ohio were alone in lacking the veto . 
It was not until 1909 that a constitutional amendment in 
Rhode Is l and first gave the governor the power of veto, 
subject to possible reversal by a three-fifths vote in 
155 both houses of the General Assembly, and even today, the 
executive power of the governor is jealously construed b 
Foster, 
154R.I. C ol oniel Records, vol. 6, pp .. 256-57; 
op • c it • , p • 9 5 • · 
155Rhode Island Constitution of 1842, art. 15. 
the courts . The executive power is wielded under article 
seven of the present constitution, which provides: 
The chief executive power of this state shall 
be vested in a governor, who, together with a 
1 ieutenant-governor shall be annually elected 
by the people. 
seiz·.ing; upon the presence of the word "chief" in the article, 
the Rhcrl e Island Supreme Court has held that the section 
rests in the governor only the ttohief" executive power, 
156 
which is evidently less than all of such power . It has 
also commented and reld that the executive power had been 
merely nominal under the charter granted by Charles II, and 
157 
that the constitution extended it very little. 
Even in judicial ma tters, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly from the first pretended to be omnipotent. In 1786, 
the General Assembly was astounded hen the Superior Court, 
then tre highest actual judie ial Bl thority in the colony, 
declared one of the assembly's acts of' legislation uncon-
sti tut1onal 8 The legisl ture summoned the judges before it 
and compelled them to account for their actio~.158 A former 
chief justice159 of the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
156El.ection of Officers by the Senate , 1908, 28 R. I • . 
607, 69 tl. 555. 
157 G. and D. Tayl.or and Co. v8 Place., 1856, 4 R.I. 324. 
158The case, Trevett v. Weeden, 1786, is discussed by 
Foster, op. cit., p. 94, who quotes from the monograph, 
"Gleanings From the .Judicial His tory of Rhode Island "by 
f'orrer Chief .Justice Durfee of the R. I . Supreme Court and 
issued as R.I. Historical Tracts , no .. 18, in series I, 159. 
159nurree, op . cit .. 
20J. 
remarked that there were not e. few who maintained that .. 
after the American Revolution the General Assembly of 
Rhode Island was little more than an assemblage of towns, 
come to bargain for local interests. The f~ty-pe.ge decision 
of G. and D. Taylor and Co. v. Place,160 which is discussed 
in chapter six below, was instrumental in thus restricting 
the powers of the town-dominated legislature. 
This legislature, then, which claimed powers not 
only legislative , but executive and judicial as well, was 
from the beginning a legislature directly representative 
of the towns as towns. Even today, the state is unique in 
that representation in both houses of the General Assembly 
is, by constitutional mandate, based upon the town . For many 
years, the custom of rotation among a half dozen different 
t owns of the successive sessions of the General Assembly was 
even retained. Town-state separation was more a theory than 
a fact . 
The 1643-44 government established under patent 
provided for representatives for each town: 
••• e. week before any general court, notice 
should be given to every town by the head 
of'ficer that they chose a conmittee for the 
transaction of the affairs there.l61 
The 1843 constitution, under which the state is still governed, 
was as solicitous or the rights of even the smallest town. 
It provided that the house of representatives shall be consti-
160cited in footnote 157, above. 
161R.I. C olonialRecords, vol. 6, p. 256. 
tuted on the basis of population, always allowing one 
representative for each fraction, but that : 
each toW:n or city shall alwait be entitled to 
one member; and no town or c ty shall ha. ve 
more than one-sixth of the whole number of 162 members to which the house is hereby limited. 
(Italics mine.) 
As the population -of Providence grew larger and larger in 
proportion to the rest of the state, the constitution was 
finally amended, in 1909, so that each t own and city retained 
its right to at least one representative, but "no town or 
city shall have more than one-fourth of the whole number of 
members .ul63 The senior member from the town of Newport is 
given power to preside in the organization of t·he house, 
thus again emphasizing the dominance of the town . 
In the senate, t oo, representation is based directly 
on the town, unlike the situation in any other state of 
the nation . 
Originally, the constitution provided simply that 
"the senate shall consist of the 1 ieutenant-governor and 
of one senator from each town or city in the state. n164 
In the 1950 census, Frovidence numbered 247,700 out 
of a total state population of 791,896 . In 1927, Provi-
dence's population was 280 , 600 , and the total state 
1 ti . 165 popu a on .was 740)000 . Yet, in that year, Providence 
p. 255. 
162R. I.Constitution of 1843, art. 6, sec. 1 . 
163
rbid ., amend. 13, sec. 1. 
164Ibl.' d ... t 6 " ar .. , s ec • 1 • 
165 Encyclopaedia ~itannica, 1955 ed. , vol. 19, 
was represented in the state s enate by only one senator in 
a total of thirty- nine, and t\Venty-five members in a house 
which totalled me hundred. At the urgent insistence of 
the Providence mox:.b · rs , t . . • i tlua t1 ott_ i:~_. the senate was 
somewhat ameliorated by the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment, in 1928, providing: 
The senate shall consist of the lieutenant-
gO'Iernar and of one senator from each town 
or city in the state; provided£: ho-wever, that 
any town or city having more t an twenty- five 
thc:us and qualified electors shall be entitled 
to an additional senator far each additimal 
twenty-five thc:us and qualified electors, always 
allowing one additional senator for a fraction 
exceeding half the ratio; but no town or city 
shal l be en titled to more than six senators~ 
Any town or city entitled to more than one 
senator shall be divided into s enatorial166 districts ••• (by) the general assembly. 
Thua, any apparent dominance of the state over the 
towns is mostly a surface phenomenon; beneath the placid 
surface of state legislative supremacy has run the under-tow 
of town powers from the earliest colonial attempts at union 
to the present day. The power of the freemen of the towns 
to initiate legisl~tion, _a power which ms never been 
formally abolished tu t which lapsed through non-use, and the 
referendum, first introduced when the four towns organized 
' 
u nder the charter of 1643- 44 were additional manifestations 
of the mture of the s.tate in those early days . The original 
statute introducing the initiative is particularly illustrative 
of the nature of that earl y confederat i on of towns: 
166R.I. Constitution of 1843, amend. 19. 
----~. --- ---
• u all cases presented , concerning General 
Matters for the Colony, shal l be first stated 
in the Townes, Vigd't, That is when a case is 
propounded . The Towne where it is propounded 
shall agitate an:i fully discuss the matter in 
their Towne Meetings and conclude by Vote : and 
tb~n shall the Recorder of the Towne, or Towne 
Clerke , send a copy of tm agreement to every 
one of the other t~ee Townes, who shall agitate 
the case likewise in each Towne and vote it and 
col lect the votes . Then shall t rey commend it 
to the Committee for the General Cour t s (then 
a meeting called) , who being assembled and 
finding the Major parte of the Colonie concur-
ring in the case, it shall stand for a Law till 
the next Generall Assembly of all the people, 
then and there to be considered whether any 
longer to stand, yea or no : Further it is 
agreed , that six men of e aoh Towne shall be 
the number of the Committee premised, and to be 
freely chosen . And further it is agreed, that 
when the General Cru.rte thus assembled shall 
determine t he cases before hand thus presented, 
It shall also be lawful ftlr the said General 
Court, and hereby are t h ey authorized, that if 
unto them or any of them some case or cases 
shall be presented that may be deemed necessary 
for the public we ale and good of the whole, they 
shall fully debate, d i s cuss and determine ye 
matter amoog themselves : and then shall each 
Committee returnin~ to their Towne deClare what 
they have done i nhe case or cases lremised . 
The Townes then de bat lilg ani conclud ng , the 
votes shall be col lected and sealed up, and then 
by t he Towne Cl erke of each Towne shall be sent 
with speed to the General Recorder who, in the 
presence of the President shall open the votes: 
and if t re ma jor vote determine the case, it 
shall stand as a Law till the next General 
Assembly then or tmre to be ccnfirmed or 
nullified .167 
Thus jealously maintaining their own rights and 
p l acing checks upon t hemselves in the exerc i se of 
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167R. I . Colonial Records, vol . 1 , p. 148 . For texts 
of other early in i tiati ve and referendum provisions , see 
fuid . , PP e 27, 147, 228 , 401 , 429 . 
the law-making power, the Rhode Island towns were careful 
to se~e tmt new towns should exercise the same rights 
end privileges as the old. Warwick was added to the four 
original towns, and "it was agreed that Warwick should have 
the same privileges as Providence. n168 
Providence, at its own request, received a charter 
at a special general assembly session at Warwick, 1648-49. 
The charter gave, granted, and confirmed unto the Incorpora-
tion of Providence Plantation in the Narragansett Bay in 
New England: 
••• full power and authority to govern and rule 
themselves, and such ·.others as shall hereafter 
Inhabit within any part of the said Plantation, 
bz such a form of' civil government as bt voluntart 
consent of all, or the greater part ofhem, slial 
be found most suitable unto their state ani 
condition: and to that end, to make and ordain 
such civil orders ani ccnstitutions, to inflict 
such punishments upon transgressors, and for the 
execution thereof, and of tl:e common statute laws 
of the colony agreed unto, and the penal ties, 
and so many of them as are not annexed already 
unto the colony court of trials, so to place and 
displace officers of justice as they or the 
greater part of t mm shall, by one consent, agree 
unto. Provided nevertheless, that the said laws, 
constitutions and punishments, for the civil 
government of the said plantation, be conformable 
to the laws of England, so far . as the nature and 
constitution of the place will admit, yet alwazs 
reserv~ to the aforesaid General Assembly 
power an authoritz t o dispose the general govern-
! men€ of that plantat i on as it stands in reference 
to the rest of' the plantitions as they shall cm-
ceive from time to time most conducin to the 
general goo of tte sa plan at ions. Ita cs 
mine.) 
16Sibid., P• 214. 
169providence Record Commissioners, Early Records 
oft he Town of Providence, 1893, vol . 2, p. II3. 
The arwick act was similar . Its provisions re~ired that 
the local government execute the camnon "lawes agreed in 
the Generall Assembly, and their penalties. " The empowe r-
ing clause was: 
~ •. by these presents doe give, grant, consigne 
and confirm this present charter to the sayd 
inhabit ants of' the Towne of' Warwick ••• al).ow-
ing, orderinge and hereby authorizing them ••• 
to trans act ell such Town af'f'a.yers as shall fall 
within the verge , liberties and precincts of' 
the sa3d town. 
The town was also to "make and constitute such particu lar 
orders , penalties and officers as may best sui te with the 
Constitution of sayd Towne and Townshippe . .... n170 
The exact effect of' granting a cruu~ter to each one 
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of' the frur toms at the first meeting of' the general assembly 
has been disputed . It was Amasa Eaton's view that it could 
not be claimed that the four towns surrendered all their 
arigin~l powers to the colony, arxl, receiving the charters 
from the colony, thenceforth continued to exercise the:ir 
171 
original powers under the grant from the colony .. Instead, 
he f ollows the view of Justice Thomas M .. Cooley172 that : 
What tm colony did was only to confer charters, 
under which the to\m authority would be adminis-
tered wi th:in agreed 1 i mi ts, and possibly with 
mere regularity than before. 
170Eaton, op. cit., p . 577, citing Fuller, History of 
Warwick , p. 32 . 
1 71Eaton, op . cit., pp. 577- 78 . 
1 72 rn Peop le v . Hurlbut, 1871, 24 Mich. 44, at p . 100 , 
9 Am Rep 3; this case is discussed and ~oted more fully 
i n Chapter II~above. 
In the clause incorporating the freemen of Providence, 
with power, as formerly " to governe and rule th.emsel ves 
••• b~ such a form of civil government as by voluntari e 
consent of all ••• · shall. be frund most sui table," Eaton 
sees an intention that in its own affairs, Providence was 
to continue, as of old, to govern itself . 
This, they and all the other tovms in Rhode 
Island have ever continued to do and still 
continue to do, save for the instances, or 
attempts at instances , on the part of the 
political machine possessing the power in 
the general assembly to pass laws that would 
infringe upon these powers of local self-
government8173 
An interesting letter from a Revolutionary War 
soldier, John Howland, who later founded the Providence 
Institution for Savings is instructive as to the opinion 
prevailing in 1832 . Speaking of the Providence charter, 
wnich ' was lost , he wrote : 
If I had lived in those days I should have 
opposed receiving such an act from the general 
assembly. The four original towns made the 
general assembly, and they cruld confer no 
power which was not already possessed by the 
old towns . New towns might be incorporated, 
but it was absurd for the old ones to receive 
authority from their own agents or deputies . 
We saw and felt the disadvantages of this 
pretended act of incorporation two or three 
years ago, when the school bill was discussed 
and passed. The assembly then claimed the 
power to restrict the towns from levying taxes 
for the support of schools, as they said no such 
power was granted t ham in their acts of incor-
poration, and that a ll the power of the towns 
was derived f rom special acts of the general 
assembly. But , the truth is, the old toyms had 
173Eaton, op. cit., p . 578. 
from their first settlement the power to 
assess taxes for this as well as for other 
purposes, and they did not relinquish it when 
they received their corporate powers . The 
acts of incorporation could not grant or 
restrict, but only confirm, the powers already 
existing, Which were not contrary to the laws 
o:f Englan:l .174 
Under this view, the charter was but a confirmation of 
powers which the town already had, before the colony was 
in eocistence, and which therefore it in no wise derived 
.fran the col ony. 
The settlement of Block Island, its history, and 
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its incorporation as the Rhode Island town of New Shoreham 
lends weight to this theory of a charter as but a confi~a­
tion of powers already possessed by the town . originally 
. under the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, Block Island 
became a part of Rhode Island under the charter of 1663 . 
Yet, later, in 1664 , the general assembly found it neces-
sary to send a message to Block Island to tell the 
inhabitants that they were under tl:e "care" or the colony, 
and "that they admit not of any other to beare rule over 
them but the power of this Collony."175 Perhaps prompted 
by this reminder, the inhabitants of the island presented 
pet it ions to the general assembly requesting admission as 
freemen of the colony. An act of November 6, 1672, finally 
incorporated the island as New Shoreham, "as signs of our 
unity and likeness to many parts of our native country. " 
cited 
174 Letter, John Howland to Rev . James Knowles , 1832, 
by Eaton, op . cit . , pp. 578-79. 
175 R.I . Colonial Records, vol . 2., p. 32. 
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However, the ac.t expressly recognized their existing form 
of government and continued some of its features. 176 During 
the 1663 to 1672 period, Block Island continued t o govern 
itself :1n all matters thw.gh under the jurisdiction of the 
col ony of Rhode I s land. Prior to incorporation of the 
island, wardens had the power to marr y persons , and to act 
as judges in cases i nvolving amounts up to five pounds 
sterling of New England money. After i ncorporation, the 
wardens were left wi th their pow er to marry persoos, a 
p rivilege not enjoyed in any other town in the state . l77 
New Shoreham and Jamestown even secured cons titutional 
recognition that they " shall continue to enjoy exemptions 
from mil itary duty which they now en j oy, until otherwise 
prescribed by law. nl78 
Even the administration of wills and other matters 
of probate :indicate vividly how important the Rhode I sland 
town was and is in governmental .af.fairs . Ever since 1647, 
probate matters have been wi thm the jurisdiction of the 
tovm . 1 79 Probate of wills was early con f erred upon the 
president of the town ccuncil. With populatiC!'l increases , 
in some areas special town and city probate courts have been 
Islam, 
p . 525; 
176~., pp. 55, 466-70. 
177Ibid*' p. 525 . S. G ~ rnold, His tory of Rhod 
163'6-!790 ( New York , 18EB -60), vol. 1, p . 304. 
178 R.I.Constitution of 1843, art. 14, sec . 4. 
179 
R.I.Colonial Records, vo1. 1, p . 188, and vol . 2, 
Durfee, op. c i~., p . 6 . 
set up by the General Assembly. If a person in Rhode 
Island dies leaving no heirs, but leaving real or personal 
property, the town council of the town in which the 
property is located may direct the tovm or city treasurer 
· to take the estate into his possession for the use of the 
local unit . Thus, there is no escheat to the state, as is 
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usual in other states. Amasa Eaton has traced this statute 
back to 1768, and maintains that even before this time 
escheat to the tom had been a cus tan in the state • Thus , 
he ma:ln tained t hat this was only another example of a 
statute passed not to limit or grant, but merely t o declare 
the law as it had always been in Rhcd.e Island •180 
I n the early days.j the central government was appar-
ently little disposed to interfere with the affairs of the 
towns unless specifically requested to d~ s~ by the towns 
themselves . British Fabian Sidney ebb was much impressed 
by later manifestations of this phenom non which he termed 
the "anarchy of local autonomy" produced by a "theory of 
non-interference."181 ~~~e the legislature did interfere, 
it was usually to control highways, adjust boundary disputes, 
or exercise police powers. 
In an attempt to ascertain vib.ether the earl Rhode 
Island towns were really JS independent of control from the 
180 
Eaton, op .. cit,, p . 640. 
181Quoted by William A . Robson, "The Central ·Domina-
tion of Local Government," Political Quarterly (1933) , 4 :85. 
I 
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central colonial government, as historians have claimed, 
the author read the statutesl82 from 1663 to 1744, a period 
of eighty-one years, and has catalogued the laws relating 
to the towns. D.lring the entire period, a bare fcrty-six 
acts were passed by t he legislature which might be said 
to concern town powers and duties~ Even these la\'i'S 
contained few restrictions of any sort, and indeed many 
con:ferred wide powers upon the town. Of the forty-six 
acts, only four could be 1a belled special legislation. 
These :four pertain, respectively, to horse speed limits 
in Newport and Providence,183 fire protection regulati·o~s 
in Newport,184 prohibiticn of nets and seines in a 
specified Newport pond, 185 and exemption of Newport fire-
men from jury duty . 18 6 From the v.ording of all frur laws, 
rare book, The 
pages 
p. 9 (1666). 
184Ibid., p. 26 {1698). 
185Ibid .. , P• 198 ( 17:37 ) . 
186Ibid ., p .. 199 ( 1737). 
it appears t:hat trey were passed at the petition of 
residents of the towns involved .. The fact that Newport 
purchased engines, engaged firemen, and felt the need 
to require every person to possess a fire ladder indicates 
that there might hav~ been particular fire hazard in that 
city. The horse speed law , setting the speed limit for 
Newport at a "common · traveling pace" and with a . provision 
for Providence prohibiting riding at a "gallop" indicate 
that they were pass ed to meet peculiar local situations. 
The jury exemption law stated specifical ly that it was 
granted in response to a petition from the town~ The 
Newport pond perch fishing statute apparently arose from 
a situation in which a few persons were using efficient 
methods to taka fish from the water "whi ch practice is 
found by Experience to be very Prejudicial to Inhabitants 
of Town of New_port." 
It is possible that these special acts were the 
result of efforts either on the part of th3 town offic era 
or on the part of responsible citizens of the town involved 
to have desirable ordinances set up in conformance with 
like ordinances in existence in other towns in the state , 
but that for some reason they found it necessary to by-pass 
the town meeting . Except for the jury exemption provision, 
all of these laws 1'A:)uld appear to be within the province o:f 
then-existing bovm powers . 
Of the remaining acts pertaining to towns, one 
group was designed to secure compliance by town and state 
officials to those laws imposing mandatory duties on them~ 
The .f'"lne s imposed in case of neglect to perform, were, in 
most instances, to go into the town treasury or poor fun@ . 
TWo acts, apparently resulting from specialized local 
s itu at i ons , were nevertheless made generally applicable 
thrcughout the state. Tlms, Indian dances in Westerly 
and south-Kingston resulted in general legislation empower-
ing the varirus towns to regulate such. dances ar.rl to fine 
those vbo f'urnished liquor to them .. 187 ' Instances of the 
firing of guns and the use of explosives and firecrackers 
in Newport resul ted in a general law prohibiting the firing 
of guns ~ anywhere in the state after dark . 188 
None of the loc e1 acts mentioned education, and very 
few mention poor relief , althrugh these were tm main func-
tions of the towns of the period . A surprising percen~age 
of the acts did concern such matters as the ccntrol of dogs , 
the disposal of ownerless animals, and like rather unimpor-
tant regulations .. However, in most of thsse curious areas 
there appears to be the possibility of inter-town ccnf'l let , 
much as was the case with the Massachusetts swine control 
and fencing laws discussed earlier in this chapter .. 
l87Ibid., p. 126 ( 1723 ) • 
188Ibid., p . 164 (1731) . 
Fires and dogs, when wild, do not stop at town 
boundaries; towns which must cere for the poor within their 
boundaries do not want the impoverished from other commu-
nities dumped upon them; storekeepers with well - established 
businesses do not want itinerant peddlers to come in fran 
other towns and upset the balance within the town; a. down-
river town does not want to be totally deprived of fish 
by the up-river town. In a way~ all of these might be 
said to be matters of state-wide concern and thus deserving 
of attention by the colonial government. Most of them 
operated against individuals , not against the tonus , md 
the t ONns benefited by receiving the penal ties imposed for 
violation . If any detriment accrued to the towns from these 
acts, it was merely that by the existence of the law, tre towns 
were foreclosed from making rules or regulations inconsistent 
with them. 
Only in the legislation affecting the exercise of the 
franchise and the conduct of debate in town meeting was the 
tom held strictly to accrunt . When the towns complained 
that the justices of the peace, state officers, arid state 
chosen, were overwhelming the town councilmen in numbers, the 
colony withdrew the jus tioes from the councils . 
Justice Joseph Story e~ressed the belief that 
' 
regardless of which level of government was first in time of 
origin in the New England states , this should be ignored for 
practical purposes v He suggested that the fiction should be 
entertained that both were simultaneous in origin, each 
having sprung from an unquestioning conviction among the 
people that each was essential, and that both were to run 
parallel to each other :1ndefinitely.189 There appears to 
the author to be little inconsistent in this eighty-one 
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years of legislaticn with the idea that in colonial Rhode 
Island there were two parallel governmental systems: the 
local with its local interests, and tre colony with interests 
of the whole community. The details of local poor relief; 
being regarded as purely local in character, were never 
elevated to the dignity of acts, but were quietly worked 
out by town councils and meetings. Only when some new or 
unique ~estion (such as the possibility of apprenticing 
young paupers) arose was counsel of the colony likely to 
be asked. In matters of inter-town relations (such as 
migrating paupers or peddlers), the colony, mere it felt 
the situation deemed it, stepped in to keep the peace. 
This, then, was the historical setting in which town 
and state government arose in Rhode Island. These were the 
facts which ere to be marshalled in the twentieth century 
by the proponents and opponents of the doctrine of the 
inherent or vested right to local self-government. They 
were the facts which were to move Amasa Eaton to assert : 
189 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 
(Boston : M. M. Bigelow, 5th ed . , 1891), pp. 202-203. 
It is evident that the origi nal towns or colonies 
of Rhode Island possessed governmental powers of 
their own before there was any united colony; 
ths.t they formed the colony, subsequently t he 
state , and gave up some of their powers to it; 
that new towns were settled and admitted to the 
union upon the same footing as were original towns, 
with all the rights , powers , and duties of the 
four original to-vms; that little by little the 
power of the colony , afterwards the state , has 
increased and that of the towns has diminished; 
that this has been done with their consent; but 
rumong the rights still reserved to the towns and 
cities of this state are t he right of existence 
and the right to manage their own local affairs , 
free from the interference or control of the gen-
eral government except through t he exercise of its 
undoubted £ower to pass general laws applicable to 
all alike. 90 
Maine, New-1 Hampshire and Vermont 
In the area that was to become the three northern-
216 · 
most New England states of Ivlaine, New Hampshire , and Vermont, 
the forms of government, both colonial and to~v-n , 1v-ere not so 
well settl ed nor as stable during the pre-Revolutionary era 
as they were in the s outhern New England colonies. The gov-
ernmental history of the area is complex and tangled. It is 
replete with conflicting patents and titles. Various prop-
rietors and commercial companies engaged in dra\.;n-out law 
suits and negotiations over the area. Massachusetts , Connec-
ticut and New York asserted claim to certain parts of the 
area , and the boundaries , particularly of Vermont, were the 
subject of interstate dispute until recent times. Nevertheless, 
tov-1ns emerged early in the frontier days of the seventeenth century. 
190Eaton, op. cit. , p . 588. 
l9lThe author has consulted the following books in 
tracing the early history of Maine , New Hampshire , and Vermont: 
Roy H. Akagi, Tom! Pro rietors of the New .11;n l and Colonies , 
Philadelphia , University Press , · w1n 1. aeon, e 
Connecticut River and the Valley of the Connecticut, l~ork 
Most similar to the "independent republics" of 
Rhode Island and Connecticut, were the four towns of Dover, 
Stra berry Banke (later to be known as Portsmouth), Exeter, 
and Hampton. Their early compacts, forms of government, 
and negotiations and maneuverings with colonial end state 
governments in the years preceding and following the Am i-
can Revolution have caused much the same comments among 
historians as did the actions of the e erl y towns of 
sru thern New England • Thus: 
• • • Each of these small plantations had its 
own local gpvernment, and owed no allegiance to 
any o verlord except the King of England, to mom 
they professed themselves loyal subjects •••• 
Each town chose a ruler or judge, with assistants 
and London : G. P. Putnam's Sons and Knickerbocker Press, 
1907); Jeremy Belknap , The His tory of New Hampshire, 3 vols . 
{Dover, N.H., 1812), printed for 0. Crosby & J. V8I'ney by 
J. Mann & J. K. Remick; James Fair banks Colby, Manual of 
the Constitution of the State of New Ham shire, Revision of 
9 ~ Concord: John B. C ar e o., 1 l ; E ward Day Collins, 
Risto~ of Vermont (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1903); Edmund Fuller, 
Vermeil , a HiStory of the Green Mountain State ( Montpelier : 
Vermont State Board of Education, 1952); Matt B. Jones, 
Vermont in the Making , 1750-1777 (Cambridge : Harvard Univer-
sity Press , !939); John L. Locke, Sketches of the History 
of the Tom of Camden Maine, including Inci dental Refer-
ences to the Nei hbor!n laces and Ad acen~~aters (Hello-
we~, Me . : Mas ers, Sm th & Co., 1859 ; David M. Ludlum, 
Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-1850 (Columbia Uni varsity 
Studies in American Culture, no. 5) (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 19~); Rowland E. Robinson, Vermont, a 
Study of' Independence (Bas ton and New York: Houghton, 
Mifflin & Co., l892); Charles M. Thompson, I ndependent 
Vermont (Boston: Hcughton, Mifflin & Co., 1942) ; Zadock 
Thompson, History of Vermont Natural Civil and Statis-
tical (Burlington, Vt .: The Author, 1S53); LaFayette Wilbur, 
Early History of Vermont, 4 vols. (.Jericho, Vt. : Roscoe 
Printing Hause, 1899, 1900, 1902, 1903}; Samuel Williams, 
Natural and Civil History of Vermont, 2d ed., 2 vols. 
Burlington, Vt.: Samuel Ml!la, printer, 1809). 
or associates, and courts of first instance, 
which were also of last resort, -- for where 
could an appeal be made? 192 
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From the beginning, the four New Hampshire towns 
were beset by internal conflict, primarily caused by relig-
ious differences among the inhabitants. Hampton had been 
settled in 1638 by the Reverend John Wheelwright, an Anti-
nomian who had been banished from Massachusetts and who 
claimed title to the land by purchase from the Indians. Mass-
achusetts immediately proceeded to encourage Puritans to settle 
there and extended its jurisdiction in 1639 by setting Hampton 
up as a town with a representative in the Massachusetts Gener-
al Court. The inhabitants of Dover, some Puritan and others 
Anglican, quarrelled with each other. Strawberry Banke, 
later to be known as Portsmouth, was Anglican. The three 
settlements suffered from so much internal dissention, that 
as early as 1633 they began making appeals to Massachusetts 
to adjud:icate one dispute or another. 
The first of the three towns to organize a govern-
ment was Exeter, in 1639. Judging themselves outside the juris-
diction of Massachusetts, the Exeter inhabitants signed a social 
compact combining themselves into a separate body politic: 
192 Frank B. Sanborn, New Hampshire, Boston and New 
York, Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904, p. 117. For similar 
statements, see Works Progress Administration, Town Government 
in New Hampshire, New Hampshire Historical Records Survey Pro-
ject, 1940, p. 3, and works there cited. 
We • • • brethren of the church of EXeter ••• 
with other inhabitants the re considering with 
ourselves the holy will of God, and our own 
necessity, that we should not live without 
wholesome laws and government amongst us, of which 
we are altogether destitute, do ••• combine our-
selves together to erect a.nd set up amongst us 
such government as shall be to our best dis cern-
ing, ••• binding ourselves ••• to submit our-
selves to such godly and christian la 'IS as are 
established in the realm of England to our best 
knowledge, and to ell other such laws Which 
shall upon good grounds be made and enacted 
a.moogst us .193 
Just as had been the case in the Rhode Island and Connecticut 
towns, the inhabitants of the New Hampshire towns entered into 
their social compacts without any authorization from t h e Crown. 
The settlers apparently felt this to be no · barrier , and by 
their agreements assumed jurisdiction not only in municipal 
affairs, but in ecclesiastical matters as well . The wording 
of the Exeter document indicate s a hesitat ion on the part of 
the s:iigna tories to submit themsel v_es to law. They bound tb.em-
selve s only to the laHS of England and to other such laws which 
"shall upon good grounds be made and enacted". The·Providence 
charter of _the same year stated somewhat more positively: 11 do 
promise to subject ourselves in active or passive obedience" 
to orders or agr eements "made for public good of the body, in 
an orderly· way, by the major assent • • • " . Nevertheless , the 
Exeter founders set up a working government by this compact. 
193 
New Hampshire Provincial Papers, vol. 1, p . 132. 
The scope of its activi t ies is shown by the fact 
that in February of the next year, the ttwhole assembly at 
the court sol emnly met together in Exetertt and enacted a 
law making treason against the country, or treachery, 
treason, rebellion, or the reviling of "his majesty the 
Lord's Annointedn punishable with death.l94 
Dover and Portsmouth also found the need for some 
fo rm of government, and the people of each settlement com-
bined themselves into plantat ions, after .the example of 
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the Exeter community. The date of the Portsmouth combination 
is uncertain, since the town's first book of records was 
destroyed in 1652. However, the Dover compact, signed by 
forty-one persons, stated: 
Whereas sundry mischiefs and inconveniences have 
befallen us, and more and greater may, in regard 
of want of civil government, his most gracious 
Majesty having settled no order for us to our 
knm<Tledge: we, ••• inhabitants upon the river 
Piscataqua, have voluntarily agreed to combine 
ourselves into a body politic, t hat we may the 
more comfortably enjoy th e benefits of his lYiajesty 1 s 
laws, together with all such lavm as shall be con-
cluded by a major part of the freemen of our 
society.l9' 
Thus four distinct goverrunents were formed. Since 
the .so-called ttcombinatiorisn were voluntary agreements, thus .' 
subject to being broken or subdivided if popular discontent 
194. 
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 140. 
195 
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 126, vol. 10, p . 700. 
arose, 
There could be no safety in the continuance of 
them . The distractions in England at this time 
had cut off all hope of the royal attent ion, and 
the people of the several settlements were too 
much divided in their opinions to form any general 
plan of government which could afford a prospect 
of permanent utility. The more considerate persons 
among them, therefore, thought it best to treat 
with Massachusetts about taking them under their 
protection •••• The affair was more than a year in 
agitation, and was at length concluded as to 
Portsmouth and Dover, · pril 14, 1641. The inhab-
itants of Exeter had hitherto continued their 
combination; but finding themselves comprehended 
within the claim of Massachusetts, and being 
weary of their inefficacious mode of government, 
they petitioned the court, and were readily ad-
mitted tmder their jurisdiction. 196 · 
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The religious differences between Puritan Massachusetts 
and the Piscataqua river towns were to cause some difficulty 
between the two. When the to1.-vns were admitted to Massachusetts 
in 1641, Massachusetts recognized as freemen in the New 
Hampshire towns not only church members, who had been the 
only voters in Massachusetts since 1633, but also all other 
substantial persons, and the four towns "were practically . 
allowed to govern themselves by their own officers, as they 
had done beforen •197 The preamble of the bill admitting 
the towns to Massachusetts stated that the residents of the 
town's were to be exempted from all public charges "other 
(N.H.) 
2 , and 
196 
Chief Justice Doe, in State v. Hayes, 1881, 61 Ladd 
264, at p. 321, citing Belknap, op . cit., vol. 1, chapt . 
N.H. Provincial Papers, vol. 1, pp. 327, 328, 332. 
1 97s anborn, op. cit., p . 119. 
than those which shall arise for or from among themselves , 
and that the "inhabitants there are allowed to send t wo 
deputies from the whole river (settlements) to the court 
. 198 
at Bostonn. 
Despite these concessions the New Hampshire towns 
continued to act in an independent fashion. Exeter never 
sent any representatives to the Massachusetts General Court 
despite provisions that each of the towns was to send a 
representative.199 In 1651, Governor John Endicott of 
l\1assachusetts, learning that the Strawberry Banke inhabit-
ants were planning to disavow allegiance to Massachusetts 
and set up an independent government, ordered arrest of the 
. 1 d d h d th t t B t f · 12 OOD r1ng ea ers an a em sen o os on or tr1a • over 
Vias, in the same year, fined ten pounds for not sending a 
deputy to the General Court; the following year, Dover 
was declared to be entitled t o send two deputi es to the 
201 legislature, and Strawberry Banke one. In 1667, there 
still existed so much discontent in New Hampshire, t hat 
t he Iviassachusetts legi s l at ure ordered that all disaffected 
persons seeking to change the form of government of the 
198 
John N. McClintock, History of New Hampshire, Colony, 
Province, State, 1623-18$$, Boston, B.B. Rus sell, Cornhill, 
1889, P• 52 • 
199 
Ibid., P • 76. 
200 
Ibid., p. 52. 
201Ibid..!., ibid. 
Piscataqua river townships should be sent to Boston for 
202 
trial. 
The river towns leff Massachusetts in 1680 after hav-
ing been elevated to the status of a Royal Province. The fact 
that the number of voters in the four towns numbered but two 
22:3 
hundred and nine at the time indicates how small their population 
continued. Beset by serious difficulties with the Indians 
almost continuously during the years 1676 to 1759 , they were 
not considered favorable towns for settlement except by those 
hardier and more courageous of the pioneers . It is under-
standable that the inhabitants were to act so independently 
in establishing governments and in ordering their m'ITn affairs . 
After the i mprisonment of Governor Edmund Andros following the 
ascension of William of Orange and Mary in England , Nev1 Hampshire 
foLUld itse l f in 1689 once more without a government. A year 
later , the New Hampshire towns met once more , and voted to 
renew their union with the Massachusetts colony. Hm..rever , 
this union has been described by historians as a nominal one 
only. In 1692, a royal government was established at the 
urging of the heirs of John Mason , who had originally held a 
royal patent to most of the land that was to comprise New Hrunp-
shire. From 1699 to 1741, Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
remained separate , but both had the same governor . The New 
202 
Ibid. , p. 65. 
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Hampshire and Massachusetts authorities continued to grant 
to\lllnships llllithin the area, disputing as to v-rhom it belonged. 
Not until 1741 was the southern boundary defined, and the 
other three boundaries were not settled until much later. 
Yet with internal and external strife and confusion, 
the town governments continued to exist and to exercise 
important functions. They do not appear to have changed 
much in nature as their allegiance shifted and as their very 
existence was being decided elsewhere. Prior to the Ar dros 
regime, the towns ' powers of local legislation were confirmed 
by and exercised according to the same act a s were those of 
the other Iviassachusetts towns: 
Whereas particular to\tlms have many things which 
concern only themselves, and the ordering their 
own affaira, a nd disposing of business in their 
own town: It is therefore ordered that the 
freemen of every town, with such others as are 
allowed, or the major part of them, shall have 
power ••• to make such laws and constitutions as 
may concern the welfare of their tovm; provided 
they be not of a criminal but of a prudential nature, 
and that their penalties exceed not twenty shillings 
for one offense, and that they be not repugnant to 
the public laws and orders of the country.203 
vVhen the towns became a separate province, this order was 
copied in the code enacted by the first New Hampshire provincial 
legislature in 1680. 204 Apparently the king disallowed the 
203 
Mass . Ancient Charters, p. 195; N.H. Provincial 
Paperer ., vo1.._ l, p~ 380 .. 
204 
N.H. Provincial Papers, vol. 1, p. 436. 
entire New Hampshire code in December 1681, although the towns 
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continued to exercise the same powers. Tnis was to cause 
225 
Chief Justice Doe of the New _Hampshire Supreme Court to connnent 
in 1881 in a · case involving alleged unconstitutionality of 
municipal exercise of legislative powers: 
enacted: 
The king's r eported disallowance of the whole 
code ••• does not tend to show by whom the people 
of New Hampshire have under~tood their town laws 
were made. A municipal power of legislation was 
a principle of the common law of the trovince. 
Its limits have been fixed by provinc al and state 
authority, but it has always been a substantial 
part of our goverrunent.206 (Italics mine.) 
In 1692, with a return to orderly government, it was 
That it shall and may be lawful for the selectmen 
of each town within this province, or the major 
part of them, with the approbation of one justice 
of the peace, to convene the freeholders of these 
towns together, to consider, debate and conclude 
of such things as are necessary for the prudential 
affairs of their town, as often as they shall find 
occasion;; and they, or the major part of them, so 
met, to make such orders as they shall find nec-
essary for the prudential concern of their towns, 
provided the Denalty of any default made of such 
orders shall not exceed ••• twenty shillings.207 
Thus in the first hundred or more years following its settle-
ment, New Hampshire was administered first by one government and 
205 
206 
pp. 333-4. 
207 
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 408;. Belknap, op. cit., vol. 2,p. x. 
State v. Hayes, cited in footnote 196, above, at 
New Hampshire Provincial Papers, vol. 3, p. 167. 
then another. Conflicting claims we re made to its territory, 
a nd the very t owns themselves were beset with i nternal strife 
and difficulties. ~ fith an early history such as t his , t he 
free-wheeling part which t hese inde pendent tmvns were t o 
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pl ay in the river t owns cont r ove rsy during and fol lovling 
t he Revol ution is understandable. As will be demonstrated 
i n Chapters VI and VII below, the New Hampshire 0upr eme Court, 
in considering t he status of the tm-vn, at first follov-red 
t he cent ralist IVIassachusetts theories holding that t he town 
vvas a mere creatur e of the legislature. Ho'V'1ever, in the 
react ion following the Civil war, . Chief Justice Doe and other 
jurists in New Hampshire v1e r e to use t hese facts of colonial 
history to buttres s their deci s ions t hat the state rested 
upon the to~J~m and t hat the town had certa in rights of a pr ivate 
corporation in re spect to local property and affairs, and thus 
t hat the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due 
proce s s and the like would attach to and protect the towns 
.when they were act ing in their character as private corporations. 
The area which was later t o become Vermont was also 
t he subject of varied and complex disputes. In one of t hese, 
the dispute between New York and New Hampshire, the very town 
itself became in 1769 an "instrument of battlen; the governor 
of New Hampshire, Wentworth, suggested that his state could 
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See Chapter IV, below . 
better obtain jurisdiction of the area 
••• if the towns should nregulate themselves , as 
Wentworth suggested, ~according to the Grants 
of New Hampshiren. The citizens of Windsor, led 
by dtone, adopted that s~~gestion at once. In 
March, they organized their town government exactly 
as they v.rould have had their town been a part of New 
Hampshire. Although this was done quietly, in 
issuing the call f or the March 1770 elect ion, they 
came out in the open and stated n~f.haras Thare is a 
meeting appointed by the charter granted by New 
Hampshire for the freeholders and other inhabitants 
of Windsor to meet or assembly on the second Tuesday 
of ~~rch anewlyn. As Jones, M.B., states in his 
Vermont in the filaking, 1750-1777, organizing the town 
after the Nev-; England town model was ttthe first overt 
act of consequence against New York authority east of 
the Green 1-1ountains" . 209 
Those towns on the west bank of the Connecticut River 
formed close bonds with the towns on the east bank. Chapter 
I V details the mighty struggles of these towns on both sides of 
the river to join together to form an independent river state 
in later years. Thus these towns, organized as part of the 
New Hampshire maneuvers against New York were to become so 
independent -minded that they, together vvi th the towns on the 
other side of the river, would constitute a mighty problem 
· not only f or the fledgling state of Vermont, but for Ne\v 
Hampshire, New York, and even the Continental Congress in years 
to come. 
lll~ine, little settled even today, \vas less in the trad-
ition of the other ~ew England colonies as far as town 
government was concerned. Although this author has stated 
209Charles M. Thompson, Inde pendent Vermont, Boston, 
Houghton, Mifflin and Go., 1942, pp . 96-97. 
briefly, above , in Chapter II , some of the factors in the col-
onial period which distinguish Maine fr om the other New 
E.'ngland states, they need somewhat fuller explanat ion. One 
Sir Ferdinanda Gorges obtained in 1639 an extremely liberal 
royal charter for the Province or County of Maine , by which 
he became Lord fropri etor or Deputy- Governor wi th plenary 
powe r s. The powers granted Gorges have been described by 
historians as more extensive than any ever granted by t he crown 
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to an i ndividual . He took advantage of thi s power to establish 
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his own government in 1639 by which he retained execut i ve pmv-er , 
appoin t ed a counci l of s even , and established a representative 
branch composed of delegates f rom t h e four countie s into which 
he divided the area . 
Under his admini stration, the l ocal unit was the county, 
with a li eutenant and e i ght justices appointed by Gorges in 
each . Thes e in turn se lected two head constabl es for each 
hundred , and one constabl e and four t ything-men for each par-
ish. Each of the s e persons was respons ible to the person above 
him i n t he hierarchy , wi t h u l timate authori t y to decide ques-
tions ves ted i n the lord propri etor or his deputy . In effect , 
Gorges had the "feudal tenure of a county palatine and vlce-
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regal powers of government". 
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William D. vlill iams on ,. The History of the State of 
Maine , 1602-1820 , Hallowell (He.)~ Glazier , Hasters and Smith, 
1839 i vol . 1 , p . 275. 
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"Maine":, Encyc lopaedia Britannica, London and New 
In l641 , Gorges chartered a small settlement at Aga-
ment i cus as a borough, wi th a governing body consisting of a 
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mayor and eight aldermen ~ During the following year , he trans-
formed the borough into the city of Gorgeana , reputed to be 
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the first chartered city in America . A second community, 
Pi s cata qua Plantation, was incorporated into the town of 
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Kittery in 1647. This 1rms quite a different pattern from 
the social compacts and town meetings early found in the 
other. parts of New England. 
With conflicting claims exerted ov er the area for more 
than half a century , Hassachusetts proceeded to bring l'!Iaine 
completely under its jurisdiction. Afte r purchasing the Gorges 
claim in 1677, 11assachti..sett s held most of l'•a i ne under provin-
cial rule , and in 1691 incorporated i t as an integral part of 
Nas sachusetts . Even earlier , the Haine settlements of \\fe lls, 
Saco , Falmouth, and Scarboro had been granted by the General 
Court of that colony all the privileges and i~~unities enjoyed 
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by existing tm-vns in the Bay Colony. Until 1820 , the history 
211 (continued) York , Encyclopaedia Britannica Co. , Ltd. , 
13th ed ., 1926 , vol . 17, p. 439. 
212 
Henry s. Burrage, The Beginnings of Colonial l'J[aine, 
1602-1658 , Portland, 1914, pp . 317-8. 
213Ibid. , pp . 319-20. 
214\-J"orks Project Administration, Tovm Government in Maine 
(preliminary edition), Naine Historical Records Survey Project , 
Portland (Me .) , 1940, p . 7. 
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rbid. , ibid ., and records there cited. 
Maine local goverrunent is a phase of Massachusetts history. 
Therefore , the discussion of t he l ocal government situation 
in Massachusetts in the earl ier portion of this chap t er , and 
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the statutes di ges ted there apply to Maine as well . I'Jnen 
Maine separated from Massachusetts in 181S-1820,all Massachu-
setts statutes affecting Maine were continued in force until 
altered or repealed by the Maine Le gislature , or until they 
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expired by their own limitation. Thus the nevi state 11 ac-
cepted the development of its local inst i t u tions as it had 
218 proceeded under Mas sachusetts rule" . 
Conclusion 
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In conclusion, the pre-Revolutionar y areas and colonies 
\vhich we re to emerge as the six New England states showed early 
characteristic town organization and exercise of function. In 
each of the six , it is possible to find instances of local in-
dependence of acti on, as well as exampl~s of tovm subordination 
216 These stat utes are digested in \i . P.A. Town ••• , .2.!2...!.. 
cit. , pp . 1-10, with citations to Iviaine histories and the like . 
Orren c. Hormell , Maine Towns , Bowdoin College Bul l etin , Muni-
cipal Research Series No. 9, Br unswick (Me . }, 1932 , c i ted there-
i n, a l so documents Maine development of local government . 
217Ibid., p . 9 fn. 7 , p . 10 fn . 3 . 
218I bid., p. 9. 11 The legislative basis of both state 
and l ocal administrati on in Maine was laid in a general body of 
acts pas sed in 1821. Whi le a pproxin1ately five hundred Massachu-
setts laws wer e specifically repealed , the statutes adopted stem 
for t he most part directly from Nassachusetts antecedents , in 
many cases containing even identical l anguage." Ibid. , p . 10. 
-231 
to colonial or provinc i al l egislat ures and authorities. The 
patt erns are somewhat c l earer i n the three southernmost areas 
o~ Rhode Is land , Connecticut and Massachusetts-. Of the three , 
J:Vlassachusetts from the be gin.."l'ing showed a more highly organized 
~ 
central government , and the 1 towns were subjected to some\ihat 
\ 
more reeulation than was the case in Connecticut and Rhode Island . 
In Rhode Island the towns v;ere domi nant , and the colony contin-
ually fell apart into its component t ov1ns . Even when a central 
government was organizE)d , the governor 1 s po1-1ers \-Jere lim.i ted and 
the town- based legisl ature exerc ised not onl y legislat ive , but 
:xecutive and judici al funct i ons as 1;-.rell . In colonial Connecti-
cut the colony was i n effect a federati on or confederation of 
towns. Just as in Rhode Island, the town- based legislature 
exercised most of the powers of the central government , and 
under its compact of 1638 nominated all publ i c offi cers , in-
e luding executive and judicial . 
The northern part of New England remained sparsely 
settl ed throughout the c ol oni a l era . The forms of government , 
both colonial and local , were fr'agmentary during much of t:!:lis 
pe r iod . However , NevJ Hampshi re and Vermont in its to-vm beginnings 
each shov-red more simi larity to the Connecticut and Rhode Island 
pattern . Mai ne developed i n the I'1assachusetts tradition, except 
f or the earl y feudal-type Gorges settlements in which the county 
was of pr i mary importance. 
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CHAPrER IV 
THE TRANSITION TO ORDERLY CIVIL GOVERNMENT: 1775-1812 
The years leading up to the Revolutionary War, the 
war years themselves, and the intervening period between the 
Revolution and the War of 1812 formed a hectic era in all of 
New England. These were the years in which the colonial 
yoke was thrown off, and political bonds with England dis-
solved; the years also of state and nation building, and of 
fighting two bitter wars with whatever materials and men 
could be mustered by whatever means. The times were often 
desperate, and if the mGans devised by the towns, the coa-
lescing states and the emerging nation were not always well-
conceived and executed with the niceties of modern consti-
tutions and laws, it is understandable. 
The actions of the New England towns during these 
times were often so bold and striking in nature, that nine-
teenth century partisans of municipal rights would remember 
these as the golden years when the .town, even in Massachu-
setts, was something more than a fledgling of the state ., 
created for legislative or administrative convenience. In 
the New Hampshire and Vermont "rivers controversy" in this 
period, certain of the towns acted so boldly, defiantly and 
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independently that they even attempted to secede ~rom their 
own states, considered organizing an independent state, and 
sent representatives to the Continental Congress to argue 
their cause and to present their side o~ the controversies 
with New Hampshire, Vermont and New York. 
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During this period the town perhaps reached its 
peak as an instrument for the ~ormulation of public opinion, 
and as a sounding board in which the ordinary citizen could 
debate his relationship to man, God, state, and nation. 
These were times when the town commissioned privateers to 
sail upon the high seas and granted them letters of marque 
and reprisal, issued memorials to the national and state 
governments when the need or urge seized them, raised their 
own troops and supplied them with arms, and used town ~unds 
to fight the nation's battles. The things which they did 
were to be remembered and put for~h in argument in later 
years by the towns, their counsel, historians, political re-
formers and muck-rakers, political scientists, jurists and 
practical politicians--indeed by most of those persons who 
were to argue before legislature, court and public for the 
New England town's very right to exist and to control its 
internal affairs. 
It is this author's opinion that town actions in 
the 1776-1812 era were primarily a product of the groping 
and unsettled nature o~ both the young nation and the new 
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states. The American Republic was then but a mere shadow of 
its present majestic structure: a weak confederation which 
would not emerge as a world power until after the Spanish-
American War in 1898 and would not even adopt a federal un-
ion until 1789. The states in their relationships with the 
national government went along much as they chose, even re-
fusing to pay the taxes asked of them by the American nation-
al government. The national government was no more than a 
loose confederation of its components. Similarly, when the 
colonial governing structure and the charters by which the 
colonies had been ruled were overturned, the liberated colo-
nies began state building and constitution writing. In 
these affairs the towns took a lively interest, often con-
sidering their delegates to constitutional conventions and 
state legislatures bound by the instructions given them by 
the towns themselves. When financial difficulties were 
added to the unsettled state governmental structure, towns 
often grew unruly and took matters into their own hands. 
Present-day Relevance 
It may well be asked what relevance town practices 
of the colonial and post-colonial times have in the twentieth 
century, when no town would think of outfitting privateers, 
levying town taxes to defray the direct expenses of war, or 
threatening to secede from the state to which it belongs. 
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It is this author's contention that these events in the 
historical evolution of New England municipalities are an 
integral part of the fabric of the persistent political myth 
that the New England town occupies a status vis a vis the 
state somehow different from that in the other states of the 
country. Since these historical patterns are among the facts 
which the proponents of local rights cite as examples of cus-
toms, usage and history showing certain types of prescriptive 
or vested rights in towns, they should be examined, not in 
isolation, but in light of the political situation then ex-
tant. Just as the political observer of today, in attempt-
ing to grasp the reason for continued Sout hern assertions 
of states' rights, must study the doctrine in its historic 
beginnings at the Hartford Convention, and in the Kentucky 
and Virginia Resolutions, the heated contentions of Calhoun 
and Clay, and its political significance during and since 
the Civil War, so too must the student of municipal govern-
ment turn to antecendent events, movements, and traditions 
to understand the complex political background against which 
home rule movements, assertions of local rights to self 
government, or other attempts at local government reform or 
change in New England will be made and evaluated today. 
In his study of Massachusetts town government, John 
F. Sly wrote in 1930: 
No method of government can be isolated and judged ir-
respective of local history and tradition or without 
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regard to the environment in which it is to be applied, 
and it is very probable that the success of a new pro-
posal will depend more upon the character of the local 
support that it receives than upon the theoretical ex-
cellences of the plan itself.l 
In like manner, three commentators2 on municipal home rule, 
writing in the 1950 ' s, have pointed_ out that present-day 
home rule statutes and constitutional amendments are no 
better than the nineteenth century court decisions on the 
nature of state..J..ooal. constitutional relationships. Such 
modern statutes and amendments, they wrote, are interpreted 
by the courts on almost the same bases as were nineteenth 
century assertions of :loca·l powers. Since these cases, as 
shown in Chapters V, VI, and VII, were often decided on the 
basis of judicial interpretation of colonial and post-colo-
nial charters, const i tutions, laws, and practices, they are 
relevant, according to these commentators, even in consider-
ing the background against which the courts will interpret 
a particular home rule statute or constitutional amendment. 
lJohn F. Sly, Town Government in Massachusetts 
(1620-1930), Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Univ. Press, 1930, 
p. 232. 
2Rodney L. Mott, "Strengthening Home Rule", 1950, 
National Municipal Review, 39:172; Harvey Walker, "Toward a 
New Theory of Municipal Home Rule", 1955, 50 Northwestern 
Law Review 571; Arthur B. Winter, "Municipal Home Rule, A 
Progress Report?", 1957, 36 Nebraska Law Review 447. · Their 
sug&ested course of action to secure meaningful home rule 
andjor independence of local action is discussed more fully 
in Chapters II, above, and VII, below. 
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Anti-British Activities in Colonial New England 
Th~ part which the towns took in early opposing the 
rule of the British later made them restive and suspicious 
of overly-close state supervision, and would lead to a state 
of near-anarchy even in the Berkshire area of Massachusetts 
once the Revolution was over. Towns were active in the 
seventeenth century in resisting the tyranny of the New Eng-
land Governor, Sir Edmund Andres, as shown in Chapter III, 
above. Andros so feared the towns, that he outlawed all 
town meetings for any purpose except for the annual election 
of officers. Yet the towns, notably those Massachusetts 
towns like Lynn whose land titles were threatened, continued 
to meet and to present their peti ti.ons of grievances. As 
the Revolution approached, the towns once more began to talk 
of the natural rights of man, including his right to local 
self-government. At town meetings, the colonists composed 
memorials on the social compact which was said to underlie 
all government, memorials on the inequities of taxation with-
· out representation, on the dissolubility of colonial govern-
ments which had been formed by mere men acting for their own 
convenience. The Ashfield memorial, quoted in Chapter III, 
above , was a typical outward manifestation of the sentiments 
which were then being expressed so boldly in the town meeting~ 
Johnston, in describing town preparation in Connect-
icut for the forthcoming conflict, illustrates the pattern 
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that was followed throughout most of New England: 
At first, the preparations for resistance were made by 
the towns, which acted, in the traditional Connecticut 
fashion, as if they were little commonwealths in them-
selves. They met, voted solemn condemnation of the 
ministry, appointed committees of safety, and appropri-
.ated money to buy arms and powder. Every town sent its 
contribution to the poor of Boston, and every committee 
felt bound also to send a long letter of condolence. 
The general assembly then began preparations to direct 
the storm •••• But it is, again, a curious survival of 
primitive conditions that the towns thought it neces-
sary for them also to meet and endorse the action of 
congress and the assembly. The town republics, which 
had given birth to the commonwealth, were still con-
scious of an abundant vitality.3 (Italics mine.} 
Windham, Connecticut, in 1765, organized its Sons 
of Liberty, and appointed a committee of correspondence to 
write to other towns and to decide on a common course of 
action. In Lebanon, the citizens enraged by the Boston 
Massacre drafted a declaration of rights and liberties in 
1770, six years before the Declaration of Independence. 
Similarly, in 1774, Mansfield, Connecticut, drew up a de-
claration of freedom.4 In weighty debates, often extending 
3Alexander Johnston, Connecticut: A Study of a Com-
monwealth Democracy, Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin 
and Co., 1887, pp. 290-1. 
4Clarence M. Webster, Town Meeting Country, New York, 
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945, p. 99. For many examples of 
such declarations in Massachusetts in this period, see 
Josiah G. Holland, History of Western Massachusetts: The 
Counties of Hampden, Hampshire, Franklin and Berkshire, Em-
bracing An OQtline, or General History, of the Section, An 
Account of its Scientific Aspects and Leading Interests, and 
Se arate Histories of its One Hundred Towns, Springfield 
Mass. , Samuel Bowles and Co., 1855, vol. 2, passim. 
over several days, the people in town meeting debated the 
pros and cons of separation from England and restated their 
basie beliefs of government. Many of these resolutions 
would furnish later ideas not only for the Declaration of 
Independence but for the new constitutions, both national 
and state. Thus Mendon, Massachusetts, resolved as early 
as 1773: 
That all men have an equal right to life, liberty, and 
property. Therefore all just and lawful government 
must originate in the free consent of the people. That 
a right to liberty and property, which are natural 
means of self-preservation, is absolutely inalienable, 
and can never lawfully be given up by ourselves or 
taken from us by others.~ · 
The town custom of issuing resolutions and mani-
festoes to state and nation was to continue for some years, 
drawing forth the later remark that, 
A most peculiar feature of New Haven town meetings at 
this period were the eloquently-worded manifestoes up-
on public affairs. Events of unusual interest and im-
portance could hardly ~ail to evoke a sermon or an 
eulogy from New Haven. 
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5Quoted by George P. Morris, "Introduction" in His-
toric Towns of New England (Lyman P. Powell, editor), 2d ed., 
New York and London, Knickerbocker Press and G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1901, p. 13. The war activities of the Massachusetts 
towns have been detailed by H.A. Cushing, "Political Activity 
of Massachusetts Towns During the Revolution", 1895, American 
Historical Society Annual Reports, pp. 105-113. Also see 
Sly, op. cit., pp. 96-lOO. . 
6Charles H. Levermore, "The Town and City Government 
of New Haven", Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical 
and Political Science, 4th series, no. X, Baltimore, the 
University, 1886, p. 463. 
The same author listed as examples five town resolutions in 
1793 supporting Washington's policy of neutrality, one de-
claring that the Jay Treaty was subversive ' of the United 
States Constitution, and "frequent fiery communications" 
about the economic havoc which the embargo was wreaking upon 
New Haven shipping. 7 
Effect of Declaration of Independence 
Although the United States Supreme Court was to de-
cide in 1815 that the states and their legislatures succeeded ' 
to all of the rights of the Crown, 8 certain of the towns 
were not quite so certain once the rebellion began that the 
state government retained any power at all. The Vermont and 
New Hampshire river towns who were allied with the "College 
Party" movement centering around Dartmouth College, main-
tained that the national Declaration of Independence had re-
solved the nation into a state of nature, with individuals 
free to make such new alliances as they pleased, except where 
they were formed together .into towns by town charters. 9 
These towns, they maintained, )having each been chartered 
7Ibid., ibid. 
BTown of Pawlet (Vt.) v. Clark, 1815, 13 u.s. 291. 
9John L. Rice, "The New Hampshire Grants: Germs of 
Nullification and Secession in 1776 11 , 1882, Magazine of 
American History, 8:1, at 17, 23. 
by the British Crown, 
in the same manner as Massachusetts and Connecticut had 
been, acquired by the Declaration of Independence all 
the attributes of sovereignty which could be claimed by 
those larger States; and in so far as those towns might 
enter into the formation of it, any new State must needs 
be, not a direct union of the people, regardless of 
their town incorporations, but a confederation of towns, 
to which primarily the people in each owed allegiance, 
and through which alone they were related to the State. 
The idea of a dual allegiance had small place in this 
political faith. From this extreme doctrine of town 
sovereignty, it was but a step to the concommitant here-
sies of nullification and secession which followed. 
Hence, as we have seen, the result of its teaching was 
that, whatever engagement a town might enter into, there 
was practically always reserved the right to secede 
from it, as pique or self-interest might prompt.lO 
This theory that the Revolution and the subsequent 
Declaration of Independence resolved the nation into a state 
of nature was held elsewhere in New England as well. In 
Connecticut, the General Assembly had declared that the form 
of government would continue to be the Charter received from 
King Charles II "so far as an adherence to the same will be 
consistent with an absolute Independence of this State of 
the Crown of Great Britain." Yet by 1782, serious doubts 
began to be raised as to whether it were not necessary to 
call a constitutional convention. Writers of various pam-
phlets on the question suggested that the state had no civil 
constitution.ll Dissatisfaction with the "commutation act" 
lORice, op. cit., p. 23. 
llJ. Hammond Trumbull, Historical Notes on the Con-
stitutions of Connecticut: 1639-1818, Hartford, Brown and 
Gross, 1873, pp. 15, et seq. 
by which Congress granted a sum of money to Revolutionary 
Army officers in lieu of half pay for life, combined with a 
feeling that no constitution would have validity unless as-
sented to by the freemen, asserted itself in 1783 when town 
resolutions denouncing the situation were passed.12 
Massachusetts and the Berkshire Disaffection 
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In Massachusetts the situation was even more marked. 
The General Court passed a resolution on September 19, 1776, 
asking the towns to empower their representatives to act in 
drawing up a new constitution to replace or revise the 
Charter of 1691. The strong opposition of Boston and Wor-
cester, one historian says, prevented the Assembly from re-
vising the charter: 
The objections which these two important towns raised ••• 
sh ow the marked local and personal feeling then active. 
Boston thought that the forming of a constitution was 
so vital to the welfare of all, that "every individual 
ought to be consulting, acting and assisting." Thi s 
statement of the rights of the individual in regard to 
his government gave sanction to the theory that any 
change in the form of government must be submitted to 
the people for their approval in town meetings. Boston 
and Worcester were not alone in their refusal to give 
the General Court power to act as a constituent body. 
Rowley resolved that any constitution should be published 
for "perusal"; while Salem voted that all changes in the 
government should be ratified by the towns. Norton 
voiced the then current opinion that the end of govern-
ment is the good of the people, and from this premise 
concluded that the power to form and establish a 
12 rbid., p. 18. 
constitution must rest with the people.l3 
Thereafter, with the Declaration of Independence 
243 
by the Continental Congress, various of the towns in Berk-
shire county regarded the Massachusetts charter as null and 
void, and virtually seceded from the state.l4 Pittsfield 
in 1776 presented a memorial to the legislature stating 
that, owing to the dissolution of the power of Britain, the 
country was in a "state of nature" and that "the people are 
the fountain of power.nl5 The town of Lee voted in town 
meeting that they would "obey the laws of this state" and 
support the civil authority for the "term of one year"; 
Great Barrington voted that "not having a new constitution 
and other reasons", the laws of the state were not operative 
there; and the towns of Lenox and Hancock voted that they 
were not bound by state law.l6 The Ashfield resolution, 
13Abner L. Braley, "Provisional Government of Mas-
sachusetts", in Commonwealth History of Massachusetts (Albert 
B. Hart, editor), New York, States History Co., 1929, vol. 3, 
p. 71. 
14For further examples and details of disaffection 
by the towns in the western Massachusetts Counties, see the 
individual town histories in Holland, op. cit., vol. 2. 
15Harry A. Cushing, History of the Transition from 
Provincial to Commonwealth Government in Massachusetts 
{Columbia Univ. Studies), New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 
1896, p. 198. 
l6Louis A. Frothingham, A Brief History of the 
Constitution and Government of Massachusetts, Boston, New 
York, Chicago, San Francisco, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916, 
1925, p. 19. 
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quoted in Chapter III was a product of the same series of 
events. The reluctance of the towns of western Massachusetts 
to be governed under the forms of the old colonial charter 
continued for the five years after the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. The main c onflict between state and local authori-
ty came in the refusal by the towns to allow state courts to 
sit, notably in Berkshire County. For instance, at the Pitts-
field town meeting, five judges were appointed to exercise 
judicial functions in place of the judges constituted by the 
commonwealth.!? The then-existing state of government in 
Massachusetts was such that Morison has described the town 
as, 
in fact, the several sovereigns of Massachusetts Bay; 
their relation to the General Court closely approximated 
that of the states to the Congress.le 
As the state government continued its refusal to 
call a constitutional convention, a Berkshire petition drawn 
up by eighteen towns meeting at Pittsfield threatened that 
"if this honorable court are for dismembering, there are 
other States, which have constitutions, which will, we doubt 
not, as bad as we are, gladly receive us. 11 19 The y~ars were 
17 Ibid. , p • 19 • 
18s.E. Morison, "The Struggle Over the Adoption of 
the Constitution of Massachusetts, 178011 , Mass. Historical 
Society Proceedings, 1917, p. 353 et seq. 
19Frothingham, op. cit., p. 23. 
ones of near-anarchy and not until after the Massachusetts 
constitution of 1780 was put into effect was the judiciary 
to return to Berkshire county. 
The town of Richmond protested strongly that the 
laws of the state were established on an uncertain basis,20 
and Lenox, voting that there was no Massachusetts constitu-
2~ 
tion which controlled the inhabitants of the town, petitioned 
the General Court to be allowed to be set off to become a 
part of a neighboring state.21 One historian described the 
situation thus: 
The northern towns of the county were the most hostile 
to the General Court; coercion would probably have been 
fatal to any future harmony for the new state and would 
perhaps have meant dismemberment •••• From 1774 to 1780 
the civil authority was really helpless as far as Berk-
shire county was concerned, the real power being exer-
cised by each town without regard to its neighbors.22 
Another commented: 
Throughout the whole period the State government showed 
itself remarkably tolerant of Berkshire's movement, 
through its disinclination to employ force in the sub-
jection of the Constitutionalists. This inaction is as 
much attributable to the impotency as to the breadth of 
view of the General Court. If the state had decided to 
employ force in the reestablishment of its authority, 
it is quite evident that Berkshire would have resisted 
20Lois K. Matthews, The Expansion of New England, 
Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909, p. 263, 
citing a manuscript thesis by Dr. F.E. Haynes, The Struggle 
for the Constitution in Massachusetts, in the Harvard College 
Library, pp. 166 , 168. 
21Ibid., p. 263, citing Haynes, op. cit., at pp. 
169, 171. 
22Ibid., pp. 263-4. 
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and blood would have been shed •••• From 1778 ·until 1790 , 
the people of Berkshire County were practically in 
open rebellion against the state. In October of 1778, 
the General Court appointed a committee to attempt an 
adjustment with the county authorities . When this com-
mittee reco~nended compromise in its report, the General 
Court, in the following year enacted a law pardoning 
Berkshire County for everything it had done in the pre-
ceding five years, and providing for the resitting of 
the Superior Court at Pittsfield.23 
This inability or umrJillingness of the state govern-
ment tooontrol the tovrrls was to continue, culminating in Shays's 
Rebellion of 1786-7. 24 This revolt was as much a product of 
the monetary difficulties following the Revolution (the scarcity 
of hard money, demand for paper money, and difficulty over 
debts and lawsults) as it was a movement upon the part of the 
towns against what they considered an aristocratic state gov-
ernment operating i·dthout benefit of a valid constitution. 
Towns took various actions, some stopping short of actual re-
bellion Thus the town of Rehoboth in Bristol County stopped 
the pay of its representative to the legislature, it being the 
sense of the town meeting that there no reason for the town to 
pay the money to keep him at Boston another eight weeks, 
23 Braley, op. cit., p. 76. 
24rn addition to the general Massachusetts history 
texts of the era, intensive surveys of town action during the 
Shays's Rebellion include Joseph P. Warren , nThe Confederation 
and the Shays's Rebe llionu, American Historical Review, 1906, 
11 :44;· Joseph P. Warren, The Shays' s Rebellion, a manuscript 
thesis in Harvard University library; Samuel A. Green, nGroton 
During Shays' s Rebelliontt, Massachusetts Historical Society 
Proceedings , 1884, 2d series, vol. 1, p . 298. 
to make laws which in our judgment are not consistent 
with republican principles ••• (and) because this town 
do not entertain the most distant idea that the BEe-
sent administration will relieve our distresses.~ 
State Legislators as Town Delegates 
This, then, was the era of revolution, of reexami-
nation of conscience and constitutions. They were days in 
which towns did not hesitate to protest against what they 
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believed to be usurpation of authority by the state. However, 
the town memorials and resolves of this period must be con-
sidered in view of the fact that many of them were the direct 
result of requests made by the state legislature that the 
towns me~t to advise their representatives as to how they 
should act in important matters. These legislators often 
considered themselves bound by the instructions which the 
towns gave them, until released by the town in a subsequent 
meeting. On May 10, 1776, for example, it was resolved in 
the Massachusetts General Court: 
The Inhabitants of each Town, in this Colony, ought in 
full Meeting warned for that Purpose, to advise the 
Person or Persons who shall be chosen to Represent them 
in the next General Court, whether that if the honorable 
Congress should, ror the Sarety of said Colonies, de-
clare them Independent or the Kingdom of Great-Britain, 
they the said Inhabitants will solemnly engage with 
25 James T. Adams, New England in the Republic: 
1776-1850, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1926, pp. 158-9, 
citing Massachusetts Gazette of January 9, 1786. 
their Lives and Fortunes to Support the Congress in 
t he Measure.26 
When the legislature reassembled in May, and learned that 
some t owns had not instructed their representatives, the 
legislature resolved: 
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As the opinion of this House, that such towns as have 
not complied with the resolve aforesaid, whether they 
are represented or not, duly warn a town-meeting for 
such purpose, as soon as may be, that their sentiments 
may be fully known to this House •••• 27 
The towns took their duties seriously, and among 
those towns which issued the strongest statements favoring 
separation from England were some of the same towns whose 
dissatisfaction with the state government was to culminate 
in Shay's Revolt. Thus Pittsfield declared: 
You shall on no Pretence whatever favour a Union with 
Great Britain as to our becoming in any Sense Dependent 
on her everhearafter and use your Influence to persuade 
the . Honorable House to Notify the Honorable Continental 
Congress that this whole Provence are waiting for the 
Important Moment which they in their Great Wisdom shall 
appoint for a Declaration of Independence and a free 
Republic.28 
Boston, despite the presence of many pro-English townspeople, 
spoke out boldly: 
The Inhabitants of this Town, therefore, unanimously 
instruct & direct you, that, at the Approaching Session 
26John H. Edmonds, "Massachusetts and Independence, 
1629-1780 11 , in Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, op. cit., 
vol. 3, pp. 95-6. 
27Ibid., p. 97. 
28Ibid._, p. 100. 
of the General Assembly, you use your Endeavors, that 
the Delegates of this Colony, at the (Continental) 
Congress, be advised, that in Case the Congress should 
think it necessary ••• to declare (independence) ••• the 
Inhabitants of this Colony, with their lives & the 
Remnant of their For~~es, will most chearfully support 
them in the measure. 
Acton, though strong in its expression of sentiment, freely 
submitted "this Interesting affair to the Wisdom" of the 
Continental Congress. Its instructions expressed an opinion 
that: 
The Present Age will be Deficient in their Duty to God, 
their Posterity and themselves if they Do not Establish 
an American Republick, this is the only form of Govern-
ment we wish to Be Established, but we mean not to 
Dictate. We freely Submit this Interesting affair to 
the Wisdom of the Honorable Congress whom we trust are 
Guided and Directed in these Important Affairs by the 
Supreme Governor of the world and we Instruct you to 
Give them the Strongest Assurances that if they Should 
Declare America to be a free and Independent Republick 
your Constituents will Support and Defend the Measure 
wi th their Lives and Fortunes.30 
The action of the state legislature in asking, and 
indeed practically insisting, that every town make known its 
feelings on the question of independence indicates that the 
members of the state legislature were not yet thought of as 
representatives, but more as delegates who were usually to 
act as instructed by the towns which they represented. In 
adopting the constitution of 1780, much the same procedure 
29 Ibid., ibid. 
30Ibid., ibid. 
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was followed. On September 17, 1776, the General Court re-
quested the towns to vote whether or not they wished the 
legisl ature to go into convention with the Council to frame 
a new constitution, and whether they wished it made public 
for the "inspection and perusal of the inhabitants" before 
it was ratified by the legislature.31 This was only the 
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first of several such questions which were to be referred to 
the town meetings in like manner. Interestingly enough, less 
than half the towns even bothered to reply. 
Once the proposed constitution was drawn up it was 
sent to the town selectmen, with instruction that "if the 
major part of said Inhabitants disapprove of any particular 
part ••• they (shall) state their objections distinctly and 
the reasons therefor." These votes were to be sent back to 
the constitution, and if, from the town objections, 
there doth not appear to be two-thirds of their con-
stituents in favor thereof, (then) ••• the convention 
may alter (the constitution) in such manner as that 
may be agreeable to the s~ntiments of two-thirds of 
the voters of the state.3 
The towns responded to this request and more than one hundred 
eighty-eight towns sent comments varying from nothing more 
than a tabulation of the votes cast on the various proposals 
31Gaspar G. Bacon, "The State Constitution: 1777-
1780", in Commonwealth History o:r Massachusetts, op. cit., 
vol. 3, pp. 182-311, at 183. 
32Ibid., p. 191. 
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to long discourses on general political principles.33 
The Embargo and the War of 1812 
With this tradition, it is not surprising that the 
New England towns, hard-hit economically, should show no 
hesitation in relaying to the national government resolutions 
denouncing President Jefferson's national embargo policy. 
Their activities caused him to write: 
How powerfully did we feel the energy of this (town) 
organization in the case of embargol I felt the founda-
tion of government shaken under my feet by the New Eng-
land townships ••• though the whole of the other States 
were known to be in favor of the measure, yet the 
organization of this little selfish minority enabled 
it to overrule the Union.34 
In Massachusetts alone nearly one hundred towns denounced 
the policy and some did not even hesitate to threaten seces-
sion from the Union unless the Embargo were repealed.35 
However, in considering these events as examples of the 
33rbid., p. 194. The author discusses in detail 
particular objections raised by the towns, pointing out that 
many of the same objections were raised at later constitu-
tional conventions, and some ultimately adopted. 
34Letter from Jefferson to Joseph c. Cabell, Febru-
ary 2, 1816, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Andrew A. 
Lipscomb, editor), Washington, D.C., Thomas Jefferson Memori-
al Association, 1903, vol. 14, p. 422. This letter is quoted 
at greater length in a footnote in Chapter II, above. 
35claude M. Fuess, "Massachusetts in the Union: 
1789-1812 11 , in Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, op. cit., 
vol. 3, p. 433. 
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independent nature of the so-called "fierce little republics" 
it should not be forgotten that the town was usually acting 
in concert with the state. It is true that the Boston town 
meeting of January 23, 1809, declared that the citizens of 
the town would not "voluntarily aid or assist in the execu-
tion" of the new Enforcement Act,36 but it is equally true 
that the very next day the state legislature passed a series 
of resolutions denouncing the Enforcement Act as "unjust, 
oppressive, and unconstitutional, and not legally binding 
on the citizens of this State. 1137 Massachusetts was so op-
posed to the actions of the Congress, that when war was de-
clared in 1812, the lower house of the General Court con-
demned the action by a vote of two to one, and the towns 
dispatched their usual memorials to Congress protesting the 
action.38 
The three northern New England states, Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont were in the process of formation dur-
ing this period, and some of the towns saw in the confusion 
attending the two wars the opportunity for evading state 
restrictions and regulations. For instance, the laws of New 
Hampshire required every town of one hundred families to keep 
36rbid., p. 432. 
37rbid., p. 433. 
38Jbid., p. 436. 
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a grammar school. During the revolution, not only frontier 
towns, but many others, without applying to the legislature 
for exemption, and not lacking in funds, supported no schools. 
Although grand jurors and justices were specifically sworn 
to prevent all breaches of law, particularly of the school 
law, ~he situation remained unalleviated as the state con-
cerned itself with the business of fighting a war and found-
ing a state.39 This behavior resulted in a corrective law 
only as late as 1812. At that time, a law was passed that 
the selectmen of the individual towns would be liable to 
have an amount 11 distrained out of their estates" in an amount 
sufficient to support a school, during the whole time in 
which they neglected to make provision for one.40 
The "River Towns" Controversy 
For the student of the development of state-local 
relations in New England, the "river towns" controversy cen-
tering around Dartmouth College is an interesting one. It 
has already been the subject of such intensive scholarly re-
search that it will be considered but shortly here. 41 Briefly, 
39Jeremy Belknap, The History of New Hampshire, 
Dover (N.H.), printed for 0. Crosby and J. Varney by J. Mann 
and J.K. Remick, 1812, vol. 3, pp. 217-18. 
40Ibid., pp. 220-21. 
4ls ee, e.g., article by Rice, op. cit.; Edwin M. 
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the facts were these. Meeti~g in convention, a group of 
twenty-five towns in what was later to become Vermont voted 
that the inhabitants could "no longer subsist in such anar-
chical Circumstances" and determined to sever their political 
connection with New York. Representatives of these same 
towns met at Dorset a year later in 1776 and decided to send 
a petition and an agent to the Continental Congress to se-
cure constitution of the area as a state. 42 
Meanwhile, across the Connecticut River, sixteen 
towns clustering around Dartmouth College and within the 
limits of the state of New Hampshire applied for admission 
to the new state of Vermont and were granted it. The New 
Hampshire river towns had little sympathy with the seaboard 
part of the state of New Hampshire. However, they had close 
ties with the towns on the other side of the river. Many of 
the settlers on both sides of the river had originally mi-
grated north from the same towns in Connecticut. Thus, the 
pr oposed union was a logical one. New Hampshire complained 
to Congress of the Vermont action in admitting the towns. 
4l(continued) Bacon, The Connecticut River and the 
Valley of the Connecticut, New York and London, Knickerbocker 
Press and G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1907, pp. 258-300; Richard F. 
Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, Hanover (N.H.), Dartmouth 
College Publications, 1936, 175-199; J.T. Adams, op. cit., 
pp. 80-108; Belknap, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 336-51. 
42upton, op. cit., p. 178. 
The vermont authorities cancelled the entire transaction in 
1779, and the towns returned to New Hampshire. The New 
255 
Hampshire union continued to be an unhappy one, however, and 
later, part of New Hampshire was again incorporated into 
Vermont, although again it was ultimately remitted. At the 
same time, Vermont incorporated some of the towns on its 
western border, but well within New York. Of these western 
towns, ten joined in 1779 to petition Congress to restore 
them to New York jurisdiction. This petition was ultimately 
granted. In the disaffection of the New Hampshire river 
towns, and their negotiations with the Vermont river towns, 
there was also discussion of the possibility of both groups 
of towns seceding from their respective governments and 
joining together to form a new state along both sides of 
the Connecticut River. 
It is significant that one of the major causes for 
the dissatisfaction which culminated in the secession move-
ment centering at Dartmouth College was representation in 
the New Hampshire legislature. The small western towns 
along the Connecticut River 
f?~d themselves denied the prerogative of sending in-
dlvldual representatives to the provincial legislature 
being joined together in groups for the purpose of ' 
electing representatives. Although the new plan was 
perfectly just on the basis of the population as a 
whole, it angered the western towns, which saw in the 
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plan an unfair discrimination.43 
Other dissatisfaction centered around the high propert y qua-
lifications for state officers as formulated in the proposed 
constitution of 1781, the strong executive it would estab-
l ish, and in the situation surrounding the land grants under 
which the area had been settled. The New Hampshire river 
towns claimed that since they were west of the so-called 
"Masonian curve" they had reverted to a state of nature as 
corporate entitles, and that the New Hampshire Constitution 
of 1776 had no validity outside the Masonian land grant with-
out the consent of the towns in question. 44 Ultimately, 
sixteen New Hampshire towns became part of Vermont on June 
11, 1778. Since then, documents have been correlated,and 
others discovered, indicating that in actuality these towns 
were persuaded to join the new State of Vermont in order to 
fend off New Hampshire claims to that state. The strategy 
apparent ly was that Vermont would persuade New Hampshire to 
drop its claim to territory west of the Connecticut River by 
promising as reciprocity to return the seceding towns to New 
Hampshire. This is apparently what happened,45 although it 
resulted in a second and stronger union of the towns on both 
43Ibid., ibid. 
44rbid., p. 190. 
45Ibid., p. 143 and documents there cited. 
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sides of the river, and in further plans for formation of an 
independent valley state. The number of towns which seceded 
from New Hampshire continued to increase, and in the thirty-
six towns on the east bank of the Connecticut River there 
developed such a conflict of governmental authority that it 
ultimately resulted in New Hampshire's threatening to call 
out its militia and Vermont's preparing to mobilize its 
armed forces.46 The dispute was finally settled when the 
Continental Congress condemned Vermont's action, and General 
George Washington wrote a letter to the Vermont governor 
urging the union with the New Hampshire towns be dissolved. 
The towns returned to New Hampshire, but sullenly. A student 
of the College Party movement has noted that the action of 
the towns 
entrenched more firmly than ever the idea of the town 
as the political unit of representation in the state 
legislature. This principle has not been fundamentally 
altered since 1784, and has operated to give New Hamp-
shire today the largest House of Representatives among 
all of the forty-~ight states, its memb~rship varying 
from 419 to 422.4 
Conclusion 
The era between the Revolution and the War of 1812, 
46 Ibid., pp. 196-7. 
47Ibid., p. 198. For discussion of the present-day 
basis of legislative representation see Chapter II above. 
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then, was a time of confusion. Just as the towns were un-
certain as to the status which they were to oc~upy when the 
colonial bonds were loosed, so too were the states uncertain 
and hesitant about their constitutional position in the new 
American Confederation. When the very existence of a valid 
state constitution was · called into question, when states in 
the wilderness were forced to join together their often 
vociferous towns to form some sort of a political structure, 
and when, at the same time, there were Indians, the British, 
and debts to worry about, it is not surprising that the state 
was unable to keep very close control over the towns and 
that discontent in the towns reached such a pitch that there 
was orderly secession, as in New Hampshire, or open revolt, 
as in western Massachusetts. Today it is difficult to con-
ceive of a situation in which the governor of Vermont would 
threaten to call out the militia to do battle with the armed 
forces of New Hampshire, as happened in the "river towns" 
controversy. These were different days, and although actions 
by the towns in those days showed continued independence, 
and a continued assertion was made that the towns retained 
some sort of residual power to act in such situations, these 
activities appear to be more a product of the times than ex-
amples of the exercise of sovereign powers by municipalities. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FORMATIVE PERIOD~ 1812-1860 
The halcyon days o~ decentralized, ~ragmentary govern-
ment were coming to a close for the towns. There remained a 
~ew years of comparative ~reedom ~or them before the rising 
tide of government in the 1830's and 1840's would bring the 
municipalities into a more clearly defined position of subjec-
tion in relation to the state. Many of the men who had ~ought in 
the Revolution and the War of Commerce were alive and in~luen-
tial in local governments. The old ideas of social compact, in-
herent rights of men, and the other slogans o~ the revolutionary 
creed were still spoken and received as self-evident truths, 
at least in the decade which ~ollowed the War o~ 1812. 1 
Yet, the great canal and road building boom o~ the 
period was soon to give way to the depression o~ 1837. And 
tb.e great era o~ optimism, in which the towns, cities, and 
states of New England had invested heavily in internal im-
provements was to give way to an era o~ bankruptcy and 
1ciyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, Univ. o~ California Press, 1954, pp. 1-6. 
I 
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depression in which local gpvernment, as well as central gov-
ernment, became somewhat suspect. The concern of i: the time 
was to minimize government spending. 2 The constitutional 
amendments forbidding local governments to invest in canal 
companies and other local improvements are a product of this 
era. Little by little, the state legislature began to exert 
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its power over the towns, in subtle and exploratory ways. The 
towns made little attempt to counter, except in those partie-
ular instances where they were directly involved in litiga-
tion which involved certain of these initial legislative at-
tempts. If one wishes to speak in terms of political theory, 
the monolithic theory of sovereignty has no application to the 
situation. A loose, almost federal union existed, within each 
of the New England states, and the points of conflict were few. 
In those legal controversies involving towns, the towns were 
prone to a~gue that central state authority should not predom-
inate, and they relied upon what they had always understood 
to be the rights of towns. 
These rights were expressed in inexact terms, in 
the modern sense. The towns would plead that they had 
always done, or not done something, therefore they could 
see no reason why things should have changed. They relied up.on 
2 
Henry L. Nelson, "Town and Village Governmenttt, 1891, 
Harper's Magazine, 83~111. 
the"inherent rights" of revolutionary theory, transferring 
these naturally to the towns as an extension of their own 
interests. The contract, or covenant, or compact, as it 
was variously known, was somehow sacred to the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century mind. 11 :r.1en follow their promises 
given", in the words of John Locke. It was difficult for 
the townspeople to see why their charters did not mean the 
same thing in the second, third, fourth and fifth decades of 
the nineteenth century as they had in the eighteenth. As 
pointed out in an earlier chapter, this way of thinking was 
based upon the idea of a personal bargain with the sovereign 
or his representatives, with both parties intending to be 
bound to certain duties and to receive certain rights 
and pri vi.leges. It was probably difficult for the people 
of the towns to accept the fact that a charter was more 
sacred to the English king and his representatives than to 
the state le gislatures, yet such was the fact. 1f.hen they 
went to the courts in an attempt to argue their charter 
rights, they received little sympathy. The New England 
courts were the friends of the central government, wedded 
to an idea of Austinian monolithic sovereignty.3 The 
3 
Harvey Walker, "Toward a New Theory of Municipal 
Home Rule", 1955, 50 Northwestern Law Review 571. 
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history of the common law in England has been largely the 
history of the extension of the power of the crown over the 
nobles and the organizing of England into a monolithic sover-
eignty. The English courts were ever the friends of the 
crown, and much of the present day real property law of Eng-
land and the United States can only be understood if one 
realizes that it was formed in the centuries-long clash be-
tween the king and the nobles in parliament and out, with 
the king 1 s judges his staunch allies. This pattern also runs 
in less marked fashion through the other older fields of 
common law. Patterns of centralized sovereignty evolved 
in these centuries, as formalized in such doctrimes as 
"Dillon's Rule", determine the course of local government 
to this day. The same judicial pattern, followed in the 
United States, has effect even in the twentieth century to 
minimize the success of new-won town and city rights as they 
are put into operation.4 In the United States, the municip-
al corporation is almost everywhere regarded as the creature 
of the s t ate, having no powers except those specifically 
granted by charter, necessarily implied by it, or necessary 
to achieve the ends for which the corporation was "created", 
with"necessary" meaning absolutely essential, and with any 
question in case of dispute to be resolved against a munici~ 
pality. Legislatures and courts everywhere have put aside any 
idea that con tract principles are involved in municip~l ·-:. char-
ters. Many legisla tu.res in the early nineteenth century were 
unable to see why a legislative act referring to a town or 
city should be any different from one referring to a pond, or 
noxious weeds, or to dealing in unwholesome goods. The sol-
emn contract of the British Crown with a g~oup of colonial 
townspeople or of gentlemen adventurers became in the hands 
of the nineteenth century state legislature no more than the 
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absolute order of an eastern emperor to his subject or retainer, 
subject to change at the whim or fancy of the sovereign.5 In 
other words, to the legislature and some constitutional the-
orists of nineteenth century America, the town or city charter 
did not partake of the nature of a contract between state and 
town or citywith attendant mutuality of rights and obligations;: 
rather it was the legislature issuing a sovereign comnnnd fer 
the formation or government of an inferior civic body. Yet 
the New England towns then, as the same towns now, persisted 
5For the English background, see:: Sir William E. Hart, 
Introduction to the Law of Local Government and Administration, 
Sth ed. by \Hlliam o. Hart, London, Butterworth and Co., 1952r 
Baron Hugh P. Macmillan, Local Government Law and Administra-
tion in England and Wales, London, Butterworth and Co., 1934;: 
Frederic w. Maitland, Township and Borough, Cambridge (Eng.), 
Univ. Press, 1898;. Henry A. Merewether and Archibald J. Stephens, 
The Histor of the Borou s and Munici al Cor orations of the 
United K ng om rom the Ear iest to the Present T me, w th an 
EXamination of Records, Charters, and Other Documents, Illus-
trative of Their Constitution and Powers, 3 vols., London, 
Stevens and Sons, 1835; William A. Robson, The Develo)ment of 
Local Government, London, Municipal Journal (printers , 1951; 
and see also Albert Shaw, "Local Government in America 11 , 1882, 
Fortnightly (England) 38::485. See also the discussion of sov-
ereignty and of the English municipal corporation in Chapter II 
of this dissertation, and authorities there cited. 
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in believing that somehow they had retained certain rights and 
powers, not subject to the rule of the sovereign. 
Massachusetts 
The court cases in Massachusetts from the earliest re-
ports show a tendency toward centralization somewhat stronger 
than that in the other New England states. The questions of 
vested rights, prescriptive rights from history, inherent 
town rights to govern themselves in local affairs, rights 
protected by federal or state constitutional clauses by ana-
logy to private citizens or corporations, or from revolution-
ary concepts of social compac~ rose in the courts of the 
Commonwealth, as they did elsewhere in the New England courts. 
Yet, those concepts scarcely gave the Supreme Judicial Court 
pause. 
One of the earliest American decisions involving the 
powers of a municipal corporation stated:: 
But the Court were clear that parishes had no powers 
except those given by the statutes ••• saying it was 
like arguing against a first principle, and respecting 
which there had never been any doubt.6 
These parishes, which were actually church parishes in the 
Congregational sense, yet recognized by law, were productive 
of considerable litigation, since their officers and member-
ship were apparently quite dubious of the right of the state 
6Bangs v. Snow, 1804, 1 Mass. 181 at 189. See also 
Inhabitants of Brewster v. Inhabitants of Harwich, 1808, 4 Mass. 
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legislature to affect their status and rights to any ap" 
preciable extent. A few years after the case of BanS! v. 
~~ the court was constrained to define the status of a 
parish; 7 and, in doing so, it set the pattern which it was 
to apply to the town as well a short time later. The legis .. 
lature set off the northerly part of Harwich Parish, making 
it into the town of Brewster, with the new town retaining 
the rights and property of that part of the old parish with-
in the new town limits. When t he right of the legislature 
to do so was raised, the court ruled: 
Parishes are incorporated with a very few powers and 
duties. They are authorized and obliged to elect and 
support some Protestant public teacher of piety, reli-
gion, and morality; they may erect houses for public 
worship, and may have parsonages. To defray the ex-
penses arising from the execution of these powers, 
they may raise money, by assessing it on the polls 
and estates of the inhabitants, and by collecting it, 
for which purpose the parish collector is invested 
with authority to compel payment. Towns are municipal 
corporations with power to assess and collect money 
for the maintenance of schools and of the poor, and 
for the making and repairing of roads and for some 
other purposes. Several parishes are often in-
corporated within the limits of a town, and sometimes 
a single parish embraces parts of different towns. 
But when no part of a town is included in, or 
constitutes a parish, the duties of a parish are 
required of a town, who are obliged to maintain and 
continue public religious worship. Thus the municipal 
and parochial powers of towns and parishes may be 
distinct; and an inhabitant of a town has not infre~ 
quently by the legislature been made a parishioner of 
a parish not within his town, While his municipal 
?Dillingham v. Snow, 1809 1 5 Mass. 547. This case 
discusses the parish in much detail. 
rights and duties remained unaltered. (As an example, 
the court cites Acts 178.5, ch • .54::: 11An Act to Set Of'f 
J.P. from the South Parish in l:pswich, in the Countyc•6f8 Essex, and to Annex Him to the First Parish in Rowley") 
Likewise, the Massachusetts Court disposed decisively of a 
case which involved a retrospective law which destroyed vested 
rights as such rights were enjoyed by towns and other publi~ 
corporations; hence it indirectly set a precedent for future 
cases based upon a claimed breach of' the obligation due to 
9 
contracts. The case of' Locke v. Dane clearly presaged the 
principles involved in the great Dartmouth College case:; 
The objections to these statutes, as being ex post 
facto, and as tending to impair the obligations of 
contracts, do not apply to them. The objection of 
ex post facto applies to laws respecting crimes only • 
••• It would be carrying it much beyond its natural 
import as well as its intended operation, to construe 
it as prohibiting, the legislatures of the states to 
pass a law confirming the doings of courts or other 
public bodies known to the law.lO 
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Yet the head-on collision between the traditional powers 
of the town and the widening sphere of the legislative powers 
did not come until 1816. In that year, in the leading case 
11 
of Stetson v. Kempton, destined to be cited in innumerable 
8 Ibid., p • .5.54. 
9Locke v. Dane, 1812, 9 Mass. 321. 
lOibid., p. 362. 
llstetson v. Kempton, 1816, 13 Mass. 271. For a 
traditional definition of a town as a municipal corporation, 
see Inhabitants of the Fourth School District in Rumford v. 
li'Tood, 1816, 13 Mass. 193. 
2.61: 
decisions down to the present, the clash of authority was 
plainl y presented. During the 1812 War for Commercial In-
dependence, British Naval forces laid seige to Fairhaven, 
shelling the coast nearby. Troops were put ashore, but 
withdrew after initial resistence. In this situation, with 
invasion in full force expected momentarily, the people ofi 
Fairhaven in town meeting decided to follow the same course 
which they had in the ·Revolution: to levy a tax to pay 
militiamen and to supply the very materials of war with which 
to turn the invasion. 
The enemy was then on the coast, and in sight of 
said town; and had made an attempt to land, but 
retre~ted. The town was greatly and imminently 
exposed to their ravages, who were then laying 
waste and destroying the dwellings and other 2 property of the people situated on the coast; ••• 1 
as the court itself described the situation. In this eleventh 
hour, the people voted the sum of $1200 without a voice 
raised in dissent. Of this amount, not over half was spent 
for military supplies, and the remainder was put into the 
town's general funds. The plaintiff, who had not been present 
at the meeting, refused to pay his share of the tax, a few 
dollars, advancing the then somewhat revolutionary doctrine 
that the town had no authority to wage war. That was far 
---------------------12Gardner w. Allen's chapter, "Massachusetts In The 
War o:f 1812", in the Conmcmwealth His tory of Massachus setts, 
Albert B. Hart, editor, 3 vols., N.Y., States History Co., 
1929, vol. 3, pp. 471-99, particularly PP• 473-9, 1+90-3, 
indicates the inadequacy of the state militia to protect the 
coast from invasion. 
the central government, he alleged, and for the state when 
called upon by the federal government for assistance. He 
quoted the Statutes of 1785, ch. 75, sec. 7 on the power of 
towns, to 
••• grant and vote such sums ••• as they .judge neces-
sary, for the settlement, maintenance, and support 
of the ministry, schools, the poor, and other 
necessary charges arising within the same town. 
Clearly, argued the plaintiff's attorney, 
necessary charges can only intend such expenses as 
towm are liable by law to pay; not such as they may 
voluntarily incur, and which have no particular 
relation to the proper powers and duties of to~ •••• 
The practice of towns during the revolutionary war 
may perhaps be cited in support of the act of the 
town and of the defendants. But that was a period 
of confusion and anarchy, from which precedents can-
not be drawn in times of settled order and govern-
ment. Towns then, at one time or another, exercised 
almost all the powers of sovereignty.l3 
Notice this technique, here advanced for the first time in 
a N"ew England court, as far as the author has been able to 
determine. An admission is made that towns have traditi onal-
ly enjoyed virtually all the powers of sovereignty until 
approximately the War of 1812, then it is alleged that a 
new order has since arisen, which invalidates almost two 
hundred years of history. One can reflect with some amuse-
ment on the allegation of the attorney that the situation 
of which he was speaking as a period of settled order and 
government was one in which citizens were fleeing for their 
13
stetson v. Kempton, cited in footnote 11 above, P• 274. 
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lives, while their homes were being shelled, their country's 
forces not even remotely nearby, and the general opinion 
being that British marines and soldiers were ready to come 
ashore again, while the relatively valm early colonial days 
were spoken of as a period of confusion and anarchy. Davis, 
Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth, acting in his of-
ficial capacity, was chief attorney for the defendant-as-
sessors. Yet, in spite of this background, the court pro8 
ceeded to la:y down an Austinian rule of rriori-olithic sovereign-
ty, discounting flatly rights secured by charter or grant, 
or historically by prescription, and adopting What is now 
lmown as Dillon 1 a Rule a half-century b,efor.e that rule was 
first formally .annunciated. The court ruled that the 
town 
••• corporate powers depend upon legislative power 
or grant; or upon prescription, where they may have 
exercised the powers anciently without any 
particular act of incorporation. But in all cases, 
the powers of4towns are defined by the statute of 1785, c. 75.1 . 
The court said that its decision as to parish powers in 
Bangs v. Snow was entirely applicable to the case before 
it, and added, '' ••• towns now (are) the creatures of legis ... 
lation, ••• enjoying only the powers which are expressly 
granted to them. nl5 It will be seen, in this case and 
14rbid., P. 276. 
l5Ibid., p. 284. 
those discussed below, that in the early part of the nine-
teenth century, when they were close to historical reality, 
courts did not deny that towns historically were virtually 
free of central control except in a loose, feder·al sense. 
The technique of the courts, more in the other states than 
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in MassaChusetts, in asserting the dominance of the legis-
lature and thus the state government, was to adroit the earlier 
existence of great freedom of action. The admission was then 
offset by describing the pre-Revolutionary or pre-national 
constitution era as one of chaos and disorder, lacking assur-
ance for person or property. 
It is almost as if the towns repeated the old 
cry "but ive were bom free", with the courts answering 
"yes, but with the new compact you gave up your rights in 
the state of nature, and in the name of order and security 
16 for persons and property, took on the chains of government." 
Only a few years hence, in the period from 186.5 to 1910,. 
the very historical existence of any town rights as against 
16 
· · See the impassioned plea of Dean Max Scheetz, Jr., 
ttHome Rule and the Inherent Powers of a Municipal Corporation", 
1923, 7 Marquette Law Review, 192, in which he states it as 
his fir.m belief, based upon his research, that towns were born 
free, and that rapacious state legislatures stripped them of 
right after right while the towns did nothing to help them-
selves. He claims to discern somewhat the same process now 
going on in the case of individuals and their inborn rights, 
in the social-contract sense. 
a:71 
the legislature would be called into question, and often 
entirely discounted as romantic fiction by legal casuists. 1 7 
Even with Locke v. Dane and the Stetson cases behind 
it, the court found the plea of vested rights, contract 
principles, and the social compact too compelling for it to 
18 ignore. In Hampshire v. Franklin, 1819, the court was 
faced with a situation in which the General Court (legislature) 
acted to strip a municipal corporation of money legally in 
its hands, and to transfer those fUnds to another muni-
cipal corporation, without any shadow of preced:i.Jig debt>or 
legal claim to account for the proceeding. The legislature 
had split the County of Hampshire into two · counties, 
Hampshire and Franklin. In making the division, the 
legislature made no financial provisions, so the funds 
of the old county remained in its hands. Eighteen months 
later, almost as an afterthought, the . legislature ordered 
a division of funds between the two counties. The older of 
the two refused to pay over, claiming that the money 
17 See e.g. Howard L. McBain, 11 The Doctrine of an In-
herent Right of Local Self-Government", 1916, 16 Columbia Law 
Review 190, 299, and by the same author, 11 Due Process of Law 
and the Power of the Legislature to Compel a Municipal Corp.o-
ration to Levy a Tax or Incur Debt for a Strictly Local· Pur-
pose", 1914, 14 Columbia Law Review 407, and "The Rights of 
Municipal Corporations Under the Contract Clause of the Federal 
Constitution", 1914, National Munici~al Review, 3::284, reprinted 
1917, Politi cal · Science Quarterly, 3 ::276. 
~8Inhabitants of the County of Hampshire v. Inhabitants 
of the County of Franklin, 1819, 16 Mass. 75. 
272 
belonged to it, and Claimed protection of its. vested rights, 
against a retrospective law. The attorney for Hampshire, 
pleading that the county had a vested right to its funds, 
spoke in familiar social compact fashion: 
If the same thing had been attempted with reference 
to property in the possession of an individual, the 
case might have been a little more striking; but it 
would not have been less justifiable than what was 
undertaken in the present case. There is no oc-
casion to refer to Magna Carta, to the declaration 
of rights prefixed to the cons ti tu. t ion of this state 1 
to the provisions of the constitution of t he United 
States, or to any written or positive instruments 
on a question like this. The rights of individuals 
or corporate societies to the protection of their 
property, is interwoven in the principles of every 
state pretending to the s hadow of freedom. It is 
a principle of universal jurisprudence, that laws, 
civil or criminal, must be ~rospective, and cannot 
have a retroactive effect.l 
This is one of the earliest instances in which an American 
state court was faced with the argument that public corpora-
tions have a dual character. First, it was argued, they 
are instruments of the central state government, when act-
ing for the state government, or in areas concerning the 
welfare of all the people of the state; however, they are 
also private corporations in that in many instances they 
act in matters which concern only their residents, or almost 
entirely concern their residents, and the rest of the state 
very little; in this latter character, since it has 
19 ~·· p. 80. 
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corp or ate identity, t h e municipality may hold fiduciary 
and other legal positions, as far instance, that of 
trustee of a private trust, executor of an estate, pro-
prietor of a zoo, and so on. It is with this private 
character that the Hampshire v. Franklin case was concerned. 
As will be demonstrated, Massachusetts recognized this 
private character for only a short time, though many other 
states continue to recognize it by common-law decisions to 
the present. ·Most home rule acts have as a major part of 
their purpose the securing of the recognition of this 
private character to the town or city, as against the 
legislature. 
Speaking of the "vested rightsn of the older county, 
the court said: 
It certainly must be admitted that, by the principles 
of every rree government, and or our consti tution in 
particular, it is not in the power of the legis-
lature to create a debt from one person to another, 
or from one corporation to another, without the 
consent, express or implied, or t h e party to be 
charged. If nothing was due from Hampshire to 
Fr.anklin before the passing of the act, which 
required the former to pay to the latter a propor-
tion of money in the treasury belonging to Hampshire, 
it would be evident, that sue h a requisition must 
have been by the legislature through mistake; and 
it would not be within the con sti tu11.ona.l power of 
any judicial Court to enforce such an act •••••• 
We thi nk. •• the. statute or 18121 ex vigore suo, had 
no operation as law; •••••• By general principles of 
law, as well as by judicial construction of statutes, 
if a part of the territory and inhabitants of a 
town are separated from it, by annexation to another 
or by erection or a new corporation, the remaining 
part of the town, or the former corporation, retains 
all its property, powers, rights and privileges, 
and remains subject to all its obligations and 
duties; unless some express provision .to the 
contrary should be made, by the act authorizing 
the separation•••• The same principles will apply 
with equal force, when a county is divided •••• 
The additional act ••• deprived them of rights which 
had before become vested, and ••• could not have any 
binding force.20 · 
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Despite its talk of vested rights, however, the court found 
tha:.t · the Hampshire County Court of Sessions had consented 
to the act in question, and hence that county had to pay 
over. It is an interesting quirk of law that several 
other states, in connn.enting on the existence of vested rights 
which a murtipality ~oys in its private character, based 
their opinions on this case, even after the Supreme Judicial 
Court had altered its meaning in later decisions. 
21 A routine case of that same year, Vi..11cent v, Nantucket, 
advanced the concept that towns could bind themselves to 
actions or contracts only wi thih their statutorily-granted 
powers. A few years later, the court took advantage of a 
rather minor dispute to settle the status of a parish 
relative to a town in Massachusetts, holding that there was 
no identity whatever between town and parish, that parish 
charges are not town charges, and that where town and 
20~., pp. 83-6. 
2lvincent v. Inhabitants of Nantucket, 1819, 
16 Mass. 103. 
parish boundaries coincide, nevertheless, the parish must 
act through its own agents, to levy and collect taxes for 
22 parish purposes, and to accomplish its other ends. The 
town, the court ruled, cannot assess residents for parochial 
charges in any case, where residents of the town are not 
included "torithin the parish boundaries. From this time on, 
the parish declined in importance, and with the Unitarian 
controversy in the 1820's and 1830 1 s, disappeared as a 
political unit. 
In the next decade, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw rose 
to the Supreme Judicial Court bench. Despite his deep 
knowledge of the history of the Commonwealth, and his 
political activities in Boston and elsewhere in the state 
(which included his being a major force w1 th Daniel Webster 
in the convention which drew up the second amendment to the 
state constitution which for the first time allowed cities 
to be incorporated. Justice Shaw appears t ·o have been no 
friend of l-ocal rights. His decisions in local constitu-
tional cases give the strong impression t hat he was a 
centralist, and being a great common-law judge, adhered to 
22woodbury v. Inhabitants of Hamilton, 1827, 23 Mass. 
101. Other representative cases dealing with the govern-
ment, powers and rights of parishes in early nineteenth 
century Massachusetts are Inhabitants of First Parish in 
Shapleigh v. Gilman, 1816, 13 Mass. 190; Inhabitants of 
First Parish in Brunswick v. Dunning, 1811, 7 Mass. 445, and 
Brown v. Porter, 1813, 10 Mass. 93. 
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the traditional drive to monolithic central authority typical 
of such jurists. In two resounding decisions in the opening 
years ) of the decade~ the Shaw court squarely reaffirmed the 
Stetson case, and extended it: 
This limitation upon the power and authority of 
towns ••• is a wise and salutary provision of law, 
not only as it protects the rights and interests 
of the minority of legal voters, but as it may not 
unfrequently prove beneficial to the interests of 
the majority, who may be hurried into rash and 
unprofitable speculations by some popular and 
delusive excitement ••• ~3 
Thus, the legislature is appointed the guardian of the towns-
people a gainst themselves. In another famous decision of the 
same year, the court put to rest any lingering doubts which 
the towns may have bad as to their ability to undertake acti-
vities not forbidden by charter, law or constitution, but not 
I 24 
expressly permitted, either. The influence of the Supreme 
Judicial Court was such that it is no exaggeration to say 
that Justice Shaw was forming American local government law 
as well as that of Ma.ssachus etts :: 
These corporations have no power to levy taxes or 
assess money upon the inhabitants, for general or 
indefinite purposes, but only so far as the same 
may be necessary to enable them to exercise the 
powers, enjoy the privileges, and perfect the duties, 
established by law.25 
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at 399. 
227. 
23Parsons v. Inhabitants of Goshen,l831,28 Mass. 396 
24Willard v. Inhabitants of Newburyport, 1831, 29 Mass. 
25Ibid., p. 229. 
The court went on to say that "necessary" is very ba.rd to 
define,and most likely in order to avoid any hope that the 
pattern of the definition by the federal courts of the 
"necessary and proper11 clause of the United States Consti-
tution, Article I, section 8, clause 2, might be foll01.-1ed in 
the interpretation of the word in reference to towns, added: 
But the difficulty is intrinsic, and arises from 
the manner in which these anomalous bodies, from 
slight beginnings, bave grown to be strict aggre-
gate municipal corporations, possessing ~y of the 
characteristics of cities and boroughs.26 
The court then embarked on an exposition of state history, 
cut to fit the case, quoting the earliest colonial ·charter, 
Ancient Charters, 195, to t .he effect that it 11authorizes 
(towns) to make such laws and constitutions as may concern 
the welfare of their town, provided they be not of a crim-
inal, but of a prudential nature. 11 The court adds that 
under the Provincial Statute of 1692, Ancient Charters, 249, 
the town meeting was 
empowered from time to time to make and agree upon 
such necessary rules, orders . and by-laws for the 
directing, managing and ordering the prudential 
affairs of such town, as they shall judge most 
conducive to the peace, welfare and good order 
thereof, not r ·epugnan t to the general laws of 
the government.27 
A more exact statement of the old common-law view of 
26Ibid., p. 230. 
27Ibid. 
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municipal corporations could not be asked. Yet, the court 
chose to emphasize the "necessary" and llprudential" rather 
than the last phrase, "not repugnant to the general laws of 
the government.n After . saying that the above-quoted 
language is vague and general, the court proceeded to 
define "prudential concerns of a town" in an "approximation 
to an exact descriptiontt thus: 
it embraces that large class of miscellaneous 
subjects affecting the accomodation and convenience 
of the inhabitants, which have been placed under · 
the municipal jurisdiction of towns, by statute 
or by usage.28 
Having defined "prudential affairs" to fit the desired pat ... 
tern, little remained of the rather obvious meaning of the 
quoted statute. The investigation might have been turned 
as well to 
suCh necessary rules and by-laws ••• as they shall 
judge most conducive ••• , not repugnant to the 
general laws • . (italics mine) 
with a completely different result. Since the caae was 
brought to determine whether the town could repair three 
old public clocks in private buildings, long used in the 
day-to-day affairs of the townspeople, the court concluded 
that such an expenditure was a necessary charge, warranted 
by long usage and practice, and hence part of the prudential 
concerns of the town. 
28 Ibid., p. 231. 
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' 
From the time of this Fyrrhic victory, the status 
of the town became more and more one of complete subjection 
. 29 
.·to the legislative. After a few interim decisions con-
solidating the rules of Stetson v. Kempton and 'ltJillard v. 
Newburyport, discretion on the part of the town as to the 
purposes for which it might tax and spend money, outside 
of specific enabling statute, was further limited in an 
1837 case.3° The Town of Taunton voted money to repair 
its fire-engines. O:ne of the residents, apparently aware 
of tbe trend of the court decisions, refused to pay the 
tax assessed for the purpose, maintaining through his at-
torney that sue h a tax for such a purpose was beyond the 
power of the town to levy. The court pointed out, logical-
ly enough, that sine e tollms were permitted to keep fire-
engines, they must be able to repair them. The decis:i.on 
asserted the complete subjection of the town officials to 
the rule of expenditure laid down by the legislature: 
The power of the towns to appropriate money and 
assess taxes therefor, as is well understood, is 
a power wholly derived from statute •••• In determin-
ing whether the subject matter is \·lithin the 
legitimate authority of the town, one of the tests 
is, to ascertain whether the expenses were incurred 
29
see, e.g., Keyes v. Inhabitants of Westford, 1835, 
34 Mass. 273; Bancroft v. Inhabitants of Lynnfield, 1836, 
35 Mass. 566. 
30Allen v. Inhabitants of Taunton, 1837, 36 Mass. 485. 
in relation to a subject specially placed by law in 
other hands. This test was applied in••• Stetson v; 
Kempton, and Parsons v. Goshen•••• It may be safely 
assumed, that if the subject of the expenditure be 
in furtherance of some duty enjoined by the statute, 
or in exoneration of the citizens of the town from 
a liability to a common burden, a contract made in 
reference to it 1dll be valid and binding upon the 
town.31 
Thus, the last sentence shows the limits of town authority 
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in 1837. The town could do only those things required of 
it by statute, and could in addition pay legal obligations; 
if any other element of government was charged with any 
duty whatever, the tm-vn would be entirely foreclosed from 
operating in that same area. 
Two years later, the court came to grips once again 
with the historical practices of the towns.32 The doctrine 
enunc±ahed in the .earlier cases, that towns had only 
those powers specifically given to them, had caused dif-
ficulty, in that there was scarcely a town in the state 
that could quote some statutory justification for each 
of its acts. Some flexibility was badly needed, sinre 
Massachusetts tovms had been carrying on their own affairs 
in set patterns for so long, that even the legislature 
did not feel called upon to pass statutes confirming in 
31 Ibid., p. 487. 
32 Spaulding v. City of Lowell, 1839, 40 Mass. 71. 
281 
minute detail the actions oi' local units in taking care oi' 
their everyday ai'i'airs. The court once again leaned heavily 
upon the "prudential ai'i'airs" phrase in the statute. 
Lowell, while a town, voted in town meeting to con-
struct a market-house. One oi' the residents rei'used to 
pay the tax levied i'or the purpose, asserting, as had the 
residents in Allen v. Taunton, that since the town could 
show no specii'ic statute authorizing such construction, it 
must lack the power to undertake it. As i'urther proof' 
that towns lacked such power, taixpayer Spaulding pointed to 
the i'act that several towns bad secured permission i'rom 
the legislature to build such ma.rket-houses. Chief' Justice 
Shaw, ai'ter recounting that corporations could exercise only 
powers coni'erred upon th5m by their constituting acts, stated 
that much dii'i'iculty arose when this principle was applied 
to corporations such as cities and towns, since they are 
constituted i'or such indei'inite and miscellaneous purposes. 
Ai'ter examining the legislative authority c~ni'erred upon 
towns to tax, as gran ted by the current Revised Statutes, 
Chapter 15, section 12, and in substantially the same 
i'b!'m as Statutes oi' 1785, chapter 75, section 7, to this 
ei'i'ect:33 
33 
Ibid., pp. 75-6. 
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Towns shall have power to grant and vote such 
sums of money as they shaLl judge necessary, for 
the following purposes, For the support of town 
schools: For the support and maintenance of the 
poor: For burial grounds; and For all other 
necessary charges arising within the same town, . 34 
the court apparently came to the concl~sion that somehow, 
the statute must be made to cover the existing practice. 
After pointing out that the provision allowing taxation 
for burial grounds was contained in ·the latest statute, 
but not its analogue of 1785, the court remarked: 
By a comparison of the two provisions it will 
appear that one object of town charges is intro-
duced into the Revised Statutes that was not 
expressed in the old one, that of burial grounds. 
This subject was one of the mj_sceLlaneous cases •• • 
over which towns exercised an authority in fact 
though none was given by statute. It is since 
conferred by this provision of the Revised Statutes ••• 
But the same remark may be applied to this, as 
to the old statute, that it is manifestly not in-
tended as an enumeration of all the particular 
objects, because some of the most obvious subjects 
of town charges are omitted, such as highways and 
bridges, pounds, magazines and many others•••• 
We think it referred to other provisions of law, 
and well established usage, to ascertain what the 
objects of town charges are, and to .provide that 
towns might raise money for any purposes thus deter-
mined. But to bring any particular sub .i ect within 
this descri tion of necessar town char es it must 
to 
34rbid., Ibid. 
and ordering the prudential affairs of the town, 
St. 1785, c. 75 1 s. 7; .Rev:t.sed Stat. c, 15 1 s, 13. The ambiguity lies in the indefinite term 
'prudential affairs,'••• One thing· is very clear, 
that it cannot include those objects of social 
concern, which are expressly vested in other 
bodies, as was settled in the case of Stetson v, 
Kempton. 
In the case of Willard v. Newburyport, •• 
some attempt was made to describe, •• 'prudential 
concerns,' by stating that it embraces those 
subjects affecting the accomodation and co nvenience 
of the inhabitants, not otherwise specifically 
provided for, which have been placed under the 
jurisdiction of towns by statute or by usage, ••• 
(T)here are some subjects which have long been 
regarded as within the authority of towns, not made 
so by statute, and as such powers have never been 
questioned, there is no authori~ whence they can 
be derived but usage. Indeed a recurrence to the 
history of the formation of towns, will show that 
most of the powers originated in usage, founded 
on the convenience and necessit i es of t he inhabitants , 
ana were afterwards reco nized and confirmed by 
s tatute •••• italics mine From convenience and 
necessi~, they adopted many other regulations, af-
fecting their mutual interests as settlers and in-
habitants. After these regulations had continued 
for some years·, they were recognized and confirmed 
by statute. The first act which seems to have been 
passed, was in 1670 1 forty years after the first 
settlement. And the provincial act of 1692, 
contains a preamble reciting, that whereas it has 
been a continued practice and custom in the several 
towns within this province, annually to choose 
selectmen or townsmen, for the ordering and managing 
of tbe prudential affairs, &c. and then goes on to 
provide for the choice of selectmen, overseers,., 
and other ordinary town officers, The same statute 
gives to towns the authority to make orders and by-
laws, 'for managing and ordering their prudential 
affairs of such town, as they shall judge most 
conducing to the peace, welfare and good order there-
of.' From this and various other legal provisions, 
we think it will be found that towns were not 
originally incorporated with specific and enumerated 
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powers; but that the inhabitants and settlers of 
each township, as organized bodies, adopted regula-
tions for their common convenience, and when they 
were incorporated, or .rather recognized by general 
laws, as established corporations, the powers which 
they had thus been used and accustomed to exercise, 
were referred to, and conf·inned, under the very 
broad and comprehensive term, 'prudential concerns.• 
••• And in considering this sUbject of usage, it is 
proper to add, that it is not a casual or occasional 
exercise of a power, by one or a few towns, which 
will constitute such a usage; but it must be a 
usage, reasonable in itself, general amongst all 
towns of like situation, as to ~~ttleme.nt and popula-
tion, and of long continuation.J!:l 
Here 1 clearly defined far t~ first time, is tte process 
by which the court had been turning the former nearly in-
dependent towns into ·wards of the legislature, beginning 
with the Stetson decision. Justice Dewey's definition 
of the power of towns in Allen v. Taunton had been a little 
too narrow for the purposes of his age. To define the 
powers of a town as strictly limited by statute in an age 
when the number of statutes was small meant, in effect, 
that towns had almost no authority to take care of their 
normal affairs. The great Chief Justice Shaw, in 2£aulding 
v. Lowell, above, performed tbe judicial tour de force of 
admitting that to,~s had a history of independence; that 
the legislature, in passing acts concerning towns in the 
early days of the colony, con.sidered that it was confirming 
and regularizing practice rather than exerting sovereignty; 
35Ibid., pp. 76-9. It is interesting to note that 
Justice SbiW fails to mention the act of March 1636, Mass. 
Colonial Records, vol. 1, p. 172, discussed in Chapter III, 
supra. 
that tm-n s from that day to his day can tinued to exercise 
a multitude of powers never even considered or affirmed by 
the legislature; that even the government of the towns had 
long been constituted by the towns themselves before the 
legislature by statute recognized the fact; that the 
towns had not been organized, nor even considered as 
booi es of specific and enumerated powers; yet, after admit-
ting all these things, Justice Shaw said nevertheless that 
the drafters of the Statute o:f 1692 which c cnfirmed the 
rights of towns, by implication had ire l u ded all these 
powers which the towns had exercised in Nassachusetts 
history under the phrase uprudential concerns". A neces-
sary governmental ' development perhaps, it might be argued, 
but such a ruling is probably scarcely matched in assertion 
o:f judicial power except by Justice Marshall's discovery o:f 
the right to judicial review in a case involving a disap" 
pointed justice of the peace whose appointment had been 
cancelled. Thus, neatly, in a single case, the facts of 
Massachusetts town history had been once and for all recog-
nized, rationalized, cut to size, and neat ly fit into the 
orderly pattern of legislative domination. 
The position which the court had taken earlier,36 
36Ha.mpshire v. Franklin, cited in footnote 18. 
confirming that towns were possessed of certain rights in 
their private corporate characters, which rights were 
beyond the authority of the legislature, returned to haunt 
the court in Simmons v. Hanover,37 in the same year. Aware 
of the fact that the United States Supreme Court in several 
cases had expressed doubts concerning, or denied such 
rights, but also aware that several other state supreme 
courts, including particularly those of Vermont and Con-
necticut, as will be discussed below, had accepted such 
rights completely, the Massachusetts court was plainly 
troubled. Implicitly, it had virtually espoused the theory 
that the town was merely a departnent of the state, com" 
pletely subject to its sovereignty, but was not quite ready 
as yet to go that far expli d. tly. The pull of an age of 
the sacred obligation due to contracts, of vested and in-
herent rights, soon to merge into an age of constitutional 
restrictions of substantive due process and limitations on 
the taxing power, was still too strong upon the court. 
Big Business was in its earliest infancy, and Big Govern-
ment a half-century away. In the Simmons case, the court 
made a massive review of the vested right cases, lingering 
especially with an air of approval on Chief Justice 
J7Sirnmons v. Hanover, 1839, 40 Mass. 188. 
8 . 
3 See the Connecticut discussion below, this chapter. 
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Hosmer's decislon in Goshen v. Stonington, which, with 
the decisions of the Vermont court, form among the strongest 
statements of such rights. 
Upon the general question,whether any retrospective 
laws affecting vested rights are valid, there have 
been conflicting opinions •••• In the case of Goshen 
v. Stonington, 4 Connect. R. 210, Hosmer, C.J., 
••• says:: "With those judges who assert the omni-
potence of the legislature in all cases where the 
constitution has not interposed an explicit re-
straint, I cannot agree. Should there exist,what 
I know is an incredible supposition, a case of the 
direct infraction of vested rights, too palpable to 
be questioned, and too unjust to admit of vindica-
tion, I could not avoid considering it a violation 
of the social compact, and within the control of 
the judiciary";: "on the other hand, I cannot har-
monize with those why deny the power of the legis-
lature to make laws, in any case, whlch, wl th en-
tire justice, operate on antecedent legal rights. 
A retrospective law may be just and reasonable;, 
and the right of the leglslature to enact one of 
this description, I am not speculatist enough to 
questlon. 11 In support of his opinion, Chief Jus-
tlce Hosmer refers to the laws of9this Commonwealth and the decisions of thls Court.3 
~~e case was decided upon other grounds, and the court re-
served lts flnal declslon upon vested rights, and its final 
definition of the powers of towns in the Commonwealth. A 
few years later, Justice Sbaw found the opportunity in a 
case involving oyster flsheries,4° and hence clearly beyond 
the power of towns by any definition, to remark tbat the 
38Town of Goshen v. Town of Stonington, 1822, 4 Conn. 209. 
39si.mmons v. Hanover, cited in footnote 37, above, p. 193. 
4°nill v. Inhabitants of Wareham, 1844, 48 Mass. 438; see 
also Hardy v. Inhabitants of Waltham, 1841, 4-L~ Mass. 163;; 
Anthony v. Inhabltants of Adams, 1840, 42 ~~ss. 284; and Babbltt 
v. Selectmen of Savoy, 1849, 57 Mass. 530. 
town, is a ncorporation of very limited powers". This 
was repeated in 1850, in cases involving the redistribution 
by the towns to their inhabitants of surplus revenues given 
by the federal to the state government, and by it to the 
towns.41 
In response to a request for an opinion by the 
legislature, the court gave its definition of the rights 
of the General Court to set up new towns, or to abolish or 
modify old ones.42 The right of the people of a town to 
representation in the legislature was considered so basic 
that even the legislature had serious doubts as to its 
power to afect such rights by changing the units of rep-
resentation in the legislature, which had always been the 
towns. 
court 
In the Opinion of the Justices, in 1851, the 
confirmed the traditional p.ower of the leg-
islature to change town lines as it deemed necessary or 
desirable, to transfer towns from one county to another, or 
41 . . 
Cushing v. Inhabitants of Stoughton, 1850, 50 Mass. 
33; Drake v. Inhabitants of Stoughton, 1850, 60 Mass. 393; 
another later case concerning the distribution of 1837 is 
Pope v. Inhabitants of Halifax, 1853, 66 Mass. 410. 
42:0pinion of the Justices, 1851, 60 Mass. 578. 
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to erect a new county by setting off towns from existing 
counties. The justices were of the opinion that representa-
tion in the legislature was a corporate right of a town 
as a corporation, and not of the inhabitants or geographical 
terri tory. Since the election of representatives could be 
exercised by towns only in their corporate capa cl ty, and 
sir~e the legislature had the power to create, modify, 
or destroy that capacity, then the legislature need not 
give consideration to supposed rights of individuals or 
locales to representation in the General Court. Earlier, 
this rigtl.t of towns had been so gravely regarded that the 
first city in Massachusetts to be incorporated as a city, 
Boston, was only elevated to that status in 1820, a.fter a 
special constitutional convention had met to propose the 
second amendment to the state constitution, and. the amend-
ment had been adopted. It had been thought that changing 
an area from a town to a city would deprive it of its 
right to representation, due to the fact that the state 
constitution, in defining representation, spoke only in 
terms of towns. It was believed that an act incorporating 
a city would deprive the people of the area of representa-
tion, and hence would be uncons.titutional. As indicated 
above, Connecticut had early avoided tte problem by deter-
mining to incorporate cities 1 boroughs, and the like, always 
coextensive with or as part of a town, leaving the dual 
character in existence. These principles were restated 
in detail by the court in a controversy which arose over 
the annexation of Charlestown to Boston.43 The court so 
objected to the fact that the legislature had not properly 
provided a method for residents of Charlestown to exercise 
their right to send representatives to the legislature, 
that it invalidated this first annexation act as contrary 
to the state constitution. In making its decision, the 
court pointed out that it was his tar ically the privilege 
of Massachusetts towns to decide whether they would send 
representatives to trn legislature or not, and if they 
decided to send them, how many the town 1-vould send. The 
court pointed out that the General Court had on occasion 
even refused to seat representatives where it could not be 
shown that the people of the particular town had been 
given the opportunity to decide whether to send representa-
tives, a1 d if so, how many. The house of representatives 
was early given power to fine towns which did not send 
representatives. In effect, the court teld that while the 
legislature might reconstitute towns and cities at will, 
that it could noi;; thereby vary the right of the people of 
these areas to send representatives to the General Court. 
An act changing or reconstituting c:i,ty or town borders 
43warren v. Mayor and Aldermen of Charlestown~ 18541 68 Mass. 84. 
would be valid only if it included provisions "saving" the 
representation of such areas in the legislatures, until 
the next time appointed by the constitution, ~~hen a re-
apportionment according to constitutional provisions might 
be made. 44 
A year before this latter case, the court had made a , 
significant ruling in relation to the right of towns to 
take up enterprises not forbidden by their charters, but 
not specifically allowed by statute, charter, or general 
usage: 
But here is the extent at once of their right and 
power. They cannot engage in enterprises foreign 
to tb..e purposes for which they were imorpora.ted, 
nor assume responsibilities which involve under-
takings not within the scope of their corporate 
powers.45 
The next few years were fateful ones. In quick sue-
cession, the supreme Judicial Court struck down an argument 
based on the inherent right to local self-government, and 
argu..wnts based on the historical rights of towns. In 
fact, so :xrffii:aam had been the past decisions of that court, 
as detailed above, that it is ·quite clear that the towns 
could not quite believe the change which had taken place 
in their status as towns in relation to the legislature. 
44Ibid., PP• 101-04. 
45Vincent v. Inhabitants of Nantucket, 1853, 66 Mass. 
103. See also Hadsell v. Inhabitants of Hancock, 1855, 
69 Mass. 526. 
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It is rather obvious in these cases that the towns did not 
consider themselves sovereign in any way. Their arguments 
were always to the point that they had always done such 
and such, and all they asked was to be let alone to spend 
their own money as they decided, without interference from 
the legislature. This is the essence of the vested right 
notion, the inherent right to loc~ self-government idea, 
the argument from prescriptive and historical rights, and 
the argument by reference to charter or contract. The 
cour t ruled flatly against the existence of any sort of 
traditional or inherent rights or powers, as valid against 
the legislature. 
In two of these cases, Chief Justice Shaw, then near-
ing the end of his life tenure, took occasion to examine 
town history in exhaustive detail. In Porter v. Sulliv~,46 
the founding of the towns of Massachusetts, and the nature 
of the early grants was considered in exhaustive detail. 
One significant passage in reference to the early status 
of towns occurs: 
These settlements, first named and then bounded••• 
were also, by general acts, vested with power to 
· choose other necessary officers, and to manage their 
own prudential concerns, until they grew to be quasi 
46Porter v. Sullivan, 1856, 73 Mass. 441. 
municipal corporations. And it is believed that 
no act was passed, similar to modern acts or in-
corporation or towns, until near the close or the 
colonial government, and the establishment or ~ new 
government under the province charter in 1692.~7 
Yet in doing research ror this paper, the author has en-
countered numerous assertions on the part of reputable com-
mentators and historians that while the towns might have 
preceded or been independent of the state in Connecticut 
or Rhode Island, yet from the first, the Massachusetts 
towns were subject to the direct control of the colonial 
legislature. It would seem, from the rna terials adduced 
in Chapter III, and from the cases detailed here, that this 
cannot have been the case. 
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The following year, in what might be called "the 
Na.ssachusetts Tidelands case",48 the court, through Justice 
Shaw, traced the entire history of land-holding, land-rights, 
land-grants and the setting up of town boundaries in the 
state. Relevant documents and cases were examined, with 
the court finally holding that the tidelands belonged to 
the Commonwealth, rather than to the towns, much as .the 
United States Supreme Court did in the modern tidelands cases 
a century later. 
Thus, the trend in the courts of the Commonwealth was 
always toward centralization. At the close of the formative 
47 
~., P'• 444. 
48 
Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 18.57, 7.5 Mass. 451. 
period, little was left of any independent character of the 
towns with the possible exception that a bill stripping the 
town or city oP its money or property and conferring no 
benefit on it might still not have been allowed by the 
courts. 
Connecticut 
Connecticut differed little from the pattern then being 
established in the other New England states. In an era of 
centra lization, of increasing industrialization, there was 
little room for a town to be left with the power to block 
action which the state legislature deemed necessary. The 
eighteenth century General Court, closely elected by a homo-
geneous group of eight hundred freemen, and closely super-
vised by the all-powerful towns, had given way to an in-
stitutionalized General Assembly, remote from the people 
in an industrialized age of expanding population and increas-
ing lack of interest in what the "politicians did at Hart-
ford". The courts were the cutting edge of the advancing 
society, and while learned judges occasionally looked back 
t o the past, their decisions and dissents support:img the 
idea of local inherent, reserved, or vested rights were 
little. ·more than eddies in t h e onrushing stream of history. 
The Connecticut decisions, as elsewhere in New England 
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follow a foreseeable path. In the period after 18121 
courts were not concerned with the problem of local rights 
against the powers of the legislature. The decisions of 
the time, even when the question was r als ed, dis cussed it 
only in hazy terms, some decisions tending toward the 
existence of local rights, some against, but none definite 
or doctrinaire. The era of canal building, and the rise 
of the democratic republic, with increased tendency to 
look to the state capital and toward Washington, brought 
the first rather definite decisions in derogation of the 
rights of towns and cities. Ill-defined, half-formed 
doctrines of st.ate creation of cities and domination 
over towns became settled doctrines which held the town 
or city a mere creature of the state, drawing its life 
from the state legislature, and having as its only powers 
those given it in its charter. The mood of the courts and 
of the political so cl.ety at the turn of the eighteenth 
century is shown very well by an early case appealed 
from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors to the United 
States Supreme Court.49 The Connecticut legislature had 
sought to set aside, in effect to nullify a ccurt decision, 
by granting a new trial by legislative act. That such was 
4 9 calder v. Bull, 1798, 3 u.s. 3e6. 
customary in the early colonial days can be verified by 
reading the reporter's or printer's foreword in any of the 
earliest New England supreme court reports. The New 
Hampshire reports particularly describe in detail trial by 
legislature, other trials in which the only function of the 
judge was to see tba t each side 11 got a chance to get at the 
jury", with the jury deciding all questions, whether of law 
or fact, and so on. The reaction from these practices 
played a large part in forming the resolve of the American 
Revolutionaries and the Founding Fathers that ours should 
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be a government of laws, not of men. Such was the background 
presented in the case of Calder v. Bull. Holding flatly 
that such practices were a thing of the past, despite dis-
sent within the court, Justice Chase wrote: 
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state 
legislature or that it is omnipotent or without 
control; although its authority should not be 
expressly restrained by the constitution, or fun~ 
damental law of the state ••• An ACT of the legis-
lature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to 
the first great principles of the social compact, 
cannot be considep0d a rightful exercise of legis-lative authority.:;, · 
Perhap.s this opinion was symbolic of the future, for only 
in Connecticut, and perhal.ps in Vermon;t and Rhode Island 
among the New England states ba ve towns enjoyed such rights, 
expressing them in the courts, in the legislature, and in 
so 
Ibid., pp. 387-8. 
political action. The towns made the State of Connecticut, 
and they have never forgotten the fact • 
. The vested rights of towns in Connecticut were appar-
ently first asserted in the case of Goshen v. Stonington.5l 
as already quoted in the Massachusetts section, above. Chief 
Justice Hosmer stated unequivocally that he did not deem 
the only restraint on the legislature to be the constitution, 
but emphasized that he would consider it his duty to declare 
void an act of the legislature which impaired vested rights, 
as a violation of the social compact, within the control of 
the judiciary. Nevertheless, he held the act in question, 
which validated certain marriages of paupers, thus trans-
ferring the residence of the female pauper to that of her 
husband as constitutional. Hence, it was remarkable that 
he should take advantage of such a case to express an 
opinion and a warning as to the power of the legislature. 
It will be noted that the court was here setting an 
off standard for the determination of the constitutionality 
of legislative acts. As Justice Hosmer said, if an a.ct 
were "just" according to social compact principles, it 
would be upheld against a plea that it viola ted vested 
51 . 8 Town of Goshen v. Town of Stonington, 1 22, 4 Conn. 
209. 
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rights. This ultimately philosophical and moralistic 
standard did not give the court pause for some time, how-
ever, and in a case two years later, the court applied 
the same standard to an act concerning the City of Bridge-
port.52 The city argued that the act in question was 
"void, unconstitutional, retrospective, and incompatible 
w1 th the chartered rights of corporations n, meaning in 
effect, that it was claiming the right to be treated as a 
private business corporation, especially as concerned the 
act in question. The court did not take advantage of tW.s 
opportunity to define the private rights of a municipal 
corporation, or to reject such rights entirely. Instead, 
it formd the statute in questionttjust" under the rule of 
Goshen v • . Stonington, and ruled that as long as it was 
"just", it did not matter that the act might be retro-
spective. A novel and unique way of solving the vested 
right issue• one might remark. 
The court again applied arrl approved o:f this rule 
in cases in 182553 and 1826,54 saying in the latter case, 
This principle steers a correct medium, admitting 
the sovereignty of the legislature to do justice 
••• while it equally repels the supposedly in-
controulable omnipotence of the same body, to 
require the observance of an unjust law, in sub-
52city of Bridgeport v. Hubbell, 1824, 5 Conn. 237. 
5>-Mather v. Chapman, 1825, 6 Conn. 54. 
54Beach v. Walker, 1826, 6 Conn. 190. 
version of fundamental rights, and in opposition 
to the social compa ct.55 
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It will be seen that the tone of the Connecticut oourt dif· 
fered considerably from that of the Hassachusetts court. 
The court did not consider the legislature supreme, did not 
vj;~j{. th9 state constitution entirely as a l !j;tf.l.'d.l.'\i;in:g: document, 
and certainly took advantage of several opportunities to 
warn the General Assembly against overstepping its bounds 
as set not by the state constitution, but by the social 
compact theory, and the justices' consciences. And the 
justices~~ not hesitant in saying that these social 
contract notions and feelings of justice are applicable to 
municipal corporations as well as to individuals. 
Another early case in Connectie1t to deal with the 
powers of towns was Pratt v. Connecticut~6 In that case, 
a constable of the town of Lyme - arrested Pratt, aboard a 
ship in the Gonnecticu t River off Lyme. The cons table was 
attempting to arrest Pratt under a writ of attachment duly 
issued by the town of Lyme. The case concerned an assault 
by Pratt upon the person of the officer. Pratt claimed, and 
qui~e correctly, that the borders of Lyme stopped on the 
shores of the Connecticut River. Under the original patent 
55 Ibid., p. 196. 
56Pratt v. State of Connecticut, l82lJ., 5 Conn. 388. 
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or L~ne, the town was bounded westerly on the channel o~ 
the river. Saybrook, the town across the river, likewise 
under the terms or its patent extended to the shores or 
the river only. As Hosmer, Ch. J., said, 
It is too unquestionable to admit or any controversy, 
that the place or the assault ••• was not within the 
patents or either Saybrook or ~·••••• That it was 
within the jurisdiction or ~~ so rar as relates 
to the service of process and enfo:cement of the 
laws, I cannot entertain a doubt•••• Our towns ad-
joining Connecticut river, probably from their origin, . 
and certainly beyond the memory _. of man, have exercised 
jurisdiction over its waters. In some instances, 
the charters of tow.ns have passed over the river 
and taken the land on either side•••• In other 
ins,tances, the towns are bounded on the river; and 
there the town jurisdiction was extended from each 
town to the centre of the channel. The jurisdiction 
of towns upon the river Connecticut, has its founda-
tion and authority, in ancient, and invariable and 
undisputed usage; ••• 57 
Note that in this case, the decision was not based on 
any theory of riparian law, or of state jurisdiction over 
. navigable waters. It was placed squarely upon the ground 
that the towns had always had the right and authority to 
govern the river. No such right existed in their charter, 
nor was rightfully to be implied. If t~ towns had such a 
right to make arrests, .it must be an inherent or prescriptive 
57 Ibid., PP• 390-1. 
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right. 58 In another case a few days later, the court ac-
cepte'd Pratt v. State as a matter of course, and repeated 
once again that the jurisdiction of Lyme extended westerly 
to the center of the river for purposes of process and 
police activities, because Lyme had always had and exerted 
power over the area. 
The case of Willard v• Killingly,59 which arose a few 
years later, rejected any theory of vested or inherent 
right. It announced for the first time the position as to 
inherent right which the Connecticut courts held from that 
time forward. Strong and capable dissents marked the for-
ward progress of the inherent right idea through the pages 
of Connecticut history, but the dissenters were never able 
to win enough of their fellow-justices to enable them to 
change the law. In t h e Willard case 1 the borough trie.d 
Willard for taking ten bushels of oysters from Hammonassett 
River and Killingworth Harbor without license and contrary 
to a by-law of the borough. Earlier, the state legislature 
had given Killingly the power to pass such laws, but due to 
a defect in the notice for the town-meeting at which the · 
licensing laH was passed, Willard asserted the law was void • 
.58Hayden v. Noyes, 1824, .5 Conn. 391. 
59willard v. 1.{arden, Burgesses and Freemen of the 
Borough of Killingly, 1830, 8 Conn. 247. 
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The town claimed that the law was valid, for even if the 
town lacked power because of its failure to comply exactly 
~dth the enabling statute, nevertheless, it had power to 
regulate such areas. Neither party rais ed the question of 
inherent right as such. 
Yet, Daggett, J., in a decision made up largely of 
what la-vzyers call die ta, .spoke for the unanimous court 
thus: 
The borough a nd town are, confessedly, inferior 
corporations. They act not by any inherent right 
of legislation, like the legislature of the state; 
but their authority is delegated; and their powers, 
therefore, must be strictly pursued. Within the 
limits of thei r charter, their acts are valid; 
without it, they are voidi60 
It will be noted that the power here involved was to control 
fishing on a navigable waterway. This power is properly a 
matter of state-wide concern, in which even an inherent-
right theorist would say that the state had full authority. 
The oyster-fisherman escaped without penalty. 
A similar case rose five years later. 61 In that 
instance, a town had passed a by-law to restrain people 
from a.llo~dng cattle to run at large. The state enabling 
legislation contained elaborate provisions for publication, 
with some of which the town had not complied according to 
• 
the letter of the statute, though it had complied subsantial-
6oibid., p. 254. 
61Rigley v. Bunce, 1835, 10 Conn. 436. 
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ly. Again, the question of inherent rights was not raised, 
but again the court took it upon itself to denounce such 
theory. The court quoted the first full sentence from 
1viilard v. Killingly62 as quoted above, and accepts that as 
fully controlling. 
In 1841, · the case of Willimantic School Society . v, 
First School Society in Windham63 came up to the supreme 
Court of Errors. Shortly before, the state legislature 
had p rovided for the division of a school district, dis-
tributing its assets according to its ovm ideas. The 
original school district claimed that it had certain rights 
in contract, and by prescription. The court answered the 
assertion in this way: 
The legislature, upon the division of towns and school 
societies, have always exercised the power, so far as 
we are informed; . of making an equitable arrangement 
as to the c ormnon property and the oommon burthe ns; 
and unless the power is taken away, by the constitu-
tion, it must exist as before. That instrument 
provides, that the rights and duties of all corp ora-
tions shall remain as if the constitution had not 
been adopted, except as changed by that instrument 
itself. That it was not intended to take away the 
power, always exercised by the legislature, of 
dividing· those local communities, is apparent from 
the fact that the division of towns is expressly 
recognized in the third section of the third article 
of the constitution, provided that such new towns 
shall be entitled to only one new representative, 
And if the power to divide towns is not taken away, 
we do not know where the power to divide minor com-
munities of a similar character, is taken away.64 
62cited in footnote 59, above. 
63willimantic School Society v. First School Society 
in Windham, 1841, 14 Conn. 457. 
64 . Ibid., p. 469. 
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A short time later, the standard of vested right set 
forth in the Goshen v. Stoningt~ case came in far a review 
and a modernizing. Courts in New England, as elsewhere, 
no longer felt comfortable talking in social contract and 
natural right terms. The day in which all rights had to 
be referred to and derived from a constitution, either 
state or national, was everywhere dawning. In this case, 65. 
the City of Bridgeport had subscribed to the stock of a 
local railroad company, which was almost certainly beyond 
its p ewers, as heretofore set forth by the legislature 
and the courts. It thereupon solicited the legislature, 
and received from it e. special law ratifying the ci ty 1 s 
action, if the voters of the city should approve in a 
referendum. The voters did approve. However, it speedily 
became to the advantage of the city to have its action in 
subscribing voided as having been beyond its powers --
ultr.a vires would be the legal term. 
The city's attorney argued his case in terms which 
he probably thought sure to win the court: 
It is not claimed, that every retrospective act 
is of course void. But whenever such acts have 
received the sanction of a court of justice, it 
has been on the principle that they subserve the 
great purposes of public justice. If manifestly 
unjust, or in violation of the social compact, 
65city of Bridgeport v. Housatonic RR. Co., 1843, 
15 Conn. 475. 
they are invalid. ••. the act in. question is un-
constitutional. Const. Conn. Art. I s. 11. It 
virtually authorizes the ta~ing of property, either 
for public or private use, without compensation. 
And whether the taking be for one purpose or the 
other, it is in direct violation of the constitu-
tion, g.gd a1. so of t he great principle of common 
right. 
The decision of the court shows in a few concise words 
the transition ~ich had taken place in judicial thought: 
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It certainly has been more than intimated -- it has 
been declared -- by judges and courts of the highest 
respectability ~~d authority in this country, that 
retroactive and other statute provisions, which 
unjustly take away or impair vested rights, or 
impose new duties in respect to past transactions, 
without just compensation, are to be treated in 
this respect as inoperative, either by a very liberal 
construction of the laws themselves, or as being es-
sentially opposed to the spirit of the constitution, 
and the fancied social compact. On the a:mtrary, 
the names of distinguished jurists are not wanting, 
who deny to the judiciary any ri~ht to treat such 
laws as void. (cites many cases}. It has been in-
timated from respectable sources, that the test of 
the validity of retroactive laws, is, Whether they 
be unjust in their operation, ••• If such laws clear-
ly abrogate vested rights, ••• we should probably so 
consider them •••• not perhaps because we might 
believe them in the abstract to be unjust, but rather 
because they stand opposfld to the true spirit of 
the constitution; and., therefore, are unconstitutional 
and void. There may not often be any great difficulty 
in determining what are the principles of natural 
justice, nor what would tend to undermine that which 
theorists may suppose to be the fundamental principles 
of the socia~ compact, especially by those who acknowl-
edge the precepts and obligations of revealed reli~ 
gion. 67 
66rbid., p. 499. 
67Ibid., P• 496-7. 
The court held this retroa ctlve legislation valid 1 and 
most significantly, announced its withdrawal from the 
field of subjecting legislation to the test of "justice": 
We concede, that retroactive laws generally have 
many features of injustice, although intended to 
effect much good; but as the judiciary is not the 
guardian of the legislature, but is the weaker 
department of government, possessing no veto power 
over acts of constitutional legislation, · more 
properly belonging to the executive; we cannot dis-
regard a legislative enactment, because it is 
retroactive in its purpose and effect, whatever may 
be our opinion of the policy of sue h 1 aws •••• 
But it was said in argument, and here lies a strong 
ground of the defendants' claim, that this resolve 
was unjust, and opposed to the fundamental principles 
of the social contract, and an infringement of the 
vested rights of the citizens of Bridgeport ••• • 
We have been referred to no express constitutional 
provision with which the resolution under considera-
tion is supposed to conflict, except it be (Conn. 
Const., Art. I, sec. 11) 'The property of no person 
shall be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion therefor.•~68 
This case set the stage for the Hartford Bridg!· case, 69 
in which the power of the legislature to split up towns, 
and mare specific ally, to impose burdens on certain towns, 
· was discussed thoroughly both by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the Connecticlt Supreme 
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Court for much the same reasons expressed in the state court 
decision: 
68rbid.,pp. 495, 498, 5oo. 
69 Hartford Bridge Co. v. Town of East Harford, 1844, 
16 Conn. 149, 51 u.s. 511, 541. See also Town of East 
Hartford v. Har tford Bridge Co., 1845, 17 Conn. 79. 
And, we believe, upon the division of towns in this 
state, the legislature has always divided the 
corporate property and the burthens, according to 
its sense of justice, and its pleasure, without 
being suspected~ in doing so, of interfering with 
vested rights. 7u 
The first case in which a town, doing a purely local act, 
was forbidden so to do because it lacked legislative 
authority or authority from its charter, is New London v, 
71 Brainard. The governing off.icials of New London, by 
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proper and lawful procedures, app ropr.iated fifteen hundred 
dollars to be spent for the celebration of the Fourth of 
July. Plaintiff taxpayers brought suit for an injunction, 
; restraining the officials from spending the money, al-
leging a lack of authority in the officials. Surprising-
ly enough, the injunction was granted. Justice Storrs72 
rendered the decision of the court in these words: 
It is well established, that corporations have only 
such rights and powers as are expressly granted to 
them, or as are necessary to carry into effect the 
rights and powers so granted.73 
The judge cited Stetson v. Kempto.u, 13 Nass. 242, and 
Hodge v. City of Buffalo, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 110 as authority, 
and continued: 
70rbid., p. 172. \ 
7lci ty of New London v. Brainard, 1853, 22 Conn • .5.53. 
72An outstanding Co~~ecticut jurist, after whom the 
Storrs Lectures at Yale. University, . and the town in which 
the University of Connecticut is located are named. 
73 Ibid., P• 554. 
-
We do not find, nor have we been referred to, any 
express power in the charter of the city of New 
London, nor is there any general law, authorizing 
an expenditure of money, for the purpose for which 
the vote in question was passed; nor is any power 
conferred on that city, for the e1~rcise of which 
such an expenditure is necessary. LJ. 
The decision was short and concise, citing no Connecticut 
case in point.75 
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The next important case concerning town-state relations 
was Granby v. Tbunst~.76 This case covered much the same 
ground as the Willimantic School Society and the Hartford 
~ridge Co. cases.77 In this instance, the cotwt was not 
interfering with the right of a town to manage its own af~ 
fairs. The question involved, the maintenance, building, 
and repair of a public bridge and approaches, isclearly 
one which involves state-wide interests. 
In the act of incorporation of the town of Granby of 
1786, the General Assembly inserted a clause providing that 
Granby would have to build a bridge over the Farmington 
River between Granby and Simsbury (of which it had former-
ly been part), if the legislattwe ordered such thereafter. 
In 1799 the legislature did so order. The bridge was 
built, but afterward fe~l into such a state of disrepair 
74~ •• p.555. 
75The author has likewise been able to find no earlier 
pre cedent for so bold an interference with 1 oc a1 dis creti on. 
76Town of Granby v. Thurston, 1855, 23 Conn. l.t-16. 
77Cited in footnote s 63 and 69, above. 
that residents of the two towns brought this action to com-
pel repair and maintenance by Granby. But Granby said that 
the legislature had no right to power to impose on it the 
burden of maintaining Simsbury's half of the bridge, that 
it had not been a proper party to the original legislative 
proceedings, and so on. The court disposed of these defenses 
thus:: 
The legislature of this state have immemorially 
exercised the power of dividing towns at their 
pleasure, and upon such division, apportioning 
the common property and common burdens, in such 
manner as to them shall seem reasonable and equi-
table. This principal has been repeatedly recog-
nized by this court. (citing the Willimantic 
School Society an.d the Hartf'ord Bridge Co. cases) 
Indeed, the power of the legislature to create new 
towns is virtually admitted in the constitution it-
self, in the section which allows but one represen-
tative to a new town thereafter incorporated. Con-
stitution, Art. iii, § 3. What particular reasons 
may have operated upon the legislature, in imposing 
upon the town of Granby the whole burden of making 
and maintaining the bridge in question, does not 
appear, nor is it necessary that it should. It is 
enough that the legislature have made an apportion-
ment of the property and burdens of the old town as 
they may have thought proper.78 
So much for the right of the legislature to change the 
boundaries of a town, or to impose upon it burdens, either 
as part of a division, or as a mere act by the legislature 
on its own motion. Part of the def'enses of the town in 
Connecticut had been battered away so thoroughly at this 
78Town of Granby v. Thurston, cited in footnote 76, 
above, pp. 419-20. 
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point that they were never to be raised again very serious-
ly. Future litigation centered mostly around the power of 
the town to protect itself from "ripper" legislation not 
related to the state-wide public interest, and to the right 
of the town to provide for local problems as they rose, 
without specific authority from . charter or legislative act. 
Abendroth v. Greenwich79 presented the phenomenon for 
the first time of a town pleading its own lack of power and 
capacity in a contract case. The town of Greenwich agreed 
to take over maintenance of a bridge originally built by 
private capital, and to pay six hundred dollars to the orig-
inal builders. This bridge ran between Greenwich and Port 
Chester, New York, across the Byram River. However, the 
interstate and constitutional aspects of the problem were 
not mentioned in the briefs of counsel nor in the decision. 
Earlier, the state legislature bad assented to and c.onfirmed 
t h e location of the bridge "provided the town of Greenwich 
shall not be held liable to maintain said bridge, or any 
. 80 part thereof.u This made the town action all the more 
flagrant. In a later town meeting, the citizens voted to 
rescind the contract, upon which plaintiff tendered his deed 
deed and brought action. The town pleaded that ntowns have 
79Abendroth v. Town of Greenwich, 1860, 29 Conn. 356. 
80 Ibid., p. 357. 
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no power to appropriate their funds for the maintenance 
of that which the laws do not require or expressly author-
81 ize them to maintain. (citing New London v. Brainard, 
and the Hodges, Stetson, and Parsons cases). The court 
upheld this plea of lack of power, 
Towns ,, like other corporations can exercise no 
powers except such as are expressly granted to 
them, or such as are necessary to enable them to 
discharge their duties and to carry into effect 
the objects and purposes of their creation. 82 
and ruled that Abendroth had no right to recover. 
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Thus, we find in 1860 a town pleading that it has only 
the powers given it by the legislature, and the Supreme Court 
of Errors accepting the plea, and restating what is later 
to be called Dillon's Rule. Both court and the town had 
come a long way from Goshen v. Stonington, and the ~oice 
of Chief Justice Hosmer would indeed have seemed strange to 
the Connecticut court in 1860. 
Rhode Island 
The confusion in the political situation of Rhode 
Island, with radical legislatures, People's Constitutions, 
and an unsettled judicial system and policy, make an analysis 
of the court decisions of that state in this period of little 
practical value. 
81 
Ibid., p. 361. 
82 
Ibid., p. 363. 
Northern New England:. The Pattern 
In any discussion of the states of northern New 
England, it should early be noted that all of them were 
set off fro'm Massachusetts comparatively late in colonial 
his tory, and that all of them have looked to that state for 
guidance in judicial, constitutional, political, and legal 
affairs. Hence, there are really only three centers in 
the growth of the ear~y constitutional and local govern-
ment traditions of New England: Massachusetts, with its 
settled and influential system, Connecticut, with a system 
almost as old, but more flexible and containing more dis-
parate e1e!l13nts, a..l"ld Rhode Island, the state of revolution-
ary traditions, continuing virtually until the Civil War 
to be a hotbed of internal dissens ion. To simplify 
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history a bit, the constitutional tradition of New Hampshire 
is virtually that of Massachusetts, since New Hampshire did 
not have _ an effective independent existence until the 
Royal Order in Council of 1741. Vermont, from 1740 to 
1791, remained a political prize, claimed by both New 
York and New Hampshire, with its towns virtually independ-
ent self-governing units, of necessity. Although it 
declared its independence in 1777, historians commonly 
date its independent existence from 1791, the date of the 
acceptance of the New York Boundary Commission's recom-
mendations by the parties concerned. Vermont's constitu-
tiona~ tradition is late in development:, and exhibits a 
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marked similarity to that or both Massachusetts and Connec-
ticut, but with a rough and independent stamp or its own. 
M~ine arrived as a member of the New England states so late, 
being set orr rrom Massachusetts in 1820 arter having been 
considered part of that state since 1659, that it can barely 
be said to have a settled constitution or local governmental 
order of its own in the pre-Civil War period. Maine, like 
New Hampshire, considers the early Massachusetts constitu-
tional development its own, and the Massachusetts court cases 
as directly applicable precedents. With these principles in 
mind, an examination of the decisions relating to towns and 
municipal corporations will fill out the pattern of develop-
ment in the period rrom the War or 1812 to the Civil War. 
New Hampshire 
One or · the great American constitutional law cases 
marked the rirst signiricant consideration or the nature 
of the public corporation by the New Hampshire Supreme Judi-
cial Court. 83 To simplify the facts, the state decided that 
it needed a state college, and decided to make use or 
Dartmouth College, already in existence and already the 
recipient or state aid. The plan was to increase the 
size of the board or trustees of the college, and thus, 
to turn the college to the more userul and practical 
83 
Trus·tees or Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1817, 
1 N.H. 111. 
agricultural, mechfu~ical, and similar useful and much-
needed arts. The College resisted, claiming that its 
royal charter was in effect a contract, and hence pro-
tected by the contracts guarantees of state and federal 
constitutions. The state suprem~ court found this argu-
ment unsatisfactory, and held that since the College was 
a public corporation, it could claim no contract rights 
against its creator, tre legislature. In its appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court, the College, represented 
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by its alumnus, Daniel Webster, succeeded in having itself 
declared a private corporation, and hence entitled to the 
protections afforded to the contracts of private individuals 
or corporations. The New Hampshire court likened the 
COllege to a town: 
The legislature, both in this state and in Mas-
sachusetts, have always claimed and exercis~he 
right of! dividing towns; of enlarging or diminish-
ing their terri to rial limits; of imposing new 
duties or limiting their pqwers and privil·eges, 
as the public good seemed to require; and this with-
out their consent. Yet· this right never seems to 
have been called in question, on the ground that 
their charters were contracts, within the meaning 
of this clause. But who ever supposed that these 
grants were con tracts within the meaning of th:i.s 
clause of the constitution of the United States. 
The dis~inction we have here endeavored to lay 
down between the contracts 1.vhich are, and l-Thich are 
not intended by that instrument, seems to us to be 
clear and obvious. If the charter of . a public insti-
tution, like Dartmouth College, is to be construed 
as a contract, within the intention of the consti~ 
tution of the United States, it will, in our 
opinion. be difficult to say -vrhat powers, in rela-
tion to their public instltutions, if any, are left 
to the states. It is a construction, in our view. 
repugnant to the . very principles of all government, 
because it places all the public institutions of 
all the states beyond legislative control.84 
Th1.s positive statement occuring so early in New Hampshire 
constitutional history, indicates how any claim of vested~ 
inherent, or reserved right on the part of a town will be 
treated, when it arises. 
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The issue of vested rights, in all its ramifications, 
historical, contractual, prescriptive, inherent, is pre-
sented by the case of Bristol v. New-Chester in 1826.85 
The Town of New-Chester was split off from Bristol and 
Bridgewater on June 24, 1819, by legislative act. Part 
of the property of Bristol was given to New Chester, in 
the common fashion followed when new towns are set up. The 
Town of Bristol chose this occasion to argue the rights of 
a tm.m. as against the legislature. If a partisan of town 
rights were to choose an occasion for judicial review and 
determination of the rights of towns, he would scarcely 
have chosen this one. There has never been any serious 
doubt or ~estion that, in order to facilitate the more 
orderly government of a state, and to meet the needs of 
the people of an area, a state legislature may draw up new 
b:nmdary lines and apportion existing assets and debts 
84!£!£., pp . 133-134. 
85Town of Bristol v. Town of New-Chester, 1826, 
3 N.H. 524. 
between the old unit and the newly-created municipality. 
The town 1 s argument that such action violated its rights 
under the contracts clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions, and that it was a retrospective law, strip-
ping Bristol of rights and property which had become vested~ 
was answered by the court as might be expected: 
Towns are public corporations •••• In the creation 
ot: such corporations, there must, in the nature ci: 
things, be reserved, by necessary implication~ a 
power to modify them in such manner, as to meet 
the public exigencies •• • • A power to alter and 
change such a corporation and adapt it to the 
purposes, it was intended to accomplish, is implied 
in its very nature •••• It has been the constant 
usage, in all the New England states, to enlarge 
or curtail the power of towns, and to divide their 
territory and make new towns~ whenever the con-
venience of the public required it; and no doubt is 
believed ever to have been ente§~ained of the power 
of the legislatures to do this. 
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The oourt's statement th..at legislatures have always exercised 
the power to constitute new towns without dispute is undoubted-
ly correct, but it is certainly overstating the case to 
maintain that no doubt had ever been maintained of t he 
power of the legislature to curtail the power of towns . 
Yet~ even in a declaration as sweeping as this, the court 
gave its recognition to the tradition of an era: "We admit~ 
that the legislature cannot arbitrarily take the property 
of one town, and gtve it to another."87 That same year, 
86rbid., PP• 532. 
87rbid., p. 535. 
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the court described the taxing power of the towns in such a 
fashion as to leave them with little discretion as to local 
enterprise or a cti vi ty: 
It is not to be questioned, that towns derive all 
their powers to raise money, by taxation, from the 
statutes •• • we have no doubt, that they m~~t be 
kept within the limits prescribed by law. 
In 1854, the court took occasion to say that the towns 
in the eastern part of the state differed essentiaily from 
those in the western part,89 but did not derive any import~ 
ant doctrine from that situation. By 1856, all doubt 't·ras 
gone, and the court was among the first of New England to 
adopt what is essentially a vl ew of absolute centralized 
sovereignty. No trace of any reference to vested rights 
· or rights in the nature of the rights of a private corpora-
tion remains: "The legislature has entire control over 
municipal corporations, to create, change, or destroy them 
at pleasure.n90. A ... "ld from this right is derived the right 
to do virtually what the legislature wishes with the to'Wll.s . 
of the state. The era closed with a firm restatement of 
the principle that towns. could tax only for ends permitted 
. 91 
by the legislature. 
88Adams v. Mack, 1826, 3 N.H. 493, at 498. 
89state of New Hampshire v. Town of Canterbury; State 
of New Hampshire v. Town of Boscawen, 1854, 28 N.H. 195. 
9°Town of Berlin v • Town of Gorham, 1856, Jl_l- N.H. 2.66. 
91Gove v. Town of Epping, 1860, 41 N.H. 539. 
Vermont 
The tone or the .Vermont Supreme Court in this era 
was much more like that or Connecticut than like that of 
Massachusetts or .New Hampshire. The same undertone or 
suspicion of the legislature ran through the cases, and a 
real concern for the rights of towns appeared therein. 
It would be no overstatement to say that Vermont gave 
judicial recognition to the rights of its local units more 
fully than any or the other New England courts. Not only 
were these rights reco gn ized early, but recognition of 
them persisted through the history or local government in 
that state, and persists today, as will be seen in the 
rollowing chapters. The spirit or Ethan Allen and those 
fierce Green Mountain warriors and townspeople has its 
echo even in the cases of the state supreme court. Towns 
in Vermont, as elsewhere, are · su.bject · to the legislature 
for state purposes, but the courts have ever been jealous 
to draw the lines separating legitimate state concerns from 
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those concerns more properly the concern or the local residents. 
The cou rt stated, in the first signiricant case 92 
rights: 
on 
Ev~ry chartered and' organized town in this state 
is a body p,olitic, and is invested with certain 
92 
to:wn 
Town or Poultney v. Town of Wells, 1826, 1 Aiken 
(Vt.) 180. 
319 
rights and interests, or which they cannot be 
divested, except by their consent legally ex~essed , 
or by conveyance executed under treir authority, 
in a mode pointed out by la1-T, or by legal process 
in courts or justice--- 4 tiheat . 636-7 and 643-4--- 2 
Bac. Abr . 9 1 13--- l Blac. Com. 502.93 
Thus, the court drew clearly on English sources, ratner 
than upon the casesof her sister' states, to derine the 
rights of Vermont towns. The attorneys fc:>r the defendant 
town argued vested, prescriptive , and social compact rights 
in full, but the court ignored these arguments in ravor of 
a statement remarkable ror its clarity. In this necision, 
the private character or a municipal corporation was plain-
ly recognized, without trappings , or natural law, and consti-
tutional guarantees or due process were applied. In 18411 
the court rollowed its eminently logical course by recogniz-
ing clearly the rights of the legislature as to the public 
character of towns: 
But the existence and extent of a town as a muni-
cipal corporation, with all its civil privileges 
and duties, depend, not on the charter, but on 
laws, subject to constant changes, and ;its geo-
graphical limits liable to alteration.9~(italics 
mine). 
The court reje cted an argument based upon tl-.e town charter 
as a contract, which must bind the state into eternity, 
93!£!£., p . 1B3. 
94To~ of Corinth v. Town of Newbury, 1841, 13 
vt. 496, at 5oo. 
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and spoke of the public character of the town in terms not 
improved upon to this day. Hence, we find that t1.vo of 
the early Vermont cases distinguish as clearly as if they 
had been written today, the local concerns of a town from 
the state-wide concerns with which it is charged as a 
departm::nt or agent of the state. 
In the Montpelier cases, 95 the vested rights and 
contract arguments were once again urged against the action 
of the legislature in setting off East Montpelier from 
Montpelier. Unlike the New Hampshire and Massachusetts 
courts, the Vermont court remains steadfast: 
The power of the legislature to alter, divide, 
modify, or abolish a municipal corp or at ion, 
created for the os e of overrunent , ·is not 
to be italics mine 
The following year, essentially the same case was resub-
mitted to the court, with much the same argUrn:ents. Once 
again, the decision was uniquely clear in its day: 
Like all other towns in this state, {Montpelier} 
was instit uted as an auxiliary of the state in 
the regulation and establishment of its form of 
government. The rights and frarohises of such 
municipal corporations can never become vested 
rights as· against the state ••• .But while this 
legislative power may be exercised over public 
and m1L11.icipal corporations, it has as uniformly 
been held that towns, and other publ i c corpora-
tions, may have private rights and interests,· 
95Town af Montpelier v. Town of East Montpelier, 
1855 , 27 Vt. 704, and 1856, 29 Vt. 12. 
96Montpelier v. E. Montpelier, 1855, 27 Vt. 704 at 
706-07. 
vested in them by their charter; and as to those 
rights, they are to be regarded and protected the 
same as if they were the rights and interests of 
individuals, or of private corporations .97 
The court also mentioned the rights of sover·eignty in the 
legisla:bure, foreshadowing t re decisions t 0 come in the 
next half of the century. The argument of Montpelier 
that its special charter ent.itled it to a unique position 
in relation to the legislature, the court disposed ·of 
ratre r suJ1liTl.arily. 
Two years later, in another great case in state 
constitutional law,98 the court reiterated what it had 
said before. The legislature, to control the liquor traf-
fie, appointed an agent for each town, not subject to town 
authority, but able to purchase liquor and supplies on 
town credit. No protection or bond was specified to 
protect the to1vn. In effect, this was the early form of 
state liquor store. The agent for Randolph absconded, 
and a supplier attempted to hold the town for his expenses. 
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The decision was short and to the point: such an enterprise 
is not a necessary governmental one; insofar as the town 
has power to contract, or to acquire and dispose of property, 
- - ---------
97Montpelier v. E. Montpelier, 1856, 29 Vt. 121 at 
18-19. 
98Henry Atkins and Co. v. Town of Randolph, 1858, 
31 Vt. 226 .• 
it is entitled to the same protections against legislative 
interference as a private corporation. Tbat is, the court 
made a distinction between the purely public functions of 
the town and its functions as a corporation in more or less 
non-governmental affairs. Several modern legal writers, as 
has already been discussed above in Chapter II, have made 
just this suggestion as an ideal answer to the perennial 
problem of the state-local clash of interests. A doctrine 
of pure state sovereignty or a blind following of Dillon's 
Rule lead inevitably, it seems, to legislative corruption 
or to the use of the town or city merely as a unit of local 
patronage, a factor in log-rolling agreements, and in the 
worst cases, to extension of control by state boards over 
local affairs. It is rather remarkable that the Vermont 
court, from the time it first turned its attention to the 
problem of state-local relations, perceived the issue pre-
sented, and reached an equitable solution which has stood 
the test of time. In the second Montpelier case, Justice 
Barrett stated for the court:· 
The case ••• presents this simple proposition 
••• ~ that the legislatures have the constitu-
tional power to clothe (the liquor agent) with 
power to contract, w.i thout the authorization, 
consent or knowledge of the town, for, and in 
the name, and on the credit of the town, 
and thereby bind it by contracts •••• It 
is asserted .that the law is for the reg-
ulation of the · internal ;p;olic e of the State ••• 
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The entire theory of government in this country 
assumes that the people of a State have the right 
to govern and regulate in this respect •••• We 
regard it as having been designed, not to confer 
authority upon the legislature, but to deny the 
existence of the right in any body but the people 
of the State •••• exercised by them through the 
legislature •••• It is ••• conceded that the 
statute ••• is a matter of police regulation •••• 
But it by no means follows that the legislature, 
in acting upon the subject, may not have trans-
cended their constitutional authority •••• We do 
not feel called upon in this case, to discuss or 
decide the somewhat vexed question, whether an 
act of the legislature is to ·be held void, ir-
respective of constitutional restriction, on the 
ground of its being contrary to natural right, 
justice and equity. Much might be, as much has 
been said, with pertinency and force, on both 
sides of the question. For present purposes, it 
is suff icient to rest our decision on the ground 
that constitutional restriction is the sole 
restraint upon legislative omnipotence.99 
The court went on to say that it could find no benefit for 
the town itself in the arrangement, but only burdens. It 
continued: 
••• it is prominent for notice, that the judges 
and courts that have gone farthest in sustaining 
laws of State legislatures against the restrictive 
provisions of' constitutions, repudiate entirely 
the idea that a person, whether natural or arti-
ficial, can be compelled by legislative enactment, 
to become a party to, or be subjected to liability 
upon, a contract, without his consent.lOO . 
The court then expressed its distaste for the doctrine of 
complete legislative domination, as by stating of a recent 
·------
99 Ibid., pp. 231-3. 
lOOl£1£., P• 233. 
Pennsylvania Supren:e Court case, that n... the doctrine 
of leg islative omnipotence was , by a majority of the 
court, carried to the last verge of endurance~QOl It 
continued: 
This doctrine (i.e. legislative making of con-
tracts f or persons) must receive, asit has ever 
received, the same application to a municipal 
corporation as to a private corporation, or to 
an individual , when it is sought to visit a 
pecuniary liability ex contractu, upon a town, 
by the ordinary means of a suit a t la 1...:r . So f ar 
a s a municipal c .CX'poration is errlowed by law with 
the power of contracting, and as such, is made 
capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of 
property, and sUbject to the liabilities incident 
to the exercise of such power and capacity, thus 
being invested with legal rights as to property 
and contracts, and made subject to legal liabi~ 
lities incident to the exercise of such power 
and capacity ••• upon tre same principles , and by 
the same means as in case of a private corpora-
tion, such municipal corporation must stand on the 
s ame ground of exemption from legislative con trol 
and interference as a private c orpor at ion ••• • 
This view (i.e. that towns have both a public and 
private character, and are subject to the legis~ 
lature only as to their public rights and duties) 
seems to be fully recognized and embodied in the 
learned and elaborate opinion ••• by Isham, · J., i n 
••• Montpelier v. E . Montpeli~, 29 Vt. 12. 
That case, moreover , as well as ••• Bowdoinham~ 
Richmond (2 Me. 42), demonstrates that some things 
are beyond tbe scope of legitimate legislation, 
as affecting municipal corpe~ations, a doctrine 
entirely at variance with t be idea of illimitable 
suprermcy of t be laH makine power . over such 
corporations •••• (citing cases from Vt., New York, 
Massachusetts, England and c onl!l'entator s ) •• • These 
cases, and many more that might be cited, fully 
indicate the double character v.rhich such corpora .... 
tions bear , an:i the rights which they have , and 
101Ibid., p . 236. 
the relations which they sustain by virtue of 
each character respectively. They are exp1•essions 
•~• of the reason why, from the fact of towns 
existing in organized corporations, primarily for 
certain public political purposes, as a~uiliary 
to tte practical govern.ment of the State, and as 
such, are under the absolute control of the legis.-
lature1 it does not follol-J that trey, as organized 
corporations, or the inhabitants composing them, 
can be subjected, arbitrarily, to pecuniary 
burdens and liabilities, to be respond ed to either 
by tre property of the town or of its ' .ihl'l.abitants .• 
•• • If through the artificial contrivance of 
municipal corporations, of which the inhabitants ••• 
must be members, nolentes volentes, such con-
sequences can be wrought out, most persons would 
invoke the annihilating power of the government 
oYer such corporations, rather than of the power 
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of the £Olice re¥ulati2u1 in virtue of which alone,l02 
this provision o the law is sought to be sustained. 
The dissent, by Justice Bennett, is also an out-
standing statem.ent of lalv. Not for him was this distinc .... · 
tion between public and private functions of municipal 
corporations. He chose to follow instead the path marked 
out by the Massachusetts and United states Supreme Court, 
waving aside all application of private property guarantees, 
and putting his dissent squarely on the basis of the un-
limited power of the sovereign. He asserted that none 
of the constitutional guarantees refer to municipal corpora• 
tions 1 and since nothing else in the state or national 
constitutions applies, then the legislature may do as it 
v-Iishes with a municipal corporation. The primary cha:bac·--
terization occurred, of course, in the statement that 
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municipal corporations are unlike private corporations and 
individuals. Therefore, the provisions relating to due 
.. 
process, contracts, and the like, have no proper applica-
tion. The majority of the court, on the other hand, 
said that a municipal corporation !! like a private copora-
tion or an individual in certain ways, and hence is en-
titled to the same guarantees. To quote the dissent: 
I hardly think it will be claimed by any cons ti-
tutional lawyer that the provision in the act 
under consideration is void, as being against 
the principles of natural justice•••• the 
legislature, under the State constitution, w~y 
do whatever is not prohibited•••• as I conceive, 
the towns are not bound by force of any contractJ 
but ••• as municipal corporations, to pay for the 
liquors, and this far political purpo~ and to 
carry out a police regulation •••• As I can find 
nothing in the constitution of this State, or 
of the federal government, to forbid the provi-
sion in question, I think it should be held 
valid, arid. that the legislature should not be 
charged with havipg transcended their constitu-
tional powers. 103 
It is well to take note of the limits upon Atkins 
v. Randolph. Although the· court both in majority decision 
and in dissent spoke in broad terms, it was deciding es-
sentially that a town has vested rights in its private 
character, which the legislature cannot displace, to keep 
its own property, where a legislative act would give that 
property to a private person without recompense to the town. 
l03Ibid., p. 242. See also Town of Plimpton v. 
Town of Somerset, 1860, 33 Vt. 283• 
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Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Vermont court ended 
the £ormative period o£ local institutions with a local 
constitutional tradition unique in New England. 
Maine 
Disputes concerning town rights did not ripple 
the waters o£ Maine's constitutional history o£ local gov-
ernment. Taking its jurisprudence directly £rom Massachusetts, 
the Maine Supreme Court concerned itself with none of the 
hesitations which · troubled the -Massachusetts court on ceca-
sion. Although the early history of the state is replete 
with the usual quota of local acts inconsistent with :State. 
authority, as for instance the complete and £arcial disre-
gard on the part of the towns o£ Camden and Union of the 
state militia laws during the 1830's and 1840•s, 104 little 
o£ this pattern of local independence penetrated the court 
105 decisions. In the case of Bussey v. Gi~ore in 1824, 
it appeared that the residents of the Town o£ Bangor voted 
to tax themselves yearly to pay to the private Bangor Bridge 
amounts to repay the cost o£ a bridge over the Kenduskeag 
River, built in 1807. The vote to pay the annual amounts 
l04John L. Locke, History o£ the Town o£ Camden, 
Maine, Hallowell (Me.), Masters, Smith and Co., ~859, pp .• 
159-164; John L. Sibley, History o£ the Town of Union, Maine, 
in the Count of Lincoln to the Middle of the Nineteenth 
entury, Boston, B.B. Mussey and • 
10.5 
Bussey v. Gi~ore, 1824, 3 Me. 176. 
was adopted in 1808. Thereupon, the residents received the 
right to pass over the bridge free of charge for twenty 
years, after which the bridge was to be turned over to 
them as owners, in good repair. The defendant, who lived 
in Massachusetts, but owned land in Bangor, paid the tax 
every year .untll 1822, when the tax was raised. His inves-
tigation revealed the facts above. Up~n his refusal 
to pay further, his land was sold in a tax lien foreclosure. 
In court, his attorneys referred to the Massachusetts stat-
ute of 1785, chapter 75, section 7, discussed in the Massa-
chusetts section of this chapter, and to the Maine statute 
of 1821, chapter 11~. , section 6, which contained substant-
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ially the same words. They asserted that Stetson v. Kempton, 
the ¥~ssachusetts War of 1812 case, applied. The court 
agreed entirely, citing Stetson v. Kempton, and adding "The 
powers granted to towns are specified and defined by statute. 11106 
The cour·t proceeded to define the language of the statute 
in terms even narrower than those used by the Massachusetts 
court. The action of the town was held void as beyond the 
town's powers, and the disputed land and costs were restored 
to the defendant. It does not appear that the town even 
attempted to assert the arguments concerning town rights so 
familiar in New England in that era. 
Maine adopted the rule or Hampshire v. Franklin107 
108 in 1829, in BoHdoinham v. Richmond, holding that while 
the legislature had complete power to split up towns and 
' 
to divide the corporate burdens as it wished in doing so, 
it had no power to pass a later act taking property or 
money rrom one town and giving it to the town set orr 
earlier~ The court stated that Bowdoinham had a vested 
right or contract with which the legislature could not 
interrere. Since the case concerned the apportionment 
or waupers between _the towns concerned, with Richmond's 
lobbying successrul in securing an act or the legislature 
to the errect that Richmond was no longer responsible ror 
its share or the paupers, but that Bowdoinham was respon-
sible ror all or them, it will be seen that the case was 
similar to the Massachusetts one. The court averred:-
No act or resolve or the legislature can of 
itselr create a debt from one corporation ••• 
to another, but only by the consenti express or 
implied,or the party to be charged. 09 
The court specifically rejected the argument that what the 
legislature could do indirectly, by wiping out the town 
107 Inhabitants or the County of Hampshire v. Inhab-
itants or the County of Franklin, 1819, 16 Mass. 75. 
l08Town of Bowdoinham v. Town of Richmond, 1829, 
6 Me. 93. 
109 Ibid., p. 95. 
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and reconstitutin~ it, it could do directly, and stated: 
11 u vJ'e must consider the arrange1mnts and provisiqns 
as in the nature of a contract, whereby Bowdoinham had 
acquired a vested right ••• at the time t he act of 
incorporation v:as passed. Had the legislature a 
constitutional right to pass the latter act , in 
its very terms impairing the obligation of the 
contract ••• created by the first act? If it does 
impair the obligation of a contract, then, ac-
cording to the express language of the constitu-
tion of the United States and of this State, the 
legislature transcended their p owers in enacting 
it, and this court is bound to declare it void.llO 
Here the same situation was presented as in Massachusetts 
in this period of the development of the c onst1.. tutional 
law of local government .• The legislature had virtually 
been declared to have complete power over the town and 
other municipal corp orations, but the influem e of the 
Massachusetts court and of the age, against the disturbing 
of vested rights, led the ccurt to close off this one 
area from legislative competence. 
What might be called the definitive case on the 
pol.;ers of the Maine town arose in 1837.111 The inhabitants 
of Bj_ddef ord had voted to distribute among therr..selves the 
funds received by the town from the state government as 
part of the distribution of surplus federal funds, under 
the Act of March 8, 1837 1 ch. 265. Upon the refusal of 
110~., p. 94. 
111 Hooper v. Emery, 1837 1 14 Me. 375. 
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the town officers charged wit h distributing the funds to 
do so, on the basis that such a distribution was n ot 
permitted by United Ntates or Maine law, residents brought 
action. The court once again pointed out that Maine 
towns were limited in powers by the Massachusetts statute 
of 1785, ch. 75, sec. 7, and by the interpretation of 
that statute by the rviassachusetts court in Stetson v, 
Kempton112 and Dilling~am v. Snow, ll3 before the separa-
tion, which it had accepted in Bussey v, Gilmore. 114 The 
court ruled that the moriey was to be retained by the t ovm 1 
saying: 
••• but these corporations (towns) derive none 
of their powers from, nor are any duties imposed 
upon them by, the corn.'Tlon law. They have be·en 
denominated quasi corporations, and their whole 
capacities, powers, and duties are derived from 
legislative enactments.ll5 
It will be noted that the Maine oourt not only said that 
towns were entirely subject to the legislature, but 
specifically added that the towns could claim no rights 
112
ci ted in footnote ll, above . 
113
cited in footnote 7, above. 
114Cited in footnote 105, above. 
11.5 Hooper v. Emery, cited in footnote 111, above, 
p. 377. In 1838, the Maine legislature, Stats. 1838, 
ch. 311, authorized the to\ms to distribute the money 
so received to their residents. 
.... 
as corporations. 
116 
In an 1842 case, henceforth cited by the Maine 
court as controlling, the court accepted the principle 
that towns exist at the pleasure of the state, without 
investigating or explaining the s ta temen t. A routine 
case in 1854 117 confirmed the power of the legislature 
to change town boundaries at its pleasure. 
118 In 1858, the Maine court determined once again 
that towns were subject to the legislature, using such 
positive language as to indicate that its earlier decision 
in Bowdoinham v. Richmond might no longer be counted on 
as a statement of law. In 1743, the proprietors of the 
area bad transferred to the selectmen of North Yarmouth 
ownership of tidal flats, sedge banks and mussel beds in 
the town, lying below high water mark. In 1849, the 
legislature set off the town of Yarmouth, providing tba t 
the residents of the two towns · should hold the tidelands 
in common. The residents of the old town refused to allow 
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1842, 
116Inhabitants of Gorham v. Inhabitants of Springfield, 
21 Me. 58. 
117 
Ham v. Sawyer, 1854, 38 · Me. 37. 
118 
Inhabitants of North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 1858, 
45 Me. 133, 71 Am. Dec. 530. (This case is a continuatiofi of 
the struggle begun in Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 
411.) 
I 
the residents of the new one access to the flats and beds, 
upon which this action was brought. It will be noted that 
these facts raised two questions: first, as to the fact 
that such tidelands are usually considered as subject to 
the control of the state and national governments alone~ 
and second, that the old town here owned the tidelands 
through private grant, just as a private citizen might 
purchase land for his own use. ~either of these questions 
was raised in the decision, however. The court chose to 
rest its decision upon the absolute subjection of towns 
to the legislature: 
The law is now well settled that ' in respect to 
public corporations which exist only for public 
purposes, the Legislature, under proper limita-
tions, have a right to change, modify, enlarge 
or restrain them'••• and such has been the uni-
form practice of th·e Legislature of this State 
from its earliest eXistence . And the reason 
why this power exists, is, because the Acts· by 
which such corporations are created are not 
contracts within the :meaning of the constitu-
tion of the United State's, or of the constitu ... 
tion of- this State. The public good evidently 
requires that such corporations should be subject 
to legislative control. The Legislature, as the 
trustee of the public interests, is properly 
vested with unrestrained power over the existence 
of all public corporations. It is also well 
settled that towns are public corporations • ••• 
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The exercise of this power, in this State and 
Massachusetts, has been so long continued, and so 
frequent, and so often acted upon by the highest 
judicial tribunals, as within t he legitimate scope 
of legislative authority, that we feel no hesitancy 
in coming to the conclusion that t .he exercise of 
such poweris constitutional and valid.ll9 
Thus, :f\'Iaine ended the period with a strong statement o:f 
the absolute control of the legislature over towns. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it appears that the oft-claimed right 
of New England towns to act independently of the legislatures 
has little ba sis in fact when one review the constitutional 
history of local government in t hese states. No New England 
court reco gnized by a single decision any inherent or vested, 
prescriptive or historical rights on the part of a town to 
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go its way in defiance of le gislative mandate. The best 
interpretation which a partisan of municipal rights can 
validly make of this formative period of New England local 
governmental status, is that at various times, some of the 
cou.rts ba. ve recognized a right of the local unit to be left 
alone. This has occurred only in complex situations in which 
i ndividuals might clearly have claimed constitutional pro-
tections. Yet these decisions were limited to their facts, 
and represented only tiny shadow areas, while the vast bulk 
of local a f fairs were subject to legislative supervision. 
The courts of ~assachusetts, New Hampshire and l~ine were 
not at all sympathetic to any plea of local rights. Their de-
cisions recognized such ri ghts only in cases where the legis-
latures attempted arbj, traril·y to deprive municipalities of 
their funds br property, and to transfer those funds to an-
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other governmental unit or to a private person, with no 
benefit accruing··w the town affected. Rhode Island in this 
era of fers little in the way of relevant constitutiona l 
history of local government. Connecticut and Vermon,t alone 
give evidence of supreme courts hospitable to na t ural rights 
pleas in behalf of municipalities, and wary of the activities 
of their legislatures. Connecticut offers the most color-
ful and va ried local constitutional history. Ver mont is 
unique in its r ecognition of both public and private char-
acters of munici pal corporations in its earliest cases, and 
a stea dfast continuity in considering all cases in relation 
to the proper spheres of state and local powers with this 
standa rd as its guide. In terms of modern law, l~ssachusetts 
early but not quite completely reached the position which 
might be called the "majority" view of the nature of muni-
cipal corpora tions in the United States today, while Vermont 
in its first ca ses set the standard still followed by a 
steadfast minority 9f American cour·t;s today. This "Vermont 
standard" has been advocated as a reasonable one to be 
applied to state-local relations. 
CRl\.PTER VI 
THE AGE OF CENTRALIZATION:: 1861-1898 
In the early years of this period of the history of 
tom~-state constitutional relations, the last vestiges of any 
town claim to independence of action were struck away as part 
of the flush of enthusiasm for centralization which followed 
the Civil War. Before long, however, the activities of the 
legislatures in reference to the towns and cities of t heir 
states brought a profound feeling of shock to the scholars 
and commentators then writing. In the middle and late part 
of the period, activities on the part of the towns in the New 
England states were directed toward finding a means of relief. 
Even the courts of these states showed the signs of reaction. 
In the late part of the period, the initial traces of ~he 
movement for economy and efficiency and the home-rule move-
ment made themselves felt. The courts of several states out-
side New England accepted the doctrine that towns have in-
herent ri~~ts and/or a private character beyond the reach of 
the legislature; 1 others, beginning with Missouri, in 1875 
lAmong the cases holding squarely for an inherent 
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chose the home rule constitutional or statutory path or clos-
ing the legislature off rrom the local affairs of towns and 
I 
cities.2 Yet, in New England, whose towns gave birth to the 
towns of the midwest, which were shortly to claim successrully 
either through the courts or through home rule activities the 
independence in local affairs logically pertaining to them; 
vmere the state of Vermont phrased at the start of its consti-
tutional existence the clear division between those affairs 
which are Caesar's and those . which are the townspeople; al-
most all traces of integrity on the part of the towns and 
1 (continued) right to local self-government, in 
add:!.tion to those discussed in the text, are State ex rel. 
Holt v. Denney, 1888, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E. 274, 4 L.R.A. 
65; Lexington v. Thompson, 1902, 113 Ky. 540, 68 sw. 477, 
24 Ky. Law Rep. 384, 57 L.R.A. 775, 101 Am. St. Rep. 361; 
State ex rel. White v. Barker, 1902, 116 Ia. 96, 89 N.W . 
204, 57 L.R.A. 244, 93 Am. St. Rep. 222; Ex parte Lewis, 
19G3, 45 Tex. Grim. R. 1, 73 s.w. 811, 108 Am. St. Rep. 
929; see those cited by Jefferson B. Fordham, Local Govern-
ment Law, Brooklyn, Foundation Press, 1949, pp. 43-50. 
2see the elaborate listing of such states and dis-
cussion in Howard L. McBain, The Law and Practice of Muni -
cipal Home Rule, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1916, and 
the continuation: of that work in Joseph D. McGoldrick, The 
Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule, 1916-30, New York, 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1933. For the modern situation, see 
Rodney L. Mott, Home Rule for America's Cities, Part II, 
Chicago American Municipal Association, 1949; Harvey Walker, 
"Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule", 1955, 50 Not•th-
western Law Review 571; and ft..rthur W. Bromage, "The Home 
Rule Puzzle", 1957, National Municipal Review, 46:118. 
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cities were to be wiped out before the close of the century, 
Ha ny New England. t owns and cities, together with those of 
New York and Pennsylvania, were to provide material for 
horrible examples of legislative domination, far the text-
books and articles in the eiiY3rging field of political 
science. 
As was demonstrated in the last chapter, the era 
of canal-building and the rise of the democratic republic, 
with the increased tendency(.to look to the state capital 
. .' .. J· • • 
.. ·.''·· 
and toward Washington for diz.ection, brought with it the 
first rather definite decisions in derogation of the 
rights of towns and cl.ties. Ill-defined, half-formed 
doctrines of state creation of cities and domination over 
towns became settled doctrines which held the town or city 
a mere creature of the state, drawing its life from the 
state legislature, and having as its only powers those 
given it in its charter. The great railroad and telegraph 
network was thrown across the country in mid-century; the 
Civil tiar was fought -- a war which rmde local loyalty 
somewhat suspect, and centralization the spirit of the 
times. The court decisions followed the pattern. It had 
become to the interest of the community, as well as to the 
interest of the owner of enterprise capital to have authori-
ty to deal with local governments established finnly and 
solely in the state legislature. And the courts, which are 
after all power structures, sensitive to the need of chang-
ing times and changing social patterns, provided in their de-
cisions that centralized power in the state capitals. 
History tells of that great era of the fast-receed-
ing frontier, of the growth first of vast railroad empires, 
followed shortly by great industrial empires. In such an era, 
there are always unscrupulous men, willing to use the power 
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of government to achieve their own ends. The pattern of brib-
ery in the state legislatures, of control by railroads, of 
bare1ly literate legislators who would sell their votes for 
very little, has been well-docuraented for us. 
The mood of the thinking people of the country 
changed slowly, but it changed strongly. The pattern o£ 
"ripper bills", that is, bills designed to place existing 
mun~cipal f unctions under the control of a state board or 
agency, of venal contracts imposed on towns and cities, 
of special laws for private benefit of a friend or cr ony, 
of corruption which followed the Civil \var, set the stage 
for a change, for amelioration of some kind almost any 
kind. The first stirrings of the movement for legisla-
' 
tiv~ and constitutional home rule rise from this period. 
Revulsion a gainst legislative supremacy led in state af-
ter state to activities which had as their objective the 
limitation of state legislative power to its proper 
sphere -- matters which can cerned the whole state or the 
welfare of the whole people. The moverrent for economy 
and efficiency in government, which led to the civil 
service reforms of Cleveland and Arthur, and which swept 
even state and local governments in the era immediately 
following the Great War, had its genesis in this period 
at the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
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What could be more natural for men, learned jurists 
with a feeling for history, than . to turn tot he past, to 
those simple days when, by the very nature of society, 
the town was self-sufficient and supreme, and to attempt 
to trace that right of ~n to govern th9 ir own 1 ocal af-
fairs down through the decades to t re ir own time, where 
it could be used to fend off the assaults of a voracious 
state le gi sla ture, or even a well-intentioned but over-
extended trend to legislative centralization? Thus, 
the nee-inherent right school, as they might be called, 
pulled out the old theories, dusted them off, and gave 
them a whirl. The attempt succeeded in several states, 
and became the dominant law, case law. No one could say 
that the inherent right or rights somehow reserved did 
not exist, and equally well, no one could say they did 
exist. In an era when the very existence of a town or 
city is threatened, or in which a town is driven to bank-
ruptcy, it would be rather easy to convince oneself that 
the towns actually did have a rig ht of self-preservation. 
The decisions of the great Justice Cooley of Michigan, 
as learned in constitutional law as any nan ever to write 
in that area, fit into this pattern. 
Palmer told3 of the abuses which the New York 
State Coinmission found in the government of the cities of 
that state by the legislature. Wholesale corruption and 
inefficiency were found in the instruments of legislative 
control of local affairs. His article pointed out that 
this legislative intervention was originally sought by 
reformers to end corruption by local officials, but that 
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the "cure" actually led to a spread of corruption across 
the whole state. Another author4 confirmed this analysis, 
saying that this first intervention of the legislature, 
by setting up a state-controlled municipal police board 
for New York City and the then-independent City of Brooklyn, 
set the pattern. The New York Suprel'l'e Court, following 
the pattern of the cases of the early part of the century, 
affirmed the power of the legislature to do so.5 Finally, 
3
c1arence s. Palmer, "Municipal Home Rule 11 , 1896, 
53 Albany Law Journal 2.52. For a general analysis of this 
eral see Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, 1878-
189~ {A History of American Life, ed. by A:M. Schlesinger · 
and D.R. Rox, vol. X), New York, Macmillan Co., 1933. 
4James Schouler, "Self-Rule in the Citiesn, 1911, 
20 Yale Law Journal 463. _See also William B. Munro, The 
Government of American Cities, PP• 14-15, citied and approved 
by James R. Douglas, Home Rule and State Administrative 
Supervision of Municipalities in the United States, Berkeley, 
' Univ. of California, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1917, 
p. 47. 
5People v. Draper, 18571 15 N.Y. 532. 
almost two decades later, after many such state boards had 
beeri set up with the inevitable attendent corruption, 
favoritism, patronage and log-rolling in general, the 
supreme court had had enough. Noticn s of the inherent 
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right to local self-government had gained headway elsewhere. 
When the legislature attempted to sack Troy by setting 
up a police board for that city and vicinity, the New 
York Supreme Court invalidated tre legislative action6 
on the basis that it interfered with Troy's inherent 
right of local self-government. In the Connecticut section 
following, the same forces will be shown at work. The 
author doubts if any of these courts which adopted in-
herent or private right arguments really believed in 
them. It seems that the courts believed that the legis-
latures had become irresponsible, and had to be stopped 
with any corrective at hand. The New England constitu-
tional history of local government, as interpreted by the 
Michigan and New York supreme courts, provided a legal 
doctrine ready at harrl. Indiana and others followed. 7 
But, as one author said: 
6 People v~ Albertson, 1873, 55 N.Y. 5o. 
7see cases cited in footnote 1, above. For a good 
general summary of tbe. inherent and reserved right cases, 
and of the private corporation theory, see Robert L. Ehlers, 
"Montana Hunicipalities: Local Self-Governmentn, 1952, 13 
Montana Law Review 43. 
••• during the many years which have elapsed 
since the (inherent right} cases were decided, 
a notable change of judicial sentiment has 
developed in this country in favor of legis-
lative control, supervision, and supremacy, at 
discretion, in all municipal matters. Those 
"inherent arrl inalienable rights" of the citizens 
of towns and
8
cities, as s~h, prove of nebulous 
existence ••• 
That is, the inherent right or private character cases 
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were largely the mark of an era of reaction against legis-
lative corruption. As will be shown in the following 
chapter, the growth of the need far authorities, multi-
city utility districts, and other similar developments 
aft 'er the turn of the century, brought the courts in 
several states full-cycle, back to doctrines of absolute 
legislative supremacy. .\nother author tracing much the 
same pattern, remarked that the trend to legislative con-
trol after the mid-century: 
••• resulted in the formation of "rings" and loose, 
disconnected local governmental organization. 
The people becam3 disappointed and a spirit of 
distrust was abroad of the refcrms in municipal 
rule, with the result that there was a reform of 
political theory. 9 
That is, the people who originally thought that the solu-
tion of mid-century ~Oblems was to have the legislature 
interfere, shortly chmged their minds when the result be ... 
8 Schouler, op. cit., p. 466. 
9willimn H. Clute, "The Home Rule System of Muni-
cipal Government -- City Sovereignty vs. State Sovereignty", 
1913, 77 Central Law Journal 344. 
came apparent. This same author declared that the popular 
reaction led directly to the strong-mayor system of local 
government and the movement for home rule 'for towns and 
cities. Thus, the persons who originally believed in the 
right of local governmental units to conduct their own 
affairs were joined by others who were interested largely 
in efficient and honest government, thus swelling the 
tide of the home rule movenJ9nt. In this same era, the 
infamous Philadelphia city hall scandal arose. This in-
cident marked one of the most extreme cases of legis-
lative sacking of a city on record. The Pennsylvania 
legislature decided to build Philadelphia a city hall. 
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It set up a board, entirely independent of the city, with 
total power to plan, hire, contract and direct the work, 
and provided further that the board might direct the levy-
ing of taxe~ as it saw fit upon the people of the city, 
which taxes be came a direct charge on the local government. 
The resulting palatial edifice would have done an oriental 
potentate honor. It still stands, a magnificent landmark 
in that city. The mayor and council protested in vain 
that such a building was not needed and would not even 
conceivably be needed as far into the future as they rould 
see. In a bitterly-fought action, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed10 the supremacy of the legislature to do as 
it saw fit with the local governments of t~ state. The 
ensuing corruption left its mark upon the courts and upon 
the thinking people of the other states. The city was 
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taxed dry to finance the city hall project, until Philadel .. 
phia tottered on the brink of bankruptcy. 
Ore of the commentators of tm t era of corruption 
wrote thus: 
The question of the proper and econorni cal govern-
ment of large cities has becone one of the most 
perplexing in American political life. It is not 
too much to say that all the schemes and theories 
of local self-government hitherto devised, have, 
in the main, proved failures. Municipal oorrup-
tion, extravagance, waste, and abuses in every 
form grow and flourish. As population and wealth 
increase, so, pari passu, do venality and fraud•••• 
so thorough and all-pervading is the maladminstra• 
tion of civic affairs •••• In New York, municipal 
pillage has been chiefly carried on under the 
democratic flag. In Philadelphia, t~ reverse hap-
pens, and the "rings 11 and robberies are organized 
under the prestige of the republican name •••• 
The spoilsmen avail themselves of wm tever party 
is in power, and are equally at home in either. 
Boston has been ruled for twenty years first by 
one party, and then by another; but the waste and 
extravagance and lavish expenditures have gone on 
steadily and immensely and almost without inter-
ruption in all that time •••• That some remedy must 
speedily be found for the accumulating evils of 
misgovernment in the principle - · A!mrican cities; 
that sane great and fundamental change must be 
wrought out in the system of municipal administra ... 
tion, is deplorably evident.ll 
10Perkins v. Slack, 1878, 86 Pa. St. 270. See the 
discussion of this affair in Douglas, op. cit., p. 66. 
llGeorge M. Browne, "Municipal Reformn, 1886, New 
Engla1d and Yale Review, 4.5:1.52, at pp. 1.52, 1.54, 1.57.-
After referring to the politicans who controlled the city 
and legislature as "corrupt and rapacious", the author 
concluded: 
No party and no Class, but the plunderers is in-
terested in perpetuating the present system •••• 
(The money) goes to the "Bosses", to the '11Rings 11 1 · 
to the favored c en tractors; and occasionally, in 
driblets, to inferior mercenaries •••• It ••• will 
grow and spread, whatever party is in power, until 
"the axe is laid at the root of the tree".l2 
This cry of a tortured soul was not that of a starry-eyed 
local government reformer, but of a "substantial citizen." 
His proposed solution, offered in desperation, was to 
restrict the vote to persons paying taxes. The mood of 
such persons in the 1870's and 1880 1 s was one of willing-
ness to accept the solutions to be offered everywhere by 
the local government reform movements at the end of the 
century and thereafter. Charles F. AdanB, former ambas .. 
sador to Britain, scholar and heir of the Adams fwnily, 
commented on legislative domination of local affairs thus: · 
Responsibility has ceased to exist;. •• in the 
greater number of cities, the mayor is reduced 
to a mere cipher, while certain irresponsible 
combinations in the legislative chambers and 
city halls, generally known as "rings u really 
control the administration of affairs. Almost 
of necessity, the executive functions have more 
and more fallen into the hands of commissions 
and boards, as ••• special ••• requirements grow in 
importance •••• Public attention (has} far years 
been forcibly called to these gathering dif-
ficulties by the occurence of scarrlals of ever-
12 6 Ibid., p. 1 o. 
346 
347 
increasing notoriety, more and more discussed.13 
The author went on to state that his town, Quincy, Mas-
sachusetts, had recently adopted a strong-mayor system, 
one of the first, if not actually the first in the nation, 
and concluded: 
Such was and is the Quincy charter, -~ our attempt 
at a solution of the great problem now facing the 
nation. It was. a new departure. • .14 
Thus, his ~oposed solution to the problems of municipalities 
was the securing of a strong-mayor charter from the legis-
lature and the abolition of all state or local independent 
commissions. The problem was the same, and only tte 
proposed solution was different. 
A distinguished Englishman, a member of parliament, 
former member of Gladstcne's cabinet, former rr..ayor of 
Birmingham, leader of a minor political party, after a 
visit to America, gave his impressions of the era in an 
articlel5 which compared the government of Boston with 
the government of his city, Birmingham. Although almost 
exactly the same size {448,000 in 1890 vs. 430,000 in 
1891) 1 in an era when the pound sterling was the standard 
l3Charles F. Adams, ~Municipal Government: Lessons 
from. the Experience of Quincy, Massachusetts", 1892, Forum, 
14:282. 
14 
.!E..!.2.. , p • 2 8.t • 
1.5Joseph Chamberlain, M.P., "Municipal Institutions 
in Amarica and England", 1892, Forum, l!p267. 
of value of the world, he discovered that Bostonians paid 
five times as much for far worse municipal services as did 
Birmingham, citing cost figures and services in detail, and 
we~hting figures to make them directly comparable. He con-
tinued, delicately: 
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A second reason frequently given to account for the 
extravagance of American City expenditure is the alleged 
existence of deliberate dishonesty and corruption prac-
tised on a gigantic scale •••• It is significant, and 
perhaps suggestive, that in Ireland, there ~~ve been 
well-grounded complaints of such practices. 
Profes s'or McBain discussed in some detail this era of 
legislative domination and corruption, and the desire of towns 
to esc~pe such in the late nineteenth and in the twentieth 
centuries .l7 A "muck-raking'' bookl8 written just at the turn 
of the century described the pitiful state of the cities in 
New England, and especially in Massachusetts, in that era. The 
author, a distinguished attorney and professor , described a 
Massachusetts city forced to secure a special bill in the legis-
lature to run a wire across one of its own streets, and many 
other instances of amazing domination of local affairs, and the 
judicial decisions conducing to the situation. He cited in detail 
16 Ibid., p. 279. 
17 . McBain, op. cit.,pp. 5-12; McGoldrick, op . cit., 
pp. 3-4. 
1~rank Parsons, The Bondage of Cities, Philadelphia, 
C.F. Taylor Co., (1900?), no copyright. See also, same author, 
The City for the People, Philadelphia, C.F. Taylor, 1901, no 
copyright; Lincoln Steffens, Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens, 
2 vola, New York, Harco~, Brace and Co., 1931, and for a 
'~coking backwards" analysis, Richard s. Childs, Civic Victories, 
New York, Harper Bros., 1952. 
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acts of the Hassachusetts legislature in 1896, 1897 and 
1898 regulating minute details of insignificant local mat-
ters. His book was an i mpassioned plea, to the effect that 
'~The Bondage of Cities to the Politicans and Monopolists 
Must .Cease": 
Finally, cities and towns are not created by the 
legislature. They may exist and frequently have 
existed without any legislature. Their existence 
gives them the right of local self-government. 
The legislature may use towns and cities to ac-
complish state purposes, and in that relation may 
properly mold their government and functions; but 
it has no more ri ght to deprive them of freedom 
and self-control in local matters than congress 
has to deprive a state of its freedom and self 
control in internal ccn cerns.l9 
The author repeated what is essentially Cooley's Rule of 
local taxation, that taxation must be for a public purpose, 
pertaining to the district or unit taxed, that a city cannot 
be deprived of the use of its private property, since even 
if managanent of that property is transferred, the use must 
rema in. Further, he declared that some courts hold that 
the private property of cities and towns cannot be taken 
20 
away. In trese latter statements,he ·was on sound consti-
tutional grounds, as has been shown abo ve, and will be 
demonstrated below. Thus is presented the interesting 
phenomenon of a professor of law at Boston University, and 
l9~.' p. 391. 
20~., p. 191. 
an attorney of distinguished career, familiar with the law 
of his state and the constitutional history of local govern-
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ment in Massachusetts and New England, asserting nevertheless, 
that New England towns and cities have an inborn right to 
looal self-government by the very fact of their existence. 
It will be seen that this opinion as to the powers of the New 
England town is a hardy flower indeed. 
The influence of this doctrine of inherent or vested 
rieht to local self-government should not be overstated. It 
was a variant, a tool at hand in the hour of need, and not 
much more. As indicated in Chapter II, it served · its purpose 
in ·the years of need in some states, prior to the spread of 
the home rule movement. 
Professor James R. Douglas has traced the course of 
the nineteenth century quite well, but in the polemical style 
of his period. 21 Of the resolution of the forces at work 
in ,this period, he concluded that although in a few states 
"a feeble doctrine was set up by the courts to the effect that, 
wholly in the absence of any express provision in the consti-
tution, municipal corporations enjoyed certain inherent rights 
of local self-governmen~~22 the home rule movements in 
-21 ' James R. Douglas, Home Rule and State Administrative 
Supervision of Municipalities in the United States, Berkeley, 
Univ. of California unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1917. 
22 Ibid., P• 66. 
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the various states were the direct outcome of the legis-
lative corruption and ill-considered"ripper' and other 
special legislation of the late part of that century. 
To the political party municipal patronage was 
vital in order to maintain control, and the 
cities were sacrificed to this end •••• Acting 
through the legal form of the legislature it did 
not stop at governmental expediency but proceeded 
to corruption. Legislative control, which at 
best by all experience had proved ineffectual, 
became intolerable.73 
He stated that the. catalytic element which turned the 
forces of good government, reform, the rising political 
science, the legal reformers, the irate taxpayers, the 
idealists, the anti-political party forces, the economy 
and ef f iciency partisans, the old immigration and t he 
other disparate dissident forces of the nineteenth century 
into the home rule and related city and town manager move-
ments was the Pittsburgh incident of 1901. The Pennsylvania 
legislature, seemingly always in the van of the most shame-
ful of the state legislatures, acted in that year to negate 
the ballots of the voters of Pittsburgh and Alleghany for 
their local officers. The legislature was of one party, 
and the mayors of the two municipalities of the other. 
The 1~ipper1 bill of 1901 removed these legally-elected 
mayors from office, empowered the governor to appoint their 
23 Ibid., PP• 43-44. 
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successors, and to remove them, until the next regular muni-
cipal election in 1903.24 
Professor Arthur B. Winter, in a recent article, 
has traced the same trend: 
The simple desire for self-government, however, 
was not the · sole contributing factor in the 
development of municipal home rule. It may be 
more true to say that the tradition of local 
autonomy was simply a convenient rallying concept, 
rediscovered in the closing years of the nineteenth 
century by those communities which were beginning 
to suffer the adverse effects of centralized legis-
lative and judicial control over local affairs . 
In many cases, the desideratum was not strictly 
"local se If-government" but rather an escape from 
the corrupt practices of state legislatures •••• 
Moreover, underlying these legislative abuses ••• was 
a growing tendency to shift the responsibility for 
local government from the local communities to the 
capital. Generally speaking, the courts2gave aided and abetted the centralization of power. 
His use of the phrase "aided and abetted" as applied to the 
courts of the last century has semantic overtones to attorneys, 
since it is the phrase customarily used to describe accessories 
in felonies. 
Professor James R. Douglas, writing in the early part 
of the twentieth century, saw and demonstrated the same 
trend. He stated that the methods used by those interested 
in reform and/or home rule consisted, among other things, 
24Ibid., pp. 53 et seq. 
25Arthur B. Winter, "Municipal Home Rule, A Progress 
Report?", 1957, 36 Nebraska Law Review 447, at pp. 447-49. 
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in specific constitutional amendments directed against parti-
cular abuses; amendments outlawing special or local laws, 
usually ineffectively; creation of municipal home rule powers 
by statute or constitution, usually also rather inefrectively 
(for reasons which the author has discussed in Chapter II), 
and amounting to not much more in most cases than the power 
to write a charter which the reformers were not qualiried to 
do and make such charters effective; and, lastly, undertaking 
action to secure legislation or constitutional amendments 
transrerring control ovei many runctions of interest to 
municipalities to administrative bodies and/or setting stand-
ards tob e enforced independently or the legislature by new 
proressional departments or agencies, ~ public health, edu-
cation, examining boards for professions and trades, and so on. 
Thus, the literature which has analysed this period 
at the turn or the century demonstrates that many rormerly 
disparate forces, which had never berore turned to overt poli-
tical action, were coalescing into the unified rorces which 
were to lead to the moderate successes or the home rule move-
ments in the various states, and to the spread of the city 
manager and non-partisan expert ideas in the twentieth century. 
In this tumultous era, what was the experience in 
New England in this last half or the nineteenth century? 
Several or the New England writers or the period have been 
described above in this chapter. For an examination or the 
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trends in the individual states, a closer look at the consti-
tutional and documentary materials is here in order. 
Massachusetts 
In 1857, Massachusetts had amended its constitution, 
so that towns no longer had their former influence in the 
legislature . 26 The lower house was based on legislative dis-
tricts under the new arrangement, many of which contained 
several towns, some even including twelve or thirteen. Towns 
became less and less aware of the pendency of legislation 
which might affect their interests.27 
In 1861, a fireworks case similar to the earlier 
Connecticut case of New London v. Brainerd arose in Massa-
chusetts.28 For the court, Justice Bigelow stated what was 
shortly to be known as Dillon's Rule: 
The general principle is well-settled that munici-
pal corporations, like other corporations aggre-
gate, can exercise no powers other than those 
which are conferred on them by the act by which 
they are created, or such as are necessarily in-
cident to the exercise of their corporate rights. 
26 Mass. Constitution, Am. XXI. 
27F.W.G., "The Need of Greater Publicity of Proposed . 
Legislation Affecting Cities and Towns", 1916, 2 Massachusetts 
Law Quarterly 124 . (Complete author's name not available.) 
2~ood v. Mayor and Aldermen of Lynn, 1861, 83 
Mass . 103. The Connecticut case mentioned is City of New 
London v. Brainerd, 1853, 22 Conn. 553. 
the perfection of their corporate duties, and 
the accomplishment of the purposes for which they 
are constituted. 29 
The court mentions with apparent approval Acts and Resolves 
of 1847, ch. 37, reenacted in General Statutes ch. 18, sec. 
79, a "tax-payers' suit" statute, allowing any ten tax-
payers to commence summary action for an injunction to 
restrain a city or town from exceeding its powers . Such 
statutes were common then, as they are now, but do not ap-
pear to have induced action until this post-Civil War 
period. 
In 1863 arose a rather amusing case30 on the 
power of a town to pay lobbyists and bribery experts who 
had succeeded in inducing the legislature to incorporate 
the town . Certain checks were paid over in the night-time 
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after a hasty town meeting, though there were not sufficient 
funds in the town treasury to cover the funds, and the 
checks were drawn on a bank in which the town had no funds. 
Frost and others insisted that such checks were a legal 
obligation of the town, and the author will leave to the 
reader's imagination the retort of the Supreme Judicial 
Court . Soon after, the first of the soldier bonus cases 
29Ibid . , p . 165. For another fireworks case, with 
the same result, see Gerry v . Inhabitants of Stoneham, 1861, 
83 Mass . 319 . 
3~rost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 1863, 88 Mass . 
1S2 . 
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arose in Massachusetts.31 Although these cases were to 
provide the backdrop for a searching examination of the 
town-state constitutional relationship in Connecticut and 
elsewhere in New England, they provide no unusual variations 
in the Massachusetts pattern. The background of these cases 
was the fact that the Union had decided to draft men for ita 
armies, but to avoid any taint of conscription (or forced 
military service) , and also to raise money, it allowed any 
man to secure a suitable substitute or to pay $300 in place 
of his own service. Throughout New England, towns voted to 
levy taxes and to pay from their general funds bonuses of 
$300 to allow their residents to seek substitutes or to be 
paid to residents who chose to serve; a man who enlisted under 
the town quota became thereby entitled to the bonus. In Mass-
achusetts, towns were deemed by the courts to lack the power. 
to make such payments, and early bonus payments were ruled 
invalid on the ground that the powers which had been granted 
by the legislature did not include the power to pay bonuses. 
However, in Massachusetts , a.s everywhere else in New England , 
towns had paid such bonuses, raised troops, constructed 
31To list only a small portion of these, Fowler v. 
Selectmen and Treasurer of Danvers, 1864, 90 Mass. 80; 
Freeland v. Hastings, 1865, 92 Mass. 570; James v. Inhabi-
tants of Scituate, 1865, 93 Mass. 93; Commonwealth v. Norton, 
1865, 93 Mass. 110; Grover v. Inhabitants of Pembroke, 1865, 
93 Mass. 88; Bishop v. Inhabitants of Rochester, 1865, 93 
Mass. 84; Williams v. Inhabitants of Plymouth, 1865, 93 Mass. 
86; Curtis v . Inhabitants of Pembroke, 1865, 93 Mass. 92. 
Among the last of these cases appear to be Marsh v. Inhabi-
tants of Scituate, Sylvester v. Scituate, Nott v. Scituate, 
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bulwarks, and performed other similar acts during the Revolu-
tion. It was a rare town which did not consider itself vested 
with the power to do the same during and after the Civil War, 
and around these facts, the bonus cases revolve. As will be 
discussed below, the early Connecticut case of Hitchcock v . 
Town of Litchfieldr2a Superior Court case from Litchfield 
County in 1790, gave irrefutable judicial recognition of the 
Revolutionary War practices of the towns of Connecticut, and 
hinted at those elsewhere in New England. A great many Mass-
achusetts towns voted such bonuses and paid them through 1862, 
though such were clearly illegal under the law of the state . 
The legislature in 1863 ratified these early payments and 
permitted such bonuses to be voted in the future. 3:3 
Only one of these cases provided material relevant 
to this inquiry. In City of Boston v. Richardson, 34 the 
attorney fo.r the city argued eloquently for the city that it 
had power to act on the basis of its historical rights . 35 
26 N.E. 
3l(continued) James v. Scituate, 1891, 153 Mass . 34, 
412. 
32Hitchcock v. Town of Litchfield, 1790, 1 Root 
(Conn.) 206. 
33Mass. Acts and Resolves of 1863, ch. 38. 
34city of Boston v. Richardson, 1870, 105 Mass . 351. 
35Among the precedents cited in this and other cases 
for t he r i ght and duty of towns to raise soldiers and militia, 
provid arms, and so on, are Plymouth Colonial Laws of 1682, 
183 ed., pp. 71, 114 , 215, 225, 285; Mass. Colonial Records, 
role 1, PP• 84, 187; idem., vol. 2, P• 282; idem., vol. 3, pp. 
26, 32, 256; i dem., vol. 4, p. 83; idem., vol. 5, pp. 399, 412; 
also, the pr ovincial statutes 5 Wm . and Mary, ch. 7, sec. 10, 
21; 16 George III, ch. 1, sec . 4, 7, 20; Statutes of 1776, ch. 
21; 1781, ch . 21. However, the Act of 1777, ch. 41, ratified 
past bonuses and permitted towns to give enlistment bonuses, 
marking an early extension of legislative authority . 
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In a decision which marked a sharp change in philosophy 
from the earlier decisions of Chief Justice Shaw of the 
same court, the 1870 court did not attempt to make the 
colonial facts of history fit the phrase "prudential affairs." 
Instead, it took the positiop that the old order had changed 
with the Revolution and the new constitutions. The court 
itself gave examples of broad town powers, and summed up: 
In the early days of the colony, under .... the 
ordinance of March 3, 1635-36, in relation to 
"the ordering of their own affairs and disposing 
of businesses in their own town," and by the 
Body of Liberties of 1641, art. 66, giving to "the 
freemen of every township power to make such by-
laws and constitutions as may concern the welfare 
of their town, provided they be not of a criminal, 
but only of a prudential nature," and "not repug-
nant to the public laws and orders of the country," 
and to enforce the same by fine not exceeding 
twenty shillings, and by distress, towns exer-
cised much more ext.ensive ·power than they lawfully 
could at the present day. 1 Mass. Col. Rec. 172, 
28 Mass. Hist. Soc. Col. 227, Anc. Chart., 195, 
Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick. 2271 230.36 
In effect, the court rejected the e~rlier specious 
treatment of the colonial history of the relation of town 
and state and substituted for it a view which took f ull 
cognizance of history. Perhaps it might be said that at 
thi s late date it was possible for the courts to admit on 
behal.f of' the state that the Massachusetts towns might well 
have had some valid claim to rights by prescription. 
In this same era, the court grappled with the problem 
of distinguishing between state and local charges on towns, 
36city of Boston v. Richardson, cited in .footnote 
34 above, at 363. 
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the difficulties cau.sed by paupers, bridges, etc., and by 
the irregular burden of taxation caused by such problems, 
where the expenditure was for state purposes, without reaching 
any noteworthy solution.$7; 
The powers of towns and cities were next tested and 
defined in a controversy which resulted :from the growth and 
expansion of the City of Boston. Attempts to annex the 
cities of' West Roxbury and Charlestown to the core city 
provided the occasion for dispute. In the first of' these 
cases,58 West Roxbury attempted to pay members of a committee 
which had been working 1n Boston on behalf of the town to 
secure annexation. The town was held not to have such power 
to pay agents for a purpose not properly related to the 
government of the town, since towns were permitted to tax 
only as specified by statute, and this was not a necessary 
59 
charge. Finally, an annexation statute was secured, 
joining the two suburban communities to Boston. Residents 
in both Charlest~n ani West Roxbury began legal action'40 to 
halt the process, on the grcunds that the provision for popular 
referendum was uncons titutianal and void, end that the act 
violated the obligation of contract, meaning their local 
37Freeland v. Hastings, 1865, 92 Mass. 570. 
~8Minot v. Town of West Roxbury, 1873, 112 Mass. 1. 
39To the same effect was Friend v. Gilbert, 1871, 
108 Mass. 408. 
1t0stone v. City of Charlestown, Minot v. Inhabitants 
of .West Roxbury, 1873, 114 Mass. 214. 
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charters. It is of interest to note that the municipalities 
o:t New England have never tired to this day of asserting that 
their charters are in effect contracts with the state legis-
lature, and hence protected by federal and state constitutions, 
despite the fact that the- argument, as stated in this bald 
form, has never succeeded anywhere. Charter guarantees, in 
the absence of constitutional. amendment specifically to the 
contrary, have no effect whatever on legislative powers. As 
to the provision for popular referendum, the crurt had no 
dittlcul ty in finding that valid. Althoo.gh only a few courts 
have explained fully the historical reason why such local 
ref'~renda on proposed laws affecting particular communities 
have been uniformly upheld, the origin of the rule is curiw.s. 
It is based upon immemorial historical practice running back 
into the unknown past, and was stated in its modern form by 
Thomas M. Cooley, ~l to whan the rule was eminently logical 
and entirely ecnscnant with his theory of the constitutional 
balance of the American system. Since the people have all 
power, and have granted only a apecified part of it to their 
legislatures, an~ since constitutions rarely contain direct 
provision applicable to the situation, then, said Cooley, 
the people must have retained this power to approve local 
laws as well, if the legislature shruld decide to refer such 
laws. Charlestown alleged again, as i't had successfully 1n 
the pastJ ~2 that the annexation act wa s unconstitu tional 
11 . 
. Thomas. M. Cool.e.y,_ .Cona.ti.tut.i.onal . L.imitations, 
7th. e_d_., op. cit., pp • . 163-..174. 
~2warren v. Mayor and Alderman of Charlestown, 
1854, 68 Mass. 84. 
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because i t made no speciric provision ror guaranteeing to 
the city residents their rights in relation to sending 
representatives to the legislature . The court pointed out 
that representatives were no longer sent by towns and cities, 
but by districts set up by the legislature, with apportion-
men t made by such boards as the legislature might select, and 
that, thererore , its earlier decision was no longer applic-
able . It repeated once again: 
••• towns and cities., being but quasi corpora-
tions established mainly ror political purposes, 
it is within the power and has always been the 
practice, of the Legislature, in changing the 
boundaries or either, or in annexing one to 
another, to provide how the property or the ror-
mer corporations, and the burden of paying their 
debts, shall be distributed among them. Such 
transrers or the property or or the debts of such 
corporations do not affect the oblig~gion of 
contracts previously made by either . 
A case which clearly foreshadowed the ruture of 
municipalities in Massachusetts arose in that same year . 44 
It concerned the abolition by the legislature or school 
districts, with all outstanding rights, duties, contracts, 
and property rormerly belonging to the districts·transrerred 
to the towns in which they were located.45 To t he ensuing 
protest, the state supreme court ruled: 
43stone v. Charlestown, Minot v. w. Roxbury, cited 
in rootnote 40 above, p. 223. 
44Rawson v. Spencer, 1873, 113 Mass. 40 . 
sec. 6. 
45Mass. Acts and Resolves or 1869, ch. 110~ 423~ 
These objections to the statutes are not well 
taken ••• school districts ••• were public and 
political as distingu.ished from private corpora-
tions, end their rights and powers were held at 
the will of the Legislature. to be modified or 
abolished as the public welfare might reqJ.ire •••• 
The obligation of contracts is not 1mpa1red.~6 
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Althcugh there were earl! er cases to this same effect, this 
was the first time tm t the Massachusetts court had stated 
plainly the fact that the property of a munic 1pal corporation 
might be stripped from it • and transferred to another public 
corporation, without any benefit whatever to the original 
corporation. In fact, the ultimate case was here presented 
of the transfer of all the property of a municipality and 
the extinction of that body. The implicit finding of tm 
court is that henceforth, any of the property or intangible 
rights of a municipal corporation may be taken from it by 
legislative action, as long as the agency whiCh receives the 
property or rights is a part of the govemmental machinery. 
Despite the obvious di.ff'erence between the socio-economic 
complex which is a city or town, and such an artificial body 
as a school district, such difference was never recognized 
by the Massachusetts courts. A municipal corporation was a 
municipal corporation, and Rawson v. Spencer had determined 
the law to be applied. The patbray was set for the rise of 
authorities and metropolitan districts in Massachusetts. 
With this holding, little remained of the principle that towns 
and cities might have a private corporate character as concerns 
46 Rawson v. Spencer, cited in footnote 44 above ~ a t 45. 
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portions ot t he:Jr property and rights, beyond the reach of 
the legislature. It remained doubtful 1i' the Massachusetts 
crurts then or now would uphold a statute which transferred 
municipal property to a private individual or corporation 
for his or its sole benefit, w1 th no resul ti~ benefit to the 
residents ot the community involved, or at leaat with no 
benefit to the people of the state, and indirectly to the 
residents of the conmunity. It largely was the character 
of the transferree which was to govem the validity of 
transfer henceforth, with the question of benefit to the 
municipality thus deprived of its property or rights being 
of little moment, and ideas of constitutional guarantees or 
the private property rights of a public corporation applicable 
only if the transferree were of non-public character. 
A constitutional case in 1874, s imilar to the West 
Roxbury one just dis cussed, concerned the proposed annexatiCil 
·47 
of the Town of Brookline to Boston. Moneys had been spent 
by the town to oppose the annexation. The case presented a 
good review of the status and powers of town in Massachusetts; 
the decision was, of course, that the town had no right to 
spend money tor a purpose not permitted by charter or statute. 
The phrasing of the decision was a bit strange, since it 
referred clearly to constitutio~l rights of towns. It would 
appear that the court still thought of towns as being entitled 
to the protection of certain constitutional guarantees. 
~7 Coolidge v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 1874, 
114 Mass. 592. 
. (Towns} are political orgail.izations, created tor 
political purposes and as mere instrumentalities 
by which the L.egislature administers certain laws 
within particular limits.... Within what limits 
a particular municipal corporation shall exercise 
these powers, whether it shall be divided, its 
boundaries changed, or its territory annexed to 
another municipality, is tor the Legislature, in 
the absence of constitutional restriction, to 
determine ••• 48 
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Hill v. Boston,49 tour years later, ·presented the crurt with 
the argument from history that the early acts of the state 
legislature tow~d towns could not be analyzed on the basis 
ot the status of the towns as municipal corporations, because 
in tact none o:r the towns were incorporated until after t~ 
Revolution. The court parried neatly, giving its own scholarly 
account of the origins and legal status of towns in Massacbu.-
setts, England, md elsewhere in the United States, explain-
ing, 
At the first settlement of the Colony, towna ••• 
became in effect municipal or quasi corporations, 
withc.ut any formal act of incorporation ••• Stat. 
1785, c. 75 s. a, for the first time expressly 
enacted that "the inhabitants of every tqwn 
within this government are hereby_declared to 
be a body politic and corporate.-sO· 
From these last cases it will be seen that the attorneys tor 
the towns and cities were taking advantage of the New England 
materials unearthed for them by the historians and poll tical · 
scientista in this era when the study and writing of his tory 
was becoming more and mare an exact a:rt. The bases tor these 
~8 Ibid., p. 596. 
-49 
· Hill v. City of Boston, 1877, 122 Mass. 344. 
50~., p. 349. 
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arguments have been discussed in Chapter III, above. 
The tone ot the court hardened again in Agawam v. 
Hampden.51 On the cp.estion as to whether the legislature 
might set up a board to carry rut public . works in an area, 
and empower the board to determ~ne on its own standards the 
amcunt to be assessed upon each municipality deemed 
benefitted, requiring local o1'1'io1als to levy taxes as 
directed, the crurt returned an unqualified yes, and took 
advantage or the opportun1 ty to jettison what it considered 
its too-wide decision 1n Ccunty ot Hampshire v. County of 
Franldin.52 _ That case, discussed in the previous chapter, 
had held that municipalities were entitled to constitutional 
protections against being deprived or their property without 
ben fi t to them. As already pointed out, tha. t rule was in 
process of being changed to take into accrunt the public or 
privat e character of the transferee, and this case marked 
the clean b r eak. Referring back to Norwich v . County 
Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60, the court stated that that 
decision first distinguished Hampshire v. Fr.anklin. The 
court then proceeded to overrule Hampshire v • . Franldin by 
distinguishing it out o!' existence, remarking that all state-
ments as to vested rights there given were dicta. The dictum 
device has been discussed t n ·Chapter . Ii; above, -· and here 
we find it being applied again as part or the normal procedure 
ot the growth of the common law. 
51 rnhabitants of Agawam v. I nhabitants of the County 
of Hampden , 1881 , 130 Mas s . 528 • 
. 52 Inhabitants of the County of Hampshire v . Inhabi -
tants of t he County of Franklin, 1819 , 16 Mass 75 . 
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To1~s ••• are strictly public corporations, estab-
lished for the convenient administration of govern-
ment; their municipal powers and duties are not cre-
ated and regulated by contract, express or implied, 
but by acts passed by the legislature from time to 
time, according to its judgment of what the interests 
of the public require; and they have not the same 
rights to judicial trial and determination, in regard 
to the obligations imposed upon them, as other corpo-
rations and individuals have •••• The Statute ••• is 
within the power vested in the Legislature by the Con-
stitution; and all questions of the justice or exped-
iency of the exercise of that power must b~ determined 
by the Legislature, and not by the courts.~3 · 
The court thus ceded the field to the legislature, and the ab-
solute subordination of the Massachusetts municipality might 
well be said to date from this point. The importance of the 
case lies not in the fact that the legislature's power to invest 
boards with certain discretionary functions is a s serted, since 
there were many previous cases upholding that power, but in 
the chipping away of the last guarantees of due process and 
vested rights in regard to local units. Only the shadow area 
of protection against divestment by the legislature for the 
sole benefit of a private party remained, and that only by im-
plication. 
The compleat statement of the absolute subjection of 
the municipality in Massachusetts was made in the Boston Salvation 
Army cornet player case.54 The cornetist was arrested under a 
regulation against itinerant street · musicians promulgated by 
the "ripper" police board of Boston. Thus, a city 
53Ibid., pp. 530, 538. 
54commonwealth v. Plaisted, 1889, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 
224, 2 L.R.A. 142. 
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resident was arrested £or an offense defined not by statute 
or by municipal ordinance, but by ukase of a state board set 
up specifically to take control of police matters away fran 
the city. The musician's attorney made a gpod case of it, 
arguing on behalf of Boa ton that the city was being deprived 
of its inherent right to local self-government, contrary to 
the principles of the natural law am the social compact. 
With the strong breeze of the New York Troy Police Board 
decision, the Connecticut dissents and the midwestern espousal 
of the inherent right doctrine behind him, the Sal vat ion Army 
cornetist struck for freedom rrom legislative tyranny and ror 
the rights of the city. Even the stalwart centralist Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial ·Court, whose decisions had rormed 
a good part of tm basis or Dillonts statement or local rights, 
wavered a bit, as may be judged by the :f'ollowing quotation 
from its decision, but finally held rast. 
It is also suggested ••• that the statute or 
1885 is unconstitutional, because it takes rram 
the city the power of sel.f-govemment in matters 
of internal police. We :f'im no provision or the 
constitution with which it conflicts, and we can-
not declare an act of the legislature invalid 
because it abridges the exercise or the privilege 
of local sel.f-government in a particular ·to which 
such privilege is not guaranteed by any provision 
of the constitution. Whll e the court recognizes 
our system of town govemments as an. 1nhe.rent"£eart . 
of our ~eral ~.stem or f!vernment, so that t 
· le iSla e cou not abo sh tbB . town . s t«n with-
au com ng . con c . . sane par s o s 
proviSions! {et In most respects, It leaves the 
power and u 'l or providing law~ . for tb9 govern-
ment of towns and cities . In the discretion of the 
legislature.... Tbe several tOwns ana cities are 
agencies of government, largely under the control 
of the legislature. The powers and duties o.f all 
the towns and cities, except insofar as they 
are specifically provided for in the consti tug~ on, 
are created and defined by the legislature.*. 
(Italics mine.) 
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There was little left of local rights at this point, and the 
succeeding cases on town and city powers mirrored and referred 
back to this case . Meanwhile, in a minor victory, the towns 
had won the right from the legislature, 56 by two-thirds vote 
in town meeting, to spend money to represent their int erests 
before the legislature and its committees. Hence, although 
they were no longer represented in the legislature, except 
indirectly, and were the creatures of that body, at least 
they might appear to give testimony as they saw fit in regard 
to actions concerning them. A garden-v~riety case57 two years 
later denied to the Town of Peabody the right to light its 
streets and sell electric power to its resident s, since no 
such power had ever been granted by the legislature. In this 
era, the Massachusetts courts were the firm friends of private 
enterprise, so this attempt by Peabody to provide power and 
l ight was doubly predestined to failure. The usual statement 
of legislative supremacy was made. In that same year, the 
state supreme court confirmed58 the right of the legislature 
to set up the first of the great multi-city authorities which 
exercise such power in Massachusetts today. Part of city and 
1891, 
55 I bid~, PP• 227-28 . 
56Ma.ss . Acts and Resolves of 1889, ch. 380. 
57spaulding v. Inhabitants of the Town of Peabody, 
153 Mass. 123, 26 N.E. 421. 
58 Kingman v. Metropolitan Sewerage Commissioners, 
1891, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N.E. 778. 
town powers might be given to such authorities at the will 
or the legislature, according to the court . 
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In the situation which gave rise to the Opinion of 
the Justices of 1890, 59 the Supreme Judicial Court had been 
asked by the lower house of the legislature whether it might 
authorize towns and cities by law to set up municipally-
owned enterprise to supply wood and coal to their residents . 
The court recoiled as ir a cobra had been dropped in their 
midst, but managed to say no . The majority of the court 
made what would be viewed today as a quite conservatively-
oriented statement . This was not enough for Justice Barker , 
who filed a separate opinion stating that he considered it 
beyond the constitutional power of government itself to 
engae;e in trade or manufacture "merely for the purpose of 
having any branch of business conducted upon a convenient 
or economical plan. "60 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr . 
was alone in his opinion, in accord with his generally per-
missive attitude toward legislative acts, stating that 
••• surely wood and coal, if furnished by a 
public body to the public without discrimination, 
is no less public a purpose than when it is water , 
gas, electricity, education, pauper support, or 
the taking of land for railroads or public 
markets . 61 
The majority opinion provided an interesting summary of what 
the court regarded as the former and present position of the 
59opinion of the Justices , 1892, 155 Mass . 598, 
30 N. E. 1142 . 
60Ib1d., 30 N. E. 1146 . 
61 Ibid .. , ibid . 
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towns of the Commonwealth, includ~ng same opinions of their 
early powers which would certainly have shocked Justice Shaw. 
The early usages of towns undoubtedly did not 
exhaust the authority which the legislature can 
confer upon municipalities to levy taxes •••• 
Up to the present time, however, none of the purposes 
for which cities and towns have been authorized to 
raise money has included anything in the nature of 
what is commonly called "trade" or "conmercial 
business." Instances can be found of same very 
curious legislation by ·towns in the colonial and 
provincial times, some or which would certainly 
now be thrught to be beyond thB powers o? towns 
under the constitution. WhiteVJer the theory was, 
towns, In fact, under the colony charter, arid far 
some time under the province charter, often acted 
as if their lowers were limited only by the oalnlan 
of the liihib tan ts as to iha t was best to be one. 
This was tJ:le resUlt of tEelr peculiar situation 
and · condi tloiL... and the powers of towns or o!. the 
general court were not much considered. The exer-
cise of these extraordinary pOI'l'ers~ however, 
fra.du9lu died rut. The purposes or Which, by 
be pro nee laws, towns were authorized to raise 
money were for the maintenance of highways, the 
support of the ministry, schools, and the poor, 
and for defraying of other necessary charges aris-
ing within the town. The words "necessary charges" 
are still retained in the statutes, but they have 
been strictly construed by the courts. We do not 
find either in the colony or the provino e laws any 
legislation relating to the buying and selling of 
coal or wood by towns for the use of inhabitants, 
or any legislation on any similar subject. It is 
possible that there may be found in the records of 
same town a vote or votes showing that the town, 
in an emergency, was authorized to buy wood or 
coal to supply their ig~~bitants with fuel, but 
we have not found any .. _.2.-, (Italics mine) 
The majority rested its opinion on the statement that they 
did not belie ~ that the setting up of such an enterprise to 
supply fuel was a "public purpose" so as to justify the 
levying of 1 oe a1. taxes. That this dec is ion was ent :1r ely in 
. 
62rbid., '%/'\ N E 1144 t.AJ • • • 
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the spirit of the times has been shown above in this chapter. 
The Holmes dissent, of course, indicates that he believed 
that the supplying of fuel was as much a public purpose as 
was the supplying o:f any other utility already permitted 
by law and court decisions in the state. 
In 1895 came the Mount Ho£e Cemeter~ case,63 which 
Professor Frank J. Goodnow, writing in the era, 64 mistook as 
a turning point in the course of American decisions. Actual-
ly, a close reading of the case will show that it fitted per-
fectly into the stream of Massachusetts decisions, merely 
making explicit what was hinted at in Agawam v. Hampton.65 
The City of Boston had purchased and set aside certain lands 
for burial purposes. The legislature ordered these lands 
transferred to a private burial corporation, with no compen-
sation to the city, and no eventual bene:fit to the city. While 
the result might easily have been foretold, and was entirely 
in accord with the previous cases, it is a little amusing to 
consider the Supreme Judicial Court in the process of justify-
ing some earlier facile overstatements as to contract rights, 
the private character o:f public corporations, and so on. From 
the tone of the court and the chronology of this and the 
Salvation fl~my cornetist case, a conclusion that the court 
was acting to put certain parts of Boston's property beyond 
63Proprietors of Mount Hope Cemetery v. City of 
Boston, 1893, 158 Mass . 509, 33 N.E. 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515. 
64Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, op. cit., ch. 1 . · It 
is likely, however, that Goodnow was availing himself of the 
privilege of writers in jurisprudence to overstate their cases . 
65cited in footnote 51 above • 
the reach of the legislature might well be justified. The 
court asserted that the legislative action was a violation 
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of federal and state constitutions, a deprivation of property 
without due process of law and without due compensation; 
further, that towns and cities of the Commonwealth have a 
private character beyond the reach of the legislature; and 
further, other property of the City of Boston which the 
legislature had not even tried to affect wa s also beyond the 
power of the legislature to transfer. While Hampshire v, 
Franklin, Agawam v. Hampden, and Mount Hope Cemetery v, 
Boston make a harmonious whole, they do so only if one 
ignores many of the words which the court used and remembers 
exactly what the court was trying to decide . While the court 
did not say that it was limiting its opinion in the Mo unt Hope 
case to the fact that the legislature cannot transfer the 
property of the cities and towns to private interests without 
compensation, that is what it actually decides , The language 
of the court is broad and sweeping in Mount Hope, but this is 
the age of the revolt against state legislatures, and even 
the Supreme Judicial Court could not remain ever aloof, The 
example of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which had allowed 
the sacking of Philadelphia by the legislature, and which had 
approved the setting up of an independent state board for the 
construction of the city hall for that city, with the members 
specified by name and made self-perpetuating,66 would seem 
6 ~-ouglas, op it 62 
-lJ ~ c • ' p. • 
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to have been too much for the Massachusetts court. Be that 
as it may, the Mount Hope case remains the closest the 
Supreme Judicial Court ever came to recognizing local rights 
immune to legislative interference. That it did recognize 
the private character of municipal corporations as strongly 
as it did was undoubtedly a 1 arge ractor in forming the 
present major stream of tbe American law of municipal corpora-
t i ons which remains much the same as that of the CoDJnonweal th, 
and recognizes the rock in the stream of legislative control 
marked out by Mrunt Hope and the similar oases of other 
s t ates. To quote the court, speaking thrrugh Justice Allen: 
By a pretty general concurrence of opinion ••• 
this legislative power ••• is not universal and 
does not extend to property acquired by a city 
or town for special purposes not ••• public and 
political, but in respect to which a city or town 
is deemed rather to have a right of private owner-
ship of which it cannot be deprived against its 
will save by the right of eminent domain with ••• 
compensation.... In this commonwealth, the ques-
tion has not directly arisen in reference to the power 
of the legislature to compel a transfer of the prop-
erty of a city or town, but the double character of 
cities and towns ••• has very often been adverted to • 
••• the cemetery falls within the class of property 
which the city owns in its private or proprietary 
character as a private corporation might own it, 
and •·· is protected under the constitution of 
Massachusetts and of the United States so that 
the legislature has no power to require its trans-
fer without compensation ••• even the state itself 
has no power to req1ire the city ~~ transfer title 
.from public to private ownership . 
The justice added, portentously and gratuitously: 
Boston 1s possessed of much other property which 
••• is held for the benefit of the public, but in 
6 7Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, cited in footnote 
63 above , p. 511. 
--- - -------- -
other respects, is held more like the property 
of a private corporation. Notably among these 
may be mentioned its ••• waterworks ••• parks 68 market ••• hospltal, and ••• library. 
• • • 
and stated further that it was not possible to give a full 
or exact enumeration of the kinds of property held in this 
private capac ity. 
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The Boo ton Subway case of 1896 69 will demonstrate 
why the 8U ·thor is of tb.e opinion tha. t the Mount Hope case 
marked no real turn in the outlook of the court. Too legis-
lature had provided that cons true ti on of the Boston subway 
would be authorized providing that the proposal was approved 
in a referendum in the city. It provided further that the 
co s t of construction of the subway was to be levied largely 
on Booton . Upon completion-, the tubes, stations, and facil-
ities were to be turned over free of charge to be operated by 
a privately-run and owned company. The referendum p roposition 
was approved by the voters, but .several Boston citizens brought 
suit to h~ t the construction on the ground that the subway 
was not a proper public charge, that it interfered with the 
city's poosession of its park land, the common, and that it 
was a transfer of the property of tbe city to a private cor-
pora tion. Admittedly the public policy aspects did not loom 
...,. . as large in this case as in the Mount Hope situation ; never-
theless, the principle was much t he same. The court's 
decision denying an injunction lacked any of the warning 
quality of Moon t Hope : 
_68rbid., p. 513. 
69 Prince v. Crocker, 1896, 166 Mass. 347, 44 N.E . 446. 
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It has ••• been est ablished by a great weight or usage 
and authority that the legislature may impose such 
a duty and burden upon the towns and cities without 
their own consent. We do not deem it necessary ••• to 
consider what objects may be so special or local in 
their character as not to come within the general 
rule •••• The powers ••• given to cities and towns by 
the legislature are in no sense a contract, and do 
not become vested rights against the legislature •••• 
The plaintiffs also contend that the statute is in 
violation of the fourteenth amendment to the consti-
tution of the United States. This objection is 
not dwelt upon in the argument, and it is enough to 
say that we think it is unfounded.70 
Thus, the court left the situation as to the property rights 
of c i ties and towns in their private characters a little murky. 
The court said that it was unnecessary to consider what pro-
perty was beyond the control of the legislature, but that some 
was. Even though a transrer to a private corporation was in-
tended in the Boston subway case, this type of transrer was 
valid. It would seem at this point in the development of the 
constitutional state-local relationship, the municipalities 
had little left to them. 
Connecticut 
In the summer and fall of 1863, nearly all of the 
towns of Connecticut passed soldier bonus laws while the 
legislature was not in session. These laws usually provided 
for a payment of one hundred to three hundred dollars to each 
man who received a draft notice, to be kept by him or to be 
used to secure a substitute to take his place in the Union 
Army. Opinion in Connecticut differed on these bonus laws, 
some thinking them an evil which subverted the call to the 
70Ibid., 44 N. E. 448-9. 
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colors of the good citizens of the community, and others 
thinking that bonus laws tended to drain off the wastrels and 
t o leave good family men, factory workers, and product! ve 
craftsmen of all kinds a.t home to support the war effort by 
their production of arms and other war materials. In any case, 
at the next legislative session, the General Assembly voted to 
empower the towns to confirm their earlier actions. A few 
did not, such a s Harwinton and Canaan, and this gave rise to 
some legal difficulties. At the next session, the General As-
sembly validated all such ordinances and by-laws, regardless 
of whether the towns confirmed or not, in order to protect the 
men who had relied on the original town actions. 71 Thi s politi-
cal setting provided the background for the Civil War bonus 
cases, which wiped out any last vestige of pretense to town 
rights inherent or protected against the legislatures~ A few 
isolated dissents late in the century mar ked a temporary re-
vival of the idea in Connecticut, during the same period in 
which the Cooley decision in the Hurlbut case72 was causing a 
renascence for the theory elsewhere. There were a great number 
of these soldier bonus cHses,73 and no purpose is served by 
considering them all. A few selected ones show the reasoning 
typical of all. 
71For a good description of the background and signi-
ficance of these Civil War soldier bonus cases, see Potter v. 
Town of Canaan, 1870, 37 Conn. 222, 225. 
72Peop1e ex reL LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 1871, 24 Mich. 44, 
at 100, 9 Am . Rep. !o2. 
73see, e.g., Potter v. Canaan, cited in footnote 71 
above; Bartholomew v. Town of Harwinton, 1866, 33 Conn. 408; 
Waldo v . Town of Portland, 1866, 33 Conn. 363; O'Connor v. City 
of Waterbury, 1897, 69 Conn. 211; Usher v. Town of Colchester 
1866, 33 Conn. 567; Stuart v. Warren, 1870, 37 Conn. 225. ' 
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Unlike the situation in Massachusetts, in many parts 
o~ the state there was little enthusiasm for the war. New 
Haven, in particular, was a center of anti-Lincoln sentiment. 
An his tori an ot t~ period commented that 
Up to September 1, 1862 there bad been 319 
enlistments. Resolutions offered in the Septem-
ber Town Meeting to facilitate the coming draft 
were opposed by Mr. James Gallagher, and were 
rejected. Part i san feeling became so violent 
that it was deemed best to send a committee from 
New Haven to washington to request the arrest and 
confinement of all persons discouraging the enlist-
ments. In the summer of 1863, the dr.aft came, and, 
tor a short period, New Haven was threatened with 
riot. The same party-riot that shed blood in the 
streets of New York during those dreadful July da~ 
appeared in New Haven also, but was overawed by the 
firmness of the authorities. On the 23rd of July, 
the Town Meeting passed by-laws to relieve the 
harsher features of the draft. The principal 
amelioration was in the vote that the town would 
hereafter purchase exemption for any conscript 
whose family necessities re~ired his presence at 
home. In January, 1864, the selectmen were author-
ized to pay three hundred dollars to set free any 
citizen from enrollment. The town was generous 
with money during this year, and voted large sums 
for tb3 p.1.rposes of the war. 74 
Another of t~ Connecticut historians, who seemed to have 
al.la.red himself to be carried away a bit, described the part 
o~ the towns in the Civil War tlms: 
In the April of 1861, the Connecticut governor 
called for a regiment o~ volunteers to till 
President Lincoln's cal.l on the camnonwealth •••• 
The step was unauthorized by law, rut the governor · 
relied on the general assembly to validate it at 
the coming session •••• But the curious feature of 
the case, as illustrating the survival underneath 
of the prim.i ti ve constitution of the commonwealth, 
74 . . . . 
· Charles Levermore, The Town and City Government of 
New Haven ( Jolms Hopkins University Studies in Historical aiii 
Politlcil Science, 4th series) : Bal. timore, Johns Hopkins 
University, 1886 __ , pp. 54-55. See also Crofut and Morris, 
Military and Civil Historz of Connecticut During the War of 
1861-65, there cited. 
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is the way in which the work was done. The common-
wealth was met by an emergency utterly unprovided 
for by law; the legislature was not in session, and 
the governor was the only available representative 
of commonwealth power. All this apparent chaos did 
not disturb the people in the least. They fell back 
at once upon the resources of their town system, as 
they would have done in 1637. Town meetings all over 
the State met and exercised their reserved powers to 
tide over the crisis. Money was voted to support the 
families of volunteers, and to insure a prompt re-
sponse to the governor's call. By tens and fifteens 
and twenty-fives, the little towns poured in their 
contributions of men; the cities and large towns 
sent larger numbers, and added larger contributions 
of money; and soon the governor was justified in 
going to Washington and inducing the admini stration 
to accept three regiments from Connecticut instead 
of one. 
When the legislature met in May, it ratified the 
governor's acts, and appropriated $2,000,000 for 
military expens19s •••• It may be said with considerable 
accuracy that the commonwealth organization did little, 
and had little to do, for the conduct of the war; 
the war was managed, as far as Connect·icut was con-
cerned, by the towns, just as in the American Revo.lu-
tion. Many of them are still staggering under the 
l oad of debt which bears witness to their unselfish 
devotion to the cause.75 
Justice Butler warmed up on the first of these bonus 
cases, Baldwin v. North Branford,76 brought to the Supreme 
Court after the validating legislation of N0 vember 13, 1863 . 
The language of that statute is so peculiar and so suggestive 
that it is well worth quoting. 
75 . Alexander Johnston, Connecticut: A Study of a 
Commonwealth-Democracy, 2d ed., Boston and New York, Houghton-
Mifflin & Co., pp. 376-78. The first edition of this work 
was dated 1887. Although the author has his doubts about 
the accuracy of this historian, his influence on historical 
and political literature of' the last century cannot be over-
stated. 
76Baldwin v. Town of North Branford, 1864, 32 Conn. 
47. 
Whereas oertain towns of this state, since the 
first day of July, 1863, ••• without authority 
of 1 aw have appropriated money to aid persons 
drafted ••• in case a majority of the legal 
voters of such town, • • • shall vote to confirm 
such previous action, then the same shall be 
considered good and valid in the same manner 
as if such town or towns had the inherent, legal 
power to so appropriate money . '1'7 
Yet, this strange wording, bizarre as an instance of legal 
draftsmanship, had little effect on the Supreme Court of 
Errors. Justice Butler spoke for the full court, as bs was 
to in all these cases: 
••• the ·towns do not possess, and have never 
possessed any inherent legal power •••• But as 
we have already said, all their powers are 
statutory and (there is) want or power to act 
at all in respect to any specific subject matter • 
••• The action is illegal because the "legal 
authority" or "authority of law" has not been 
delegated or has been withheld."78 
The next su.ch case, Booth v. Woodbury, 79 . was the major 
Connecticut bonus case, and received the Closest attention 
from court and ccunsel. Attorneys Seymcur and Huntingdon, 
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:for the town, argued from the facts of his tory and traditional 
concept of the municipality in English law. 
But the right ·Of towns in Connecticut to appro-
priate money :from their treasuries, and lay taxes 
to pay bcunties in furtherance of the necessities 
of the general government in time of war is not 
urged now for the first time. It was a right 
constantly exercised up to the establisAment of 
our state constitution. · (Citing Hollister's 
History of Connecticut, 88, 147; Cothren's History 
of Waterburz, 188; 2 ·Kent Commentaries, 4th ed., 
2~; De Toqueville•s Democracy in America, 40). 
It is a right judicially recognized. (citing 
77Ibid., ·p. 49. 
'?P~ 
-.Lbid. 1 P• 54. 
7~ooth v. Town of Woodbury, 1864, 32 Conn. 118. 
Hitchcock v. Litchfield80 ) . The constitution of 
this state is a limitation o~ powers. (Citing 
Starr v. Pease81) . It has never limited the power 
of towns in this particular. By the terms of the 
constitution itself, all rights that corporations 
had previous to its establishment, are expressly 
guaranteed, save as expressly restricted by that 
instrument. Constitution, art. 10, sec. 3. The 
case of New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552 
differs in all the above particulars from the case 
at bar. (Referring next to the bonus by-law.) . 
That act is opposed to no provision of the state 
or national constitutions. It can only be adjudged 
invalid on the ground that it is opposed to natural 
right and justice . Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 
149.82 
80A Superior Court case from Litchfield County, 
Hitchcock v. Town of Litchfield, 1790, 1 Root (Conn.) 206. 
It is directly in point, since it concerned a soldier bonus 
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law passed by the town of Litchfield benefitting troops who 
enl isted in the Revolutionary Armies, but the court did not 
choose to follow it. In the Litchfield case, the to n, at a 
proper town meeting, voted a bonus to men of the area who had 
enlisted or would in the future enlist. The town refused to 
pay, and the soldier conc,erned brought this action. The town 
alleged lack of ccnsideration, but the court swept this away, 
and held the town liable to the soldier for the sum promised. 
At no point in the case did anyone raise any point of the power 
of the town to do so. It appears that such power was taken 
for granted. 
8lstarr v. Pease, 1831, 8 Conn. 541. Cases contro-
verting the question whether the Connecticut Constitution of 
1818 was a "limiting" document, or a "granting" document, 
ran through the courts for years. See Pratt v. Allen, 1839, 
13 Conn. 119, which supported the Starr case entirely. For 
earlier cases, see Calder v . Bull, 1798, 3 u.s. 386, in Conn., 
2 Root 352, Lawrey v. Gridley, 1862, 30 Conn. 458, and for 
later cases, vVheeler's Appeal, 1877, 45 Conn. 307; Norwalk 
Street Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 1897, 69 Conn. 576. For a well-
written case, harmonizing many of the earlier decisions, see 
State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1900, 73 Conn. 255. The Norwalk 
Street Ry. case overrules Wheeler's Appeal, and pretty much 
marks the end of the trail begun by Starr v. Pea . • 
82Booth v. Woodbury, cited in footnote 79, above, 
at 123 . 
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Although the argument would have warmed Judge Cooley's 
heart, Judge Butler's answer was blunt. He quoted from 
Abendroth v. Greenwich83 and Willard v. Killingly, 84 and 
concluded : 
Such is the law repeatedly recognized by this 
court, and it is quite too late to urge for 
(towns) the possess ion of ariy inherent rights 
or powers not expressly or impliedly delegated85 to them by the legislative power of the state. 
Webster v. Harwinton86 was decided at the same 
time. Andrews, the attorney for the town, again tried the 
historical and prescriptive right plea: 
••• the towns of this state have always exercised 
the right thus to raise money, and if it is not 
among the original powers, have obtained it by 
prescription. (The counsel here read extracts 
from the town records of a large number of towns, 
showing that in the Revolution most of the towns 
in this state passed votes of the same nature as 
those under consideration.) Our present consti-
tution preserves to the towns all the powers which 
they have ever possessed. Art. 10, sec. 3 ••••• 
The whole history of Connecticut shows that the power 
of the state is but the aggregate of the towns, 
rather than that the authority of the towns is 
par celled out :from the powers of the state . 87 
(Insert by court reporter.) 
Justice Butler, giving the decision of the court in 
a learned opinion, traced the history of Connecticut towns: 
83Abendroth v. Town of Greenwich, 1860, 29 Conn. 356. 
84Willard v. Warden, Burgesses and Freemen of the 
Borough of Killingly, 1830, 8 Conn. 247. 
124 . 
85Booth v. Woodbury, cited in footnote 79 above, p. 
86Webster v. Town of Harwinton, 1864, 32 Conn. 131 . 
87Ibid., p. 134 . 
The authorities cited are with one exception 
historians, and certainly the towns have been 
liberally ••• praised by them. Doubtless ••• 
they have said ••• that when the constitution 
of 1639 was framed and adopted ••• towns gave 
up a part of their corporate powers ••• and 
r etained the rest in absolute right. But these 
views have been expressed ••• without sufficient 
reflection or examination, and are not correct 
in principle or sustained by our colonial records 
or by any adjudication of our c0.1rts. As the 
plaintiffs fru.nd their motion ••• on tl:s. t c1 aim of 
reserved power i n the towns, and ba ve urged it 
with apparent confidence, we will briefly examine 
it.B8 
The oourt went on to reason scholastically that if a t own 
claims it is a corporati on, with reserved rights as a 
corporation, it must clailn to have received the right to 
incorporate !'rom some superior power. 
The men who thus conferred supreme and exclus i ve 
legislative, executive and judicial power, and 
all power except that ot electirif magistrates, 
upon the general court, spoke o y w en they 
had occasion to speak, and meant all they said; 
and the. t entire and exclusive gxoant wculd not 
have left a scintilla of corporate power remain-
ing in themselves, as inhabitants at the towns, 
if any such had then existed.89 
However• Connecticut history shows no such superior power 
wh ich could have created corporate rights, unless it is in 
t he state itself. The constitution of 1639 recognizes the 
towns as existing municipalities, but not as corporate or 
independent, and makes no reservation, expressly or 
impliedly, of property or of legis l ative power in their 
favor. The constitution of 1639 purport~ on its face t o 
be the work of the people, not of the towns, and having 
88 Ibid., p. 136. 
89~.,pp. 137, 138. 
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created a legislature, they gave it supreme power, the 
"entire sovereignty and territory not possessed by indivi-
duals." Thl9 c01rt then gave two instances of very early 
laws which it interpreted as acts by the legislative court 
granting power to the towns to per:f'onn certain acts local 
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in nature, and to make local laws. Speaking of this appar-
ent grant by the legislature ot the power to make local laws, 
it said: 
Now that provision enacted by the general court 
in 1639, was both a grant and ·a limitation of 
vital. power, and was intended to embrace towns 
therea:f'ter created (as tpey were in tact) by law, 
and 1s utterly incmsistent with the idea o:f' a 
reserved sovereignty, or of any absolute right in 
the towns, and constituted the towns corporations, 
and the continuance of it has continued them so; 
and that provision, with the numerous special 
provisions then and since made, preacribing their 
officers, and regulating their meetings and other 
proceedings, and imposing and prescribing their 
duties as subordinate municipal corporations, 
constitute their charters; and thus their powers, 
instead of being inherent or reserved, have been 
delegated and controlled by the supreme legis-
lative power ot the state from its earliest 
organization. And sueh is the law as uniforml)" 
recognized by this court.90 
In this one case, the court determined: that the Connecticut 
Constitution was a limitin:g, not a granting document; that 
historians shculd look to the courts :!'or the proper inter-
pretation o:f' history; that towns had no private corporate 
character, or if they had had, must be deemed to have 
surrendered it; that they had no historical or prescriptive 
rights, no vested or inherent rights, had been subject to 
the legislature :!'rom the earliest times, had no vestige of 
90Ib1d. I p. 139. 
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reserved sovereignty, and had only those powers given to them 
by charter or statute. The court went on to distinguish the 
Hitchcock case, saying that the town raised its quota of men 
allotted by the state; that noclaim of reserved, or inherent 
right was made, so the question was not passed upon. 
The reasoning is closely-woven and sound. Only if one 
views the towns of 1639 against the background of the over-
whelming acceptance of the idea that each local area solved 
its own problems, and that even a ride from town to town was 
difficult and dangerous, can one controvert it. Much is made 
of provisions, two in number, which may or may not mean what 
the court says they do . Yet, it is impossible to say the court 
is wrong, or even mostly wrong. It is difficult to project 
the ideas of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as to 
existence or non-existence of local sovereignty in limited 
areas, back to an age which would not recognize the problem. 
Webster v. Harwinton is regarded as one of the leading 
cases on the sUbject of vested, reserved, prescriptive, his-
torical, inherent, and virtually every other kind of town 
rights, and is the outstanding case of the bonus series in 
Connecticut. The rest of the cases mirror its reasoning, or 
quote from it. 
The inferior status of the municipality was defined in 
cases of 1874 and 1880. The court said, merging Dillon's and 
Cooley's Rules: 
The artificial body known as a municipal corporation 
is a creature of limited powers. It possesses only 
such as are specially granted by the law which confers 
upon it the right to exist, and such others as are 
necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect 
those expressly given. These powers are derived 
from the general statutes, and from special acts 
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of incorporation, and should not be unnecessarily 
extended by construction. The act sought to be done 
should be fairly within the scope of the corporate 
power, and the principle of implication from which 
authority not expressly given is claimed to be de-
rived, should be always carefully guarded in the 
interest and for the protection of the citizen, whose 
property in the form of taxation is largely subject 
to the demands and under the control of the municipality.9l 
The court spoke strongly in the 1880 case, refuting a claim of 
inherent right and private character : 
Thiscourt has repeatedly declared towns have no in-
herent powers; none except such as they have either 
by express grant or necessary implicatione The state 
makes them its instruments in the administration of 
civil and criminal justice, in the construction and 
reparation of highways, in the ~~intenance of schools, 
and in the support of the poor . 
As the period of reaction, toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, set· in, the tone of the court grew less sure 
and confident . Chief Justice Andrews of the Supreme Court of 
Errors espoused the inherent right theory much as stated by 
Justice Cooley. However, of the five-man court, he was never 
able to join with more than one other justice at a time, and 
so his mode of thought never reached the status of a rule of 
court. For a short period, it seemed as if Connecticut might 
evolve a theory of inherent right much like that of Michigan. 
It is quite possible that if in that era another judge devoted 
to the idea of inherent right, either on historical grounds, 
or as a political corrective, had reached the Supreme Court of 
at 158. 
91Gregory v. City of Bridgeport, 1874, 41 Conn. 76. 
92 State ex rel Coe v. Fyler, 1880, 48 Conn. 154, 
Errors, Conne cticut would likewise have developed through 
judicial precedent a local sovereignty law. 
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Doubt crept into the solid str oam of precedent deny-
ing any sort of protected or vested rights to municipalities 
with the case of Farrel v. Derby~ 93 The majority decision 
assumed, but did not decide, the basic premise that towns had 
no reserved powers whatever, but •• • 
Neither is this case to be contJrolled by those cases 
in this state and elsewhere whit:~h hold that towns 
have no inherent or reserved powers of legislation, ••• 
On the other hand, we do not detlm it necessary to 
decide whether towns in this s t t:tte are essentially 
different in respect to their origin, powers and 
duties from towns in other states . We assume that 
towns have only such powers as e~e conferred by 
statute, expressly or by reasonable implication. 9 4 
On the facts, the colirt was quite right in saying that it did 
not have to decide the issue of reserved t::>r inherent rights . 
However, in a case which involved the issue as closely as this 
one, it is difficult to understand the reluctance of a court 
which, as one may see fr om the preceding cases, went out of 
its way to condemn such rights by dictum. The selectmen of 
Derby, by proper procedures, had voted funds to hire an at-
torney to resist the splitting-off of Ansonia into a separate 
town. Taxpapers, with an eye to the unbrol-:en precedent hold-
ing that the towns had no right or power to object to such 
splitting, brought suit to e n joi n payment of the attorney. 
The fact that the court ruled that the town had the right, 
impliedly, to hire a lawyer to protect its own integrity, is 
93Farr el v. Town of Derby, 1889, 5B Conn. 234 . 
94Ibid., p . 245 , 
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an indication of how far the court had :3hifted. Specifically, 
the court held that a town has powAr to hire counsel to ap-
pear before the General Assembly and to oppose a petition for 
a division of its territory. Further, the selectmen had power 
to act for the town in such a case, where the town meeting 
had not acted . 
What is a town? A corporation •••• Now the argument 
is that the organized community may not appear to 
protect the community interest, but each individual 
in the community may appear and defend such interest 
as he may have, infinitesimal though it may be, in 
common with all the others. We confess our inability 
to appreciate the force of this logic. If either 
is to be excluded it would seem more natural to ex-
clude the individual and admit the corporation. It 
seems to us much more reasonable that the organiza-
tion, representing the whole, should act 6gr the 
benefit of all and at the expense of all .u 
The court is even willing to ignore direct precedent from 
neighboring states, with much the same social, historical, 
political economic, geographical, and religious background: 
We are not unmindful of the cases cited in behalf 
of the plaintiffs from Massachusetts and Maine,96 
and that they are inconsistent with the views herein 
expressed. We have given those d1~cisions and the 
reasons by which they are supported a careful consider-
ation, and we are constrained to Hay that neither the 
reasons nor the conclusions are satisfactory to us.97 
95Ibid The discussion of pp. 245-47 is of particu-
lar interest. The quoted excerpt is from P• 245. 
96coolidge v. Brookline, 1874, 114 Mass . 592; West-
brook v . Deering, 1874, 63 Me. 231. The att;orney for Deering 
and others introduced the Massachusetts dec.~ sion in manuscript 
before it was even printed in the Massachus~;tts reports, and 
so swept the case. But times had changed be1fore the issue 
rose in Connecticut. 
97Farrel v. Derby, cited in footnote 93 above . 
98 The majority decision in Bulkeley v. Williams . is 
an outstanding presentation or the case against the theory or 
reserved powers in municipalities. The dissent b~ Justice 
Andrews is equally masterrul. On appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court, the majority was upheld. This is one of the 
great cases on the subject ever argued in that court. The 
facts were theser the state legislature set up a special 
bridge district, to take over and maintain a formerly private 
bridge and causeway over the Connecticut River. It provided 
ror commissioners, appointed by the legislature, empowered to 
apportion among towns "benefitedU by the bridge the COSt or 
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maint enance. The attorneys far Glastonbury argued due process, 
the vogue in the rederal courts at the time in cases i nvolving 
private corporations. 
The Spec:l.al Act .of June 28, 1895, is in violation 
of Art. 14th, of the amendments of the Constitution 
or the United States, and or S. 1 or Art. I or the 
Constitution of this State, because it deprives the 
town ••• or their property without due process or 
law, and also denies to said town and the citizen s 
thereof equal rights with the citizens or other towns 
und.er the law. 99 , 
The decision was roreseeable. It held that the legisla-
ture had a right to set up such a district, and no right inhered 
98state ex rel. Bulkeley v. Williams, Treasurer, 1H96, 
68 Conn. 131, 35 At!. 421, 48 L.R.A. 465, arrirmed in Wil~iams 
v. Eggleston, 170 u.s. 304, 42 L. Ed. 1048, 18 s. Ct. 617. See 
also Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 u.s. 514, 25 L. Ed. 699. For 
an early case not involving Connecticut, but with somewhat sim-
ilar facts, see Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (u.s.) 43, 3 L.Ed. 
650. 
99Bulkeley v. Williams, cited in rootnote 98, above. 
in the towns to oppose the setting up. · 
It has undwbtedly been the general policy of . 
the State to leave the eJPense of public improve-
ments for highway purposes to the dete~ination 
of the municipal corporations within the limits 
of which the highway may be situated. and to 
charge them only with such obligations as may 
be incurred in their behalr by officers of their 
own selection. But when the State at l~ge or 
3 8 9 
the general public have an interest in the construc-
tion and maintenance of such works • there is nothing 
in cur Constitution, or in the principles of 
natural justice upon whiQh it rests. to prevent 
the General Assembly from assuming the active 
direction of a.ffairs by such agents as it may see 
.fit to appoint, and apportioning whatever expenses 
may be incurred among such municipalities as may 
be found to be especially bene.fited. without first 
stopping to ask their consent. Norwich v. County 
Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60 {citing severSl addi-
tional cases). As against legislation o.f this 
character, American courts generally hold that no 
plea can be set up of a right of local self-
government. implied in the nature of our institu-
tions. (Citing more cases.) The constitution of 
Connecticut (gave) to these territorial subdivi-
sions ••• certain political privileges in 
perpetuity.... It secured them, because -it 
granted them; not because they previously existed. 
Towns have no inherent rights. They have alwa:fS 
been the mere creatures of the Colony and of the 
s tate, with such .functions and such only as were 
conceded or recogniz d .by law. Webster v. Harwinton, 
32 Conn. 131. The State possesses all the powers ot 
sovereignty, except so far aa limited by the Consti-
tution ot the United States. It has been suggested 
that in Colonial times it was the right of the 
inhabitants of every town. themselves, to order the 
municipal duties assigned to thEm and choose the 
o.fficers by whom only it could be placed under a 
pecuniary obligation. and that thi·s is one of those 
rights and privileges "derived from our ancestors," 
to "define • secure and perpetuate" which rur 
Constitution was adopted. and to which its preamble 
refers. If it can be said that such a right ever 
e.ais ted, it was not one of the nature of those 
which were described by the framers of the Consti-
tution. They were speaking of rights personal to 
the individual.... It would create an imr~rium 
in imperio, and invest a certain class o our 
people·- those quali fled to vote in town meetings--
with the prerogative o.f defeating local improvements 
which the General Assembly deemed it necessary 
to construct.... No set of men can lay cl·aim 
to such a privilege under the Constitution of 
Connecticut.lOO 
On the due process question, the court has this to say: 
No right, as against a state, to the equal 
protection of the laws is secured to its 
municipal corporations by this amendment, 
which can limit in any way legislation to 
charge them with public obligations. Nor have 
their inhabitants, in their capacit.y or members 
of such corporations, any greater rights or 
immunities. New Orleans v. New Orleans Water 
Works co., 142 U.s. 79, 93. No property of the 
· town of Glastonbury has been or is to be taken. 
• • • General Assembly ••• proceedings ••• were 
due proceedings: the process by which it is 
now sought to compel the defendant to pay the 
sum in controversy is due process. The town 
can found no claim, under the Constitution of 
the United States, any more than under that of 
Connecticut, to such right of local self-
government as precludes the General Assembly 
from exacting this payment, notwithstanding 
the demand comes from another municipal corpora-
tion, the Bridge District, in choosing whose 
members, or directing whose a.ff'airs, it has had · 
no share. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 u.s. 657, 662 •••• 
Tm district and the towns are alike agencies of 
the State for governmental purposes and, whether 
they be styled public or municipal corporations, 
their relations to it and to each other are the 
same, and:I_~ally subject to modification at its 
pleasure. 
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Yet, all this is to be .expected. The real interest 
in the case came with the dissent by Chief Justice AIXlrews. 
It was a complete vindication or the right to local self-
government, tracing those rights from the earliest beginnings 
to the Connecticut of that day. The dissent marked the high 
10%ulkeley v. Williams, cited in footnote 98• above, 
pp. 148-49, 151-52. 
101lli_g.' pp. 156-57. 
point of such theory in Connecticut, and the only time 
when such theory even came close to adoption. 
The real difficulty is w1 th the power of the 
legislature, under the provisions of the State 
Constitution, to give up the whole execution 
and control of duties and powers assigned to 
towns, to persons in whose selection the towns 
have no agency direct or indirect, and over whose 
conduct they have no control. It will be a sur-
prising doctrine to the people of this State, 
even if only suggested, that the Constitution 
by the grant of legislative power has conferred 
on the legislature the authority to take from 
them the management of their local concerns and 
the choice of their own 1 ocel officers. It would 
hardly be more surprising to them to be told, 
that by adopting the Constitution they had granted 
to their own representatives the legal a11.t:hority 
to take away their liberties altogether. 102 
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The justice went on to point rut that building and repair of 
highways had always been a town function, citing New Haven v. 
Sargent, 38 Conn. 53, and Suff'ield v. Hathaway, 44 Conn. 
521 . He referred al so t o Ludlow's code of 1650, and continued: 
Stated broadly and nakedly, the question in this 
case can be nothing short of this: Is or is not 
town government in this State a mere privilege 
conceded by the legislature in its discretion, 
and one which may be withdrawn at any time at 
its pleasure? While the majority of the court 
do not assert so extreme a view, yet the argument 
· of the majority opinion involves the theory of the 
existence in ·the legislature of this plenary and 
sovereign right; and unless su~h right exists 
that argument fails. It is true that in some 
decisiom the c rurts of this State have spoken of 
toms as poo sassing no inherent, original, or 
reserved powers; but only such powers as have been 
delegated to them, and which may be regulated and 
controlled by the legislature. It is from these 
expressions that the claim is made that the towns 
are nothing but mere agencies which the State 
employs for the convenience of government, clothing 
them from time to time with a portion of its 
sovereignty, but recalling the whole or an y part 
102~., p. 159. 
thereof whenever the necessity or the useful-
ness of the delegation is no 1 onger apparent. 
In those cases where these expressions have 
been used, they may not have been inappropriate. 
In none of them was the actual exercise by the · 
legislature the subject of the decision. Such 
expressions, however, are very seldom true in 
anything more than a general sense. They never 
are and, in this State, never can be literally 
accepted in practice. There are also cases the 
conclusion in which is not inconsistent with the 
existence in the legislature of the power claimed; 
and one in Which the conclusion is antagonistic. 
Farrel v. Derby, 58 Conn. 234; Ta~or v. Danbury 
Public Hall Co., 35 id. 18~0; Burl gton v. Schwarzman, 52 id. lBl. · 
He then pointed rut that Connecticut towns were self-
sufficient in the early days of the colony, that they 
created the state for their convenience, and arranged for 
methods of voting and office-holding by state officials 
so that the state remained subject to their control. The 
towns, he said, never would have imagined that they could 
ever be denied the right to take care of their own internal 
affairs. He continued: 
The relation of the towns in this State to the 
State government is different from that in other 
States. Prior to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, the State government consisted mainly of 
an assembly of delegates from the towns; and 
those tow.ns had been uniformly treated as entitled 
to 1 oc al self-government. While it could not be 
said that an Act of that assembly vesting the 
functions of a town meeting, or the duties of 
selectmen, in a commission appointed by the 
assembly, wruld be unconstitutional--strictly 
there was in those days no constitution--yet 
everyone familiar with our history knows that 
such an Act would have been regarded as revolu-
tionary, and that its passage was practically 
1°3rbid., p. 161. Note that JUstice Andrews here 
reconciled ana-harmonized the earlier cases, making it 
possible for the court to swing to his view at a later date 
without undue embarrassment. 
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impossible. The right of the inhabitants of 
a town to themselves order the municipal duties 
assigned to the town, was plainly one of those 
"rights and privileges derived from their 
ancestors, 11 which the Constitution was adopted 
"in order more efrectually to derine, secure, 
and perpetuate." By the several articles of the 
Constitution above mentioned, that instrument 
intended to make surficient provisions to that 
end. It did guarantee the perpetual existence 
of the several towns, with selectmen to manage 
their local affairs and a town clerk to record 
their doings at town meetings; although it left 
the variety and dl ties of _the ofricers of the 
local police subject to legislative change. In 
studying these parts of the Constitution, we 
shruld always keep in mind that the terms used 
had a settled meaning before it was adopted. 
So far as it relates to the fonn of administra-
tion the Constitution is in the main no more 
than a recognition and re-enactment of the 
accepted system. The rights preserved are ancient 
rights, and the municipal bodies recognized in it 
and required to be perpetuated, were already 
existing with known elements and functions. And 
when the Constitution guarantees the perpetual 
continuance of towns, it means towns with the 
same essential characteristics which towns at 
that time exercised; for if these essential 
characteristics do not remain, the town as known 
to the Constitution does not remain. It is the 
town as it then actually existed, with which the 
Constitution deals. Let us, then, ascertain what 
a town was as then existing. In that way only we 
can give to these provisions of the Constitutt~ 
respecting towns, their ru11 and true effect. ~ ' 
The judge went into a detailed study of the history of the 
Connecticut town, making an exceptionally strong case for 
_3 93 
his discussion above, and incidental]_y attacking the histori-
cal precedents set forth in the majority opinion with an 
excellent rebuttal. One passage in this historical summary 
is worth quoting: 
104
-Ibid., p. 162. Cf. underlying theory of William 
Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, 2 vols., 
_Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1§5t , that the U.S. 
Constitution is to be interpreted on the basis of the language 
of the late eighteenth century. 
In 1818 the "town" was a territorial and 
municipal corporation exercising the rights 
of local self-government through a town meet-
ing and of fie ers of its own choosing. It had 
existed with these rights from a time prior to 
the combination of the first towns under a joint 
jurisdiction. It had been continuously the main 
instrument by which all the operations of govern-
ment were set in motion and carried en; and when 
the provisicns of the Constitution speak of "towns" 
they speak of that kind of a municipal corporatioo 
whose character, rights and privileges, had been 
thus defined and settled for nearly two centuries. 
• • • It was to be expected that when the delegates 
from the towns met in convention to form a consti-
tution that should perpetuate their ancient rights 
and privileges, a local self-government would not 
fail to be secured; and so we find this principle 
embodied in the whole framework of tm new govern-
ment. 
Underlying fear of legislative tyranny shows through in 
several of the sentences in the dissent: 
If, therefore, there are no restraints ~posed 
upon the legislative discretion beyond those 
specifically stated, the towns of this state 
might be abolished and their pe.ople subjected 
to the rule of commissioners appointed at the 
State Capitol. Tha people of these towns might 
be kept in a sort of pupilage for any period of 
time, o:;r to any extent the legislature might 
choose.l05 
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This grim hypothesis was virtually a statement of the contem-
porary trend, and a warning for the future. The commissions 
so feared by Justice Andrews became known to many Connecticut 
towns and cities in the next half-century, including most not-
ably Bridgeport and Waterbury. The justice concluded by 
quoting a three-page excerpt from Judge Cooley's People v. 
Hurlbut, 1871, 24 Mich. 44, at 105, endorsing it in full. 106 
lO~bid., p. 171. 
106rbid., pp. 174-77. 
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Andrews had joined the majority in a cas 107 decided 
shortly before the Sulkeley case, while Justice Hammersley 
wrote a strong dissent, based largely on the theory of a 
limited right of local self-government. It is interesting 
to note that Justice Torrance also dissented separatel y. 
If Andrews had joined them, it seems that a majority opinion 
on the right of local self-government might have been written. 
JUstice Hammersley had this to say: 
While the legislature represents the sovereignty 
of the State in legislating# in respect to all 
governmental powers, yet this power of legisla-
tion must be exercised subject to limitations 
expressed in the specific provisions and funda-
~ntal principles contained in the Constitution , 
and shruld be exercised in harmcny with those 
settled methods of free government whose essen-
tial .importance has been recognized as self-
evident by the people of cur own State. The 
principle of local self-government, i.e., the 
control by each municipality of those local affairs, 
as distinguished from those matters affecting the 
State at large# is recognized as an underlying 
principle so essential to free government under 
an American and especially the New England system, 
as to constitute a rule of legislative conduct, 
even if it can never be treated as strictly a 
limitation on legislative powers. Caldwell v. 
JUstices o~ Burke, 4 Jones' Eq., 323; People v. 
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 66, 96; P·eople v. Detroit , 
~8 id. 228.... And it seems to me that iri this 
State certainly, the principle of local self-
government may fairly be regarded as at least 
effective to direct the action of the legislature, 
and potent to prevent this court, in a case of 
reasonable dcubt, from preferring a construction 
that would give effect to legislation plainly 
obnoxious to the principle.lD8 
107 
·Central Ry. end Elec. Co. •s Appeal, 1896, 
67 Conn. 197. 
108Ibi d . , pp. 235-36. 
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One cen only speculate on the relationship among 
the justices on the court at this time. Strangely enough, 
in a case109 writ ten only three years after tm Bulkeley 
decision, Chief Justice Andrews, writing of the City of . 
Bridgeport, took pains to say that the charter of that city 
is the full measure of its powers, and gave no attention 
whate~er to any inherent or vested right theory. This is 
entirely in accord with the judicial precedent of the state, 110 
and it is quite likely that after his one dissent,. Justice 
Andrews had decided to ~ive up outward espousal of reserved 
or inherent right theory. 
The early divergent tendencies in the Connect! cut 
decisions, Justice Hosmer• s adoption of social contract 
language, tm suspicion expressed of legislati~e designs, 
crystallized in this latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Yet, strong as these traditions were, and strong as was the 
folk tradition of the creation of the state by the three 
river towns in their own image and responsible to them, the 
over-all effect of the decisions of the Connecticut Supreme 
Coo.rt in this period was to reduce the town still further 
into the control of tm legislature. Yet, as strong as the 
109
s tate ex rel.Scuthey v. Lasher, 1899, 71 Conn. 540. 
11~ong minor cases holding against vested, inherent, 
or similar protected rights are Keegan~. Town of Thompson, 
1925, 103 Conn. 418, 421; Turney~. Town of Bridgeport, 1867, 
55 Conn. 412; Moore v. Town of Stamford, 1946, 14 Conn . Supp. 
258, 260-61; Brown ex rel.Lathrop v. McCall, 1942, 11 Conn. 
Supp. 233, 235; Borough of Wallingford v. Town of Wallingford., 
1948, 15 Conn. Supp. 344, 347; Connelly v. Bridgeport, 1926, 
104 Conn. 238, 252. 
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c&ntralizing trend was, the Connecticut courts had not found 
occasion to de.ny strongly to municipalities rights which they 
might enjoy in their private corporate capacities. The Connec-
ticut courts were not then able, nor have they since been ab le, 
to define the Connecticut Constitution consistently as a lim-
iting document, under which ' the legislature would enjoy all pow-
ers except those specific ally denied therein. The court wavered 
then, as now, never quite able to state that theory of monoli-
thic sovereignty consistently, as has the Massachusetts supreme 
court. Connecticut left the nineteenth century with its towns 
and cities virtually sub .ject to the ,legislature, but with the 
courts still part of a tradition of latent separatism. The 
more strenuous doctrines of local rights had been stricken 
down, but not without leaving in their wake a strong residue 
of dissent available for possible future use. Yet, in essen-
tial points such as the private character of the municipal cor-
poration, its right to hold its property free from legislative 
confiscation, and the theory of the constitution as possibly 
a granting one, the situation was unsettled sufficiently sb ·· 
that a gross act of legislative usurpation could have upset the 
balance. This might have led the courts to close off certain 
areas of legislation in regard to municipalities. The Connecti-
cut municipality at the close of the era did not enjoy the rights 
of a private corporation, or those of the municipalities of Mich-
igan or Indiana. But the town retained its representation in the 
legislature and a constitutional position more felicitous 
398 
than that of its Massachusetts analogue . 
Rhode Island 
Following the American Civil War, the urban popula-
tion of Rhode Island continued to rise, and the percentage 
of the population that was urban and foreign-born continued 
to increase markedly. By 1900, the state was to have the 
highest percentage of urban dwellers of any state in the 
country, and of the total state population, thirty percent 
would be foreign-born. 1ll As the population of the Rhode 
Island cities increased, they demanded increased representa-
tion in both houses of the legislature and constitutional 
reforms which would enfranchise non-freeholders and natural-
ized citizens. Instead, as the interests of the small towns 
and the larger town-cities be c ame more divergent, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the cities were to be 
subjected to more arid more "ripper" bills divesting them of 
such i mportant governmental functions as police and fire ser-
vices. 
The reform campaign of Providence lawyer Thomas w. Dorr, 
culminatipg in Dorr's Rebellion of 1842, represented the revolt 
of the unfranchised town and city residents against the domi-
nation of the state legislature and state politics by the 
lllsee census statistics quoted extensively in article 
"Rhode Island", EncycloEaedia Britannica, 13th ed., London 
and New York, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1926, vol 23, p. 250. 
propertied, native-born classes who Slone cculd vote. The 
broadening of the franchise Which had occurred elsewhere 
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in New England in the 1820's and 1830's, with the elimination 
of property qualifications for suffrage and for office, did 
not even start to occur in Rhode Island until the failure of 
the "People's Constitution" and the adoption of the compromise 
new constitution in 1843-44, after the failure of Dorr•s 
Rebellion. Even that constitution did not represent too 
significant a broadening of the franchise, since not until 
1888 was the right to vote extended to the state 's many 
f oreign-born but naturalized American citizensJ12 
Providence was growing more and more restive in the 
late nineteenth century. Its calls for constitutional con-
ventions in 1796, 1817, 1822, and 1824 had gone unheeded, 
Its gains in the legislature by virtue of the constitu-
tional amendments, discussed above in Chapter III, increasing 
its share of members in both the house and the senate, were 
not enough to save the local govemment from continued 
legislative interference. The legislature was showing an 
increasing tendency to interfere in the local affairs of cities 
and towns alike. John Howland of Providence wrote in 1832 
that the legislature claimed that it had the power 
to restrict the towns from levying taxes for the 
support of schools 1 as they (the legislature) 
said no such power was granted thEm (the towns) 
in their acts of incorporation, and that all the 
112:Rhode Island Constitution of 1843, Amendment VII . 
power of the towns was derived from special acts 
of the general assembly.ll3 
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This presaged the type of ever-increasing legislative inter-
fer9nce in the late nineteenth century which would result in 
the "ripper" bills of the twentieth century by which the 
legislature would take from Providence and Newport control 
of important governmental functions. These in turn led to 
futile attempts by such men as Amasa Eaton and Zechariah Chaf ... 
fee to induce the state courts to accept the theory that the 
towns had retained certain inherent rights against the state, 
and that the "rippe~' bills violated these rights. The 
resulting cases, scholarly articles, and statutes are dis-
cussed below in Chapter VII . 
Evidence of corruption appeared in the Rhode Island 
state legislature during the nineteenth century, just as 
in other states . The situation was to become such that even 
the EncycloEaedia Britannica stated in 1926: 
The Republican machine finds it easy with the 
support of the street railway corporations to 
corrupt the French-Canadians and a portion of 
the native element in the rural towns and 
maintain absolute control of the state govern-
ment . The majority has occasionally protested 
by electing a Democratic governor, but he has 
not been able to accomplish a great deal, because 
until 1909 he did not have veto power nor effec-
tual means to 1l~duce the Senate to ratify his appointments . 
113Letter, John Howland ~o Rev. James Knowles, 1832, 
cited by Amasa M. Eaton in "The Right to Local Self-Government", 
1900, 13 Harvard Law Review 470, pp . 578-79. 
ll4Encyclopaedia Britannica, op. cit., vol. 23, p. 253 6 
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Until 1900 there appear to have been no important 
cases in which town-state intergovernmental relations were 
at issue. However, the 1856 case of G. and D. Taylor and Co. 
v. Place 115 involving legislative exercise of judicial 
powers, was one in which the court discussed many of the 
arguments which had been long used b municipalities in ·other New 
England states in their attempts to show that they had 
historically exercised certain rights and that they had 
retained certain inherent or prescriptive rights. The Rhode 
.Islam legislature, as discussed 1n Chapter III, bad early 
exercised not only legislative powers, but executive and 
judicial ones as well. In a forty-page decision, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court, speaking thrru.gh Justice Ames, held 
that the legislature had no judicial powers. To the argument 
and historical proof that the legislature had repeatedly 
exercised judicial functions throughout the his tory of the 
colony without objection by the people or by the constitu-
tional convention of 1843, Justice Ames replied: 
It is very true that in matters of doubtful 
interpretation the long continued practice of 
the o tliir departments of the government, 
acquiesced in by the people, under such an 
instrument, is often properly resorted to by 
the courts, for the purpose of ascertaining its 
meaning; and even the authentic debates of the 
body which fr-amed the constitution have, though 
wit~ caution, been used in such matters, for 
the same purpose. We do not, however, deem this 
question doubtful in the slightest defree; nor 
the practice in question, if it wereong continued 
enough, considering the circumstances, to be 
115G. and D. Taylor and Co. v . Place, 1856, 4 R.I. 324. 
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entitlea to weight . It was to be expected that , 
in such a body as the general assembly, with so 
many precedents in its archieves for the unrestrained 
exercise of judicial power, and without express words 
in the constitution prohibiting it to them, the prac-
tice now invoked to aid the right, should to some ex-
tent continue, until the question of its constitution-
ality had been examined and decided by the appropriate 
tribunal. If, indeed, the unconstitutional exercise 
of a power for so short a period as thirteen years, 
were to weigh with the court in so plain a case, it 
must be upon the strange ground that an usurpation 
of power, in derogation of the constitution, always, 
of itself, affords a constitutional justification 
for the usurpation.ll6 (Italics by the court.) 
The first important Rhode Island constitutional law casell? 
asserting, through reference to the history, charters, consti-
tutions, practices, and writings of an earlier day , that the 
towns had somehow retained certain rights and that the legis-
lature had no power to interfere with these rights, was not 
to arise for forty-four years. Yet, the Taylor case gave in-
dication of the manner in which the court would treat such as-
sertions when they were brought before it for decision at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
New Hampshire 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court decisions in this 
• . 
era started off conventionally enough, in the pattern of the 
Massachusetts cases of the previous half-century. The court 
gave lip-service to the principle of legislative domination 
over municipalities and to the idea that towns were the creatures 
of the state. However, strange outcroppings appeared, also 
in this era . A few cases asserted the honorable principles of 
116Ibid. 
117city of Newport v. Horton, 1900, 22 R.I. 196, 
47 Atl . 312, 50 L.R.A. 330. 
the social compact and natural rights theory, in words with 
which Justice Chase and Justice Hosmer could find no fault. 
The cases seem anachronistic, and can only be accounted for 
by the idea that the New Hampshire court had shaken off the 
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lethargic grip of the Massachusetts cases, recognizing at last 
the fact that such cases were poorly suited to its constitution-
al tradition of state-local relations, and that the ideas there-
in expressed were foreign to the mores, traditions, and the ex-
pectations of the people of New Hampshire. With the accession 
of one of the great common-law judges, Justice Charles Doe, in 
the mid-part of thie era, the cases changed, and took on much 
more the air of the Vermont cases than those of Massachusetts. 
With State v. Hayes118 in 1881, the New Hampshire court took its 
place in the forefront of the New England states in recognizing 
the private character of towns and cities, and their right to 
claim from history certain prescriptive, inherent and extra-
constitutional rights . 
The early Civil War soldier bonus cases in New Hampshire 
were not unusual . Since the legislature early provided for 
such bonuses, in the Laws of 1861, ch . 2480; 1862, ch. 2584; 
and 1863, ch. 2712,119 there was little occasion for a soul 
and constitution-searching inquiry into the position of the 
towns relative to the state and the legislature. As to other 
questions, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held them as 
ll8state ex rel Pearson v . Hayes, 1881, 61 N. H. 264. 
ll9These bonus laws remain in effect today. New Hamp-
shire Public Laws, ch. 42, sec. 6, 1926. 
controlled by the Massachusetts case of Stetson v. Kempton, 
120 and by its own Gove v. Epping.· Also conventional 1n 
this era was the statement in these cases that towns have 
no power to tax except as permitted by statute. 121 
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The texture of the New Hampshire cases might be said 
to have changed with East Kingston v. Towle in 1868.122 In 
what seems like an anachronism in those late nineteenth cen-
tury cases llhen natural rights, natural law, and the 
principle of equality and equal justice had been pretty 
thoroughly transmuted into their constitutional analogues 
of due process, the Obligation due to contracts, equal 
protections, and the like, the New Hmnpshire court spoke 
unashamedly of common right, and o'£ natural just ice, and o'£ 
the rights of Englishmen. The legislature, the court ruled, 
was not restricted only by the constitution, but by those 
notions of counnon right and natural justice inh~rited from 
the earliest days of the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. The 
court traced such rights from Bonham's case of the Elizabethan 
era, 8 Co. 1186, to Day v. Savage, Hobart 85, 87, and from there 
120 Stetson v. Kempton, 1816, 13 Mass. 272; Gove v. Town 
of Epping, 1860, 41 N.H. 545; the first bonus case, Crowell v. 
Town of Hopkinton, 1863, 45 N.H. 9, announced these principles, 
and was follawed in essence by the subsequent cases. Among 
these are, for instance, Shackford v. Newington, 1866, 46 N.H. 
415.; Upton v. Stoddard, 1866, 47 N.H. 168; Huntress v. ToWl. of 
Stratham, 1866, 46 N.H. 409; Knowlton v. Town of o __ ton, 
1869, 48 N.H. 333; Stone v. Town of Stew~rtstown, 1869, 48 ~.H. 280; 
Kidder v. Tow.n of Stewartstown, 1869, 48 N.H. 290. 
l21As, for instance, in Huntress v. Town of Stratham, 
cited 1n footnote 1~0 above. 
122rom of East Kingston v. Towle, 1868, 48 N.H. 57. 
into the contemporary law of New Hampshire. Though the 
decision is written in .a rambling style, it espoused a 
prine iple not given adherence in New England since the 
1830's. In effect, the court held that a decision as to 
whether the state constitution was a limiting or granting 
me, and as to wh.e ther the residuary powers of sovereignty 
40 5 
were in the legislature or the people, was beside the point. 
No matter where sovereignty was located, individuals and 
municipalities were entitled to the protections of the natural. 
law and the social compact as well as those of the con~tution. 
Just how effectively the state was setting up its own consti-
tutional tradition and how that tradition was diverging tram 
that of the "mother state" of Massachusetts may be seen from 
this case. 
Yet, the tradition of the Old Colony remained strang. 
Almost as it the 1868 case had not occurred, the two major 
cases 123 on l.oca:i rights of the immediately succeeding years 
held that towns were creatures of the state, and as quasi-
corporations, were subject to the legislature. In one of 
them, the Wooster v. Plymouth ca~e· 124 of 1882, the pleas of 
inherent, prescriptive or vested rights would have been an 
obvious defense, but the issue was not raised, and not even 
the dissent discussed that issue. A late soldier bonus case, 
123 It~arnumts Petition, 1871, 51 N.H. 376; Wooster v. 
Town of Plymouth, 1882, 62 N.H. 209. 
124
-wooster v. Town of Plymoo.th, cited in footnote . ll.~~. 
above. 
Spaulding v. Andoverl25 in 1873 stated in terms almost as 
positive as any in the Massachusetts cases,the subjection 
of the town to the state. The court called the town a crea-
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ture of the legislature, a public corporation with no private 
rights, and so on, citing Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 
sec. 39, and obviously approving the language therein. Yet, 
even in a case this strong, the court distinguished the dual . 
character of a town, and emphasized the point that a town has 
some private rights beyond legislative control. As has been 
pointed out above, Judge Dillon recognized these minimal 
private rights in municipalities, and only the Massachusetts 
cases in New England seem at times to have denied the exis-
tence of any town rights as against the legislature. For 
the interested person, a case of 1879126 provided the oppor-
tunity for a mighty review by court and counsel, of . the Civil 
War soldier bonus cases in all the New England states, though 
the decision ftself is run-of-the-mill. Of towns rights, 
Chief Justice Doe had this to say: 
Legislative power can be delegated tot owns only 
in local town affairs; and a public expense, not 
of a local character, cannot be unequally divided 
among the towns. The legislature cannot give towns 
an option of taxation for a purpose not local, 
and cannot compel one town to build a statehouse, 
or state prison, or to gay more than their share 
of any public expense.LJ7 
125spaulding v. Town of Andover, 1873, 54 N.H. 50. 
126Bowles v. Landaff, 1879, 59 N.H. 164. 
127Ibid., p. 192 . 
407 
This, o£ course, is a cautious statement, merely saying 
that taxes for state purposes must be levied equally among 
towns. Yet, it gives rather clear indication that the crurt 
is not prepared to think of the legislature as absolutely 
unlimited in powers. 
Chief Justice Doe was presented in 1879128 with what 
is probably the most complete and minutely-documented argu-
ment £rom history ever placed bef'ore a New England court. 
Attorneys £or the towns in two late soldier bonus cases 
cited as authority £or the towns the prescriptive rights 
derived from practice before and during the Revolutionary 
War. For the principle that towns, of their own motion and 
without legislative authority, voted bounties to soldiers in 
the continental armies, as well as to militia, the following 
documentary proof was offered: 
8 Bouton's State Papers 393, note 1, 843; 
Dover Records, book 9, Votes of September 10, 
1777, July 4, 1780, July 14, 1781, September 19, 
1781; Somersworth Records; Rochester Records; 
History of Dublin, 21; History of Hollis, 170, 
180, 181-83, 190, 193, 196; History of Chester 
in v. 7, N.H. Historical Collection, 369, and 
see History of Concord 276, 278-79; Letters of 
Col. Enoch Hale, of Rindge, to Committee of 
Safety, 8 Bouton's State .Papers 543; History 
of Boscowen 117, 120, 252; Copwell•s Histcry 
of Nottingham, Deerfield, and Northwood, 128-29, 
292-93, 527; History of Gilmanton, 88, 93-96; 
Histor~cal Sketch of Sanbornton, votes of 1780, 
1781 in 3 Farmer and Moore•s Historical Collec-
tion 354; Barrington Town Records, book 2, 
p. 145, vote of November 18, 1776; p. 148, vote 
of April 15, 1777; p. 149, vote of June 16, 1777; 
125Gould v. Town of Ra~ond; Drake ·V. Town of North 
Hampton, 1879, 59 N.H. 164, 250. 
Durham Records, book 1, pp . 111-12, 137-38, 
145, 171; Commission of Safety Records, May 1, 
1777 in 7 N.H. Historical Collection 93; Dover 
Records, book 9, pp. 153, 156, 164-65, 168-69, 
172-75, 178-79; Madbury Records, votes of 
August 12, 1776, April 12, 1777, September 15 , 
1777, April 21 , 1778. Legislature and State 
officials recognized towns power--Laws 1780, 
p. 96 (Statute of N0 vember 26, 1777). Order 
from President Weare to General Fo1wom, 8 N.H. 
State Papers, 512.; Commission of Public Safety 
Records, May 1, 1777, decision, 7 N.H. Htstori-
cal Collection 93; Laws 1780 (Statute of March 16, 
1780);129 
and from other New England states: 
F'reedland v. Hastings ( 1878), 10 Allen 570, 
581 (92 Mass. 570); R.I. Legislative Act of 
1777, 8 R.I. Colonial Records 200-202 refers 
to the fact that the towns were already giving 
bounties without any statute and approves. 
Also see Hitchcock v. Litchfield, 1 Root (Conn~) 
206 (Superior Court, Litchfield -County, 1790). ~30 
Overwhelming as was this presentation of the case for the 
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towns, Chief Justice Doe analyzed and reduced it to order in 
graceful and forceful style. let, that this case left a 
lasting impression on him may be gathered from State v . Hayes, 
the case discussed immediately below. He sketched out the 
period of blood, terrorism and anarchy which preceded the 
Declar'ation of Independence, and concluded logically that 
this, together with certain anarchistic rights of indivi-
duals and municipalities, had passed with the adoption of 
the new constitutional order: 
129Ibid. , pp . 260-71. 
130Ibid., ibid. 
Against the former decision of those cases an 
argument is advanced upon ante-constitutional 
precedents. The New Hampshire government or 
1776 carried on the war ••• without a bill or 
rights and without any constitutional division 
or limitation of power. It was a temporary 
s overeignty~ se t up "to continue duri ng .the 
present ••• contest wi t h Great Britain." 8 N.H. 
Stat e Papers 2. And its undefined and brundless 
authority 1 hastily assumed and arbitrarily exer-
cised, for the transient purpose of the war, does 
not prove the bounds of the limited government 
afterwards instituted with deliberation in a farm 
designed to be permanent, designed in its limita-
tions to be a radical innovation, and designed by 
its limitations to change the provisional and 
preliminary form because the latter was unlimited. 
The abs olute form; and its precedents, so long as 
they were of the same character or :1n any respect 
repugnant to tbe new and constitutional system, 
were swept away altogether. 8 N.H. State Papers 
14-l7, 420-25; 9 N.H. State Papers 878-79 •••• 
In that war, as in others, civil and foreign, 
many fundamental principles were temporarUy 
superseded by what was regarded as necessity. 
Construed in accordance with the tyrannical 
practice of that period, the constitution would 
be a repeal of its own express reservations of 
liberty and ecpality. That practice included 
arrest and imprisonment at the discretion of a 
committee of public safety, banishment and con-
fiscation without trial, and any other act of · 
despotism that was deemed expedient, Instead of 
being safe guides in the legal construction of 
constitutional restrictions, the precedents of 
that time show to what anomolous courses, in the 
absence of such restrictions, men can be driven 
by the stress of a revolution. All power ••• 
was concentrated in the ••• general court, and 
was used as it waul d be likely to be by energetic 
men, engaged in a desperate enterprise, to the 
success of which everything was pledged •••• 
They acted for their constituents upon the natural 
law and supreme right of self-defence. They were 
elected 1 not to administer a constit~onal govern-
ment, but to contend for the privilege ot 
constructing such a government in the future, when 
time should be fcund for wor~ of that kind. Mean-
while, they were to take charge of the public 
welfare, and maintain order by such temporary 
measures as might be convenient •••• Men vested 
with absolute power, able to convey the whole of 
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it to any eight members or a comm~ttee o£ 
public safety ••• found no difficulty in convey-
ing to towns a power of paying bounties for 
enlistments, if it bad been understood that towns 
needed any other authority than the law of nature. 
••• If the plaintiff's argument were sound, it 
would reestablish the unbounded rule that was 
cast off at the inauguration of free govemment 
nearly a hundred years ago. Ard the earlier 
provincial practice 1s as inconclusive as that 
of the Revolution. We had no inviolable rights, 
no rights guaranteed in the American sense, before 
the second day of June, 1784. The constitution 
that went into operation on that day terminated 
the era of unlimited power, and introduced an era 
of 1 iberty and equal! ty secured by a supreme 
written law •••• By the constitution, legislative 
power is vested, not in the towns, but in the 
senate and house of representatives.e•• The power 
o£ the legislature to delegate legislative power 
to towns in local affairs 1s exceptional •••• And 
an authorized extension of the exception to nan-
local affairs would be abdication and usurpation • 
••• There is no express grant of the power of 
delegation in local affairs.... The grant, by 
the people to the senate and house, of the power 
of delegating a power of local legislation, is 
implied by the principle of local legislation. 
• • • The principle of local self-government 
allows, between towns, much inequality of taxa-
tion for local purposes, but not for purposes 
not local. It permits towns to decide, within 
certain limits, how heavy their local burdens 
shall be, but not to decide whether they will 
bear their . shares of the non-local burdens of 
the state. 131 
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It should be noted how entirely out of the pattern of conven-
tional legal reasoning the decision was. The justice wrote 
in the clear and unmistakable terms of Realpolitik, of the 
knock on the door in the night season, of political assassina-
tion, and of trial without judge, jury, or civilized safe-
guards, as being parts of the same political order for which 
the towns were pleading. When he writes in terms like these, 
13\bid., pp. 272-78. 
it is hard for any man who is part of tm political tradi-
tion of western civilization to dispute him. It shculd be 
pointed out, however, that the political and historical 
order in which he was writing was the strong, well-ordered 
era of the late nineteenth century, and not the troubled 
days of the new experiment in government which formed the 
backdrop against which Justice Shaw had made his decisions 
law. 
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The limits of the decision s hculd be noted. Here lay 
no statement of absolute state rights as against the towns . 
The prescriptive and historical practices of towns were 
placed into proper historical perspective. Further than that, 
the Justice did not go. It may be that the courts of New 
Hampshire were more secure in this era than the courts of 
the mother state in the one just past. Or it may be that 
the political order of New Hampshire differed markedly from 
that of Massachusetts; without metropolitan cities or great 
social problems, there was · no need then, as there is no need 
now, for the power to act strongly and resolutely to be 
placed i nto one set of hands. Whatever the reason, monolithic, 
Austii'lian sovereignty found no expression in New Hampshire as 
it had in Maine or Massachusetts. As Maine marks one pole 
in the position of the towns in New England, with Massa-
chusetts tending toward that pole, so does Vermont mark the 
other, with Rhode Island, Connecticut, end New Hampshire 
approximating to the Verment side of the balance, in that 
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order, rather than to the Massachusetts side . It must be 
emphasized that the author here is not speaking of practical 
politics, but of the constituti onal order and political 
frameVD rk of state-municipal constitutional relations. Never-
theless, as with a free man, it is philosophically preferable 
for a municipality to know that it is free , within the reason-
able limits of such freedom in a democratic society , than to 
know that it is free, but that its freedom may be taken away . 
This is the spirit which lies behind those home rule movements 
which ,have been so strong even in states like California and 
Michigan, where municipalities were liter ally born free; the 
home rule constitutional order has maintained for them that 
freedom in local affairs which was their heritage at birth. 
The remaining important casel32 of that era having 
to do with state -municipal constitutiona 1 r elations arose in a 
singular fashion . The New Hampshire legislature took the 
unique step of providing for cumulative voting for directors 
of corporations wi~hin the state, but of making the statute 
effective only if approved in each pa- ticular town by local 
referendum. Mor e or less, this was "local option" for 
c~~ulative voting . Such a manner of handling corporate law 
was as outre then as it would be today . As Justice Doe said 
in this case, local option in reference to matters of police 
regulation, safety, and morals, such as in r egard to liquor 
or similar commodities, has some basis in reason, but it is 
132 State ex rel Pearson v. Hayes, 1881, 61 N. H. 274. 
di.fficul t to perceive of a cumulative voting provision for 
corporate directors as concerning local police power OD 
control over bad morals. During the nineteenth century, 
the question of whether ar not it was constitutional .for 
the legislature to pass laws with the proviso that they 
would be state law only in those towns in which the people 
had approved them at town meeting was a burning issue . 
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These local option laws were usually upheld if they dealt 
with police regulations, such as whether or not liquor 
should be sold within the town, operation of bowling alleys, 
and the like. But in cases where the power was not that 
power o.f sovereignty inherent in the legislature but rather 
that power delegated by the constitution to the legislature 
to make laws, delegation to the people was commonly held ;~ to 
be an unconstitutional delegation of law-making power in 
the absence of a constitutional provision for referendum. 
However, it was held that the legislature could make the 
eJ. teration of county, town, and city boundaries dependent 
upon local vote since the power to alter the boundaries af 
these units is an inherent attribute of the legislature 
incident to its sovereign power, which could be exercised 
as the legislature saw fit. Most state courts of that 
century thru.ght o.f the legislature as clearly the residuary 
of sovereignty. Where the state constitution in so many 
words granted a power, that power could only be acted upon 
by the legislature itself. It was only where the theory of 
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the constitution held it to be of a limiting nature that 
such a rule is possible. The legislature could .make laws 
and provide that they would be effective only where approved 
by the local voters, but only. where the legislature acted 
in its residuary sovereign capacity in an area not covered 
specifically by the state constitution. 
Corporate laws, virtually of their nature, are 
matters of state or national concern. The interest of the 
case for the purposes of this dissertation canes from the 
fact that some of the greatest legal talent of the day was 
involved in the suit. The original issue concerned one of 
the disappointed candidates for a directorship, who was 
contesting the successful candidate's right to his seat on 
the board of a private corporation. As the suit progressed, 
other parties in similar situation joined themselves on one 
side or the other, and even the state finally intervened in 
the ease on its own behalf. Thus, literally dozens of 
attorneys and constitutional lawyers were involved, forming 
contending batteries, each battery arguing separately its 
own theories of underlying principle. One of the principles 
thus argued was the power of the legislature to refer 
such a matter to the towns. The entire history of the towns 
of the state, the nature of the s tate-local governmental 
relationship, the extent of legislative powers, and the theory 
of the state constitution as a limit or grant, all came in for 
intensive argument and examination in the respective briefs, 
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papers, and oral arguments. Though the matter would seem to 
most observers to be one concerning largely principles or 
corporate law, the court, through Chief Justice Doe, chose 
to place its decision primarily on the basis of the nature 
of the state- local relationship in New Hampshire . The decision 
was a foregone conclusion. It is the statements of the court 
in regard to the position of the towns and the powers of the 
legislature which form the main interest of the case. The 
court reviewed the nature of both public and private corpora-
tions at great length, and even :turned to Alexis de Toqueville ' s 
Democracy in America, to Thomas M. Cooley's treatises, and to 
the Hurlbut decision, which it quoted extensively, with approval, 
in the seventy-five page decision. State v . Hayes has already 
been discussed in Chapter III of this dissertation, as to its 
historical aspects, so only the relevant political and consti-
tutional aspects will be here considered. 
As stated above, the court chose to treat the case on 
the basis of local government principles . In singular fashion, 
the court accepted the fact that the basic and axiomatic fea-
ture of the constitutional structure of New Hampshire was 
the fact of local rights to self-government. The power of the 
legislature in this decision is virtually derived from the 
action of the towns in giving up certain of their rights to 
self-go.vernment in the founding of the state . Justice Doe 
reasoned that if the people and the towns had given to the 
legislature certain rights of government, they must certainly 
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have made it part of tm grant that the legislature could 
refer certain classes of laws back to the people far their 
approval. Much this sane type of reasoning underlies 
Thomas M. Cooley's justification of the right of local 
referendum as based upon immemorial usage. The court cited 
with approval from Gould v. Raymond, discussed inmediately 
above: 
"The grant by the people to the senate and 
house of the power of delegating a power of 
local legislation is implied from the prin-
ciple of 1 ocal self-government. "135 . 
Justice Doe then proceeded to place the entire basis of the 
state gove mment on this right to local self-gove mment. 
From the following quotation, it will be seen ~ that despite 
the stirring language,all that the justice is doing here is 
recognizing the fact that towns have certain rights in their 
private corporate character which are beyond the reach of 
the legislature. 
Since the want of government was supplied by 
the settlers at Exeter, Dover, end Portsmouth, 
the system of decentralization has accompanied 
the occupation of our territory. Local self-
government (including much administration of law, 
end an extensive use of the law-making powers of 
taxation and police), introduced not only before 
the organization of both the state and province 
of New Hampshire, but also before the extension of 
Massachusetts jurisdiction to the Piscataqua, and 
firmly fixed in the foundation of rur institutions 
as an executed intention of the people, the local 
exercise of the power of making local law is an 
application of the principle of self-government 
that retains the eon trol of 1 oc al (matters ) 
continuing in uninterrupted operation more than 
133
rbid., p. 529. ThP- passage cited is from Gould v. 
Raymond, cirea-in footnote 128 above, p. 276. 
two hundred and forty '36ars, bas been constitu~ 
tionally established by recognition end usage. 
Preceding all other New Hampshire legislation, 
and firmly fixed in the foundation of our 
institutions as an executed intention of the 
people, the loe e1 exercise of the power of 
making local law is an application of the · . 
principle of .self-government that retains the 
control of local affairs in the community most 
interested in them. It is a positive and 
operative principle that cannot be displaced 
by a theory of centralization constructed upon 
the mere negation that a law is not invalidated 
by being made to take effect upon a contingency. 
Equally impossible is it to reverse the nature 
of an inalienable trust, and make the entire 
fiduciary duty of. general legislation assignable, 
by an application of the principle of local 
government to legislation that is not local.l34 
The case is replete with quotations from all sorts of 
sources as to the right of local self-government, either 
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as a logical or an historical fact. The crurt, for instance, 
cited from a New York ease, People v. Morris, which has been 
regarded as one of the strongest statements of the right to 
local self-government, and of the ol~ Engli~h common-law view of t~ 
municipal corporation as the correct one, and the one 
approved by history. 
A municipal "corporation is properly an invest-
ing of the place with the local government 
thereof." CUddon v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 192, 193. 
"This latter description is the moot appropriate, 
and is justified by the history of these insti-
tutions, and the nature of the powers w1 th -which 
they were and are invested. The forming of 
cities into communities, corporations, or bodies 
politic, and granting them the privileges or 
municipal jurisdiction, contributed mare than any 
other cause to introduce regular government, 
police, end arts, and to diffuse them throughout 
Europe. Some of the ei ties assumed the necessary 
privileges, and formed themselves into bodies 
134~.' p. 322. 
politic under a government established by 
commcn ocnsent. Others purchased them from 
their superiors, or aoq1ired them gratuitously 
from the generosity of the prince, e.nd to enable 
him to counterbalance the powers of the aris-
tocracy. The feudal government he.d degenerated 
into a system of oppression, and the great body 
of the people were subjected by the power of 
princes or superior lords to the most degrading 
and intolerable servitude. Me.n~of the English 
charters inoo oratin cities a towns were 
Yet, despite the approval given to this New York ease, and 
to Judge Cooley's HUrlbut decision, this ease cannot be 
viewed as an adoption of the English common-law principle 
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or the status of the municipality. It is not even a four-
square adoption of the inherent or vested or prescriptive 
right to local self-government principle, since town rights 
were involved in the case only indirectly. The case should 
probably be considered as a strong recognition of the .fact 
that towns in their_private characters have rights proteot$d 
against the legislature, and as a judicial statemEnt of 
approval o.f the ideas of the local self-government cases in 
other states, with an indication that this type o.f thinking 
will .form one of the bases for judicial action in the fUture, 
but more in implicit than e~licit fashion. 
l35 r bid., pp. 314-15. The case cited is Peo_2le v 
Morris, 183~3 Wendall (N.Y. Common Law Reports) ~5, at 334. 
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As may be seen from the development of the state-
local government pattern in New Hampshire in this era, a home 
rule statute or constitutional provision was not really a 
necessity in that time, and no particular strong abuses of 
legislative or judicial powers occurred to give impetus to 
a home rule movement. It might be said that no real need 
for such a movement exists in this state even today. 
Vermont 
The Vermont experience in this era is almost the 
opposite of its eastern neighbor. The era started out with 
the rights of town to local self-government in local affairs 
being implicitly and explicitly acknowledged by the courts, 
but closed with a statement of absolute legislative supremacy . 
The current of judicial controversy is slow in Vermont, and 
the cases are so few that the analyst feels definitely 
uncomfortable in confessing to be able to detect " trends" 
therein. So much depends upon the character of the individual 
judge writing the decision, and his personal ideas. Also, 
much depends upon the pattern by which the particular court 
carries out its judicial business. It is not at all unusual 
for supreme court judges to talk things over after a more 
or less summary glance over the records, and to arrive at a 
compromise as to the conclusion of the case, and the law to 
be applied; one judge is then commonly given the job of study-
ing the papers and writing the decision, which the others 
commonly approve as a matter of course . There is little 
difficulty in finding trends in Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
and Rhode Island, since the judicial current runs strong in 
those states , and many cases are decided in every area of 
law and individual idiosyncrasies average out. In Vermont, 
420 
New Hampshire , and Maine, on the other band, the number of 
cases decided in the courts is relatively few, and the strength 
of precedent strong, so that even of the less er number of 
cases, few of these get to the highest courts. Hence, one 
must form conclusions on the basis of a dozen or two dozen 
cases , for judicial trends, if such conclusions are to be 
reached at all. Having revealed this weakness, the author 
will proceed t o discern as best he can the direction of the 
"trends. " 
The Civil War bonus case, which had been the Armageddon 
of towns elsewhere in New England, dist~nbed the Vermont ccurts 
not at all , nor tm towns. The first such cases were decided 
on the basis of simple contract law.l3·6 The town had promised 
the bonuses, so it had to pay them. No one raised the point 
of the power of towns to pay bonuses very strongly, and the 
cases assumed mare or l ess implicitly that since Vermont 
towns had paid such bonuses before, there was no particular 
reason why they should not do so now. The legislature passed 
an act in 1862, Acts of 1862, no. 38, which confirmed t~ 
fact that towns could pay bonuses. The act did n ot pretend 
!~esee, e .g., Gale v . Town of Jamaica, 1867, 39 Vt. 610; 
Se~mo v. Town of Marlboro , 1868, 40 Vt. 171. 
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to ratify past acts; it just more or lass regularized the 
situation. A few towns, after voting such a . bonus thwght 
better of the fact, and attempted to repeal the earlier 
ordinance. Without even referring to the statute, the crurt 
held such acts invalid on simple contract grounds,137 as to 
men who had aJ.ready taken up the offer and enlisted. One 
can only sit back in amazement at these Vermont cases. 
They are so simple and so sensible, avoiding controversy 
neat ly, that one wonders why the s~e approach could not 
have been tried elsewhere. Perhaps the ans war lies in a 
rural, homogeneous population, to which debt is sin, and 
ostentation and over-extension a social vice. Every tax 
levied affects virtually every man, woman and child of the 
limited population directly, so that the approval of an 
expenditure, in a socie.ty where differences of wealth are 
small, bl.s virtually the effect of a church meeting taking 
up a collection for a church social--everyone reaches into 
his pocket for rc:ughly the same amrunt. There is little 
need for legislative or judicial supervision of local units 
so constituted. 
131see, e.g., Cox v. Town of Mcunt Tabor, 1868, 
41 Vt. 28; for a cross-section of these cases, see Bingham v. 
Town of Springfield, 1868, 41 Vt. 32; Steinberg v. Town of 
Eden, 1868, 41 Vt. 187; Hill v. Town of Eden, 1868, 41 Vt. 
195; Hartwell v. Town of Newark, 1868, 41 Vt. 337; Hickock v. 
Town of Shelburne, 1868, 41 Vt. 409; Haven v. Town of Ludlow, 
1868, 41 Vt. 418; Pottle v. Town of Maidstone, 1866, 39 Vt. 
70; Tarbell v. Town of Plymouth, 1867, 39 Vt. 429; Burbee v. 
Town of Windhall, 1869, 41 Vt • . 694; the author's list includes 
seventeen more such cases, but no more need be cited . 
This same stability and timelessness still charac-
terizes the Vermont of the twentieth century. A recent wri-
terl38 has pointed out how little effect the passage of time 
has had on his st ate. The town is still the basic unit of 
government. Counties serve only as judicial districts and 
for the election of state senators. 
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The state contains sixty-five incorporated villages , 
and eight incorporated cities which have virtually the same 
rights, powers and duties as the towns. The population of 
the local units and of the state is virtually static. In 
1950, fifty percent of the towns had a smaller population 
than a century before, and the state as a whole . had only 
twenty percent more. Only five municipal units exceeded 
10,000 population. One hundred fifty-four towns have less 
than 1000 population, eighty-five towns less than 500, and 
ten less than one hundred. There is no movement away from 
the town .l39 In fact, the unit is so close to the people 
that it is almost part of the soil . Home rule in its broad-
est sense has always existed in Vermont, and no paper guarantee 
is needed to confirm it. 
138John P . Wheeler, "Towns in Transition", 1959, 
National Municipal Review, 48 :68. 
139Ibid. 
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140 A rather amusing case came up in 1874. The Town 
of Fairhaven, in Rutland County, was bordered and separated 
from New York State by a river. The boundary, fixed in 
1789, was also the town boundary. Yeung ran a liquor store, 
on a piece of land adjoining the river. In 1834, the resi-
dents, deciding that it was easier to build a bridge if 
they moved the river, got out their shovels and a post-
auger, cutting through the embankment, thus straightening 
and changing the course of the river. Young's liquor store 
was thus on the New York side of the Poultney River. This 
was quite convenient, since 1 t placed Yrung beyond the 
liquor laws of Vermont, as he thought. New York treated 
it as part of that state until 1869, when a local trial. 
cuurt ruled that the land was still part of Vermont. When 
agents for Vermont haled Young into court, he was fined 
.r1 fty dollars for violating the state liquor laws. He 
appealed, pleading that when the townspeople had diverted 
the course of the river, they had changed the town, county, 
and state boundaries. Of course, the state supreme court 
upheld the fine, and the old boundary was affirmed as the 
correct one, but the amusing part of the case came with the 
thunderous oration of the State's At t orney, to the general 
effect that : 
14'0 Vermont v . Young, 1874 , 46 V.t. 565. 
Adjoining states cannot change their .boundary 
lines without the consent of Congres& . . Can it 
be possible, that a portion o~ an isolated 
community, with the aid of a post-auger, may 
accomplish what the sovereign states are not 
permitted to do in this respect?l41 
With the case of Underhill v. Essex,142 the Vermont 
court took it upon itself to state flatly that the state 
legislature cruld do anything it wanted to with the towns 
of the state. It stated that t owns have no vested rights. 
Since the point at is sue was the construction and mainten-
ance of a bridge, the question involved was of statewide 
concern, and gives little indication of What the court 
would have said of a statute affecting a matter generally 
conceded to be of local character .. 
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This scattering of cases here discussed constitutes 
most of those touching upon the state-local relation. Little 
can be concluded from them, except that it was likely at the 
End of this era that the Vermont town was not appreciably 
more restricted or more subjec~ed to legislative abuses in 
1898 than it was at the beginning of the his tory of that 
state. 
Maine 
The Maine cases of this era stated just as positively 
as those of the previous one, the absolute subjection of the 
towns to the legislature. Once again, it might be said that 
l4!l~., P• 567 . 
l42Town of Underhill v. Town of Essex, 1891, 64 Vt. 28. 
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the Maine cases run pari passu with those of Massachusetts, 
but ar-e in intent even more absolute, stripping fran the 
Massachuse tts cases the occasional words or modification. 
With a doctrine as severe as that of the mother state in 
denying to towns any right whatever as against the legis-
lature, t he Maine courts did not even reserve in specific 
terms any private rights, even against an absolute depriva-
tion of money or property ror private benefit, to the towns. 
Maine :tad no Mount Hope Cemetery case to soften the pattern 
of absolute legislative control of town end town assets. 
The town, or any other public corporation in Maine for that 
matter, was tm plaything of the legislature as far as the 
cases which have determined the pattern of state-local 
c onst it uti onal r elationships were concerned. 
The power of the towns in Maine to vote Civil War 
bonuses was flatly denied in the Opinion of the Justices of 
1663 .. 14·3 The court cpoted the statute which defined the 
powers of towns, being virtually a reproduction of that of 
Massachusetts, added that a few other statutes gave the town 
fUrther powers, but that such powers were to be strictly 
construed. Tow.n tax powers were limited strictly by these 
statutes, and money could be raisE~d for no other purpose. 
To the argument that such bonuses might be a "necessary 
charge" in the language or the general town statute, the 
court replied: " ••• other necessary charges ••• only 
1 43 Qpinicn of' the Justices, July 2, 1863, 52 Me. 595. 
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embrace all incidental e~enses ••• in the ••• exercise of 
the various powers conferred by statute ."144 In a minor 
case, the court held that the cost of maintaining lobbyists 
at the state capital was certainly not a necessary town 
charge .14 5 The bonus cases which followed in considerable 
numbers were predetermined by the unswerving view which the 
court took of town powers. Only those bonuses voted in 
correspondence with the Acts of . l864, ch. 226- 27, and 1865, 
ch. 298, sec. 1., were valid. All others failed. In one of 
the earliest of these in Maine, the court stated its 
unvarying opinion on the point : 
Beyond cpestion or controversy the right of towns 
to grant or to raise money depen ds upon authority 
derived from sane statutory provision. Like other 
corporations, trey have no powers, that are not 
either expressly granted or necessarily implied 
from such as are granted, to enable them to dis-
charge the special fUnctions for which they were 
created and such duties as are by law imposed upon 
them. They have no inherent right of legislation 
like that of the State, but act only by a dele-
gated power which must be measured by the terms 
of the grant. See remarks of Daggett, J., in 
Willard v. Killingly (1830), 8 Conn. (247), 254.146 
The court cited Stetson v. Kempton, the 1816 Massachusetts 
War of 1812 case, and there the matter ended. In another 
such bonus case, chosen virtually at random, the court said: 
The general doctrine is, that towns must be con-
.fined to the exercise of the powers and perfection 
of the duties conferred by legislative acts. Th9y 
have no inherent powers beyond those granted by 
144Ibid., p. 598. 
1 4'5 Frankfort v. Inhabitants of Winterport, 1865, 
54 Me. 250. 
14·6Alley v. Inhabitant~ of Edgecomb, 1866, 53 Me. 446 . 
such statutes. The authorities to sustain 
these propositions are so familiar and so 
often cited that it is unnecessary to name 
them.l47 
The Opinion of the Justices of 1871148 reveals 
just h<l'f firm was the sentiment of the Maine just ices as 
to the subjection of the town. However, it is of sane 
interest to note that, although all justices gave their 
separate opinions of the subjection of' the town to the 
legislature, nevertheless, they assum.edthat towns are 
municipal corporations, entirely subject to the state in 
public purposes. The point was not directly controverted 
in any Maine case, but it would appear from this opinion 
that tre Maine court would be prepared to give at least 
m:lnimal protection to a town threatened with legislative 
confiscation for private benefit. 
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From the f'ew cases reaching the Maine Supreme Court, 
it would seem that municipalities had just about accepted 
their lot as tar as judie ial defini,tion of their cons titu-
tional position went. The only later . case of any significance 
in this per1od14'9 concerned the issue of whether a town could 
incur expenses in opposing a division of its territory before 
147winchaster v. Inhabitants of Corinna, 1866, 55 Me. 
9. For other bonus cases, see Perkins v. Inhabitants of 
Milford, 187l, 59 Me. 315; Thompson v. Inhabitants of Pittston, 
1871, 59 Me. 545; Barbour v. Inhabitants of Camden, 1865, 
51 Me. 608, etc. 
1 48opinion of the Justices, 1871, 58 Me. 590. 
1 49 Inhabitants of Westbrook v. Inhabitants o~ 
Deering, 1874, 63 Me. 231. 
a legislative committee. It will be recalled that New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts had denied that right, but that 
the Connecticut court had upheld it, even though presented 
with the fact that the other two courts had just decided 
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to the contrary . That Connecticut's position was the sounder, 
was obvious from the fact that the other two states added 
statutes to that effect to the state laws shortly after the 
decisions in their states . No clairvoyant -v·1ould be required 
to predict the outcome of the Maine case. The court stated : 
(The town is) _an institution of the State, es-
tablished for certain public purposes, and for 
effecting those purposes, it is invested with 
certain corporate powers, and is charged with 
corresponding duties--all either expressly or 
impliedly provided for it in the statutes, and 
adopted to their peculiar nature. Within the 
proper scope of these purposes, powers and duties, 
its corporate acts bind the corporation; while 
all others being foreign thereto, are without 
law and of no binding effect.l50 
The court cited Massachusetts and Maine cases, and Judge 
Dillon's Munici.Qal Corporations, pointing out that Maine had 
accepped Stetson v. Kempton as binding on it in its early 
cases, and reviewed its cases on town rights, or rather, the 
complete lack of them, in some detail. 
Summary of Trends 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that the 
150 Ibid., p. 236 . 
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course of the political development of the state-town inter-
governmental relationship was marked in this era by the 
extension of legislative control over the town, with the 
subsequent reaction in both the courts and in the growth of 
reform and home rule movements. · It was shown further that 
in many states outside New England, the courts of their own 
accord, on one ground or another, closed off local concerns 
from legislative interference. The influence of this court-
centered movement was shown at work in New England, where it 
succeeded to some extent in New Hampshire, had influence 
upon the Connecticut law but did not change its pattern~,was 
not needed in Vermont, or in Rhode Island due to the peculi-
ar local internal situations in those states, and failed 
utterly of adoption or even of influence in th~ courts of 
Maine. In Massachusetts, however, the reaction from legis-
lative domination brought a stern warning to the legislature 
that ! t must restrain its activities in regard to the. City 
of' Boston, and by implication, to the other towns and cities 
of' the state. However, the court did not take .it upon itself 
to change the previous pattern of its decisions to make the 
warning completely effective. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE AGE OF REFORM: 1899 TO PRESENT 
At the beginning of the twentieth century it was 
clear that some check was necessary on the authority of the 
state legislature to despoil the towns. Equally, some check 
was necessary to prevent the centrifugal tendencies within 
the towns and cities from triumphing to the detriment of the 
welfare and progress of the entire state. 
As has been demonstrated, some states, a handful, 
had already found a solution in an adaptation of the theories 
of Thomas M. Cooley or his contemporaries of the same mind. 
In these states, matters of local interest are solely the 
concern of the municipalities. "Ripper" legislation is im-
possible. There is a shadow area in which either may act, 
but in which the state can usually displace the town or city 
by occupying the field~ and there is an area of state-wide 
concern ln which only the state legislature may act. Other 
states have attempted to accomplish the same end by statute 
or by constitutional provision. Even in some of those states 
without home-rule provisions, a barrier of sorts has been 
erected against state dominance of the local community by 
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constitutional provisions outlawing special legislation in 
terms more or less definite ~d more or less effective. 
In the late last century, the New England town 
lost population, and lost influence in state affairs. Popu-
lation moved from the rural areas to the rising industries 
of the cities. The great influx of immigration and the im-
mense pools of capital made the cities the pace-setters of 
civilization. Living was easier, more rewarding; jobs were 
easier to find. The arts which are so often held to be the 
highest product of any civilization, were virtually the ex-
clusive properties of the cities. In this rise of technology 
and concentration of population, the old ideas did not seem 
as eternally valid as they once had. The town meeting, the 
selectmen, the town constable, and other town officials even 
became the butt of jokes on vaudeville stages. Also, rela-
tive wealth between cities and towns changed drastically. 
Once, cities had been dependent upon the towns nearby for 
their food. With the extension of the great railroad network 
across the country, the city could reach far afield for food 
of better quality, at lower prices. With few exceptions, 
from the late nineteenth century until the second world war, 
the New England town was a perpetually-depressed area. A 
recent book, 1 written by an author who had been born in a 
1Clarence M. Webster, Town-meeting Country, New York, 
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945, especially pp. 221-2. 
432 
small town near Willimantic, in the northeast corner of Con-
necticut, has described the situation in which towns found 
themselves after the Civil War very well. The "Town-meeting 
Country" of which he writes is a small piece of New England, 
occupying that part of Connecticut east of the Connecticut 
River, a small part of mid-southern Massachusetts, and the 
western ten-mile strip of Rhode Island, but it might serve 
as well as an analysis of much of New England. Poverty, 
new burdens, and new problems virtually bigger than the ' 
borders of the town are the events of every day for the town 
officers. More and more, the towns have become dependent on 
the state, almost like shabby, once-respectable relatives. 
State police have taken the place of the constable, a region-
al library and hospital the place of the former town facili-
ties, if indeed these facilities formerly existed at all. 
Only with the spread of population radially outward 
from core cities and from rural industrial areas has repect-
ability returned to many of the towns. New England is small, 
and it is a rare town which is more than forty or fifty miles 
from a city of twenty-five thousand or larger. This same 
distance marks the limits of easy commuting, and with the 
automobile, the commuter train, and metropolitan rapid trans-
it, with all their problems, has come a renascence for the 
New England town. The new population have taken surprisingly 
to the old tradition. Also, they value the relatively low 
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taxes, the state aid, and the freedom from the "graft and 
corruption" of the political order of the cities. In 
actuality, the town has served to give this new suburban 
population a basis for orderly, economical, reform govern-
ment, with none of the problems of the urban slums and the 
poor tax base of the central city. 
Against this background, then, must the New England 
town be viewed in the twentieth century. Elsewhere in the 
United States, the citizens of local government units who 
had fought the good fight in the nineteenth century, and had 
secured their home rule constitutional amendments and statutes, 
their home rule charters2 and manager-type governments found 
that the victory was not as sweet as it had seemed at first. 
Judicial interpretation of the provisions restricted their 
operation in several states. 
Massachusetts 
In the twentieth century, the position of the Massa-
chusetts municipality in relation to the state remained one 
2For a verbatim reprinting of constitutional pro-
visions relating to classification, special legislation, and 
home rule, as of 1949, see "Constitutional Provisions Relat-
ing to Local and Special Legislation and Home Rule", Popular 
Government, Feb.-March 1949, pp. 58-79. For a digest of 
constitutional provisions on the same subjects, including 
those in the Hawaiian and Alaskan constitutions, see Legis-
lative Research Drafting Fund, Columbia University (Richard 
A. Edwards, ed.), Index Digest of State Constitutions, Ro-
chester, Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co., 1959. 
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of absolute subjection. The creation of standard charter 
forms by statute, any one of which might be adopted by a 
city, but only if legislative approval were given, did little 
to alleviate the worst difficulties of local government. It 
did have the effect of taking some of the force from reform 
and home rule movements. Despite the provision of these 
standard forms, it is worthy of note that the Massachusetts 
legislature has on occasion failed to approve its own statu-
torily-specified charter forms, when one such form was chosen 
by a particular city. Few cities have taken advantage of 
these optional forms, and most cities of the state still 
operate under special charters. The towns of the state do 
not have charters, properly speaking, but adopt from time 
to time enabling acts, which accomplish a piecemeal change 
in the local government. 
The optional charter plan was set up in 1915, by 
Acts and Resolves of 1915, ch. 267, with four forms available 
for adoption, specified in exact form in the statute itself. 
Boston was by name disqualified from adopting any charter 
under the act. 3 By 1923, one city had adopted plan A; one, 
plan D; and four, plan B. 4 No great enthusiasm seems to have 
3see Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Bulletins for the 
Constitutional Convention of 1917-1918, vol. 1, Bulletins 1-16, 
Boston, Wright and Potter Printing Co., State Printers, 1918, 
pp. 419-50. 
4state of Connecticut, Ref!ort oft he Commission on 
Uniformity of Municipal Charters,artford, The State, 1923. 
435 
been engendered in the cities of the state by the availability 
of the model plans. Since the plans are open for adoption 
only by cities, and since Amendment II of the state constitu-
tion specifies that no town of less than 12,000 population 
may be incorporated as a city, the potential effect of the 
model forms is limited. Rodney L. Mott, in his monograph 
for the American Municipal Association, 5 has said that the 
smallest unit affected by a good home rule plan should have 
a population of not more than 5000. It is obvious that he 
would prefer such plans to apply also to towns and cities 
with less than the 5000 population specified. Twelve thousand 
seems by any standard to be too large a population minimum for 
incorporation as a city. The author would favor a population 
figure just large enough, considering the average income, 
distribution of wealth, and potential tax base, to bear its 
own cost of government as a city. It would seem that a figure 
of 2500 would be reasonable in most of the New England states. 
The recommendations of the technical staff of the 1917-18 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention touched upon thi s 
problem, referring with obvious approval to the home rule con-
stitutional provisions of Ohio, Oregon, Michigan and Minnesota. 
These extend home rule privileges to all municipalities, 
5Rodney L. Mott, Home Rule for America's Cities, 
Chicago, American Municipal League, 1949. 
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regardless of size, especially the home rule right to draft 
their own charters.6 
The home rule movement in Massachusetts is vigorous, 7 
but so far unsuccessful even in obtaining intermediate goals. 
It has not the almost religious fervor of the Rhode Island 
movement of the early l950 1 s, but is certainly better organ-
ized and more constantly at work than similar movements in 
Connecticut and elsewhere in New England. That Connecticut 
has gone as far as it has in granting home rule powers to its 
cities and towns is probably more a tribute to the strong 
tradition of localism in the state, and the good will of cer-
tain of its legislators than it is to the influence of "reform" 
and home rule organizations. Always to be borne in mind, also, 
is the fact that there is only one great metropolis in all of 
New England, Boston (1950 population 801,444). This makes 
the pattern in Massachusetts different from that of any other 
New England state. While Providence is a large city (1950 
population 248,674), and Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport 
of metropolitan size (1950 populations between 158,000 and 
6 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Bulletins ••• , ~ 
cit., loc. cit. Robert W. Bolan, State-Local Relations in 
Massachusetts, Part I, Amherst (Mass.), University of M:a.ssa-
chusetts Bureau of Government Research, 1957, recommends on 
page 11 a 5000 population for home rule charter purposes. 
7see e.g., Victoria Shuck, "Home Rule Stressed at 
Massachusetts Meeting", 1955, National Municipal Review, 44:420. 
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178,000), they do not yet present the picture of the "mega-
lopolis" of political science literature. Also, the existence 
of the three large Connecticut cities named above, with 
Waterbury, Norwalk, and New London having their own metro-
politan areas and problems, results in a diffusion of the 
problem, and also in a number of centers in which the desire 
for home rule is strong and effective. Representation in the 
upper house of the Connecticut legislature rests to a good 
extent upon urban population, and the cities are able to act 
in concert when necessary, and to make their influence felt 
in the lower house as well. In Rhode Island, although Provi-
dence is large, it has not reached the megalopolis status, 
and there are several other urban centers, such as Pawtucket, 
East Providence, Woonsocket and Newport, which share its 
outlook and problems. These cities, in Rhode Island history, 
have been able to join forces and work together to solve 
their common problems. The struggle for the 1951 home rule · 
amendment is a case directly in point. Although there are 
other large cities in Massachusetts--to name only a few, 
Wor ·cester, Fall River and the Holyoke-Springfeld-Chicopee 
complex--they do not have identical interests with Boston, 
and they and Boston do not form a cohesive bloc directed to 
the solving of local problems. The Democratic "machine" 
which has dominated Boston throughout recent history has not 
had the desire to undertake positive action which would unify 
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the Boston area and bring a greater measure of local self-
government to the urban areas of the Commonwealth. As Pro-
fessor Luther Gulick remarked just two years ago, Boston has 
paid dearly for the last hurrah. 8 
At the tenth annual conference on current govern-
mental problems, at the University o·f Massachusetts, in 1948, 
Joseph A. Kelly, Chief of the Pawtucket Bureau of the Provi-
dence Journal and Evening Bulletin, gave direct testimony to 
the contrast between the strongly centralized government of 
Mas sachusetts and the centrifugal nature of the government 
of his own state of Rhode Island. The force of history and 
tradition was strong in the latter state, he declared, in 
comparing the local histories of the two states in some de-
tail. He concluded that the Rhode Island tradition of local 
rights to control local affairs was a great factor in determin-
ing the situation of towns and cities in that state.9 
One of the many fine handbooks of your bureau of govern-
ment research here at the university says, and I quote ••• 
"Massachusetts cities are among the most highly regulated 
and closely supervised as to state control of local govern-
ment." By way of contrast, Rhode Island stands near the 
other extreme~ Its cities and towns get less interference 
8Luther Gulick, "The Price of Municipal Home Rule", 
Press Release, November 19, 1957, New York, National Munici-
pal League. 
9Joseph A. Kelly, "Strengthening Local Government", 
Proceedings of the Tenth Governor's Conference on State-Local 
Relations, June 3-4, 1958, Amherst (Mass.), University of 
Massachusetts Bureau of Government Research, 1958, pp. 59-60. 
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and less supervision by state agencies than almost any 
other state. We actually had more home rule in Rhode 
Island before the 1951 home rule amendment to the state 
constitution than most other states.lO 
Last year, the town manager of Stoughton, formerly 
active in the fight for the Rhode Island home rule amendment, 
found occasion to say, "Massachusetts is generally considered 
one 6f the most centralized states in the entire nation.nll 
He proposed a plan for home rule for Massachusetts, then added: 
These are but a few of the home rule powers offered for 
your consideration. More important than any enumeration 
for home rule powers is the existence of a broad consti-
tutional grant of home rule authority, a liberal inter-
pretation of home rule powers by the courts, and a 
favorable political climate in which the proper dividing 
line between state and local matters can be fairly and 
prudently determined.l2 
None of these comments as to centralization will surprise the 
reader who is familiar with the earlier discussion in this 
dissertation, showing how this state of affairs has come into 
being. Yet, home rule activity is constant. In 1951, for 
instance, the Massachusetts lower house passed a weak home 
rule bill, under pressure from citizens' groups, but the bill 
failed of approval by the senate. It had been anticipated 
that the bill had a good chance of approval. Similarly, in 
lOibid., p. 59. 
llRobert J .M. 0 'Hare, "Real Home Rule for Massachu-
setts Communities", Proceedings .of the Tenth Governor's Con-
ference ••• , op. cit., p. 44. 
12Ibid., p. 46. 
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1954, a home rule measure introduced by the Massachusetts 
Federation of Taxpayers failed to win legislative ~proval. 13 
Yet, despite all this, there remains abroad in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere the idea that the Massachusetts 
town is somehow possessed of a certain independence of action, 
and perhaps even of powers which it has somehow retained 
against the state. Exploring this myth, Troy R. Westmeyer or 
the National Municipal League in a recent article, 14 pointed 
out how absolutely subject the Massachusetts town is to the 
state, both in law and practice. Somehow, he pointed out, 
the myth has got abroad that the Massachusetts town and city 
enjoy considerable freedom and a good measure of local sever-
eignty. The myth was even commonly-accepted in the state 
itselr. Yet, attempts to secure home rule constitutional or 
statutory provisions have been railures, as have been attempts 
to lessen legislative control over municipalities. Every sort 
of home rule movement and other device to secure greater free-
dom of action in regard to local affairs has been tried, with 
13For a description of the continuing pattern of 
passage of bills of insignificant importance relating to 
minute local concerns, see Victoria Schuck's comments, in 
George Goodwin, Jr., (ed.), State-Local Relationships, Eighth 
Annual conrerence on Current Governmental Problems, April 23, 
1948, Amherst (Mass.), University of Massachusetts Bureau of 
Public Administration, 1948, p. 39. 
14Troy R. Westmeyer, "A- Massachusetts Myth", 1956, 
National Municipal Review, 45:116. 
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no success. In order to show how complete the subjection 
of towns and cities remained, '~· Westmeyer gave many ex-
amples of local bills regulating the tiniest and most local 
affairs. Since he directed the Fiscal Survey Commission of 
that state, and served for several years as the Research 
Director of the special Recess Commission on Taxation of the 
state legislature, his first-hand knowledge of the situation 
can hardly be doubted. Aside from such considerations, one 
should bear in mind the fact that in Massachusetts the town 
is not used in any way as a basis of state legislative re-
presentation. Thus, the influence of the towns in that body 
can do little to offset the tendency displayed so fully in 
history for the General Court to direct the affairs of the 
towns and cities of that state in intimate detail. It is 
virtually a by-word in the City of Boston, for instance, 
that the city has two councils, one at city hall, and one on 
the hill.l5 
The plight of the City of Boston is at the center 
I · of any consideration of a modern solution to the problem of 
the municipality or of the metropolis in Massachusetts. The 
city itself, as a social and economic unit, spreads over many 
15see, e.g., Harvey M. Shepard, "The Thraldom of 
Massachusetts Cities", 1912, National Municipal Review, 1 :182. 
That such bills are not a thing of the past, see Professor 
Victoria Schuck's comments, in State-Local Relationships, op. cit ., 
p. 39, and examples of local concerns covered by statute 
t here given. 
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cities and towns and several counties. Its problems have 
not been solved by an adaptation or consolidation of exist-
ing local govern."D.ents, which would appear to be the obvious 
solution. Rather, layers of new government have been added, 
with their attendant expense, confusion and multiplication of 
function. In a 1957 statement, Professor Luther Gulick spoke 
of just this sort of metropolitan problem.l6 He said, in 
effect, that if local governments, by cooperation or consoli-
dation could not solve the metropolitan problem, then the 
state or federal government would, with attendant flow of 
control and power from the local unit to the larger element 
of government. If a p0'.¥er vacuum existed, as he put it, the 
state would fill it. The existence of authorities and com-
missions charged with essentially local functions gives 
testimony of failure of local governments to solve the metro-
politan problem. The possibility of home rule is curtailed 
insofar as local functions pass out of local hands. Boston 
was used as a prime example, and Professor Gulick described 
the situation of that metropolitan city as caused by petty 
localism and petty politics. This situation had come about 
16Luther Gulick, "The Price ••• " : op~ cit. For an 
extensive bibliographical listing of materials dealing with 
the Boston metropolitan problem, see Boston University, 
Bureau of Public Administration, Bibliographn on State and 
~cal Government in New En,land (Lashley G. arvey, ed.), 
~oston, The Bureau, 1951(? , pp. 174-80. 
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despite the existence of fine local newspapers and of local 
educational leadership. Of the old city, he summed up 
"After sixty years, the crazy quilt continues."17 
Professor George Goodwin, Jr., has presented the 
reverse side of the same picture very well. To him,the 
special district is the ideal cure for the ailments of the 
metropolitan areas of Massachusetts. In a call for "federal 
districts", i.e., districts like the Metropolitan District 
Commission of Boston, he declares that such districts fit 
perfectly into the pattern of the state, and that they are 
preferable to forcing small local governmental units to join 
with others or be consolidated. 
Special districts appeal to me, particularly because of 
the strong sense of localism which we find in our state. 
As I have said, I am concerned about the resulting com-
plexity and lack of direct popular control in these 
districts, but these obstacles are not insuperable.l8 
Even those Massachusetts local officials who parti-
cipated in a recent governor's conference in that state did 
not seem to understand the full import of home rule. Al l 
were vocally in favor of the idea of freedom from legislative 
control but yet demonstrated in their remarks that they were 
17Gulick, "The Price ••• ", op. cit. 
l8George Goodwin, Jr., "Local Intergovernmental 
Relations Through the Special Districts", in State-Local 
Relationships, on. cit., p. 25. ~uoted excerpt is from 
p. 28. 
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not prepared to shake off the protecting and guiding hand 
of the legislature. A delegate from Rhode Island at a later 
governor's conference stated proudly that Rhode Island muni-
cipalities had always decided how to spend their money, how 
much debt to assume, and how to conduct their local financial 
affairs, with very little direction from the state, and the 
state "has never had to bail out a local community.nl9 Con-
trast this attitude with the statements in the earlier con-
ference of October 27, 1953,20 especially those of Mayor 
Andrew B. Holmstrom of Worcester on page 26 and of Victor F. 
Adams, a Selectman of Barnstable, on page 27, to the effect 
that local officials could not really be trusted to direct 
their local financial affairs without standards being set by 
the state. The right of a municipality to govern itself 
means responsibility as well as privilege. It is difficult 
to measure attitudes on the basis of such minute examples, 
but the author believes such attitudes may be typical. 
The Bureau of Government Research of the University 
of Massachusetts published in 1957 an interesting monograph 
exploring the possibilities of home rule for the state.21 
19Kelly, op. cit., p. 59. 
20commonwealth of Massachusetts, First Governor's 
Conference on State, County and Municipal Relations, Panel 
Discussion on Home Rule, Boston, State House, October 27, 1953. 
21Bolan, op. cit. 
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The monograph, though only sixteen pages long, does an ex-
cellent job of presenting the problem and the possible 
solutions. On a few minor points, criticisn1 might be made, 
for instance, the statements on page two to the effect that 
a home rule amendment creates two classes of cities, since 
only those cities which have adopted home rule charters may 
enjoy home rule benefits. This statement is true only if 
that is the sort of home rule amendment adopted by a parti-
cular state. As has been discussed, the Texas and Ohio con-
stitutional provisions, among others, apply to all municipali-
ties, whether they have adopted charters or not. Although 
Connecticut has adopted home rule by statute, the relevant 
powers are granted to all municipalities of that state, 
whether or not new charters are drafted and adopted. In 
Rhode Island, the proponents of the 1951 amendment thought 
that they had achieved this result, but since the wording 
which they chose was poorly-suited to the purpose, the Rhode 
Island supreme court held the operation of the amendment to 
be as described in the monograph here discussed. The mono-
graph also appears to regard home rule as achievable only 
through constitutional amendment, ignoring the Connecticut 
experience. However, though the definitions and basic con-
cepts might be criticised in a few details, the booklet is 
sound. Particularly aQmirable is the refutation of the bogey 
of imperium in imperio, that old fear of creating a sovereignty 
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within the state.22 The author has not seen such a skillful 
refutation in print anywhere else. No sovereignty within a 
sovereignty iscreated at all. Since the constitution is the 
basic law of the state, there is only one sovereignty. In 
deciding how state power is to be allocated, the constitution 
may apportion some of it to the legislature or other element 
of state government, and may also allocate as much of it as 
desirable to the local unit. Hence, the local unit, in ex-
erci s ing home rule powers of the broadest possible scope, 
is not exercising sovereign functions. Sovereignty is in the 
state, and the legislature is not to be confused with the 
state itself. This simple distinction has never been set 
forth in any legal case to the author's knowledge, yet the 
obvious logic of the statement is irrefutable. One sovereignty 
exists, exercised by different officers and different agencies. 
The writer of the monograph grasps the importance of the under-
lying tradition and the pattern and influence of judicial and 
legislative practice clearly. 
One reason only a small number of eligible cities accept 
home rule is the municipal laws in some state are quite 
liberal, and cities in these states enjoy a substantial 
' degree of home rule power under existing state laws. 
This is not the case in Massachusetts.23 
Yet, despite this flow of comment and suggestion in 
22Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
23Ibid., p. 7. 
recent times, the pattern in Hassachusetts in regard to 
legislative control and judicial attitude did not change 
in t h e ttv-entieth century.. In Mashpee and Millville , for in-
stance, repeated "ripper" legislation removed every vestig e 
of control of those towns over the levy of taxes, determi-
nation of expenditures, accounting, auditing--in fact, over· 
every internal financial affair . In the case of Mashpee , 
Acts and Resolves of 1932, ch~ 223, 1935, ch . 226, 1938, 
ch. 291, and 1941, ch. 189 accomplished this;; in the case 
of 11illville, Acts and Resolves of 1933, ch. 341, 1935, ch. 
4 70, 1939, ch. 511.~. 
It is to be remembered that the Mass achusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court is a very conservative body, much bound by 
its past decisions, and much dedicated to monoli thic 
notions of sovereignty, like those of Judge Dillon. A single 
eKample of action by the Massachusetts court will g ive the 
reader a clearer idea of the working of this court than any 
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rumount of description . The Massachusetts Constitution is liter-
ally h oary Hith age and replete with obsolete and useless pro-
visions . In the 1954 official version,~ the body of the consti-
tution occupies thirty-four pages and amendments,forty-fou r . The 
24commonwealth of Massachusetts, Constitution, Boston, 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1954. This is the latest copy 
certified by the Secretary . The constitution may also be found 
in the Manual of the General Court for 1959-60 and preceding 
years . 
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constitution itself, originally adopted in 1780, can be used 
only with great difficulty and much flipping back and forth 
of pages. Recognizing this fact, Governor McCall in his in-
aug~al address of 1916 to the legislature, called upon that 
body to submit a referendum to the people on the q1estion of 
revision. The legislature approved, Acts and Resolves of 
1916, ch. 98 1 and the question was submitted. The voters 
favored approval 217,293 to 120,979, a substantial margin in 
favor of revision.25 The revision was done carefully and 
well by a convention, being in the nature of a rearrangement 
and deletion of obsolete provisions.26 It received the ap-
probation of responsible commentators and was ratified by 
the voters by a large margin on November 4, 1919. Yet, the 
state supreme court, when asked for an opini'on, ruled27 that 
it regarded the old constitution as the only valid one. The 
revised version might be of some limited interest to scholars 
and others needing a handy reference work. The grounds 
stated in the opinion were t~chnical, based upon the minor 
mechanics of submission. However, the major reason given 
for the rejection of the revised version was that such a 
symmetrical and vast body of judicial precedent had been built 
25r bid., pp. 83-5. 
26The text of the Rearrangement will be found in 
Acts and Resolves of 1921. 
27opinion of the Justices, 1919, 233 Mass. 603. 
up on the basis of the old constitution, that the justices 
could not conclude that such decisions and the old consti-
tution of which they were a part were properly to be re-
placed by the revised version .~ This Opinion was confirmed 
by ~ later controversy28 concerning the validity of the 
revised version, on much the same reasoning. 
It may thus be appreciated that the municipal! ty 
in Massachusetts has two jealous foster-parents, ever-
alert to protect it during its infancy. That this trend is 
not one of recent days, has been demonstrated by reference 
to the work of Professor Parsons described in the last 
chapter. Harvey M. Shepard, former president of the Boston 
City Council and former first assistant attorney-general 
of the Commonwealth for four years, has described29 the 
pitiful condition of Massachusetts cities and towns in 
1912 and the years preceding in great detail. He lists 
instances in which the legislature gave over control of 
whole streets in various cities and towns to private utility 
corporations for their own purposes, ordered city streets 
closed or relocated, directed the building of tunnels and 
subways at municipal expense, and so on4 Probably his 
28 . 
Loring v. Young, 1921, 239 Mass. 349. 
29shepard, op. cit., p. 182. 
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strongest example concerns the attempt by Boston to protect 
the Old State House, a historical monument of great cul-
tural value. The city determined to allow all commercial 
leases to lapse as they expired, and thereafter to restore 
the building. Thereupon, the vacating of the building 
having been secured, the legislature turned over the whole 
first floor and the basement to the privately-owned and 
managed Boston Elevated Railway Company for use as a subway 
station. 
Raymond L. Bridgman has described the Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention of 1917, 30 and the unsuccessful 
attempts of home rule and reform forces to secure relief 
from legislative interference in local affairs. He pointed 
out that although municipal home rule amendments we~e a 
prime topic of conversation and consideration, every re-
solution by a delegate providing for any sort of home rule 
was reported adversely. Two years previously, in 1915, the 
legislature had provided the present optional charter plans31 
for adoption by voters. As already discussed, any appearance 
of municipal freedom which these charters might seem to 
30Raymond L. Bridgman, The Massachusetts Consti-
tutional Convention of 1917, Boston, published by the 
author, printed by the Rumford Press, Concord (N.H.), 
1923. 
31Massachusetts Acts and Resolves 1915, ch. 267. 
assure was more illusory than real. The Bridgman report 
of the convention of 1917 pointed out that delegates to 
the convention exhibited no sign that they considered that 
the optional charter plans provided any measure of local 
self-governmental protection. In fact, different home 
rule proposals were offered by the delegates from New Bed-
ford, Boston, Nantucket, Taunton, Lynn, and others. So 
status-quo oriented was the convention that a proposal by 
a Brookton delegate that a resolution be approved providing 
that the enumeration of rights in the constitution should 
not be deemed to impair or deny other rights of the people 
was reported adversely, as well.32 
Against this background, then, must the cases 
involving the constitutional state-local government re-
lation in the twentieth century be viewed. An early case33 
modified somewhat the earlier Opinion of the Justices 
which had stated that the provision of fuel by municipali-
ties to their residents was beyond their powers. The 
courts, In re Municipal Fuel Plants, in 1903 ruled that 
where private enterprise was unable to supply fuel, that 
32 Bridgman, op. cit., pp. 221-3. 
33rn re Municipal Fuel Plants, 1903, 182 Mass. 
605, 66 N.E. 25. 
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towns might do so for the relief of their inhabitants. One 
justice dissented, giving it as his opinion that such a 
course would be justified only in an emergency, with legis-. 
lative authorization. A case involving the City of Worcester,34 
in the following year, gave an indication of the mood of the 
Massachusetts legislature and of the United States Supreme 
Court in the new century. Under the terms of a franchise 
approved by the city, a street railway company operating 
therein was to pave and maintain the streets occupied by it 
in the city. The street railway had accepted these terms. 
A short time afterward, by special bill, the legislature ex-
cuse the street railway company from this promised duty. To 
some extent this action approached expropriation by the 
legislature for private benefit, only the "quasi-public" 
character of such a municipality serving to distinguish the 
case. After wavering in the early and mid-nineteenth century, 
the United States Supreme Court settled the issue of claims 
by municipalities of constitutional guarantees, on any basis 
whatever, as inapplicable, and placed the right of the state 
to do as it wished with its municipal corporations upon the 
basis of an exercise of sovereignty. No rights of a private 
character in regard to local property were recognized, 
34City f W t o orces er v. Worcester Consolidated Street 
R. Co., 1904, 196 U.S. 539, 49 L.Ed. 591, 25 S.Ct. 327. 
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not even as against legislative expropriation for private 
benefit.35 The "creatures of the legislature" assertion 
continued to appear in the cases . 36 The legislative amend-
ment of the charter of Haverhill to provide a novel non-
partisan voting plan, which the court called a "radical de-
parture" was approved as being within legislati~e powe1" . 37 
Hodgdon v . Haverhill in 190738 presaged the opinion of the 
court in a 1915 case39· involving the operation of the 
Chelsea Bridge between Boston and Chelsea. This was a 
situation essentially in tlw pattern of the earlier one 
involving the metropolitan sewer district, and represented 
an attempt on the part of the legislature to deal with 
metropolitan problems . The legislature imposed the cost of 
35 
Howal"d L. McBain, "The Rights of Municipal Cor-
poration Under the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion", 1914, National Municipal Review,3:284, and 1917, 
Political Science ~uarterty, 5~:276. In City of Trenton 
v . New Jersey, 192 , 262 u.s, 182, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed . 
937, 29 A.L.R. 1471, the United States Supreme Court under-
took a complete review of its cases as to local rights, 
distinguishing out of existence those several earlier ones 
which had recognized private rights of municipal corpora-
tions and the like . 
36see e.g. Wheelock v . City of Lovrell, 1907, 196 
Mass . 220, 81 N.E. 977 . 
1009. 574. 
406, 
37Graham v. Roberts, 1908, 200 Mass. 152, 85 N.E. 
The statute ref erred to is Ac ts and Reso l ves of 1908, 
38Hodgdon v. City of Haverhill, 1907, 193 Y~ss. 
79 N.E. 830. 
39rn re City of Boston, 1915, 221 I1ass. 468, 109 
N. E. 389 . 
ch. 
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the const~uction and ~epai~ of the b~idge on Boston, Chelsea, 
and Revere , but placed the bridge unde r the management of 
Boston alone, empowe~ing the b~idge commissioners appointed 
by that city to levy costs as they might determine upon the 
three cities to keep up the bridge. Chelsea and Reve re 
complained that this was an improper delegation of a legis-
lative function to the bridge commissioners. The court 
ruled, in the pattern of its past decisions: 
Legislative power is not exhausted by a single 
exercise, but may be put forth at any time in any 
reasonable way in furtherance of the general pub-
lic good •••• The various cities and towns ••• are 
liable at any moment to have their aublic powe~s, 
duties, rights and property modifie , divided, 
combined or alienated by the Legislature.40 
(italics mine) 
It will be noted that the court specifically restricts the 
ruling of the case to the public character of municipal 
corporations. 41 The rule of the Mount Ho~ Cemetery case 
was obviously still in force. The 1918 Opinion of the 
Justices 42 disapproving the representative tO\vn meeting led 
to the adoption shortly thereafter of a constitutional 
amendment permitting such. Given the conservative tone of 
the court and the pattern of its precendents, such an opin-
ion would be expected. After the conventional statements 
40 Ibid., p. 393. 
41 Propl:'ietors of Mount Hope Cemetery v. City of 
Boston, 1893, 158 ¥mss. 509, 33 N.E. 695. 
42 0pinion of the Justices_l 1918, 229 lv1ass . 601, 
119 N.E. 770. --
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in a 1923 case, tthe court demonstrated once again in 192643 
that it had not forgotten the lesson of Mount Hope Cemetery, 
nor was it being misled by the federal Supreme Court cases of 
the time. The dispute again involved metropolitan area ones. 
Th e City of Newburyport complained of a legislative assess-
ment on it to pay the cost of a regional tuberculosis hospi-
tal.44 Since the purpose to be accomplished was clearly of 
benefit to all the people of the state, there would seem to 
have been little reason for such a complaint. Of the power of 
the legislature to provide for the apportionment of the costs 
of a public pro j ect, the court said, much as it had in In re 
City of Boston, above: 
There are instances where ••• municipalities have been 
compelled or authorized to contribute for improvements 
beyond their own borders. The municipal subdivisions ••• 
have not the same right to judicial trial and decision 
respecting obligations imposed on them for the support 
of strictly public burdens as have private corporations 
and other persons. Their powers and duties are not crea-
ted or regulated by contract but by statutes ••• subject 
to change ••• as ••• determined by the Legislature. The 
cost of public improvements undertaken by any agency of 
government may be apportioned not only with reference 
to ••• benefits ••• but ••• also ••• population, physical charac-
teristics and ability to bear the burden. Legislativepower 
4JAttorney-General ex rel. Nesmith v. City of Lowell, 
1923, 246 Mass. 312, 141 N.E. 45. 
~ssex County v. City of Newburjport, 1926, 254 Mass. 
232, 150 N.E. 234. The laws involved were Acts and Resolves 
of 1916, ch. 286, Acts and Resolves of 1917, ch. 107, and 
Acts and Resolves of 1924, ch. 443, 23, levying the cost of 
the hospital on certain cities and towns by name. 
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is not exhausted by a single exercise, but may 
be put forth at any time for the promotion of the 
general welfare. 4.5.' 
Hence, from the two cases has evolved the rule that although 
the legislature may assess the cost of a metropolitan area 
project upon the municipalities benefited thereby upon any 
objective rule of assessment, what municipalities were to 
be deemed benefited was largely for the legislature to de-
cide, in one act or several. 
The shadow ofnripper"legislation fell over Fall 
River in 1932, with the appointment of a state finance 
boar dto take absolute control of that city's financial 
affairs. Bankruptcy threatened, but it is much to be doubted 
if the state board was any more effective than the city of-
ficers would have been in the early days of the Great De-
pression. The Supreme Judicial Court gave its approval to 
such legislation in the cases of Broadhurst v. Fall River~0 
and Paquette v. Fall River.~? The first of these cases 
contested the power of the legislature to appoint such a 
board. The court ruled: 
The several towns and cities are instrumentalities 
of government largely under the control of the 
General Court (legislature). Their powers and 
duties ••• may be vested in officers appointed by 
the governor instead of those selected by the 
~'5 Ibid., p. 236. 
ASBroadhurst v. City of Fall River, 1932, 278 
Mass. 167, 179 N.E. 587 • 
. :i?Paqg~tte v. City of' Fall River, 1932, 278 :Mass. 
172, 179 N.E. ~~8. . 
people or other municipal authorities, provided 
the Legislature deems in it~8wisdom that the public welfare requires it. 
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With as little ceremony as this, the court permitted the 
most serious trespass on the most vital of the internal 
aff 1airs of one of the state t s oldest municipal corpora-
tions. Such a finance board, by its nature, is not liable 
even to an accounting to local authorities. The only sanc-
tions upon its activities are those imposed by the legis-
lature. It is very difficult to understand how the Mass-
achusetts court, as courts elsewhere, could allow the in-
stitut ion of a board which could accomplish the acts of 
expropriation far more skillfully than the legislature 
could itself, yet hold such boards constitutional but 
legislative acts directly taking municipal property for 
private benefit void. Yet, such has been the general pat-
tern of law, in Massachusetts and elsewhere. What the 
legislature cannot do directly, it may do indirectly. The 
Paquette case disputed the right of the finance board to 
reduce the salaries of teachers despite the existence of 
salary guarantees in existing contracts. Though this 
activity of the state finance board took over the functions 
of the school committee as well as the city council, the 
finance board was ruled to have entire control over all 
4&3roadhurst v. Fall River, cited in footnote .46,. 
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expenditures, no matter what agency would otherwise have made 
dec is ions concerning them. The history of these "ripper" 
boards in Hassachusetts , as in Connecticut and elseHhere in 
New England may properly be regarded as the history of the 
blackest days of local government . One may easily picture 
them as set up to combat a specific evil, whether real or 
imagined. However, whatever the original purpose, the.se 
boards inevitably acted in a shadow area of non-responsi-
. . 
bility, and tended everywhere to fall into disrepute, and 
to become agencies of party politics. 
Initial attempts by municipalities in l1assachusetts 
. . 
to operate their own illuminating gas or electric power 
facilities without special legislative permission met with 
no success. 49- \Vi th the case which unsuccessfully contested 
the validity of ttPlan En, 50- the fifth type of optional char-
ter provided by statute, the Hassachusetts court spoke again, 
as it had earlier in Commonwealth v. Plaisted, of "the pri-
vilege of local self-government". The phrase has an O.rw:ellian 
ring to the person familiar with New England history . The 
plan, city manager-council government, with the council 
elected by proportional representation, was held valid 
49Adie v. Mayor of Holyoke, 1939, 303 Mass. 295, 
21 N. E. 2d 377; McRae v. Selectmen of the Town of Concord, 
1937, 296 ~~ss. 394, 6 N. E. 2d 366, 108, A. L. R. 1450. 
5~oore v. Election Commissioners of Cambridge , 
19~.1, 309 ¥laSS. 303, 35 N.E. 2d 222. 
because "the General Court has power to restrict the 
privilege of local self-government" .51 That same year, 
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in another case, the court described the status of munici-
palities thus: 
Cities and towns are political subdivisions 
created for the convenient administration of 
government, and they possess only such powers 
as are conferred upon them either in terms or 
by necessary implication of enabling statutes 
•••• They are separate units, possessing only 
the authority thus entrusted, and acting ~ in-
strumentalities of local self-government. 
That the tradition of tb.e right to govern itself 
springs eternal in the New England town is amply demonstrated 
in the wartime case of. Commonwealth v. Hudson.53 in 1943. 
Ordered by the state department of public health to chlor-
inate its water supply to guard public health and protect 
against possible sabotage during the war, the town voted 
at to"tv-n meeting to postpone action indefinitely on the 
order, and on appropriating any money to carry out the or-
der. Further action by the state to enforce the order 
brought a flat refusal to obey, on the basis that a town 
had the sole power to decide how money should be voted and 
51 Moore v. Election Commissioners, cited in foot-
note 50 above. 
52
·:Burnham v. :r-rayor and Aldermen of Bevel,ly, 1941, 
309 Mass. 388, 35 N.E. 2d 242, at 243. 
53
· commontiealth v. Town of Hudson, 1943, 315 Mass . 
335, 52 N.E. 2d 566. 
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spent within its limits, and ful,ther, that the town had 
rights independent of the legislature, and of the state and 
its agencies, and that no state law had effect or operation 
within a to-vm unless · the town meeting should give its con-
sent to such law. Such an argument, advanced with deadly 
seriousness by the attorney for the town before the Supreme 
Judicial Court, vir•tually left that court speechless with 
apoplexy. Its magnificent judicial edifice, constructed 
over two centu!•ies, and defended even against the governor, 
the legislature, the voters, and a constitutional conven-
tion, was spurned by a town, one of that class of inferior 
beings whose very existence was a gift of the legislature. 
Of the refusal to obey, the court fumed: 
i'Je .make no attempt to list all the weapons in the 
ample armory of equity. We merely point out that 
courts of equity do not l~ck the means of doing 
their duty. We still have a right to assume that 
upon sober second thought the town and its officers 
and inhabitants will not continue to defy the leg-
islative mandate, but will obey the decree which 
will follow this decision. For that reason, we 
shall not put forth at this time the full judicial 
power that might be b:r>ought into operation to com-
pel obedience to that decree. It will be time 
enough to do that when it appears -- if it eve!' 
does appear -- that the town will not do its duty 
as that duty is now adjudicated. In that event, 
a bill to carry the decree into execution would 
lie, if needed, against such persons as the 
plaintiff might be advised to join with the town 
as defendants. • •• For the present it seems suf-
ficient to order the entry of a final decree that 
will (1) require the defendant town to pay costs 
to the plaintiff, (2) command the defendant town, 
and its commissioners of public works and all its 
officers, agents, servants and attorneys whose 
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action may be required in order to cause the de-
cree to be obeyed, forthwith to obey the order of 
t he State department of public health set forth 
in the bill by providing and making ready for use 
at the expense of .the defendant town chlorinating 
equipment sufficient to chlorinate all the water 
supplied by said town through its water system, 
and (3) command the defendant selectment forth-
with to cause a town meeting of the defendant town 
to be called and held, and forthwith to cause to 
be inserted in the warrant therefor and to cause 
to be submitted to the voters at such town meeting 
in accordance with law, an article or articles 
that when adopted by said voters will cause such 
equipment to be forthwith provided and made r~ldy 
for use at the expense of the de~endant town. 
The court thereafter threatened to hold all town officers, 
and even the voters in contempt if they continued to refuse 
to act. The court analyzed the argument for• the town, com-
pletely outside its experience, in equally-shocked terms: 
vie say more in thepresent case only because of 
a contention made by counsel for the defendant 
town which is without precedent in our experience. 
He contends that the power to appropriate money 
of the defendant town is vested exclusively in 
the voters at town meeting ••• ; that they have a 
right to act according to their untrammeled judg-
ment, and may refuse to appropriate money even to 
discharge adjudicated duties or obligations of the 
town; that the Commonwealth and its courts are 
porrerless unless the voters of the town in town 
meeting give their approval and concur•re.nce; that 
v1hen "unquestioned (unquestioning?) obedience is 
imposed upon the people," even the· people of a 
subordinate governmental.. unit like a town, and 
even obedience to an order of the legislative 
branch of the State government adjudged valid by 
the ~udicial branch, then "democracy could be 
dead ; and consequently, since a decree would be 
futile and unenforceable, that this court should 
54Ibid., p. 575. It should be emphasized that this 
was ~artime.--nid the state not acted, the federal government 
probably would have . However, the town ' s absolute refusal 
to cooperate in time of national emergency is even more as-
tonishing. 
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order none. 
That argument is so full of dangerous e r rors, 
and if relied on by the town and its officers and 
inhabitants might lead to such serious consequences 
to them, that we are unwilling by silence to per-
mit the counsel or his clients to remain under the 
delusion that a town may thus safely defy the 
Commonwealth and its courts . A town is not an in-
dependent sovereignty. It is merely a subordi nate 
agency of State government. It is a creatur•e of 
the Commonwealth, from which are derived all its 
powers and those of its voters and officers. • •• 
The powers of a town and of its town meeting, and 
the very existence of the town are subject to the 
will of the legislature. Powers exercised by the 
voters in town meeting or by officers chosen by 
them may be taken away and vested in in officers 
appointed by the Governor~ ••• Plainly a town is 
in no position to defy its creator, the Common-
wealth, or to attempt to nullify legislative man-
dates :tssued under the authority of the General 
Court.55 
Even in a 1958 case, the cou1•t continued to be 
as t onished: 
The respondents seem to make the astonishing con-
tention that the town ' s vote in enacting the by-
lavl is a judicially mn•eviewable act . The ar gument , 
if made, overlooks the elementary principle that a 
town is merely a subor dinate agency of the State 
g overnment created for conven.ient administration, 
and has only those powers which are expressly con-
ferred by statute or necessarily implied from 
those expressly conferred or from undoubted muni-
cipal rights or privileges.56 
However, the fact situation was a little more amusing than 
that of the Hudson case. One Atherton, who had been denied 
5~ 0 Ibid., P• 572 . 
56 Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne, 1958, 336 Mass . 
511, 149 N . E. 2d 232, at 235 . The earlier case mentioned 
is Atherton v. Boal"d of Appeals . of the Town of Boul'ne, 1956 , 
334 I1ass . 451, 136 N.E . 2d 201. 
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a zoning variance by the board of zoning appeals of his 
· town, "fought it to the supJ:•eme court", and lost . Nothing 
daunted, he connived at the holding of an irregular town-
meeting, which voted the variance sought, thereby overruling 
the board of zoning appeals and the Supreme Judicial Court, 
more or less. The outcome is plain. 
Thus, we find that the position of the Massachu-
setts municipality in relation to the legislature and to 
the central state government was neither better nor worse 
than it was at the end of the last century. It was still 
a creature of the legislature, but probably retained a 
basic right against expropriation by the legislature in 
favor of a private party. Yet, the law was now clear that 
municipal functions and property .could be transferred to 
other public bodies where the legislatux•e, in its ovm 
judgment, deemed that such bodies might perform a certain 
job in the place of the local body. Only in the consent 
which the court had given to state boards running strictly 
local affairs was the municipality worse than before. This 
ultimate in"ripper'practice gave somewhat of a new incentive 
to home rule activity, but with no significant result in 
Ifussachusetts . As will be demonstrated, hoHever, such 
ultimate ''l•ipper"practice in Rhode Island and Connecticut 
brought a strong popular reaction, and with it, the first 
successes of the home rule activities in those states . 
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Connecticut 
The fate of the Connecticut municipality in the 
courts in the early part of the twentieth century was rather 
like that of its Massachusetts analogue, but the forces of 
centrifugalism were always stronger in the state created by 
the river towns. A commentator in 1930 remarked, even of 
his day that 
The people of the state have historically shown an 
almost ineradicable tendency to atomize their politi cal 
life, to break up territory into smaller and smaller 
units, and to fight off anything smacking of centrali-
zation.57 
The author was no partisan of this tendency. The situation 
which he was describing was the uphill, years-long fight 
which advocates of a metropolitan district for certain area-
wide services had had in inducing the surrounding towns to 
accept such a district; and this despite the fact that the 
character of the people of the whole area and their interests 
were substantially identical, with Hartford having no unusual 
slum, crime, or other problems. Yet, Connecticut was no . 
exception to the tide of history. It fought out its "ripper" 
acts, as described below, and the municipalities secured 
their home rule acts of 1913 and later. The early acts were 
57Lane W. Lancaster, "Hartford Adopts a Metropoli-
tan Charter", 1930, American Political Science· Review, 
24:693. 
4-65 
less effective than the home rule amendments and statutes of 
other states. In fact, a statement that they were ineffective 
would not be far from the truth. Professor Max White, of the 
University of Connecticut Department of Government, writing 
in 1942,58 pointed out that every city and borough of that 
state operated under special legislation. 
The original Connecticut Home Rule Act was Public 
Acts of 1913, ch. 154, entitled "An Act Giving General Powers 
to Cities and Boroughs." Towns were not included, and two 
years later, Public Acts of 1915, ch. 319 was added to remedy 
the deficiency. This time, the title was "An Act Providing 
for Home Rule in Towns, Cities and Boroughs." These were 
not used and were of no effect to accomplish the ends pro-
claimed in their titles. Recognizing t his fact, the legis-
lature repealed these provisions in Public Acts of 1917, ch. 
405, entitled "An Act Concerning Powers of Towns, Cities and 
Eoroughs." This latter Act was effective in expanding a 
little the sphere of areas within which municipalitie s might 
act without specific legislative sanction in each instance. 
Parts of the Act survive in Conne ctiaut General Statutes, 
ch. 25. The 1917 Act was amended by Public Acts of 1919, 
58Max R. White, "Town and City Consolidation in 
Connecticut", 1942, American Political Science Review, 
36:492. 
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ch. 60 and ~921, ch. 30 in minor details, to give somewhat 
extended powers to local governmental units.59 
Aside from some minor legislation in 1923, following 
the report of the Commission on Uniformity of Municipal Char-
ters, the next significant home rule legislative activity 
in the state occurred in 1951. The home rule statute of 
1951 was at least partly due to the reform activity of the 
Commission on State Government Organization of 1949-50 of 
Governor Chester Bowles, which gave the professors, political 
scientists and "reformers" of that state the opportunity to 
analyse the state-local relation. Professor Duane Lockard 
stated that this statute granted home rule in name only.60 
To illustrate this fact, it should be pointed out that the 
statute gave power only to change local charters insofar as 
they related to local government and local affairs, not in-
consistent with the statutes. The new charter had to be 
approved by referendum in which a majority of voters voting 
approved the change, and in an election in which at least 
fifty-one percent of the voters voted. Professor Lockard 
stated that such a majority was impossible, pointing to figures 
59state of Connecticut, Commission on Uniformity of 
State Chart ers, Report, Hartford, The State, 1923. The texts 
of the Acts mentioned in the text are reproduced in full 
therein. 
60nuane Lockard, "Home Rule for Connecticut's Munici-
palities", 1955, 29 Connecticut Bar Journal 51, at p. 52. 
of the Connecticut Public Expenditures Council which showed 
that in eighteen local referenda between 1945 and 1952, the 
average voter turnout was 29.1 percent; on only two occasions 
did more than 51 percent turn out, the highest being 53 per-
cent. None of these were home rule referenda, however. In 
the 1952 presidential elections, New London submitted a pro-
posed home rule charter change to permit local officers to 
be nomi natee by petition rather than by party caucus. Al-
though 91.5 percent of the electors voted, only 32.5 percent 
voted on the question, 27.4 percent yes, 5.l ·percent no.61 
Since the Eisenhower election brought out virtually every 
able-bodied voter, this performance probably represents about 
the maximum vote to be anticipated on any charter change at 
any local election. The standard technique of those blocking 
charter change was to urge voters to stay home. If even 
relatively few took their advice, adoption of the change was 
impossible. Professor Lockard cited the testimony of "Leo" 
Kershner of Bridgeport before the legislative Committee on 
Cities and Boroughs in 1953, to the effect that opponents of 
local charter change urged voters to stay home, and that in 
6lconnecticut Public Expenditures Council, "Home Rule 
Law Puts Premium on Non-Voting", Taxpayers News, January-
February 1952, 5:1. The Council pointed out that even with 
a requirement that fifteen percent of voters voting at an 
election approve a charter adoption, the minimum voter parti-
cipation in the election would have to be over thirty percent, 
and in actuality would have to be far higher, since many 
voters do not vote on such issues. 
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one community, newspaper advertisements were published urging 
voters to refrain from voting. 62 
Professor Lockard conducted a personal survey, send-
ing questionnaires to every city and town clerk of the state. 
Of the eighty-nine who replied, four reported attempts to 
change their charters, all unsuccessful. 
In commenting on the 1951 act, Professor Lockard 
stated that the majority required to achieve charter revision 
was so high as to be almost impossible. 63 Hence, there was 
no incentive for anyone to spend the money and do the work 
needed even to prepare a home rule charter for submission to 
the electorate. 
He gave an interesting "close-up" view of the Con-
necticut General Assembly as of the time he was writing. In 
the average session, three hundred fifty to four hundred bills 
of special or local nature were introduced, constituting about 
one-fifth of the total. These bills were mostly of very minor 
importance. Such bills in the lower house were referred to 
the Committee on Cities and Boroughs. The decision of this 
62The "Leo" Kerschner here identified is Leonard 
"Hank" Kerschner, presently president of the municipal employ-
ees' union , and a long-time friend of the author, who also 
remembers the advertisements referred to, in the case of the 
Milford, Connecticut, charter adoption campaign. The charter 
was approved, nevertheless. Kerschner ,'s testimony is repro-
duced in Steno~raphic Notes of Public Hearings Before the 
Committee on C ties and Boroughs, 1953, pp. 125-6, as cited 
in Professor Lockard's article, op. cit. 
63Lockard, op. cit., pp. 52-3. 
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committee was final, since the lower house rarely discussed 
bills on the floor of the house. This resulted directly in 
the use of "log-rolling" techniques among members, and to the 
use- of the control over such legislation by party leaders 
to "hold the boys in line." Professor Lockard states that "All 
too frequently local legislation is rejected entirely because 
of some backstage maneuver unrelated to the merits of the 
question in hand." He gave concrete examples of bills "re-
called" after being passed, and then defeated, all to dis-
cipline a recalcitrant member. Where recall was impossible, 
bills have been "lost" on the way to the governor. For in-
stance, he points out that a 1953 local bill creating a 
manager system for Waterbury was thus "lost" after approval 
by both houses, and quotes from the Hartford Courant (an 
eminently respected newspaper) of June 17, 1953. The news-
paper reported a high Republican leader as saying of the 
Waterbury bill, "The Democrats killed it two years ago, the 
Republicans killed it this time.u64 
Professor Lockard then discussed the problem of home 
rule provisions for Connecticut, advocating a good home rule 
statute during the interim before a constitutional amendment 
might be secured. He gave three desiderata: permission to 
initiate local measures by petition of some small percentage 
64Ibid., p. 55. The analysis of legislative activity 
is on pp. 53-5. 
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of electors, a ban on all special legislation, and a reduction 
in the minimum voter approval needed for adoption of a home 
rule charter. He concluded: 
For all its complications and difficulties, the home 
rule idea has much to recommend it, and its acceptance 
in Connecticut is long overdue. That the General As-
sembly has passed two unsuccessful pseudo- home rule 
acts suggests to me not that home rule will not work 
but that it might well be tried once to find how it 
works.65 
It is interesting that the 1957 home rule legislation, which 
brought "real" home rule to Connecticut, f'ollows Prof'e s sor 
Lockard's recommendations rather closely. 
The experience with the 1951 act brought renewed 
activity to secure amendment. In 1953, the act was changed 
to require approval of' a proposed charter change by t wenty-
six percent of' all electors qualified to vote at the election.66 
While at first glance, this new statute might seem to have 
libera lized the requirement, it actually did not. About the 
only ef fect of the statute , on analysis, will be seen to be 
that i t makes intentional non-voting no longer ef'f'ective as 
a technique to def'eat a proposed change. Prof'essor Lockard, 
in examining activity under this act, could lesxn of only 
three instances in which the act was used, only once success-
fully . The 1953 statute permitted as well initiation of 
-65Ibid., p. 60. 
66see "Home Rule Made More Feasible in Connecti cut", 
1953, National Municipal Review, 42:400. 
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suggested charter changes by petition as well as by vote of 
two-thirds of the local legislative body. Together with the 
tendency of the legislature, Connecticut's courts have been 
given in this century to interpret local powers more broadly, 
though as Lockard stated, Dillon's Rule still blighted home 
rule there as elsewhere . The 1957 home rule statute has not 
been subjected to detailed analysis as yet by courts or com-
mentators.67 In that it specifically restricts towns in 
levying taxes to those authorized by state law, the grant 
is not as broad as it might be.68 The 1957 act was largely 
a renewal of the 1953 one, except that the General Assembly 
pledged itself not to interfere with the internal affairs 
or organization of any town or city of the state.69 If the 
67But see "Home Rule Broadened in Connecticut", 
1957, National Municipal Review, 46:356. As to the situation 
before this act, see MarkS. Matthews, "Under an 1818 Cloud", 
1955, 44 National Municipal Review, 44:352, at pp. 355-6. 
The "1818 cloud" is the Connecticut Constitution of that date. 
68Bolan, op. cit., pp. 4-5 in discussing home rule 
for Massachusetts municipalities is of the opinion that 
authority over education, debt, taxation, and judicial matters, 
among other things, should be withheld from local communities. 
The author does not agree as to education, debt or taxation. 
69rn 1955, the house of representatives approved a 
proposed home rule constitutional amendment. Connecticut 
Public Expenditures Council, "Another Step Toward Home Rule", 
Your State and Local Government News and Views, September 13, 
1956, no. 58, Hartford. It might have been described as a 
"charter-draft ing" type amendment, indefinite in terms, leaving 
to the legislature the granting of specific powers, by general 
law. Constitutional amendments are proposed in Connecticut 
by approval of the lower house, which must be followed at the 
next session by approval of two-thirds of each house, and 
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act is effective, it would seem to mark the sharp end of 
"ripper" acts and special legislation. No legislative act 
can bind succeeding legislatures, but the tradition of local 
self-government has run strongly in Connecticut. It would 
seem that the act has some good chance for success in elimi-
nating legislative abuses. The act states: 
The general assembly shall enact no special legislation 
relative to the powers, organization and form of govern-
me nt of any town, city, borough or other unit of local 
government, unless requested by a town, city, borough 
or other unit of local government, in the manner herein-
after prescribed, to enact such special legislation. 
A resolution requesting the general assembly to enact 
special legislation and specifying the purpose of such 
legislation shall be adopted: (a) by a two-thirds vote 
of the council or board of directors in any town having 
such a body; of the board of aldermen, council or body 
charged with the duty of making annual appropriations 
in any city or consolidated town and borough; or of the 
board of directors or district committee in any district; 
or (b) by the board of selectmen or by a majority vote 
of the town meeting or representative town meeting in 
any town not having a council or board of directors. 
A request for the enactment of special legislation by 
the general assembly may also be initiated by a petition 
specifying the purpose of such legislation and signed by 
not less than ten percent of the electors of the tovvn~ 
city, borough, or other unit of . local government •••• 7u 
The 1957 act has modified the vote required for 
6 9 (continued) approval by a majority of the electors 
voting thereon. Thus was begun the process, but the legis-
lature chose to enact statutory home rule instead in 1957. 
It seems that the local governments did not lose thereby. 
See Connecticut Public Expenditures Council, "Proposed Home 
Rule Amendment to State's Constitution", Taxpayers News, 
March-April 1956, 8:1 
70connecticut Public Acts of 1957, ch. 465, sec. 19; 
also Connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1958 , sec. 
2-14. 
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adoption of home rule charters to a feasible and reasonable 
figure. For adoption, a simple majority of those voting at 
a general election (not a majority of those voting on the 
question) is required. In a special election, such a charter 
may als o be adopted if approved by a majority voting, and if 
such majority is equal at least to fifteen percent of the 
registered voters. The charter process is initiated by vote 
of two-thirds of the local legislative body, or by petition 
of ten percent of the registered voters. The same majorities 
and percentages are required for a local community to request 
special legislation, so disaffected minority groups are fore-
closed from seeking to destroy the effect of the home rule 
adopt ion, through seeking legislative intervention. 
Further, the statute grants fifty-seven specific 
powers to ~11 local governments, charter or non-charter, and 
quarant ees that all existing powers are to remain unaffected. 
Towns may consolidate with other local units, specifically, 
cities, towns, boroughs and special districts, on approval 
of fifteen percent of the total town electorate in an elec-
71 tion. The Connecticut legislature has thus granted home 
rule to all local units, effective on the adoption of the 
statute. The only real effect of the grant of charte-r-
v~iting power is to allow local units which do not like the 
71Ibid. See also "Home Rule Broadened in Gonnecti -
" --cut , op. cit. 
form of their local governments, to change them, and to 
adopt virtually any other of the modern local governmental 
forms. The statute is phrased so carefully and in such 
sweeping terms that the author does not see how it mL~ht be 
weakened in the courts. This, added to the fact that the 
Connecticut courts have recognized the legislative intenti.on 
to extend a greater measure of local self-government to 
municipalities, with a concurrent weakening of the applica-
tion of Dillon's Rule and the ultra vires concept, virtually 
assures success for home rule in Connecticut. In fact, the 
Connecticut home rule statute is far more effective than the 
Rhode Island constitutional amendment. The statute extends 
to all municipalities, regardless of the charter-drafting 
process, and guarantees them, in its fifty-seven named powers 
plus its broad grant and reservation to them of existing 
powers, full control qver all local concerns. The amendment, 
on the other hand, has been interpreted to grant home rule 
powers only to charter-adopting municipalities. Even then, 
since the amendment names no specific powers, the Rhode Is-
land courts have applied Dillon's Rule and ultra vires with 
no change, to limit even the powers of these home rule char-
ter municipalities. 
The twentieth century history of s ta t e-local c on-
stitutional relations i n Connecticut showed a need for this 
'1./75 
type of corrective legislation. Some crude "ripper" legis-
lation had marked the decade of the 'twenties in Connecticut. 
Fo~ instance, during part of the 'twenties and 'thirties, 
all control over city finances was removed from the City of 
Bridgeport, and placed in the control of a state-appointed 
finance board. There had been abuses in the city finance 
structure, but the finance board seemed to be almost as 
much a political as a remedial measure. Out of the same 
era came a case involving special legislation affecting the 
City of Waterbury.72 By chapter 233 of the special laws 
of 1921, the public parks of ·waterbu y were put under the 
control of a Board of Park Commissioners, witb. the p olver 
of eminent domain, as well as power to purchase land, to 
spend money to repair and maintain, and so on, all as the 
agent of, and at the expense of the City of Waterbury. The 
worst fears of Justice Andrews seemed to be realized, since 
the legislation was passed as a special amendment to the 
charter of the City. Landholders whose land was about to 
be condemned by the park board, alleged that the. special act 
violated Art. 10, Sec. 2, and Art. 32 of the Connecticut 
Constitution, and further, that the act violated trour social 
compact and Bill of Rights 11 • The court did not hesitate in 
holding this legislation valid: 
7~ 4 ~city of Waterbury v. Macken, 192 , 100 Conn. 407. 
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It is too late to reopen the questions settled by 
these. decisions. Towns in Connecticut have no in-
herent rights, and . "no powers except as are ex-
pressly or impliedly granted to them by the legis-
lative power of the State". The City of \vaterbury 
was created by our General Assembly, which gave 
and which can take away or add to these powers. 
The town and city of 1tlaterbm•y has no inherent 
right of local self-government not subject to the 
legislative will, unless given such right by the 
State or Federal Constitution. 73 
As lightly as this, then, did the cour t dismiss the di-
vesting of a town of control over its parks, unprecedented 
in the state's history. The reaction to this kind of 
legislation led to the home rule acts of 1951, 1953, and 
1957, already discussed. Once again, in that same year, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors expressed its con-
fusion as to the exact nature of the state constitutionJ4 
It stated summarily that the constitution was a grant, not 
a l imi tation of powers, he nce conveying tlw idea that the 
· state gove rnment was one having only the powers specifice~ly 
granted , wit h the remaining powers reserved by someone, 
most likely the people or the towns. However, the cou.r•t 
also held, as it had in previous cases, that the grant of 
power to the legislature is unqualified, and so not other-
wise restrained except by the state bill of rights. It 
7'3 
. Ibid., p. 411. 
7ttate v. Coleman, 1921, 96 Conn. 190, 113 Atl. 
385; to same effect is Bridgeport Public Library v. 
Burroughs Home, 85 Conn. 309, 82 .Atl. 582. 
would appear that the nature of the constitution could be 
i n the future almost anything tlle court might say it was. 
In a surprising decision of 1938, 75 the legis-
lature passed and the court approved a special benefit 
act depriving the City of Bridgeport of its property. The 
incident involved a fall on a city sideivalk, resulting in 
injury and death. Proper notice had not been given to 
hold the city liable, but the legislatu1•e passed an act 
waiving the notice in this case by name. The lower cour t , 
as one might expect, held that the city could not be de-
prived of property fo r private benefit with no benefit to 
it. However, the supreme court in this one instance ap-
parently :r•egarded the act of the legislatur•e as an act 
of sovereignty, or, more likely, considering the legal ex-
cellence of the New England cou.:r•ts, probably considered the 
notice requirement as in the nature of a procedural rather 
than a substantive right, within the po-v;er of the leg isla-
ture to waive. In either case, the decision does not fit 
well into the Connecticut pattern. 
Moreover, municipalities as political subdivisi ons 
of the State, created for public purposes and 
having their pot.Jers, rights and duties conferred 
and imposed by the State through the Legislature, 
are subject to its will and liable to have any 
such rights or duties modif1.ed Ol' abolished by it, 
?~ anger v. City of Bridgeport, 1938, 12L~ Conn. 
183, 198 Atl. 746. 
and not to be regarded as thereby being deprived 
of any vested rights.76 
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The 1942 ruling in Winchester v. Cox77 was that a 
town, holding land for public purposes, may have that land 
taken from it by the legislature for a public purpose with-
out compensation. New Haven tried once again in 1946 to 
claim constitutional guarantees against state action, but 
the supreme court ruled that a city cannot claim constitu-
tional guarantees against its creator.78 
The 1953 home rule act 79 was interpreted narrowly 
in one of the few cases which arose under it. 80 The New 
Britain charter had established ten wards, each to serve as 
a voting district. Section 496c , Connecticut General Sta-
tutes Cumulative Supplements 1.53 provided: 
The legislative body ,of any town, consolidated town 
and city or consolidated town and borough may divide 
and, from time to time, redivide such municipality 
into voting districts and may determine the location 
of polling places therein. 
76 Ibid., at p. 188. 
77Town of Winchester v. Cox, Highway Commr., 1942, 
129 Conn. 106, 26 A. 2d 592. 
78city of New Haven v. New Haven Water co., 1946 , 
132 Conn. 496, 513, 45 A. 2d 831. 
ment of 
79 Connecticut General Statutes, Cumulat ive Supple-
1953, sees. 214c, 215c, 469c, etc. 
2d 795. 
80Lacava v. Carfi, 1953, 140 Conn. 517, 101 A. 
479 
The city determined to redivide the wards, very dispropor-
tionately set up in regard to population, into more even dis-
tricts. To accomplish this, it passed an ordinance seeking 
to redictrict the city, and also containing a provision in-
creasing the number of' aldermen and wards to a nu.l'!lber "not 
to exceed twenty." The Supreme Court struck down the ordi-
nance as an improper exercise of' power. The real objection 
might have been this increase in the number of' aldermen, but 
the court placed its decision, in the Dillon tradition, on 
the narrow basis that the statute said "voting districts", 
and voting districts are not wards. 81 
... 
It is true that the New Bri t ain .charter provides 
that "said wards shall be voting districts." It does 
not follow, however, that the two terms are synonomous 
•••• The section does not authorize the common council 
of' New Britain to change the number of the boundaries 
of the wards as fixed by the charter.82 
And as a dying statement of a soon-to-be-obsolete principle: 
The argument that the trend toward home rule for 
municipalities has vested prerogatives in the city in-
volves a strained application of the principles of 
legislative interpretation relied upon. Home rule , so 
far as it relates to charter changes, may be exerc ised 
only in accordanc e with the provisions of Sees. 214c 
and 215c of the 1953 Cumulative Supplement to the 
General Statutes.B3 
Slit is interesting to speculate on what would have 
been the decision of the court if the case had involved a 
city such as Bridgeport, where there are no wards, and the 
aldermen come from voting districts, specifically named as 
such. 
S2Lacava v. Carfi, cited in footnote SO, above, p . 518. 
S3Ibid., at p. 520. 
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This decision is irrelevant since the 1957 home rule statute. 
The modern period in Connecticut is one of good 
portent for the towns of that state. The general tone of 
the modern decisions is to give lip service t o the old max-
ims, to repeat the phrases of Dillon, but to interpret char-
ters with a fair amount of liberality. The 1957 legislation 
gives to cities, towns and boroughs which adopt a home rule 
charter as therein allowed, fifty-seven named powers plus 
the power: 
••• to make and enforce police, sanitary and other simi-
lar regulations and to protect or promote the peace, 
safety, good government and welfare of the town, city, 
borough and its inhabitants. 84 
If the courts interpret this according to its obvious intent, 
it would seem that such charter units would be protected in 
all of their affairs of local self-government, especially 
when this is construed with the section of the same act out-
lawing special legislation except upon extraordinary petition 
of the local government or its citizens. 
Rhode Island 
The distinctive characteristic of the development 
of the state-local relation in Rhode I sland in the early part 
of this period was the argument of Amasa Eaton at the turn of 
84
connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1958, 
sec. 7-194. 
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the century for the rights of the state's municipalities 
to govern themselves, carried on in the courts and in the 
journals. At the time Attorney Eaton was writing the arti-
cles,85 he was preparing to join battle in the state's first 
full-dress case directly on the subject of local rights. 
City of Newport v. Horton,86 was argued before the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court by J. Stacy Brown, Arnold Green, and 
Amasa Eaton, for the city. In 1900, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly had passed an act to establish a state board Qf 
police commissioners with broad powers, for the City of New-
port. The board was given authority to expend up to thirty-
six thousand dollars annually and such additional sums as 
might be appropriated by the city council. All such ex-
penditures were to be borne by the city. 
In the litigation which inevitably resulted, the 
city argued that the act infringed the rights of local self-
government, fundamental and historic. The major premise was 
that four independent towns, governing themselves in all res-
pects, formed the colony. In doing this they gave up none of 
85Amasa M. Eaton, "Annotation", 50 Law Reports An-
notated 330; same author, "The Origin of Municipal Incorpo-
ration in England and in the United States", 1902~ 25 American 
Bar Association Reports 292, 372; same author, "The Right to 
Local Self-Government", 1900, 13 Harvard Law Review 441, 470, 
638; also 1901, 14 idem. 20~ 116. 
86city of Newport v. Horton, 1900, 22 R~ I. 196, 47 
Atl. 312, 50 L.R.A. 330. See also Opinion .of the Justices, 
1912, 34 R.I. 191, 83 Atl. 3. 
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their rights of self-government. Further, these powers had 
never been given up, and were therefore retained by the people. 
Among these powers was the right to establish their own po-
lice commissions with power to appoint their own chiefs of 
police. To this argument, the court replied: 
We readily concede that the settlements in Providence, 
Portsmouth, and Newport were unique. Unlike other 
colonies, they were made before and without a charter 
of any kind. The settlers came upon land to which the 
crown of England had no title; they bought it of the 
Indians; they organized their governments ••• they were in 
fact independent sovereignties •••• The form of government 
adopted under that charter was a federation of towns 
rather than a colony. Legislation originated in the 
towns, and the General Assembly had simply a power of 
approval or veto. Local self-government was preserved 
to its full extent •••• The charter of 1663 made a marked 
change in the conduct of public affairs. It concentrated 
power in the General Assembly •••• The action of the As-
sembly was in accordance with the increased power •••• 
All laws were made by the Assembly from that time on, 
and an inspection of them will show in how many ways the 
towns had advanced towards a stronger central government 
and relinquished the absolute control of their own af-
fairs which they originally possessed •••• Generally towns 
were treated as deriving their powers from the State, 
rather than from an independent right of local self-
government. While this subject is more historical than 
legal, we have considered it to this length simply to 
show that the broad claim made and so urgently pressed 
by the petitioners cannot be sustained to the extent of 
holding that the constitution of the State must be in-
terpreted according to an unwritten theory of local 
self-government, which so entered into its provisions as 
to make it controlling in construing those provisions. 
We do not find that the history of legislation in this 
State shows that the clause relating to the powers "re-
tained by the people" necessarily implies that the Gen-
eral Assembly has no right to pass a law affecting a 
particular town or city. Indeed, the counsel for the 
petitioners concede that the Assembly may pass some such 
laws, but not to the extent of the one before us. If 
this much be granted, and we do not see that it can be 
denied, the question comes down to the validity of this 
particular law, so far as it affects the right to 
establish a polig~ commission with power to appoint a 
chief of police. (Italics mine.) 
Thus although the court paid its respects to Eaton's schol-
arship as an historian and admitted his facts as to the con-
stitution of the colony in the pre-1663 period, it drew a 
line at the 1663 charter. Failing to answer the instances 
of the exercise of town power which had been put forth by 
Eaton, the court proceeded to list instances in which the 
state had wielded control over things which concerned the 
towns. None of the examples cited by the court, with the 
possible exception of the one pertaining to the election in 
Providence, were special legislation of the type attacked by 
the city. The court concluded: 
Towns and ci t .ies are recognized in the constitution, 
and doubtless they have rights which cannot be infringed. 
What the full limit and scope of those rights may be 
cannot be determined in the decision in this case. The 
court cannot properly go beyond the question before it. 
We assume that the towns and cities in this State have 
the same rights which towns and cities have in other 
States under the prevalent form of State government. 
Our inquiry, therefore, is whether the establishment of 
police authorities by the State infringes the rights of 
self-government.88 
The question which the court so meticulously felt itself bound 
to leave open was effectively killed forever. Thereafter, 
the Rhode Island courts went on the assumption that munici-
palities, including towns, were mere creatures of the State. 
87Ibid., pp. 201-4. 
88Ibid., p. 204. 
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Never again has the Rhode Island Supreme Court admitted the 
possibility that towns and cities have "rights which cannot 
be infringed." 
The proposition of' the petitioners goes too far. It 
assumes that because State control interferes at all 
with local control it violates the principle of' local 
self-government. In any system of' government, towns, 
as well as individuals, must yield something of' in-
dividual independence for the public good •••• To say ••• 
that the State cannot assume control of' these agencies, 
in public affairs, is to say that a town can nullify a 
State law, which it does not approve, by choosing of-
ficers who will not enforce it. This is not the na-
tional doctrine, and, for a stronger reason, it cannot 
be the State doctrine. What the petitioners really 
claim is log~l - independence rather than local self-
government. 
The status of' the Newport Police Commission was 
further examined in the Opinion of' the Justices of' 1901.90 
Four years later, in another court action, the city maintained 
that the act establishing the commission was unconstitutional, 
under the state and federal constitutions, and that the act 
creating the board infringed Newport's right to local self'-
government. The court, in a. detailed decision, refuted both 
assertions. 
The issue of' local self-government was not squarely 
raised again until 1932, 91 when the legislature by Public Laws 
89Ibid., pp. 208-9. 
654. 
90In re The Newport Police Commission, 1901, 22 R.I. 
9lcity of' Providence v. Moulton, 1932, 52 R.I. 236. 
of 1931, ch. 1910, created a board of public safety for 
Providence. Again the counsel for the city relied on the 
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arguments advanced by Newport in the two Horton cases. They 
argued particularly that the state government was one of 
limited powers, that the city was being deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws contrary to the federal constitution, 
and that the legislation here involved went far beyond the 
earlier Newport act, infringing that right of local govern-
ment which even the Supreme Court had recognized in the first 
Horton decision. The court ruled that the state constitution 
was a limiting one, and that hence, the legislature could act 
in any area not closed to it by the constitution. It rejected 
once again any claim of historical or prescriptive right to 
local self-government, and ruled that the equal protection 
clause did not apply. 
A hopeful lawyer included in his brief in 1942 a 
statement that: 
In the older Eastern States where many cities and towns 
were de facto sovereignties before there was any Legis-
lature with jurisdiction over them, broader powers are 
found in the General Laws in addition to the terms of 
their charters.92 
The court said simply: 
It is not clear from other parts of respondents' brief 
whether they seriously contend otherwise or whether they 
at 285. 
92Buckhout v. City of Newport, 1942, 68 R.I. 280, 
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wish to have us consider that in this state the cities 
and towns have inherent powers which make this princi-
ple of less consequence here than it is in some other 
states •••• If by this assertion the respondents are im-
pliedly contending that Newport, as one of the original 
towns, has powers that do not necessarily derive from 
the state, the answer is that 9~his court long ago def-initely denied such a thesis. 
Less important than these three cases, was the 
opinion In re The Warwick Financial Council. 94 The court 
there maintained that 
From very early times the course of legislation by the 
General Assembly has furnished a legislative construction 
that the towns derived all their powers from the legis-
lative enactments passed from time to time.95 
It distinguished the Newport Charter case,96 which had seemed 
to imply that towns had some preexisting rights; and held 
constitutional a proposed act which would abolish the Warwick 
financial town meeting and vest all financial powers of the 
town in a financial council. 
The power of taxation is vested primarily in the state, 
and may be lawfully exercised by the subordinate politi-
cal bodies of the state only in so far as and in the 
manner which said power is delegated to them by the 
legislature. Up to this time, it has been the statute 
law in Rhode Island that in towns the taxing power shall 
be exercised by the qualified voters in town meeting as-
sembled. But this has been only by virtue of express 
statutory authority. The General Assembly may provide 
that towns may exercise the taxing power in any other 
93Ibid., P• 285. 
94In re The Warwick Financial Council, 1916, 39 R.I. 1. 
95Ibid., p. 6. 
96rn re the Newport Charter, 1892, 15 R.I. 655. 
way that is deemed expedient prS~ided no provision 
of the Constitution is ~lated. 
The real interest in the development of the state-
local interrelationship in this century has been extra-
judicial. Professor Fairlie98 has pointed out that in the 
early years of this century, the older towns of Rhode Island 
continued to exercise peculiar privileges, quite outside 
state law. He mentioned in particular an incident in which 
the Town of Bristol attempted to regulate the operation of 
automobiles within the town, on the ground that the tenure 
of highways in that town was different from that in other 
towns of the state, citing a letter from Professor William 
MacDonald of Brown University. In the second decade, pres-
sure began to build up for home rule. It appears from the 
writings of the period that the towns and cities of the state 
were not willing DO remain in the inferior status to which 
the courts had rather recently relegated them. James Dealey 1 s 
articles99 in the Providence Journal and in the newspaper of 
97In re Warwick Financial Council, cited in footnote 
94, above, p. 13. 
98John A. Fairlie, Local Government in Counties, 
Towns and Villages, New York, Century Co., 1905, p. 143. 
99James Q. Dealey, Political Situations in Rhode 
Island and Suggested Constitutional Changes, no city, pub-
lisher, or date, copyright by the author. Probably published 
by the League of Women Voters, Providence, 1929. It is com-
posed of a reproduction of a series of articles by the author 
in the Providence Journal in 1920, and in the United League 
News, 1926-28. 
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a local reform organization were influential in building 
up pressure for constitutional home rule provisions. He 
illustrated the corrupt nature of' the state legislature in 
graphic terms, speaking of "Boss" Brayton who ruled the 
state in the interest of himself and his cohorts for twenty-
five years, until 1910. He illustrated by examples drawn 
from the New York Evening Post, Century, and McClure's 
magazine, all of which had written accounts of the amazing 
performances of Brayton and his poll tical companions on oc-
casion after occasion. They had given many examples of be-
trayal of public trust, venal contracts, special benefit laws, 
and other types of governmental corruption. Mr. Dealey also 
analysed the Rhode Island Supreme Court in some detail. He 
attributed the justices' actions and their decisions to the 
fact that all Rhode Island judges then (as now) were chosen 
by the legislature under the constitution of 1842, and re-
mained indebted to their sponsors. He commented that there 
had been no constitutional convention since the Dorr Rebellion, 
and that the supreme court of the state had ruled that no con-
venti9n could be held since there was no provision for one in 
the constitution itself. The rule in the other New England 
states and elsewhere, except possibly for Massachusetts, has 
been to the contrary. He pointed out that the standard work, 
Jones on Constitutions, 4th ed., sees. 473-4, singled out the 
Rhode Island decision as erroneous, ill-advised, and without 
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legal basis. The articles really amount to a cumulative and 
powerful call for a constitutional convention to alleviate 
the problems of Providence and the other cities of the state. 
He spoke disparagingly of the 1897 legislative "commission" 
which the legislature set up to "reform" the constitution. 
The proposals died at the polls. A similar 1912 commission 
report died in a 1915 legislative commlttee. 
Such statements would be difficult to believe if 
that champion of civil rights., Harvard Professor Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., did not corroborate them in certain of the "Dorr 
Pamphlets.nlOO Professor Chafee, born and reared in the 
state, appears as a vigorous partisan of the right of towns 
and cities to govern themselves. Once again is demonstrated 
the power of the tradition of local rights to enlist in its 
service the finest minds of particular eras. In the span 
of five decades, the municipality in Rhode Island enlisted 
in its service the eminent attorneys Amasa Eaton, who had 
been a president of the American Bar Association, Professor 
Chafee, and Dean Jefferson B. Fordham of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. Professor Chafee's two monographs 
called for a constitutional convention to revise the consti-
tution to protect local right to representation in the 
lOOzechariah Chafee, Jr., The Constitutional Con-
vention That Never Met: Second Part--1936, and Home Rule for 
Providence, Providence, Dorr Pamphlet no. 3, published and 
sold by the Book Shop, 5 Grosvenor Bldg., 1939. 
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legislature, or alternately',; to grant home rule to the cities 
of the state. He traced the history of the "conventions that 
never met", and of the sham commissions as described above. 
He was primarily a partisan of the City of Providence, as 
against the rule by representatives of the towns in both 
houses of the legislature. He pointed out that the then-
present trend in the state could do neither cities nor towns 
any good, and had only succeeded in depriving both of them 
of their rights in the past. He described the letter which 
he had written '·· to Governor Norman S. Case on April 5, 1931, 
to protest the invasion of the rights of the City of Provi-
dence by the "ripper" bill which placed police and other 
municipal functions in the hands of a state board. The letter 
did l:Lttle good. The article pointed out that Rhode Island 
towns have little to fear from the legislature, because in 
effect they are the legislature; hence, court cases on the 
rights1 of towns are virtually non-existent because towns have 
the right to local self-government and no one questions it. 
What cases do exist concern cities, who are then forced to 
argue their rights on the basis of historical precedents re-
lating to towns. In a strangely non-academic tone, he warned 
the legislature and the courts, " ••• if law tries to shape 
facts (i.e., those of reasonable local right to self-govern-
ment), facts will end by shaping law."lOl Once again, it 
101Ibid., p. 42. 
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must be emphasized that one cannot understand the nature o~ 
state ~ local relations in Rhode Island without realizing that 
towns are represented as such in both houses or the legisla-
ture, and that unlike the "ripper" legislation or other 
state~, that or Rhode Island, as described in the ramous 
Newport and Providence cases above, is a partisan attempt by 
the Republican towns to control the Democratic cities. "Rip-
per" l egislation there does not confront the local community 
with the power or the state legislature per se, but rather 
conrr0nts one local community with the power or others, 
operating through the mechanism of the legislature. Since 
the legislature (i.e., the tmms) appoints all judges, as a 
matter or practical ract, aside from the reasons expressed 
in cas;es, towns have little to fear from the courts. It 
will be noticed in all the Rhode Island cas es that although 
the s~preme court of the state flails away lustily at the 
rights of towns, it is almost never a town which is on the 
receiving end, but rather it is a city as a more expanded 
type of town. 
Robert J.M. O'Hare toldl02 vividly of the situation 
which led to the adoption or the famous Rhode Island consti-
tutional amendment twenty-one, the only such constitutional 
home rule provision in New England. He described the situation 
102Robert J.M. O'Hare, "Cities Rush Home Rule Gate", 
1953, National Municipal Review, 42:73. 
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of the last century as one of laissez-faire as to town rights, 
with only a few laws which were commonly accepted restricting 
complete local self-government. Increasingly, in the last 
years of the nineteenth century, the legislature extended 
its powers. Only then did there come the first clashes be-
tween local communities and the state. The lack of modern 
local charters grew more and more troublesome to the local 
units, and unrest spread. In 1951, Governor Dennis J. Roberts 
was elected on a home rule platform, and included such a re-
commendation in his inaugural address. However, little was 
done until the citizens of Pawtucket became outraged at a 
local bond bill, and under the direction of the Citizen's 
League of Pawtucket, marched on the legislature and the 
governor's office. The Home Rule Association, League of 
Women Voters, and the Rhode Island Public Expenditures Council 
all joined in the activity designed to achieve home rule. 
Kenneth W. Parker has also described the background 
and the problems of government which set the stage for the 
home rule amendment struggle.103 He detailed the growing 
tide of public sentiment for home rule. In the 1951 legis-
lative session alone, three separate home rule bills were 
introduced, supported by the Rhode Island Home Rule Association. 
103Kenneth W. Parker, "The Struggle for Municipal 
Charter Reform in Rhode Island", 1953, American City, 68:98. 
See also, "Rhode Island Has '~uickie' Constitution Convention", 
1951, National Municipal Review, 40:360. 
Legis~ative delegations rrom the larger cities were in sym-
pathy,, but the proposals were killed on the rloor. In this 
I 
critical hour, almost as an accident, the mechanism for ·the 
achie,vement of home rule aims became available. Two consti-
tutional amendments which had been approved by the elector-
ate at the polls in 1950 were declared by the state supreme 
court to be incompatible. Ordinary rules would not serve to 
solve the conflict, and a constitutional convention was needed 
to make the proper changes. In this situation, Governor 
Roberts acted strongly, turning the convention activity into 
a right for home rule. He had been the first mayor of Pro-
vidence under the amended charter of 1940, and had become 
convinced of the desirability of local control of local ar-
fairs .• 
At the same time, Pawtucket and Newport, angered at 
their treatment by the legislature and the courts, joined the 
struggle through their delegates, local officials, and legis-
latons. Their representatives in the legislature had intro-
duced home rule bills again and again, only to see them de-
reated. It will be seen that the supreme court cases involv-
ing Frovidence and Newport, described above, ha.d not been 
accepted as settling the matters involved. These old town-
cities, Providence, Portsmouth, Newport, Warwick, had a 
consciousness of history and a determination to protect their 
own interests. 
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The resulting confusion, unrest, and political acti-
vity formed the background for the first constitutional con-
vention in one hundred nine years. Party and legislative 
leaders opposed the convention, even carrying their deter-
mined opposition t o the floor of the convention. However, 
strenuous efforts by the governor and certain influential 
persons forced the home rule amendment out of committee and 
onto the floor, where it was approved unanimously. In the 
special election of June 28, 1951, the home rule amendment 
was enthusiastically approved by the electorate. The drafters 
of the amendment had been careful to make it self-executing, 
and pressure had been applied for home rule as seldom before 
in New England, through radio, television, newspaper and 
door-to-door solicitation, and through the personal approach 
by home rule partisans to every member of the convention.l04 
The state supreme court applied Dillon's Rule and 
the rule of narrow interpretation to negative a good part of 
the gain. It wa.s early decided105 that the home rule pro-
visions did not apply except to those cities which had adopted 
new home rule charters under the act. Further, the apparently 
broad grant of legislative power therein given was to be 
1040 1Hare, op. cit. 
105see e.g., State of Rhode Island v. Crepeau, 1908, 
29 R.I. 340, 71 Atl. 449, and Wood v. Peckham, 1953, 60 R.I. 
479, 98 Atl. 669. 
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interpreted to mean broad powers in regard to strictly local 
affairs only, with the decision as to what was state and what 
was local made according to Dillon's Rule and the strict in-
terpretation of such distinction in the past.l06 General 
legislative acts relating to municipalities which would have 
been valid before the amendment were ruled valid after it.107 
In 1953, the court ruled that a simple nepotism provision in 
a home rule charter was invalid as being beyond the power of 
a town or city to adopt, and was the sole province of the 
legislature. In 1954 followed other opinions that the state 
retained all power over all aspects of local elections de-
spite a home rule charter;l08 further, that a town or city 
could not even set a date for local elections.109 Another 
106opinion of the Justices, 1952, 79 R.I. 277, 87 A. 
2d 293; see also cases cited in footnotes immediately follow-
ing. 
107opinion of the Justices, 96 A. 2d (R.I.) 623. For 
the many ways in which legislatures can pass local or special 
acts which the courts will uphold as general law, see Henry 
Hubbard, "Special Legislation for Municipalities", 1905, 18 
Harvard Law Review 588. See also, William B. Guitteau, Con-
stitutional Limitations Upon Special Legislation Concerning 
Municipalities, Toledo, Published University of Pennsylvania 
Ph.D. Dissertation, 1905, no publisher or copyright; and the 
discussion of Eugene Mc~uillin's articles in Chapter II, above. 
1080pinion of the Justices, 1953, 96 A. 2d (R.I.) 
627; State ex rel. Flynn v. McCaughey, 1953, 99 A. 2d 482; 
see comment, 1954, 67 Harvard Law Review 899, disapproving 
of the latter case. 
109opinion of the Justices, 1953, 80 R.I. 288, 96 A. 
2d 627, and also cases cited in footnote 108, above. 
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opinionllO held that the legislature might provide three 
types of legislative codes, which the towns or cities might 
adopt, and that home rule charters had no application to 
the situation. The trend continued, perhaps the most signi-
ficant of these Opinions of the Justices being one of 1952,111 
which st ated that the legislature retained absolutely all 
financial control over the towns and cities, including ex-
elusive power to grant authority to levy, assess and collect 
taxes or to borrow money, and to provide procedures and ac-
counting methods. It also held that not withstanding the 
adoption of a home rule charter, the legislature by general 
act applicable to all municipalities might exercise any of 
the legislative powers it had formerly exercised, with the 
sole exception that it could not change the form of town or 
city government adopted under a home rule charter. The legis-
lature might also pass special legislation applicable to any 
city or town, except that it would not be effective unless 
approved by a majority of the voters at a special or general 
elect ion. In the case of a town only, special legislation 
would take effect only if approved by a majority of the voters 
qualified to vote on financial matters, where the measure 
110
opinion of the ~1stices, 1954, 81 R.I. 254, 102 
A. 2d 118. 
1110pinion of the Justices, 1952, 79 R.I. 277, 87 
A. 2d 693. 
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involved imposition of a tax or expenditure of money. The 
''show down" case, however, was the famous State ex rel. 
Flynn v. McCaugheyll2 of 1953, in which Dean Jefferson B. 
Fordham joined the staff of counsel for the city. The case 
involved a model type of nonpartisan election for local of-
ficials only. This author has already pointed out that if 
the state occupies a particular field by legislation, that 
field is automatically closed to the municipalities of the 
s t ate unless there is specific provision to the contrary 
in the act itself or in the state constitution. Much the 
same rule is applied by the federal courts in relation to 
an act by Congress in regard to state powers not otherwise 
excepted. A magnificent performance was put on by counsel, 
including a brilliant exposition of the principles of muni-
cipal home rule, and the desirability of guaranteeing to 
local government the right to control its own affairs. They 
drew upon the tradition of Rhode Island, the law of local 
government, and the intent of the home rule statute. However, 
the court was so set in its devotion to the principles of 
Dillon, centralization, and monolithic sovereignty that it 
virtually ignored these arguments. Once again, the tradition 
of the nineteenth century ruled and negatived the apparent 
gains of a home rule movement of the twentieth. A home rule 
112state ex rel. Flynn v. McCaughey, cited in foot-
note 108, above. 
constitutional amendment seemed to have been proved little 
more effective than the judicial pattern of past decisions. 
Victory at the polls had proved somewhat hollow in Rhode 
Island as in other states, as the author has pointed out in 
Chapter II. The home rule advocates had won one-half the 
victory, but had lost the other half, and with it, most of 
the gains for which they had expended so much effort. They 
hardly even realized the nature of the foe which they were 
fighting. In speaking of the case itself, Dean Fordham 
pointed out in a letter of February 10, 1957 to the author: 
In connection with the Rhode Island experience, you 
have in mind, I am sure, Rhode Island recently added 
a home rule amendment to the ~onstitution. In the first 
case under this amendment, local counsel and I were 
totally unsuccessful in getting the judges to grasp 
home rule theory. I refer to the case of the State of 
Rhode Island ex rel. Flynn v. McCaughey, 99 A. 2d 482 
(1953}. 
Thus, the experience in Rhode Island conformed to the pattern 
one would expect, if he knew of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century decisions in the state, and knew how the 
judges would apply that body of rules to the home rule amend-
ment. 
Yet, in the state itself, there was a feeling of 
having been cheated, among the partisans who had taken part 
in the movement. Not being aware of the fact that their 
constitutional provision had been poorly drafted to secure 
the results they desired, and having been assured, they be-
lieve, that they had one of the best such amendments in the 
---- --------------------------------------------
country, they have hinted in subsequent comment at dark 
activities by the judges. The reader who has borne with 
this dissertation to this point knows how carefully a con-
stitutional home rule amendment must be drafted if it is to 
withstand the application of the rules normally applied by 
American courts. The Rhode Island amendment is drafted with 
great attention to the matter of local internal government, 
and with little attention to the overriding problem of the 
relation of the local community to the legislature and the 
courts. It would have been surprising if the Rhode Island 
supreme court had acted any other way than it did, and the 
home rule forces must blame their own ineptness and lack of 
knowledge of their own judicial precedents and of home rule 
theory for their failure. Among other matters, for instance, 
home rule partisans were rather astounded that local elections 
were held by their courts to be a matter of state-wide con-
cern, and hence the business of the legislature. Yet, this 
is the normal rule elsewhere, as will be seen from the Con-
necticut case immediately before this present section; the 
Maryland court of appeals ruled similarly in the case of the 
non-partisan local primaries and elections of Montgomery 
County, Maryland. Rhode Island could have had its local con-
trol of elections by providing for it specifically among 
named powers reserved to local governments. Alternately, 
it could have provided that unless the state occupied a 
5.00, 
particular area entirely, it was not closed to local govern-
ment, and then denied to the legislature the power to provide 
ror purely local elections. Further recommendations with 
reference to the Rhode Island situation will. be found in the 
following chapter. 
One can virtually trace the evolution of this feel-
ing through the relevant local government literature. For 
instance, a Public Administration Clearing House News bulletinll3 
issued shortly after the adoption or the amendment, and ap-
parently inspired by correspondents within the state, asserts 
that now all Rhode Island cities and towns have home rule, 
and another article in the same bulletin, 114 asserts that 
Rhode Island municipalities now have all powers except those 
denled them by the constitution, those being largely in re-
gard to debt and taxes. The author fails to see how such a 
result could be anticipated from the amendment as adopted . 
The Rhode Island Home Rule Association issued a 
monograph in 1952, 115 in the nature or a "do-it-yourself" 
instruction book telling local communities how they should 
113Public Administration Clearing House, "Rhode 
Island Grants Cities Home Rule", News Bulletin, Release no. 1, 
September 17, 1951. 
114Public Administration Clearing House, rtcities 
Gain Home Rule Powers", ibid. 
115Rhode Island Home Rule Association, Your Local 
Government, {mim.), Providence(?), The Association, 1952. 
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go about adopting home rule charters. On page two appears 
the opinion that all Rhode Island cities and towns then had 
home rule powers. Later that year, the Rhode Island Public 
Expenditures Council in its publication, Public Business, 
discussed the proposed charters of Bristol, Central Falls, 
East Providence, Jamestown, Newport, Pawtucket and Woon-
socket.ll6 The author appeared confident that home rule for 
all municipalities of the state had been achieved, and ap-
peared unaware of the pending court cases. 
The same publication six months later117 was thunder-
struck as the first of the supreme court interpretations of 
the home rule amendment was issued. 
Confusion resulting from the recent advisory opinion 
of the Supreme Court on the validity of election pro-
visions contained in the four home rule charters adopted 
last fall, has caused some misunderstanding and appre-
hension as to the soundness of the entire home rule 
amendment. While it is unfortunate that the problem 
raised by the court was not adequately foreseen at the 
time the amendment was drafted, the decision should by 
no means be regarded as fatal to the further development 
of home rule in this state. 
There followed a rather limping explanation of the way courts 
in other states have defined the state-local power division. 
The periodical then gave Professor Rodney Mott as authority 
for this statement: 
ll6Rhode Island Public Expenditures Council, "New 
Charters Provide Home Rule", November 1952, Public Business, 
1:8. 
ll7Rhode Island Public Expenditures Council, "Home 
Rule in Rhode Island", May 1953, Public Business, 1:9. 
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Authorities are fairly well agreed that the best 
practice is to write a broad general provision and 
leave its specific application to the courts, even 
though judicial interpretations sometimes vary and 
are often unnecessarily restrictive •••• No less an 
authority on home rule than Dr. Thomas H. Reed has 
stated that the Rhode Island home rule amendment is 
the best self-operating amendment adopted by any state. 
Although Dean Fordham might agree with the first part of the 
statement, the author doubts if Professor Mott would have 
approved of the form of the Rhode Island amendment. As dis-
cussea in detail in Chapter II, it is certain that Professors ~ 
Bromage, Walker, and other authorities of the same stature 
in the local government area would definitely not agree. It 
is likely also that when Professor Reed gave his opinion on 
the amendment, he was speaking of the provisions relating 
to the internal government of municipalities, which were well 
done. 
The tone of the article is apologetic, saying that 
home rule is sound, even if the Rhode Island courts had 
chosen to limit it for reasons of their own. 
If experience elsewhere is an indication, it may well 
be that many years will be required before the real 
meaning of home rule in Rhode Island is fully decided. 
It should occasion no particular surprise if litigation 
develops here, and if a considerable period of time 
elapses before all the elements of doubt are resolved. 
This is a part of the home rule process which other 
states have had to experience before they attained the 
home rule status which they now enjoy. 
This air of hopeless martyrdom is disturbing. If any person 
or agency should be expected to know the art of drafting home 
rule provisions, it should be just such agencies as this one. 
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It is not true that the experience which followed upon the 
adoption of a poorly-drafted amendment in Rhode Island is a 
normal part of the home rule process. Also, in other states 
where home rule provisions have not been drafted carefully 
and have as a result suffered diminution in effect in the 
hands of courts applying what they conceive to be generally-
known rules of law, local communities have not won through 
their periods of trial a more elevated status. They have 
what they took part in writing into their constitutions, for 
better or worse. A better job of drafting would have spared 
them much of the trial and achieved for them a status more 
like that which they originally envisioned. 
Adoptions of home rule charters fell off sharply in 
the same period. The Providence Governmental Research Bureau 
reported only seven such charters offered to the voters in 
1952, and only four a.pproved. 118 The charters approved were 
"only in the four cities where the defects in municipal govern-
ment were the most obvious and where a. higher cost of local 
government appeared imminent." Giving its opinion as to 
whether Providence should seek to adopt the home rule charter 
for which it had vigorously contested for so long, the Bureau 
stated that since the charter of 1866 had been amended in 
118Providence Governmental Research Bureau, "Home 
Rule for Providence--A Question?" June 1953, Newsletter, no. 
211 . 
1940, and since it worked fairly well and was familiar, Pro-
vidence should wait and see what happened to other munici-
palities adopting such charters. It should wait for the 
cour ts to clarify the law in cases involving other cities, 
before itself taking action toward home rule. 
Thus, the mood changed completely in a year. The 
most intelligent reaction to the court decisions was that 
of the Citizens League of Pawtucket, which had been the 
prime motivating force in the adoption of the 1951 amendment. 
In 1953, the League called for a new home rule effort, to 
secure a new constitutional amendment to add specifically-
named local powers to the 1951 amendment.ll9 This is the 
only real solution to the problem, if Rhode Island municipali-
ties are to enjoy the freedom of their Connecticut neighbors. 
Yet, nothing has been done to achieve this result. 
Joseph A. Kelly, head of the Pawtucket News Bureau of the 
Provi dence Journal-Bulletin, in a reprint of his articlesl20 
11911Home Rule Struggle", 1953, National Municipal 
Review, 42:532. 
120Joseph A. Kelly, "Where's Home Rule?", reprinted 
from the Providence Journal-Bulletin, January 1956. See also 
remarks by Robert J.M. O'Hare, "Real Home Rule for Massachu-
setts Communities", in Bureau of Governmental Research, Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, Proceedings of the Tenth Governor's 
Conference on State-Local Relations, June 3-4, 1958, op. cit., 
p. 42, to the effect that the Rhode Island home rule amendment 
is one of the best ever written, and that the state supreme 
court struck it down for unknown reasons. He pointed out 
that Pawtucket won the All-American City award of the National 
----
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which appeared in that newspaper in the period shortly before 
the date of issue, January 1956, returned to bemoaning the 
rate which had befallen the amendment through no fault of its 
own. The legislature and the courts are the villains or the 
pieces, and little is said or the patent defects in drafting. 
Today, home rule is so clouded by adverse opinions or 
the State Supreme Court and the failure of the General 
Assembly to implement the amendment that most or the 
cities and towns _s till have no home rule at all. In 
what seemed to the layman to be very simple English, 
the home rule amendment gave the cities and towns the 
power to adopt and amend their own local charters and. 
to enact and amend local laws,--all this without having 
to go, hat in hand, to the General Assembly. Home rule 
.proponents were jubilant over the gains achieved by the 
cities and towns which had long been subject to the 
whims of the state legislature •••• Some of the country's 
foremost authorities on local government law gave fur-
ther cause for elation. They described the Rhode Is-
land home rule amendment as an exceptionally broad grant 
or power to the cities and towns. They called it one or 
the best self-operating home rule provisions in the 
country. As the advisory opinions came back to the 
legislature it was obvious that the Supreme Court did 
not share the view of Governor Roberts and a number of 
constitutional authorities who believed that t he home 
rule amendment was a broad grant or power to the cities 
and towns. On the contrary, the opinions of the Supreme 
Court have taken such a narrow approach that they have 
whittled away many or the powers which the people of' the 
cities and towns thought they were granted by the home 
rule amendment •••• stripped or their legal verbiage, the 
Supreme Court opinions have said, in effect, that the 
cities and towns are still pretty much at the mercy of' 
the General Assembly. To the laymen working for the 
cause or good local government through a new home rule 
charter, this means that the communities are still 
120 (continued) Municipal League and Look Magazine, 
for its part in securing the amendment and in improving its 
government. His other comments are similar to Mr. Kelly's. 
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"fettered by the a5:~!_ent chains that bind them to the 
General Assembly." 
And again: 
The first of the Supreme Court's advisory opinions to 
the House of R'epresentatives held that the cities and 
towns gained nothing at all from the home rule amendment 
unless they adopted a new charter •••• It was this same 
opinion that held that even after a city or town adopts 
a home rule charter the relative status of that city 
or town to the General Assembly becomes changed only in 
"certain limited respects." This latter opinion was 
particularly confusing to home rule advocates, who felt 
that section 1 of the home rule amendment was exeeeding-
ly clear on the point that it intended to grant and con-
firm to the cities and towns the right to self-govern-
ment "in all local matters.nl22 . 
Mr. Kelly described the battle, carried on parti-
cularly by the Citizens League of Pawtucket, for the amend-
ment. He gave it as his opinion that it is unlikely that 
any more Rhode Island cities would adopt home rule charters. 
If any more municipalities are to adopt charters, the path 
to be followed is a legislative one. 
If additional home rule charters are to be anything more 
than a hope, it will be necessary ·for the governor and 
others to convince the state legis.lators of the neces-
sity of cooperating with the cities and towns to get 
them into effect.l23 
He gave it also as his opinion that despite the ad-
verse court decisions, cities which had adopted charters, 
numbering six in January 1956, were actually much better off 
121Ibid., p. 1. 
122Ibid., ~· 2. 
123Ibid., ibid. 
than t hey had been. He gave several examples of corrupt use 
of local governments by the legislature, specifically and in 
detail describing patterns of bribery, the holding of nominal 
jobs in the Pawtucket local government by state legislators 
and city councillors, and the like. He stated that the 
amendment has been relatively ineffective, and advocates a 
statutory home rule provision apart from the 1951 a-mendment. 
On page four of the reprint, he said that the court decision 
"flabbergasted local home rule supporters." Although he re-
cognized the actual problem to some extent, on page five, in 
discussing Professor Mott's A.M.A. monograph on the home rule 
problem, he still seemed to regard what had happened as some 
sort of plot on the part of legislature and supreme court. 
He then quoted John Bebout as saying that elections under a 
home rule charter are always the concern of the local charter, 
and that Rhode Island is the only exception he knows of. It 
seems likely that Mr. Bebout was incorrectly quoted. Mr. 
Kelly ended by exhorting the legislature to pass a local 
option local election law, and by facing the problem squarely 
at last. 
It will probably take longer to get another amendment 
to the constitution. Yet it is the only way that the 
present home rule amendment can be made to achieve its 
original purpose of giving the cities and towns the 
right to frame new charters without hindrance from the 
General Assembly. Such an amendment was introduced at 
the constitutional convention last June •••• It was 
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defeated on voice vote.l24 
New Hampshire 
In the northernmost New England states, the pattern 
was more conventional, as might be expected. Maine in this 
century adopted the manager form of government so admirably 
suited to its extensive area and thin population, leading 
the New England states in this respect.l25 
New Hampshire had its legislative corruption just 
before and at the turn of the century, mostly involving the 
operations of the Boston and Maine Railroad in the state. 126 
By Laws 1895, ch. 188, for instance, the legislature created 
a state "ripper" police board for the Town of Exeter. Exeter , 
one of the original and most litigious towns of the state, 
has historically been highly jealous of its right to govern 
l24Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
125For analyses of their own and other states as to 
the progress of manager government, see Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, 
"Town Meeting vs. Town Management", 1940, National Municipal 
Review, 29: 540; Kalijarvi reported of New Hampshire that t he 
manager plan enabling statutes were "dead letters on the 
statute book", since the traditional town government worked 
well and was highly esteemed in his state; the plan has been 
quite popular in Vermont and moderately so in Connecticut; 
K~R.B. Flint, "Twenty Years of Town Management in Vermont", 
1940, National Municipal Review, 20:473; Carter W. Atkins, 
"The Manager Plan in Connecticut Town", 1940, National Muni..;, 
cipal Review, 29:593. 
126Frank B. Sanborn, New Hampshire: An Epitome of 
Popular Government, Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin 
and Co., 1904, pp. 321-38. 
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itself without interference. Litigation ensued, 127 and in 
1901, the town appeared before the state supreme court to 
argue its local rights allegipg that it was being taxed with-
out representation, deprived of its inherent rights to local 
self-government, and in ~neral, setting forth the traditional 
town rights arguments. The court considered the recent "rip-
per" bills a bit dubiously. With obvious reluctance, it ap-
proved the actions of the legislature. 
Recently acts have been passed establishing boards of 
police co~missioners for particular cities and towns •••• 
These special statutes seem to create an inequality in 
the rights and privileges enjoyed by towna and cities, 
but, when it is considered that the corporations have 
no inherent rights in the matter of electing or ap-
pointing police officers and prescribing police regula-
tions, the seeming inequality fades away •••• Whether 
legislation of this character in a particular case "be 
wise, reasonable, or ex~edient is a legislative and not ' 
a judicial, question."l 8 
The court did not deny inherent rights in general, or assert 
legis lative supremacy in absolute terms . 
By 1935, however, the court had taken on a stronger 
tone, and in a case of that year,l29 made the usual statement 
of the subjection of the town to the legislature. In 1937, 
with Amyot v. Caron,l30 the court had lost its former hesitant 
127Gooch v. Town of Exeter, 1901, 70 N.H. 413, 48 
Atl. 1100. 
128Ibid., 48 Atl . 1101. 
129clough v. Osgood, 1935, 87 N.H. 44, 182 Atl. 169. 
130Amyot v. Mayor and Aldermen of Caron, 1937, 88 N.H. 
394, 190 Atl. 134. 
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tone, and took its place, really for the first time, solidly 
among those states espousing Dillon's Rule. The occasion 
was the provision by the legisla.ture of a "ripper" finance 
board for the City of Manchester. In the ensuing dispute, 
the city asserted those local rights which had never really 
been soundly and thoroughly discounted: 
The broad contention for unconstitutionality of the 
act is that there is a fundamental doctrine of a right 
of local self-government which the act violated. The 
entire trend and phllos£B~Y of our decisions is in 
denial of the right,~ •• 
The court went on to trace its cases, fitting them into its 
definition, and quoting Professor Dillon's Municipal Corpo-
rations. Hence, after almost three-quarters of a century of 
a permissive attitude, the court ret~ned to the rigid char-
acter of its first decisions in the Massachusetts pattern. 
This firm stand was reasserted again in 1953132 and in 
1956, 133 when the court stated, of an attempt by a town to 
refuse to obey the water pollution statute because it in-
vaded the right to local self-government, that such a con-
tention must be rejected .on the basis of both precedent and 
history. "The plenary power of the Legislature is no less 
131Ibid., 190 Atl. 137. 
132 Opinion of the Justices, 1955, 99 N.H. 540, 114 
A. 2d 879. 
l33state of New Hampshire v. Town of Goffstown, 
1956, 100 N.H. 131, 121 A. 2d 317. 
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t nl34 today than it was over a cen ury ago. 
New Hampshire has little need t o amend its consti-
tution or to adopt a statute to secure to its local govern-
ments the right to provide for their local affairs. Aside 
from a period of brief conflict in the 1930's, there has 
been little clash of powers, and the legislature seldom 
interferes in local affairs. The state is comparatively 
large for New England, the population small, and no signifi-
cant urban problem exists. No appreciable sentiment for 
adoption of home rule has manifested itself in the state, 
and the local government journals are bare of indication 
that such home rule provisions are needed. 
Vermont 
The Vermont cases concerning the state-local govern-
mental relation are scarce in the twentieth century. Sargent 
v. Clark,l35 decided in 1910, is about the only important 
case in this area. Certain of the townspeople had opposed 
before the legislature the division of the Town of Pawlet. 
The town meeting had voted to recompense them, but this vote 
was contested. The court held that this expenditure was not 
a proper one within state law or charter, leaving Connecticut 
134Ibid~, 121 Atl. 2d 319. 
135sargent v. Clark, 1910, 83 Vt. 523. 
the only New England state allowing such expenditure without 
statut,ory authorization. The court spoke in terms strong by 
Vermont standards, but since the case involved no very compli-
cated or basic assault upon the orderly government or in-
ternal affairs of the town, it is difficult to judge its 
true effect on the governmental relationship: 
Towns are ••• creatures ofthe Legislature, and are con-
stituted for governmental purposes, and their rights and 
franchises never can become vested rights as against 
the State, which may exercise over them exclusive con-
trol, and may enlarge, restrict, and even destroy their 
corporate existence, as the public good requires ••• 
whenever a town attempts to exercise powers not within 
the proper province of local self-government, whether 
the right to do so is claimed under express legislative 
grant or by implication from the charter, the act must 
be considered as altogether ultra vires and ••• void.l36 
The latter statement is difficult to interpret. Since it is 
a quotation from the sixth edition of Cooley's Constitutional 
Limitat ions, page 260, it would seem to express a policy of 
legislative supremacy as to affairs properly state-wide, but 
to leave doubt as to those affairs strictly local. In 1913, 
a proposal to turn over from the legislature to the public 
service commission authority to determine the plan and frame 
of government of villages, and to pass on city charters was 
summarily disallowed137 as an unauthorized delegation of 
136 Ibid., P• 525. 
137In re Municipal Charters, 1913, 86 Vt. 562, 
86 Atl. 307. 
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legislative powers. Since this is about as close to "ripper" 
legislation as the legislature came, it can be regarded at 
best as a mild indication of judicial disapproval of the 
delegation of such powers to state boards. Once again, the 
scarcity of relevant cases makes conclusions difficult. 
Maine 
Maine in this century offered no outstanding judicial 
decisions, since the pattern had been fixed from the beginning 
and did not ,rary. The state, in Maine politics, is not an 
opponent of towns, since there are no real political bases 
for such opposition. The enthusiasm with which Maine towns 
took up manager government has already been indicated above. 
During the 1930's, when certain towns neared bankruptcy, the 
emergency municipal finance board took over local financial 
functions, but apparently met none of the local opposition 
and bitterness of feeling with which state boards appointed 
to control local affairs were greeted elsewhere in New England. 
In that same decade, many of the towns of the state sought 
voluntary "deorganization" as a solution to the tax and 
finance problem. Relevant commentl38 seems to indicate that 
13E\Villiam S. Carpenter, 11 Deorganization . in Maine", 
1938, American Political Science Review, 32:1139; Clyde F. 
Snider, "county and Township Government in 1937 11 , American 
Political Science Review, 32:936 at 954, citing another source. 
It should also be observed that V\ihen the Maine tovm gives up 
Main e citizens stood ready to give up the existence of their 
tovms rather readily when this appeared as a desirable solu-
tion to local problems. This very fact indicates how much 
different is the tradition of Maine from that of the other 
New England states . 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this century, as we have seen, the chief interest 
in the development of the state -local consti tutiona.l rela-
tionship occurred at the practical level, in the various home 
rule movements, the creation of and reaction to "ripper" 
boards, and in the political action which secured the Con-
necticut and Rhode Island home rule guarantees. The 1951 
and 1953 Connecticut home rule statutes proved ineffective 
in practice, but the 1957 statute is in much broader terms. 
The grant of a very long list of local powers, to all muni-
cipalities, regardless of charter adoption, with a virtual 
pledge on the part of the legislature to refrain from inter-
fering in local affairs, seems to indicate that Connecticut 
municipalities have achieved effective home rule. It is much 
better, from a practical point of view, to secure home rule 
138 (continued) its existence, there is no question 
of its losing representation as would be the case in Con-
nect.icut, Rhode Island and Vermont in which towns are still 
represented as such in the legislature. See the discussion 
of legislative apportionment in Chapter II, above. 
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in this fashion, if the legislature can be depended upon to 
live up to its guarantees . While it has been demonstrated 
that such statutes do not bind the legislature in any legal 
fashion, they have the practical effect of avoiding the 
judicial tribunals as the testing-ground of legislation. 
Rhode Island's experience with its constitutional amendment 
twenty-one indicates just how thoroughly the monolithic 
ideas of strict construction and the presumption, in every 
case of conflict,that the state meant to give up as little 
of its sovereignty as possible, may des t roy much of the ap-
parent success gained in the acceptance of such a measure. 
Rhode Island continued as virtually a confederation of towns, 
with conflict developing as between the legislature and the 
cities due to the peculiar pattern of representation in the 
legisla.ture. Vermont and New Hampshire developed stronger 
statements of state domination of every aspect of local af-
fairs, with New Hampshire in particular forsaking its deci-
sions in the late nineteenth century by Chief Justice Doe, 
to return to a position much like that expressed in the 
Massachusetts cases. In Maine, as indicated, there has been 
little historical conflict between town and state, and what 
little there has been has been settled summarily in the 
courts in favor of the state. The judicial path to local 
rights appeared to be pretty thoroughly blocked with the 
advancing institutionalization of judicial decision in this 
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century, and the Connecticut and Rhode Island experience 
se ems to indicate that the only path open to those seeking 
the advancement of local interests and their protection 
against state action lies in practical political action on 
the home rule front, coupled with a long-term attempt to 
change or modify the bases of judicial decision which have 
become so firmly set against town rights as to negative a 
good part of the objects sought to be gained through such 
acts. 
I 
I 
-~ I 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation has studied the nature of the 
state-local constitutional relationship and division of 
powers in New England, past and present, defining the con-
s t itutional and legal status of the municipality. The New 
England political or social myth of local independence in 
i t s ~arious guises has been traced from its historical roots 
in the activities of the colonial towns, through the facts 
and theories accompanying nineteenth century centralization 
and adoption of Austinian concepts of sovereignty, to pre-
sent day home rule and allied movements and theories. 
The varying theories, rules of interpretation , and 
political and jurisprudential theories which continued as-
sertion of the myth engendered have been studied. Their 
resultants are shown to have creat ed a judicial pattern and 
political climate, the limits of which will determine the 
need for home rule, and the chances for success of varying 
types of constitutional or statutory home rule provisions 
i n the New England states. 
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The myth of local independence has appeared in many 
guises in New England and elsewhere. In any given court 
case or scholarly writing asserting local rights, a mixture 
of elements has usually been pleaded. However, it is pos-
sible to separate the arguments which have accompanied or 
tended to perpetuate the myth into several components: 
(1) Prescriptive Right Argument. This theory as -
serts that municipalities have certain powers and rights 
acquired by immemorial or long-continued exercise and that 
the legislature has no power to interfere with them without 
the consent of the local units or of the people. 
(2) Vested Right Plea. This is similar to the 
first one, in that its proponents look to the past, and 
claim that certain rights and powers having been vested in 
the municipality by tradition, practice, or statute, cannot 
thereafter be divested from the municipality without its 
consent. 
(3) Corporate Right Theory. This line of reasoning 
assents that the New England city or town in the past and 
at present is a corporation, and therefore, like the common 
law corporation has all powers not specifically denied to 
it; that is, the powers and protections of a natural person. 
(4) Social Compact or Contract Theory. In seven-
teenth century tradition, this idea stated that government 
rests on the consent of the governed, and that the central 
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state government was formed as the result of the forming 
of an agreement or contract, with the contracting parties 
each having mutual rights and obligations, and with the 
powers of the parties defined by the terms of the compact. 
In Rhode Island and Connecticut, this argument has been 
coupled with the theory that in the formation of the state, 
the towns contracted to form a central government. In the 
other states, there has been some speculation that the De-
claration of Independence resulted in a " state of nature" 
in which only the corporate towns and municipalities remained 
and that these then formed the state. Advocates of this 
theory, as of (2) above, have often attempted to claim pro-
tection of their status or rights under the "obligations due 
to contracts" clauses of federal and state consti t utions. 
(5) Limiting vs. Granting Interpretation of Consti -
tution and Municipal Charters. Like the social compact theo-
ry, t his argument is a comple~ one entailing the philosophi-
cal and political concepts of the relation of man to state, 
municipality to state, and state to nation. The primary 
ques ti on involved for purposes of this discussion is simply 
stated, whether the state acquired by the state constitution 
only those powers specifically granted to it therein, or 
whether, on the contrary, it was given all powers except 
those denied it by the explicit terms of the constitution. 
The first interpretation, which i t applied to the United 
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States Constitution, is that the document is a " granting" 
one; the second, that it is a "limiting" one. Proponents 
of the right of the legislature to do what it will with the 
municipality have urged the view that the constitution is 
a limiting one. However, proponents of the right of the 
municipality to act freely in matters purely local have 
claimed that the constitution is a granting one, in which 
the people and the local governments have retained or re-
served power to act in all matters not specifically desig-
nated by the constitution as belonging to the state. A 
similar argument has been made as to the nature of the muni-
cipal charter or incorporating act. Proponents of local 
r.ights have urged that the charter is a limiting one, and 
the eentralists that the charter is a granting one. An 
even .further extension of the theory is as t o whether sta-
tutes empowering municipalities to do certain things (as for 
example, a statute allowing cities to vaccinate against 
smallpox), when combined with other statutory, charter, and 
constitutional provisions relating to municipalities, con-
tain the full measure of the municipality's powers, or 
whether they merely authorize the municipality to act in 
specified areas in which there might be some question as to 
whether the matter were local or state-wide in nature ., or 
in which concurrent action by state and municipality might 
be permissible. 
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(6) Federal Nature of the State • An argument sel-
dom advanced. This theory views the state and its munici-
palities as occupying in relation to each other the same 
s t atus as do the s;tates to the nation. The constitution 
is regarded as a granting document in which the central 
state government has only those powers specifically given 
it, with the others reserved to the local units or to the 
people. This has often been combined with the idea that al-
though the constitut i on terms certain powers as state and 
certain as local, and that although certain powers are re -
served to the local units or to the people, there is a large 
shadow area in which concurrent action is permissible by 
both the state and municipality. 
(7) Due Process Assertion. Closely related to (3) 
above. The contention has also been made that the munici-
palipy is entitled to protection under the due process 
clauses of state or federal constitutions, just as is any 
privat e corporation or individual. 
(8) Inherent Right to Local-Self Government. This 
theory holds that local government has certain powers which 
inhere to local government by its nature. These powers, 
since they are not given by the state, therefore cannot be 
taken away by it either. The right exists quite apart from 
express constitutional guaranty or reservation. The doctrine 
received its stronges t support in Justice Thomas M. Cooley's 
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separate opinion in the 1871 Michigan case of People ex re. 
Le Roy v. Hurlbut and the writings and judicial decisions 
to which it gave birth. 
(9) Undefined Feeling that Local Governments have 
Certain Rights. As has been mentioned in this dissertation, 
there appears to exist a persistent feeling among New Eng-
landers that the state has no power to meddle in local af-
fairs, and that the local government is entitled to go its 
own way in local matters free from state interference. The 
author has encountered this among New Englanders, including 
some minor local officials, justices of the peace, and the 
like. As detailed in this dissertation, this vague, myth-
like feeling has persisted, despite the fact that court 
decisions have repeatedly held that the local government 
is the creature of the state, and therefore subject to its 
will. Enigmatically, this "feeling" has received expression 
on occasion by learned men. 
In most of the court cases or theoretical discussions 
involving assertions of local rights as against the state, 
one or more of these concepts are usually put forth, and 
often they are so intertwined that it is impossible to sep-
arate one from the other. They have persisted despite re-
sounding court decisions striking them down. 
Summaries and conclusions have appeared at various 
points in every chapter of the dissertation, and no purpose 
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is to be served by repeating them in any detail. However , 
some of the main points covered in the body of the disser-
tation, chapter by chapter and the conclusions derived there-
from are as follows: 
Chapter II investigated the basic concepts and 
relevant theories in considering home rule and its ante-
cedents in New England. 
The county is of relative unimportance as a govern-
mental unit, except in Maine. The New England town, on the 
other hand, remains the primary unit of local government, 
since even cities, except for the very largest, tend t o be 
regarded by the courts as essentially towns with somewhat 
extended powers. 
The basis of representation in the le gislature must 
not be disregarded in considering state-local division of 
powers. In Rhode Island, the town is represented in both 
houses of the legislature, and towns have remained virtually 
free of legislative control. With the exception of Maine 
and Massachusetts, the two most highly centralized of the 
New England states, the basis of representation in at least 
one house of the legislature is the municipality. The 
character of these legislatures is such that they have been 
described by responsible authors as virtually conventions 
of towns. Thus it is possible that one clique in a munici-
pality, through its influence in the legislature, may cause 
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the passage of legislation ultimately harmful to the muni-
cipality. The strong influence ~of the major political par-
ties must also be taken into account, since much of the 
"ripper" and other special legislation is politically moti-
vated. 
The mode of selection of judges is also possibly 
a relevant factor bearing on the decisions which such judges 
make when they reach the bench. In Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire and Maine, the judges of the supreme court are selected 
by a process not involving the electorate or the legislature 
directly. The analysis of court decisions in these states 
(though to a lesser extent in New Hampshire) shows a marked 
tendency toward centralism. In Connecticut, where the towns 
maintain strong representation in the lower house, and where 
the governor nominates and the legislature approves the 
judges, the decisions tend to be state-centered, with some 
minor trace of concern for local rights demonstrated. In 
Rhode Island where the town maintain strong representation 
in both houses of the legislature, the legislature alone 
appoints and removes the judges by simple resolution. There, 
although the town prejudices appear to have some effect on 
the pattern of decision, the issue of state-local relations 
is obscured by the severe town versus city split in the 
pol:it,y of the state. In Vermont, judges are elected by the 
voters, and the judges are quite solicitous of local rights. 
525 
Yet one cannot say that the way judges are chosen has deter-
mined the judicial interpretation of state - local relations, 
but only that perhaps the factors which have determined the 
relationship have also influenced the way judges are selected. 
The strain of local particularism, strong in all of 
New England except for Maine, has perhaps begot its opposite 
extreme. The New England legislatures and courts have acted 
decisively to adopt patterns of theory and action designed 
to assure legislative control over local units. Possibly 
in non-New England states, lacking the centuries of tradition 
possessed by the New England town and the widespread myth of 
local independence, the state government found no need to 
adopt such stern measures to assure its dominant position. 
Towns in New England have, perhaps, some suspicion 
of home rule movements, regarding home rule and related re-
form movements as intended primarily for the benefit of 
larger municipalities. To some smaller and poorer towns, 
the state is a monied partner whose advice, funds, and re-
gulations are eagerly sought. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth century legislative 
and judicial reaction against the tradition of local self-
government has controlled, defined, and limited the develop-
ment of and need for home rule in the New England states 
and will do so in the future. Home rule movements are 
strongest where they are most needed, and where the myth of 
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local self-government is strongest. Thus knowledge of the 
previous pattern of legislation and coUrt decisions relating 
to the municipality is essential to draft a home rule pro-
vision which will endure the court tests and legislative 
actions which will ensue, and the creation of nripper" 
boards which another great financial depression might bring 
with it. Home rule provisions which might work well in to-
day's prosperous economic climate might likely fail to secure 
their purposes in time of economic depression, unless care -
full;y drafted. 
The definition of home rule as the right to draft 
a charter is too narrow a one. The broader definition 
adopted for purposes of this dissertation, includes the 
statement that any suggested home rule amendment or statute 
or model plan must concern itself not only with the mechanics 
of charter drafting and of the internal organization and ad-
ministration of the municipality as set up in the charter, 
but also with the relation of the local unit to other units 
of government within the state. 
An appreciation of relevant writings of political 
and jurisprudential theorists is an essential precedent to 
an examination of home rule theory itself. The antecedent 
pattern created by legislative activity, constitutional theo-
ry, and judicial precedent must be answered, refuted, nulli-
fied, and otherwise coped with by home rule theorists, and 
draf:ters of home rule provisions and plans. The patterns 
of j~udge-made law in turn stem to some extent from the 
I 
theories and treatises of the past. The writings of John 
I 
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F. Dillon, Thomas M. Cooley, Howard L. McBain, Eugene Mc-
quiJ,lan, and others such as Frank J. Goodnow and John A. 
Fainlie influenced the patterns which were to follow. These 
autliors were concerned not only with restating the law as 
it Jas, but also with shaping the law of the future. 
Judge Dillon was a particularly strong centralist 
' in his writings and judicial opinions. "Dillon's Rule", 
so- called, was an important factor in establishing absolute 
legislative control over all governmental bodies within the 
state . This rule is t hat a municipality has only those 
powers expressly given by its charter or by the state con-
stitution and laws, strictly construed, plus other powers 
nec~ssarily to be implied therefrom or necessary to accom-
I 
plish the ends for which the municipality was created. This 
is usually accompanied by the corollary that once the state 
has occupied or acted within a certain legislative area, 
that area is thenceforth closed to municipal action, w1less 
the :statute plainly allows concurrent local action. 
Following an analysis of the concepts involved in 
home rule, the dissertation has considered the relevant por-
tions of the model home rule plans of the American Municipal 
Association and the National Municipal Association~ The 
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strong and weak points of each, as indicated by the emergent 
pattern traced in the dissertation and by actual experience 
in several states, were then discussed in some detail. The 
A.M.A. plan seems to be undesirable for adoption in the New 
England states, and the National Municipal Association more 
sui table . 
In considering home rule, the metropolitan problem 
is of relevance. Dean Jefferson B. Fordham and the A.MeA. 
plan seek to bring about metropolitan rather than municipal 
home rule. Other writers have agreed that home rule which 
contlnues the "imrnorta.lity of small units of government" is 
undesirable. Plans for voluntary and involuntary consolida-
tion are considered in the chapter. The author sugges ts 
that a voluntary and permissive integration on a reward 
basis, perhaps following the Connecticut plan, is preferable 
to integration by legislative fiat. Profe ssor Harvey Walker 's 
"private incorporation act" proposal by which municipal cor-
porations might be formed with relatively small population 
and property might lead to "atomization" of the metropolitan 
area :. This is too high a price to pay for freedom from 
legislative interference. Some sort of non-legislative, 
virtually-automatic process for incorporating municipalities 
is possible. It should be cast in a mold which will en-
courage the gover~~ental &~d functional unification of the 
metropolitan area, rather than its dissolution. 
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Stat utory home rule such as that adopted in Con-
necticut and New Jersey is an alternative to constitutional 
home rule. However, it would appear that to guard against 
legislative or judicial interference with the process, a 
carefully-drafted home rule constitutional amendment would 
be preferable • 
No home rule plan can be written or adopted in a 
vacuum. The home rule partisan must be able to set the 
home rule document into its background like a master land-
scape architect sets a new plant or tree into an existing 
milieu. The analysis of the underlying theory of home rule 
presented in this chapter has shown that the major problem 
facing the drafters of home rule provisions is the deter-
mination of the constitutional position of the municipality 
in relation to the state. It is t he pattern of antecedent 
constitutional theory and judicial decisions with which he 
must cope to solve the problem of home rule for a particular 
state. The Rhode Island home rule constitutional amendment 
was drafted according to a well-accepted pattern . However, 
it was poorly designed to stand or to prosper within its 
environment. 
Chapter III concerned the beginnings of gover1nnent 
in the colonial era. and its development until 1775. 
Examples of local independence of action and of 
town subordination to colonial or provincial legislatures 
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or authorities can be found in each one of the New England 
areas. Some of these are examined in the chapter, and are 
related to the colonial environment of uncertainty, confusion 
and frontier conditions. 
The patterns of central-local relations are somewhat 
more regularized in the southern three New England colonies 
during this period. Massachusetts from the beginning showed 
a more highly organized central government, and the towns 
were subjected to somewhat more regulation than was the case 
in Connecticut and Rhode Island. In Rhode Island, the towns 
were dominant, and the colony several times fell apart into 
its component towns. Even when a central government was 
organized, the governor's powers were limited, and the town-
based legislature exercised not only legislative but executive 
and judicial functions as well. 
In Connecticut, the colony was in effect a federation 
or confederation of towns. Just as in Rhode Island, the town-
based legislature exercised most of the powers of the central 
government, and WLder the compact (constitution) of 1638-39 
the legislature nominated all public officers, including exe-
cutive and judicial. 
The northern part of New England remained sparsely 
settled, but New Hampshire and Vermont showed more similarity 
in town beginnings to the Connecticut and Rhode Island pattern 
than to that of Massachusetts. Maine developed in the Massa-
chusetts pattern, except for early feudal-type settlements 
in which the county was of primary importance. 
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Selected colonial statutes, constitutions, charters, 
compacts, colonial records, and historles were used to dem-
onstrate the nature of the municipality and the evolving 
central-local relationship. The influence of v~iters such 
as Alexis de Tocqueville, Alexander Johnston, .and the members 
of the "New Historical School" at Johns Hopkins University 
and their -proponents and opponents was considered. Not only 
did these writers focus attention on the nature of the New 
England town, but many of the facts and theories which their 
prodigious research and writings uncovered and developed be-
came the subject of controversy in later court cases in which 
local rights were asserted as against the state. Certain of 
them contributed to the myth of local independence of the 
New England municipality, while others detracted from it. 
Many of the judicial decisions of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries were concerned with discountenanc-
ing certain of these writings. 
Chapter TV discussed the actions of local governments 
and their relationship t o the central state government during 
the 1775-1812 period of transition to orderly civil govern-
ment. 
The period was one in which the towns were uncertain 
as to the status which they were to occupy when the colonial 
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bonds were loosened, just as the states were confused as to 
their con stitutional posi t ion in the new Amer ican Confedera-
tion. Barticular incidents in the era were examined. These 
included anti-British activities and resolutions in the 
colonia l towns just prior to the Revolution, town assertions 
that the Declaration of Independence resolved the colony 
"into a state of nature" with only the towns retaining t heir 
existence, the Berkshire disaffection in Massachusetts in 
which the western part of the state remained in a state of 
virtual revolt for several years, the tendency on the part 
of the towns and the legislators themselves to regard state 
legisl~tors not as representatives but as town delegates, 
New England municipal actions during the Embargo and War of 
1812, and the "river towns " controversy involving New Hamp-
shire and Vermont towns . Town action in each of these series 
of incidents was discussed as a part of the New England his-
torical heritage contributing to the myth that the New Eng-
land towns are different from towns elsewhere . 
Chapter V described the period from 1812 to 1860 in 
which the New England courts began to define the constitu-
tional status of the municipality. 
With the rising tide of government in the 1830's 
and 1840's, t he municipalities in all of the six states were 
brought into a more clearly defined position of subje ction 
to the state. Following the depression of 1837, in the 
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movement to minimize government spending, statutes and con-
stitutional amendments forbidding local gover1unents to invest 
in canal companies and other local improvements were adopted. 
State legislatures began to exert power over local govern~ 
mental units in subtle and exploratory ways. In rare i n -
stances, municipalities or interested taxpayers therein 
countered these moves by litigation. 
In the early part of the period, the monolithic 
concept of sovereignty had little application to the situa-
tion. A loose, almost federal union existed wi t hin e ach of 
the New England states. The points of conflict were few. 
In t ho s e few legal controversies involving municipal powers, 
the local units t ended to argue in inexact terms that centr al 
state authority should not predominate, relying upon what 
they had always understood to be the right s of local govern-
ments. In particular, they argued in terms of contract, 
covenan t , or compact. The New England courts, wedded t o the 
idea of Aus t i n i an sovereignty, gave them little support. To 
the ni ne teenth centm·y legislature and court and to many of 
the theori s t s , the town or city charter did not part ake of 
the nature of a contract between state and town or city, with 
attendant mutuality of rights and obligations. Rather it was 
the legislature issuing a sovereign command for the formation 
or government of an inferior civic body. 
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The relevant constitutional law cases which found 
their way into the New England supreme courts are considered 
chronologically and state by state, in the chapter . These 
show that the courts of n~ssachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
Maine in this period were not at all sympathetic to any plea 
of local rights. Their decisions recognized such rights 
only in cases where the legislature attempted arbitrarily 
to deprive municipalities of their funds or property and to 
transfer them to some other governmental unit or to a private 
person, with no benefit accruing to the municipality affected . 
I 
Rhode Island offered little in the way or relevant constitu-
tional h!story of local government during this period. Con-
necticut and Vermont alone gave evidence of supreme court 
decisions hospitable to the natural rights pleas in behalf 
of munic!palities, and of judicial wariness of the activities 
of the legislature~ Connecticut offers the most colorful 
and varied local constitutional history during this period. 
Some of its early court decisions during t he era recognized 
that the legislature was not omnipotent, and that legislative 
acts contrary to the principles of the social compact or which 
impaired vested rights could not be considered rightful exer-
cise of legislative authority . The court did not view the 
legislature as supreme, did not regard the state constitution 
entirely as a limiting document, and on several occasions 
warned the General Assembly against overstepping the bounds 
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set b y the state constitution, the social c ompact theory , 
and the j ustices' consciences. The early cases talked in 
terms of social contract and natural rights. By 1843, how-
ever, the Connecticut court turned more and more to the view 
that the municipality was a creature of the state, and that 
the legislature could act rather fr eely in re gard to it. 
Dillon ' s Rule was accepted by the court by 1860. The Vermont 
courts during this period gave judicial recognition to the 
rights o f local units more fully than did the courts of any 
of the other New England states. The court drew a careful 
distinction between the legitimate state concerns of the 
legislatw~e and those thing s more properly the concern of 
local residents. A distinction was dr awn between the private 
and public functions of municipal corporations, and the con-
stitutional guarantees of the inviolability of private pro-
perty held to apply to the private functions. However, there 
was strong dissent . Maine and New Hampshire followed the 
centralist Massachusetts court decisions. 
Chapter VI concerned municipal-state division of 
powers in the 1861 to 1898 era of state and national central-
ization. 
An analysis of the court decisions showed a further 
development of the judicial and constitutional patterns be-
gun in the earlier part of the century. As had been dis-
cussed in Chapter II, toward the end of the last century, 
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attention was focused on the status of the municipality in 
relation to the state. Alexis de Tocqueville's writings had 
caused a revival of interest in the New England town. The 
political scientists and historians at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, Columbia University, and elsewhere began publishing 
intricately-documented monographs, articles and books re -
lating to the origins and the power s of the early New Eng-
land co~~unit~s . At the same time, the great political and 
juri sprudential theorists of the time were debating the 
nature of sovereignty and the basis of the constitutional 
status of man, the local unit, the states, and the nation. 
The Civil War was followed by an era of national centrali-
zation, and theories akin to those of secession, reserved 
rights, null ification,interposition and the like became 
suspect . The ensuing legislative abuses and corruption, 
resulted toward the end of the century in a counter-movement 
toward more local independence of action. Justice Thomas 
M. Cooley put forth his theory of the inherent right to 
local self- government, and a handful of states adopted it. 
In New England, the legislature extended its con-
trol over the towns further and further, and the first 
nripper" boards appeared. The ensuing corruption and bad 
government resulted in New England, as elsewhere, i .n a judi-
cial react ion against legislative dominance, and in the 
growth of reform and home rule movements . The courts in New 
Hampshire in the decisions analyzed in the chapter were 
shown to have closed off local concerns from legislative 
interference on one ground or another. In Connecticut, 
Chief J\ii.stice Andrews of the Supreme Court of Err ors es -
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poused the inherent rights theory much as stated by Justice 
Cooley . For a period, it appeared as though Connecticut 
might evolve a theory of inherent right to local self-
government much as had Michigan. However, Justice Andrews 
was never nble to join with more than one other justice of 
the supreme court at a time, so his opinions remained mere-
ly strong dissents. Even the majority decisions showed 
some tendency to hint that municipalities might have some 
sort of protected or vested rights, and to warn that there 
was some limit to legislative powers. In the landmark ca se 
of State ex rel . Bulkeley v. Williams the opposing theories 
received full treatment, and Connecticut town history and 
tradition was reviewed in detail . Although the majority 
of the court struck down the claims to local independence, 
this marked the closest the court came to adopting the in-
herent right theory. 
' 
In New Hampshire, the supreme courts began to break 
with its Massachusetts traditions. With the accessi on of 
Justice Charles Doe in the mid-part of the era, the New 
Hampshire court began to follow more the earlier Vermont 
line of reasoning. It recognized the private character 
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of towns and cities, and, to some extent, their right to 
claim from history certain prescriptive, inherent and extra-
constitutional rights. After a period in which the court 
talked in terms of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common right 
and natural justice, the court reverted to the Massachusetts 
view of the municipality as a creature of the s~ate--a quasi-
corporation subject to the legislature, and with no private 
rights. The prescriptive and historical practices of towns 
in the colonial era were placed in their proper historical 
perspective. It then returned in the case of State v. Hayes 
to a view that the right to local self-government lay at the 
very basis of the state government. Towns have certain rights 
in their private corporate character which are beyond the 
reach of the l egislature, the court ruled. Thus the pattern 
in New Hampshire during the period was such that there was 
no particularly strong abuse of legislative or judicial pow-
er which would give impetus to a home rule movement . It 
might be said that even today no real need for such a move -
ment exists in the state . 
Vermont in this period began with implicit and ex-
plicit acknowledgment by the courts of the rights of towns 
to local self-government in local affairs. Although the 
scarcity of Vermont dec isions involving state-local division 
of powers during the era made the author he si tate to detect 
"trendsn therein, it would appear that the state finally 
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shifted to a modified theory of centralization of control 
over local units in the legislature. Legislative abuses 
remained few . The towns continued to be the basic unit of 
government, and the legislat ors remained close to the people. 
The popul ati on continued primarily rural and homogeneous, 
and there appeared little need for le gislative or judicial 
supervision of local units so constituted. The town has 
remained close to the people, and home rule in its broadest 
sense might be said to have existed always in the state. No 
paper guarantee was needed to c onfirm it. 
The Maine cases of the e r a continued to follow the 
pattern of centralization set out by Massachusetts courts. 
At one point, the court stated that t owns were municipal 
corporations, entirely subject to the state in public pur-
poses. This indicated that the court might have been willing 
to give at least minimal protection to a municipality threat -
ened with legislative confiscation for private benefit. How-
ever, such a case did not arise. 
Thus the non-New Eng land judicial movement of in-
herent right and allied theories by which courts closed off 
local conce rns from legislative interference was at work in 
New England during the 1861-1898 period. I t succeeded to 
some extent i n New Hampshire, had influence upon the Connect-
icut law but did not change the pattern, was not needed in 
Vermont nor in Rhode Island due to the peculiar local internal 
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situat ions in both states, and failed utterly of adoption 
or even of influence in the courts of Maine. In Massachu-
setts legislative domination and corruption did call forth 
a stern judicial warning that the legislature must restrain 
its activities in regard to the City of Boston, and by im-
plication, to the other towns and cities oft he state. How-
over, the court did not change the previous pattern of its 
decisions to make the warning completely effective. 
Chapter VII continued the analysis of the judicial 
decisions and reform movements, particularly the home rule 
movements, in each of the New England states to the present. 
The age has been characterized as one of reform. 
In the twentieth century, attention has turned from 
attempts to secure judicial recognition of the right to local 
independence in local matters to the more realistic effort 
to secure home rule constitutional amendments or statutes. 
Although the growth of metropolitan areas in Massachuse tts , 
Rhode I sland, and Connecticut has added new problems, the 
concepts underlying and purposes motivating the home rule 
and allied movements are similar to those in the earlier at-
tempts to secure local independence of action in local matters 
by use of the myth in its various guises. 
The twentieth century Massachusetts municipality 
continued to feel the heavy hand of the legislature. Special 
legislation affecting the cities and towns, special districts 
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and authorities taking over services essentially local in 
nature, "ripper" boards and commissio~,and court decisions 
holding that the local unit was a mere department of the 
state created for its administrative convenience and plea-
sure have continued and have flourished. Coupled with this 
has been a strong, but to date completely unsuccessful, home 
rule and reform movement. The Massachusetts legislature even 
failed on occasion to approve its own statutorily-specified 
optional charter forms when one such form was chosed by a 
particular city. The town and city remained absolutely sub-
ject to the state, and the Commonwealth was described as 
among the most centralized states in the country. That home 
rule has failed of adoption to date and that the municipality 
occupies its position of complete subjection was shown to 
have been predictable on the basis of the past court decisions 
and historical evolution of the town-state division of powers 
in the state. Writings of various reformers were considered 
in view of the findings of this dissertation. 
In Connecticut, the municipality in the earlier part 
of the twentieth century fared not much better than did its 
Massachusetts analogue. However, the forces of centrifugal-
ism remained stronger in Connecticut. "Ripper" legislation 
and special laws proliferated in the Connecticut legislature, 
especially as the Republican-dominated legislature acted to 
strip from the Democratic-controlled cities certain of their 
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municipal functions. 
The statutory provisions for home rule before 1957 
were ineffective for reasons considered by reference to the 
past judicial and historical pattern of the state, the me-
~hanic•al provisions of' the statutes, and the comments of 
political observers of the times. However, the 1957 home 
rule amendment was successful in bringing home rule to the 
towns and cities oft he state. The legislature pledged it-
self not to interfere with the internal organization or af-
fairs ' of the municipalities, seemingly promising an end to 
"ripper" acts. Since the tradition of local self-government 
has run strongly in the state, it is concluded that the act 
has good chance for success in eliminating special legisla-
tion. Although the act specifically names a large number of 
powers which municipalities may exercise, and declares that 
this list is not all-inclusive of the powers of the munici-
palities, Dillon's Rule has not been abolished. However, 
the act does outlaw special legislation relating to the muni-
cipality. except upon extraordinary petition of the local 
government itself or of its citizens. 
In Connecticut, as in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, 
there has been no successful attempt made to prevent inter-
ference with the legislative process by which bills relating 
to local government reforms or powers are "lost" after being 
passed by one house or the other, or at the stage when they 
are to be transmitted to the governor for approval. 
Although the Connecticut home rule statute is not 
all that could be hoped for, it is concluded that in view 
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of the past judicial pattern of the state, the modern period 
is one of good portent for the municipalities of the state. 
Municipalities will probably be protected in all, or at least 
most, of their affairs of local self-government. 
The Rhode Island twentieth century pattern was marked 
by the early attempts by Amasa Eaton to secure recognition of 
the right of towns and cities to govern themselves. This 
battle wa s carried on in the state courts and in extensive 
scholarly articles tracing the history of the New England 
town, particularlythat in Rhode Island. In answering his 
argument, the Rhode Island Supreme Court conceded that towns 
and cities "doubtless ••• have rights which cannot be infringed ." 
However, it held that "ripper" acts stripping police powers 
from the City of Newport and vesting those together with cer-
tain financial powers in a state "ripper" board did not in-
fringe these rights. At no later time has the court admitted 
the possibility that towns and cities have protected rights . 
In late cases involving "ripper" boards, the court adopted 
the theory that the constitution was a limiting document and 
that the legislature could therefore act in any area not 
closed to it by the constitution. Municipalities were held 
to be the creatures of the state. The court, legislatively 
appointed, and subject to removal by simple resolution of the 
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legislature, continued its decisions in the Dillon mold. 
However, the city versus town split has been more at issue 
than has been the one of state versus local unit. Most of 
the 'tripper" legislation was directed by the town-controlled 
legislature against the large u~ban Democratic cities,wit h 
their large numbers of immi grant industrial worker s. 
Reform movements in Rhode Island finally culminated 
in the only constitutional home rule amendment in New England. 
The activities leading up to the adoption of this amendment, 
and t he fate which it met at the hands of the centrali s t 
Rhode Island court were set out in detail. It was concluded 
that had the drafters of the amendment worded the provi s ion 
more carefully with the judicial and historical pattern of 
the state in mind, it might have fared better in the i nevi-
t able court tests which followed, 
The New Hampshire legislature also passed "ripper" 
laws for the first time at the close of the l ast century. 
Although the court at first approved the legislature ' s power 
to do so with reluctance, by 1937 the court took its place 
solidly among the states espousing Dillon's Rule. In r e cent 
years, it has rejected firmly any idea of rights to local 
self-government. In Maine and Vermont, there have been few 
judicial cases concerning the division of powers between 
state and municipality. In Maine, however, the county has 
remained important, and towns have 11 daorganized 11 from t ime 
to time as a solution to their tax and finance problems. The 
town manager plan gained early acceptance in the state. In none 
of these three northern states does there appear to be any need 
today for home rule. 
In the twentieth century, the chief interest in the 
development of the state-local division of powers occurred at 
the practical level, in the various home rule movements, the 
creation of and reaction to "ripper" boards, in the political 
action which secured the Connecticut and Rhode Island home 
rule provisions, and in the attempts to solve the metropolitan 
area problem. Rhode Island continued as virtually a confeder-
ation of towns, with legislative-city conflict due primarily 
to the pattern of legislative representation. New Hampshire 
and 'Vermont developed stronger statements of state domination 
of local affairs. Maine continued its pattern of rare conflict 
between municipality and state, with conflict that arose being 
settled summarily by the courts in favor of the state. Mass-
achusetts continued to follow a pattern of subjection of the 
municipality to the will of the legislature. 
This, in the barest outline, has been the pattern de ... 
veloped in this dissertation. As has been shown in Chapter 
II, the pattern has a definite relationship to the need for 
home rule and the possibilities for success of home rule within / 
a given state. The pattern in the two New England states whicq{ J 
/ 
have secured some measure of home rule, the experiences in other 
states under various home rule pl~s, and the considered opin" 
/ 
ion of such analysts as Professors Harvey Walker, Arthur B. 
Winter, Rodney Mott and Frank J. Goodnow support the conten-
tion that successful home rule can be attained only through 
constitutional or statutory provisions negating the central-
ist theories and concepts developed by the courts in t h eir 
decisions engendered by the antecedent attempts to assert 
claims to local independence of action in local affairs. 
Home Rule Recommendations: Massachusetts 
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The lot of the Massachusetts municipality is the worst 
in all of New England. It lacks constitutional protections, 
lacks statutory safeguards, has no political or judicial trad-
ition to protect it against the legislature, and in addition, 
it has a positive tradition of legislative interference in and 
direction of local functions where no general state interest 
is involved. Its capital city is part of an incredible maze 
of co-existant and overlapping governmental functions, units, 
and services. Its political leaders, including several of 
its governors, have given lip service but no real support to 
the tradition of home rule. Party machinery is strong, and al-
most oblivious of the desirability of local control of local 
function, the true integration of the metropolitan community, 
and the equalization of the costs of government within such 
an area. In addition, its large cities have not work ed to-
ge'ther uniformly and strongly to achieve their common advantage 
and common goals. 
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It will be seen that the problem of the state is 
deeper than one which can be solved by the facile recommenda-
tion of neatly-phrased proposed amendments. The statutory 
path, which has so far worked well in Connecticut and New 
Jersey, would probably not work at all in the Bay State. 
What is needed is an air-tight constitutional amendment ar-
mored against the certain laceration to which it would be ex-
posed in the centralist courts of the Commonwealth. But 
more than that is needed. Only a program of political action, 
virtually in the nature of a crusade, can bring local self-
government to Massachusetts. That such is possible is indic-
ated by the experience of Rhode Island, where in a mighty 
sustained effort, the reform groups of the state, certain of 
its newspapers, the aroused citizenry of Pawtucket, joined by 
the efforts of most of the local and legislative officers of 
the larger cities, and with the full support and influence of 
the chief executive of the state, literally forced from the 
legislature and a reluctant constitutional convention a fairly 
good home rule amendment. Massachusetts is fortunate in that 
by and large, the newspapers, particularly in Boston, would 
support a soundly-conceived home rule movement. 
This, then, is what the author would regard as the 
minimum activity necessary to secure a meaningful home rule 
provision for Massachusetts cities and towns. First, an effort 
must be made, probably on the part of one of the existing "good 
government" or taxpayers groups, to get all or most of the 
--- --.-
loc al officials of the larger cities of the st at e to join 
actively in pr omotion of t h e home ru l e ide a . The legisla-
tiv e de legation from these cities should be approached as 
well, in n effort to win it . The refonTI g ro up s themselves 
should. f or the t ime f ors ake all o t her goa ls and conc entrate 
on this 11 grel?,t crusade 11 • The cooperation of the university 
centers of public administration, loc al government research, 
and other .departments and research groups concerned with the 
problem should be sought, to provide respected "front" and 
intellectual leadership. A program of publicity designed 
to capture the decencies, must accompany the movement, iden-
tifying this movement for home rule with all that is respected 
and cheri&1ed in the history of the state. This can best be 
accomplished by soliciting the assistance of the newspapers 
of the larger cities of the state, by the supplying of edi-
torial material and of relevant news releases in quantity, 
and by the constant emphasizing of anticipated tax cuts 
and i ncreased services, as. well as by soli~iting sympathetic 
public officials, professors, busines s leaders who can be 
shown the direct and immediate tax savings to be expected 
from success of such a drive, and other distinguished per-
sons to take every opportunity to make public statements and 
give public support to the movement. 
When and if the above can be accomplished, the re-
sulting combination of good government forces should look 
around for a local official, preferably a mayor of a large 
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city of the state, who has felt the heavy hand of the legis-
lature, but who yet has given evidence of personal integrity, 
ability, and dedication to the public interest. Regardless of 
party, a.nd regardless of normal prejudice for one political 
organization or another, the elements of the crusade must strive 
to place this man in the governor's chair. Again, if it pos-
sibly c en be accomplished, a constitutional convention should 
be sought. In time of such conventions, the governmental situa-
tion is fluid, and those interests which normally feel safe in 
tpeir domination of party or legislature must look to secure their 
ovm pos i tion. They are more willing to bargain, and are more 
afraid of the consequences which may follow upon their not doing 
so. If this prog ram begins to sound a bit revolutionary, the 
reader must accept the fact that only a peaceful, planned, and 
orderly reworking of the very bases of government itself is 
likely to solve the problem of integrated, efficient and econ-
omical local government in Massachusetts. 
After this putting together of a single-goal centered 
organization, creation of a favorable climate of public opinion, 
securing of the governorship for a dynamic person dedicated to the 
goal, and unbalancing of the normal constitutional pattern, one 
may turn his attention to the constitutional provision itself 
wqich is to accomplish the desired end of . reasonable local self-
government. I~ has appeared that persons and organizations in 
Rhode Island had suceeeded in creating just the conditions de-
-----------
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scribed above, and recommended by the author to be reproduced 
as far as possible in Massachusetts. Yet, after this prodigy 
of organization and unification of effort, part of the effec-
tiveness of the movement was destroyed by a constitutional 
amendment drafted poorly, ill-conceived to match the past 
patter~ of Rhode Island tradition and experience, and with 
a lack of attention to exploratory articles even then appear-
ing in the journals of local government and law. The amend-
ment was drafted with more attention to the mechanics of in-
ternal local government organization, than to the crucial 
points of relation to the state judicial, legislative and 
administrative apparatus. 
In the drafting of such an amendment, particularly 
in Massachusetts of all the New England states, expertise is 
necessary. If possible, the aid of such distinguished analysts 
as Professors Harvey Walker, Rodney Mott, Arthur B. Winter, 
or Arthur W. Bromage should be sought. If they are not avail-
able, persons suggested by them as having full awareness of 
the importance of the state-local constitutional relationship 
involved in the drafting of such an amendment Should be sol-
icited to t~~e part in the drafting process. It is the 
opinion of this author that the proposals set forth by the 
American Municipal Association and by Dean Jefferson B. Fordham 
would best be avoided .in any attempt to secure home rule in 
Massachusetts, since they depend heavily upon the existence 
of a model state legislature. 
-------~------- -- -----
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The amendment itself should contain certain provisions. 
First of all, Dillon's Rule and ~ltra vires (insofar as it re-
lates to the municipality) must be forever struck from Mass-
achusetts jurisprudence. The vehicle for this purpose might 
best be the provisions suggested by Professor Walker, and re-
ferred to in Chapter II, above. Alternately, only this pro-
vision and no other might be taken from the A.M.A. model 
plan. In the A.M.A. plan, this reversal of the established 
pattern is so clearly and unmistakably worded by the distin-
guished Dean Fordham that the author doubts that even the 
Supreme Judicial Court could avoid enforcing it. The New 
Jersey home rule provision has been interpreted by the courts 
of that state as accomplishing this result, but the wording 
seems ambiguous to the author. Alaska's provision is not 
definite enough, though it would probably serve the purpose 
in a good many states with a less restrictive judicial pattern. 
The Rhode Island provision has proved ineffective in achieving 
the goal sought, and should be avoided. 
Second, the author agrees with Professors Mott and 
Bromage, and with the Connecticut home rule statute, that 
an extensive and detailed list of powers deemed to be local 
should be included in the amendment. Error, if any, should 
be on the side of inclusion. Any powers not named specifically 
as local will almost certainly be held to be state powers by 
the Massachusetts courts. Accompanying this statement of 
powers should be two related provisions. The first such pro-
vision should abolish the rule that when the state occupies an 
area, it is thereupon closed to the local governmental unit. 
Substituted for this should be a provision like Ohio's, de-
signed to shut out the local action only if the legislature 
states specifically that the local unit is to be foreclosed, 
and only if the legislature is acting in a proper area of 
state-wide concern. The second such provision should strike 
down the legal presumption that when a general statement of 
power is made in a statute or constitutional provision, and 
is then followed by a list of powers or provisions, that the 
enacting authoriV,r intended only to grant such powers and 
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ones closely related to them, or of the same order, or inci-
dental to them. This ejusdem generis rule must be specif-
ically rejected, and the courts instructed that it is not 
applicable to the named powers • . Professor Walker has sug-
gested ways of accomplishing this in his recent articles, 
Professor Mott has touched upon it, and Connecticut has 
succeeded in having its statutory language to this effect con-
strued by the court in this fashion. Since the Mas s achusetts 
and Connecticut courts tra.ditionally have deep respect for 
one another's decisions, it would seem that an adaptation of 
the Connecticut provision might be made. 
As the author has pointed out in this dissertation, 
one of the greatest problems faced by Massachusetts is the 
multiplicity of local units and overlying special districts 
which perform the governmental function in each of the metro-
politan areas of the state. To put it brutally, many of these 
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units are inefficient, obsolete, expensive and ought long 
ago to have been stripped of their governmental functions 
if not of their identities. Let the author hasten to add 
that he has as great respect for and love of the tradition 
of the New England town as any man. Yet, the luxury of 
certain of these units can no longer be afforded. The home 
rule amendment should contain provisions designed to induce 
consolidation. As discussed more fully in Chapter II, above, 
these should include saving of legislative representation, 
preservation of present tax base or lowering thereof, guar-
antee against change in zoning, and the other present advan-
tages of independent status, and in addition, should offer 
substantial financial benefits to towns and cities so con-
solidating, such as an e~ption from certain state taxes, 
state guarantee of bonds issued by such units, subsidization 
of industrial location in the enlarged municipality, and the 
like. The provisions of the second amendment to the state 
constitution prevent consolidation of towns into adjoining 
cities except by consent of the inhabitants, plus legisla-
tive approval. Hence, under the present constitution, any 
consolidation plan which depends upon legislative fiat alone 
is predestined to failure. An attempt to change this partic-
ular provision of the constitution would probably foredoom the 
entire home rule effort. Voluntary inducement to consolidation, 
and the provision of mechanisms therefor, is the only practical 
solution for Massachusetts. Connecticut under its home rule 
legislation allows towns (since every city or other munici-
pality of Connecticut is also a town, or part of one, towns 
may in effect here be read "municipalities") on their O'Wil 
initiative and vote to combine with other units of local 
government. This same pattern should be applied to Massachu-
setts, including all municipalities so that they could com-
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bine into larger units without any legislative action necessary. 
This could be accomplished preferably by including a provision 
to this effect in the proposed home rule amendment or might 
be accomplished separately by statute. The guarantees of 
status proposed above must be limited in time. It would seem 
that twenty or. twenty-five years would be a reasonable per-
iod for such guarantees. The guarantees should be designed 
so that most present taxpayers would not themselves suffer 
from the change in polttical boundaries, but rather, be ad-
vantaged thereby. 
The granting of broad powers to municipalities, the 
abolition of Dillon's Rule, ultra vires, and so on, should in 
explicit terms be applicable to ill local units, regardless 
of size, and regardless of status as town or city, and 
specific,ally including Boston. However, the privilege of' 
incorpo~ating as a city, and of writing its own charter, and 
thus of deciding upon its internal form of governmental struc-
ture, should be made dependent upon population and potential 
tax base and ability to support the expenses of city status. 
The author believes that a minimum population of 2500 v1ould 
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be well~adapted to the Massachusetts distribution of popula-
tion and wealth, and would agree entirely with Professor Mott 
that a population of 5000 should be large enough in any case 
to allow a town to claim city status and the charter-writing 
privilege. The population of 12,000 now specified in Amend-
ment II of the Massachusetts Constitution is unrealistic and 
much too large. 
It is particularly important that any home rule pro-
vision should control classification of cities and towns in 
terms of population or other conventional standards. Classi-
fication should be either forbidden entirely, or else logical 
classes should be specified in the home rule provision itself, 
' as the only form of classification permitted to the leg isla-
ture. ~he legislature should be limited to general laws, in 
providing for matters concerning local government. -If a sys-
tem of classification is decided upon it is particularly im-
portant that each of the classes thereunder be part of a g ood 
sized group. No single city ·and even no two or three cities 
should be included within a single group. Boston particularly 
must be protected in setting up such a plan. The author would 
suggest classification, if desired, under s orne such standard 
as the following: (1) municipalities of less than 5,000 popu-
lation; (2) municipalities of 5,000 to 20,000 ;, (3) municipali-
ties 20,000 to 100,000; (4) municip alities of 100,000 or larger. 
This would accomplish the goal of allowing the legislature to 
f .it general statutes to t h e needs of local communities, without 
~6 
permitting that body to avoid the intention of the home rule 
provision~ Thus even with no change in municipal borders, 
the 100,000 plus population class would include, on the 
basis of the 1950 census, Cambridge, Fall River, New Bedford, 
Sommerville, Springfield and Worcester, in addition to Boston. 
With recent population increases it would probably include 
additional cities such as Lowell and Lynn. The 100,000 figure 
appears to be the most logical one, because any substantial 
increase above that mark would mean that only Worcester and 
Springfield would share a class with Boston, barring municipal 
consolidation under the proposed home rule provisions. 
Specifically included among the named powers reserved 
to all municipalities and exempted from state interference, 
should be the right to make local ordinances in the specified 
areas of local concern. and in other areas covered under the 
general grant, free from any need for these ordinances to be 
approved by any state officer. The present requirement that 
all local ordinances be approved by the Commonwealth attorney-
general is a badge of local slavery that would be tolerated alone 
in Maine of all the other New England states. It serves no 
valid purpose except to allow executive intermeddling in local 
affairs; in addition to legislative and judicia~ interference 
therein. The approval is largely routine, but is nevertheless 
an overextension of state power. 
It goes virtually without saying that the legislature 
must be restricted to action only in the field of general 
state concern, as interpreted by courts without presumption 
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ei the1r on behalf of state or local exercise of particular pow-
ers. In areas of local concern where state legislation might 
be indicated, it should be made to depend upon approval by a 
major~ty of the qualified voters of the local unit voting on 
the question. This majority would be easy of achievement, but 
would supply a positive check on legislative usurpation of 
local function. Such functions as police and fire should be 
reserved to the municipalities, except as those units chose to 
give them away. Regulations having the force of law or ordin-
ance, and promulgated by state boards exercising essentially 
local functions, without representation on such boards by the 
local units, and without their consent to such regulations 
should be prohibited. If state boards are necessary in met-
ropolitan areas, their functions must be made purely adminis-
trative, and they must be made to enforce only statutory law 
and local ordinances. The Massachusetts home rule amendment 
should forbid specifically legislative delegation of such nor-
mally local functions to state boards, and should refer to and 
forbid this police regulation situation in exact terms. 
Related to this problem, but not restricted to Massa-
chusetts, since indication of similar practices has appe ared 
in the literature in reference to Rhode Island and Connec ticut, 
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is that of protecting the legislative process. Bills contended 
for b~ local units, and others containing much-needed general 
powers for municipalities, have in the past disappeared after 
approval by one legislative house, and before action by the 
other, and also, in transit to the governor after approval 
by both houses. No honest legislator should have objection 
to a provision making conduct resulting in the loss of such 
bills :a felony, debarring anyone convicted from political 
rights for the rest of his life, vacating any public off .ice then 
held, and putting such an offense beyond the power of the 
executive pardon. As part of this same provision, loc al units 
or a s~ ecified number of voters by petition should be permitted 
to seslk mandamus against a prosecutor not prosecuting persons 
involv;ed in such an offense, and special summary judicial pro-
cedures might be provided for. 
Such a prog ram is indeed an ambitious one, but the 
author believes it to be capable of fulfillment. It goes with-
out saying that such amendment should be self-executing with 
local officials and councils privileged to act without further 
J 
reference to the legislature or to any state officer. As an 
al tern.ative, the aimndment should also provide that a minimum 
number of qualified voters, or perhaps qualified taxpaying 
voters, should have the pDi.,er to initiate the charter-writing 
process without the permission of the local elected of ficials, 
and without any reference to them. Such a proposal, signed by 
perhaps five hundred such persons, or by five or ten percent 
of the qualified voters, should thereafter be submitted to the 
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local electorate at the next election, and only a reasonable 
proportion of voters voting on it should be required to start 
the charter-drafting process. Two-thirds would probably be 
a fair number. The reader should refer to the Connecticut 
difficulties with such voting provisions dis cussed in full 
in the preceding chapter. 
Home Rule Recommendations: ·Connecticut 
Since Connecticut has already achieved most of the 
goals of a home rule movement with enactment of the 1957 home 
rule statute, the author is of the opinion that it might be 
best to leave the situation at rest in that state. The very 
broad grant of powers in the 1957 legislation, plus the ten-
dency or the courts in that state to interpret local powers 
sensibly, plus a large amount of freedom in th~ adoption of 
local charters, the availability at will of almost any sort of 
manager or other "reform" local governmental structure, both 
to tow.n and city, and the legislative permission to adopt 
representative town meeting plans, permit Connecticut commun-
ities to adopt with little :formality almost any conceivable 
pattern of local internal government. Local communities have 
not that potential freedom which they might enjoy under an 
ideal home rule self-execut5.ng constitutional provision, and 
they have no real guarantee into the future, but given their 
present freedom,· and the tradition of the state, the author is 
content to recomrr1end that the home rule problem be regarded as 
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solved for the present. Connecticut might well use a statute 
or co
1
nstitutional amendment protecting the legislative process, 
as de:scribed immediately above. The author might add that 
with the adoption of what amounts to a new constitution in 
1953, effective· in 1955, the amending process has been made 
considerably easier. The potentiality of a s1.veeping home 
r ule p rovision being adopted will pr&bably be an effective 
deterrent to any legislativ e tendency to take away that which 
h as been gr anted. 
Home Eule Recommendations : Rhode Island 
Rhode Island already has quite a good constitutional 
home rule amendment, enacted in 1951. The amendment is well-
drafted in reference to internal local concerns, charter pro-
visions, and the like. However, it was poorly designed to 
meet tp.e test to 1-vhich it was inevitably -subjected in the 
courts. Specifically, attempts to provide for non-partisan 
local :elections as part of modern plans for local government 
\..rere d eclared unconstitutional. Aside from this test, however, 
the home rule prov.isions still apply to cities or towns which 
have adopted a new charter thereunder. There is no qu estion 
that the amenoJUen t was · intended to extend home rule immediately 
to all municipalities of the state, but as a corollary of its 
decision in the elections cases, the court, as would be anti-
cipated, ruled that the home rule grants and the broadened pow-
ers, extended only to charter-adopting municipalities. 
Rhode Island needs a new amendment. The local organ-
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izations and citizens groups which functioned so effectively 
to gain the 1951 amendment must make a further effort if they 
are to secure all that which they thought they had accomplished 
in that amendment. Specifically, Rhode Island must reverse 
Dillon's Rule and ultr;,a vires, as discussed in the proposals 
for Massachusetts. It must also define specific local govern-
mental powers by spelling them out, including the power to 
determine the form of and results of local elections. It must 
avoid application of the ejusdem generis rule. It must also 
define more specifically and exactly .the fact that ~ muni-
cipalities in the state, regardless of size, are immediately 
granterl the specified powers and all others not specifically 
denied to them by statute, whether they choose to adopt a new 
charter or not. The precedents, as in Ohio and several other 
state's are clear; if the proper words are used, the conclusion 
will follow. The wording of section 1 of the Rhode Island 
home rule amendment, "It is the in ten ti on of this artie le to 
grant and confirm to the people of every city and town of this 
state the right of self-government in all local matters,tt is 
utterly ineffective to achieve the desired result. It must 
be replaced by expert words of art. Again, the power-granting 
provisibn of the A.M.A. plan, but nothing else, would be ex-
cellently-calculated to gain the desired result. Professor 
Walker's wording would perhaps be even better. The addition 
of a long list of specifically-named local powers will do much 
to save litigation. The example of Connecticut indicates the 
path to be followed. 
In effect then, the author believes that the Rhode 
Island constitutional amendment of 1951 needs redrafting to 
correct glaring omissions and inexpert phrasing. If the con-
geries of forces which C8me together to produce the amendment 
of 1951 can again be gathered to· perfect it, Rhode Island will 
' have an ideal home rule provision. If it cannot, the state has 
stil] accomplished substantial home rule, and the local unit 
need ,only adopt a charter at its own option to secure for 
itself a status which its northern neighbors might well envy. 
The amendment wa.S drafted, .unfortunately, more with attention 
to the relatively unimport ant issue of internal affairs and 
charter than to the issue of relation to the state. Making 
intenference v-ri th the legislative process a felony, as dis-
cussed above in the Massachusetts section, is also indicated. 
Home Rule Recommendations: New Hampshire 
The state of New Hampshire has relatively little 
need for a home rule constitutional amendment. The hand of 
the legislature upon the local community is light, urban 
pre$sures are small, and there is little clash between state 
and ]ocal interests. In fact, with its small population 
(533,:242 in 1950; 411,588 in 1900) it will be seen that no 
metro,politan pressures have built up in the state. State 
legislative delegations are still close to the constituency 
in actual numerical terms. Local communities rely upon the 
state to supply a good many of the services over the thinly-
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settled state. The author would say that since local communi-
ties ,may e.qopt modern forms of government rather freely, and 
the infrequent new charters are approved without much trouble, 
there is no need for home rule activity in this state. If sub-
stantial pressures made themselves felt, it would seem a rela-
tively easy matter to obtain legislative action to approve a 
home rule statutory provision much like Connecticut's. The 
influence of Connecticut political and judicial tradition, 
while definitely less than that of Massachusetts, has had a 
part in forming the tradition of New Hampshire. The author 
would advise the ~nolesale importation of the Connecticut 
statute into New Hampshire law. Since the New Hampshire and 
Connecticut courts share the ssme variant local rights t radi-
tion of the late nineteenth century, there is little doubt that 
the New Hampshire courts would accept the precedents of their 
southern sister state in interpreting such a statute. Thus, 
home rule, liberal interpretation of local rights, named powers, 
charter-drafting privileges open to all municipalities, and 
permission to adopt any possible modern variant of internal 
local government pattern would become imrnediately available. 
But, as stated above, such action is hardly needed. 
Home 1Rule Recommendations: Vermont 
Although not in its modern sense, Vermont has never 
had anything other than home rule. No activity to achieve 
modern home rule goals is indic ated or advised. The strong 
political, judicial, and social tradition of t h e Green Mountain 
state will control the pattern of the future as it ha s the 
past. The right to local self-government is part of the air 
and soil of the state. 
Home Rule Recommendations: Maine 
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Maine shares with Massachusetts the tradition of 
absolute legislative domination. If anything, Maine has 
surpassed the mother state, and has centralized its govern-
ment to an extent unmatched in New England. Even the partic-
ularism and love of town which is such a strong factor i n the 
politics of the other five New England states is virtually 
absent in Maine. Her towns give up their existence freely 
when it is advantageous for them to do so, and deorganization 
was a favorite way of solving local problems in the Great 
Depression. Such a solution would have been unacceptable 
in the other states of New Eng land. The key lies in the fact 
that Maine is as large as all the other New England s tates 
tog ether (Maine, 31,040 square miles; others, 32, 119 square 
miles). It has large, relatively unsettled areas, and depends 
for a good part of its income on vacationers, spor tsmen, summer 
r esidents and the like. Hence, lts population swells during 
the summer and fall and contracts sharply in winter and s pring. 
The tax base for local government is correspondingly weak and 
err atic in much of the state. It is no coincidence that man-
ager plans, with thei~ efficient use of local resources, have 
succeeded there more than elsewhere in New England. The state 
necessarily takes upon itself performance of functions which 
would be regarded as local elsewhere in New England, and the 
county is a functioning unit, more important than the local 
community in most of the state. 
565 
Against this background, the author has no recommen-
dations for Maine. The pattern of government in that state, 
though unlike that elsewhere in New England, is suited to 
its problems. The Maine legislature has no reputation for 
the mishandling of loc a1 concerns. In fact, it has a repu-
tation for saving local communities embarrassed by their own 
freedom and their debts. The legisl~ture has provided for 
local communities to adopt nreform" charters with little 
difficulty. Thus, although the state is the most centralized 
in New England, it is quite unlike Massachusetts, from which 
it took its governmental and judicial pattern and tradition, 
in its needs for activities calculated to end legislative 
interference in local affairs. 
Abbott, Howard s. 
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